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The origin of this book goes back to the conference on ‘The decolonization of 
the Indonesian city in (Asian and African) comparative perspective’, held in 
Leiden, from 26 to 28 April 2006. Most of the articles were first presented as a 
paper at this conference, but a few articles were added later.
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the conference received 
from the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies 
(niod) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, 
Section Social Sciences (nwo-MaGW) in The Hague, the Leids Universiteits 
Fonds (luf) in Leiden, and the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde (kitlv). The conference was one event of the research pro-
gramme ‘Indonesia across Orders’, which was coordinated by the niod. This 
programme was funded generously by the Dutch Ministry for Health, Welfare 
and Sport (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn and Sport). We would also 
like to acknowledge the generous support of the kitlv, which has enabled our 
volume to be available as an open access publication.
We feel deep sorrow for Saki Murakami, who passed away before this 
book was published. Despite her young age, Saki was a central figure at the 
conference: witty, sunny, kind, and able to communicate in three languages 
with  participants coming from three different continents. We dedicate this 
book to her fond memory.
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Modernization of the Indonesian City, 1920–1960
Freek Colombijn and Joost Coté
This book deals with people, technologies and, above all, place. It explores 
dimensions of a growing research interest in what has been broadly referred 
to as ‘colonial modernity’ (Barlow 2012).1 It focuses on the changing face of 
the Indonesian city in the mid-twentieth century that reflects the dramatic 
events of Indonesia’s history in that period and – it is argued here – was a 
causal factor in those events. It seeks to provide an empirical basis to explore 
the link between urbanization, modernity, and decolonization. Taken as a 
whole, the contributions to this volume present a case for asserting that 
Indonesian cities were not merely the backdrop to processes of moderniza-
tion and rising nationalism (the canvass, in other words, on which more 
important historical processes were painted), but that the processes of urban-
ization, modernization, and decolonization were intrinsically linked. Focusing 
on specific aspects of these processes, this volume examines the multiple 
responses to innovations introduced by Western colonialism in what was 
the Netherlands Indies in the twentieth century. These innovations con-
sisted of new technologies, ideas about new forms of social organization, and 
images that produced new material, cultural, and social conditions and 
relationships.
The innovations with which this volume is concerned manifested them-
selves in such urban contexts as the provision of medical treatments, fresh 
water and sanitation, the implementation of town planning and housing 
designs, and contingencies for coping with increased motorized traffic and 
industrialization. In the colonial context examined here, their introduction 
was motivated by, or at least rationalized as, efforts to deal with the historically 
unprecedented large concentrations of people in urban areas generated by 
new economic conditions. They represented the translation to the colony of 
existing or emerging policies and technologies already or simultaneously being 
implemented in metropolitan contexts, confirming the assertion that ‘colo-
nialism and modernity are simultaneous expressions of capitalist expansion’ 
(Barlow 2012:624).
2 Colombijn and Coté
<UN>
2 The words ‘indigenous’, ‘Indonesian’, and ‘native’ are used as synonyms throughout this book, 
despite their different connotations; each of the respective authors has her or his own prefer-
ence in this respect. Likewise, authors use Eurasian, Indo-European or Indisch interchange-
ably for people of mixed parentage.
Because these technologies reflect foreign principles and their specific ref-
erence was to centres of concentrated economic activity dominated by non-
Indigenous agents, the novelty of such innovations had their greatest impact 
on the Indonesian inhabitants of urban centres.2 However, Indonesians so 
affected by exclusion from or inclusion in particular forms of modernization – 
such as the domestic staff who came to Kota Baru (Fakih, this volume) or the 
vendors who set up food stalls on the alun-alun of Malang (Basundoro, this 
volume) – could mock the ways of Westerners, attempt to subvert the new 
spatial order or find ways to use them to their advantage. For urbanites like the 
Indonesian staff employed by the oil refineries at Plaju (Tanjung, this volume), 
the new represented opportunities. For others, such as the residents of kam-
pongs subjected to new building regulations and kampong improvement 
(Reerink, Wijono, this volume), modernization created unavoidable circum-
stances that demanded new behaviours that became the ‘normal’ way of life.
A recurrent theme in many of the contributions in this book is the way the 
integration of imported technical innovations often called forth novel social or 
organizational changes. This in turn often resulted in further technological 
changes specifically shaped by local circumstances, as noted previously by 
Joep à Campo (1994:25–26), Brenda Yeoh (1996), Howard Dick and Peter 
Rimmer (2003:37), Ian Proudfoot (2005), and Marieke Bloembergen and Remco 
Raben (2009) among others. Innovations once introduced, seemingly took on 
a life of their own. For example, the introduction of railways and steamships 
into the archipelago provided the impetus for the development of modern 
housing complexes, such as the so-called Uniekampong created specifically by 
Western shipping companies to bind together the labour force of dockers 
(Veering, this volume). Local adaptation of newly discovered principles of 
hygiene and sanitation led to significant intervention in housing in terms of 
the regulation of housing design, new architectural designs adapted to the 
tropical climate, and under the guise of kampong improvement, kampong 
construction. The introduction of cars necessitated the development of local 
driving regulations that recognized the differences in speed and function 
between cars and oxen and the creation of an associated new occupational 
category of chauffeur/driver (Khusyairi and Colombijn, this volume). Likewise, 
the introduction of bicycles led to the development of the becak which, like the 
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3 Perhaps the most extreme recent instance of an unreflective celebration of modernity as 
Western technology is suggested by the title which proclaims with unintentional irony For 
profit and prosperity: The contribution made by Dutch engineers to public works in Indonesia 
1800–2000 (Ravesteijn and Kop 2008).
automobile, generated new patterns of behaviour uniquely adapted to the spe-
cific conditions of colonial society.
Current literature rejects earlier assumptions of modernization in the colo-
nial sphere as synonymous with Westernization, or that it manifested itself 
primarily in technological or material changes.3 However, considerable debate 
continues regarding the extent to which the colonial space witnessed or 
allowed for autonomous processes of modernization to occur. Despite its 
detailed and elegant account of modernity, the ironical perspective of Rudolf 
Mrázek’s, Engineers of happy land for instance, at base tends to sustain the 
view of modernity as an unnatural intervention in ‘traditional’ Indonesia 
(Mrázek 2002). In presenting detailed studies of specific aspects of such 
changes, the contributions in this volume share the broader critique of the 
economic and political dimensions of colonialism, but remain alert to the 
agency of colonial subjects in their responses to a European modernity. 
Recognizing the realities of the emerging contingencies associated with popu-
lation densities, the economic demands generated by urban concentrations, 
and notions of acceptable levels of morbidity and mortality, the contributors 
to this volume explore the complexity of these historical circumstances. Their 
contributions are assembled here in three sections reflecting three broadly 
defined dimensions of the response to modernity, ranging from passive accep-
tance, via partial accommodation to selective appropriation.
Modernity did not only materialize in tangible forms such as technology, 
physical changes to the environment, or even in social structures, but mani-
fested itself in ideas about modern society and the environment, in notions of 
progress, velocity, control over nature, and so on. Of primary interest to colo-
nial advocates of modernity – and to contributors of this volume – is the aes-
thetic ideal of order, or structure. Town planning can be seen as an extensive 
endeavour by colonial authorities to organize urban space, to bring order in 
what was regarded as chaos. Town planning treatises explicitly equate order 
and regularity with beauty. Houses should stay within building lines; urban 
greenery is allowed, even desired, but only when planned and kept within 
bounds; and trees must be pruned and hedges trimmed, as town planner 
Thomas Karsten warned. Roads need not be straight but could extend in care-
fully designed curves (Van Roosmalen, this volume). The presence of Chinese 
graveyards scattered within the residential areas of Surabaya was considered, 
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among other things, an aesthetic problem (Husain, this volume). Contem-
poraries judged that the ordered lawns of Plaju formed a clear and beneficial 
contrast to the disorderly city of Palembang (Tanjung, this volume). In kam-
pong improvement projects gutters and paths were straightened, houses in 
new kampongs constructed in strictly defined relationship to neighbouring 
dwellings and road frontages. As the influential 1938 Explanatory Memorandum 
on Town Planning (quoted by Van Roosmalen, this volume) states:
Certainly the beauty of a city, or at least, at a lower level, its maintenance, 
orderliness, and comfortableness, are external signs of an internal order 
and harmony; they are a testament to the character of the society.
Even if regulations did not explicitly formulate order as an aesthetic ideal, they 
did perforce create regularity, standardization, and structure. Traffic rules 
required drivers and people to keep to the left. People who lived in municipal 
public housing had to pay the rent on a fixed date. Applications for a building 
permit used a standard form. The electric tram rode on a fixed timetable. If all 
these elements are usually associated with the Dutch colonial regime, they 
hardly differed from regulations later introduced during the Japanese adminis-
tration and carried on after independence. A Japanese propaganda film depict-
ing the perfect kampong showed inhabitants taking care of their environment 
such as the image of a man trimming his hedge (Kesehatan rakjat 1943). In the 
1950s Indonesian government planning calculated the even distribution of 
medical doctors over urban and rural areas (Murakami, this volume). Those 
who enforced this order – town planners, medical inspectors, policemen, 
building surveyors, tram drivers, school teachers, government public servants – 
did so not only in the belief that these measures were essential for the efficient 
operation of society but because they recognized the beauty in the regularity. 
Ordnung muss sein.
At a discursive level, the idea of ‘progress’ (kemajuan) is even more central 
to the concept of modernization than is the notion that order is beautiful. 
Proponents of modernization strongly identified with this promise of prog-
ress. Michael Adas (1989) has argued that nineteenth-century European writ-
ers framed European colonization in terms of the triumph of science, reason, 
and modern technological inventions over superstition and tradition. This 
underpinned the belief in Western superiority which, as well as shaping 
European attitudes towards Africans and Asians, provided the rationalization 
for ‘modern colonization’.
As several of the cases presented in this volume show, in the context of the 
colonial city, the obvious antithesis to modernity in the eyes of European 
5Modernization of the Indonesian City
<UN>
4 Indeed, until today scholars have found it difficult to define kampongs with a positive formu-
lation (Colombijn 2010:102–104).
urban administrators, was the kampong. In this equation the urban kampong 
stood for and was for many seen as an extension of, the native village, the cul-
tural and social crucible of ‘tradition’. The kampong acted, as it were, therefore 
as the counterpoint to modernity. This raises questions as to who indeed was 
the imagined or actual audience for this discourse on order? Was the kampong 
used merely as a didactic device in this discourse or did the kampong merely 
provide for these modernizers a ‘field for action’, a space in which to work and 
act out the predilections of their professions? To what extent did the concerns 
of colonial modernizers replicate or differ from those of urban reformers in the 
metropole for whom the uneducated working classes and their disorderly 
homes, districts, and families offered comparable scenes of the ‘unmodern’?
What is clear is that, as the antithesis of the ideal of a modern city, the kam-
pong was mostly defined in terms of what the kampong lacked.4 A kampong 
lacked piped water, building lines (or the building lines were not respected), a 
regular street plan, and sanitation: in other words, it lacked order. A Dutch 
author quoted by Mrázek (2002:77) describes the dwellings in kampongs as huts 
‘with shutters but no windows, with no floors but earth, with no bathrooms, no 
washing place, and no water-closets’. The urban reformer, H.F. Tillema described – 
and photographed at length – the dwellings in kampongs as
extremely smelly, filthy and squalid. Here hovels are built one on top of 
the other, without any sense of order, without taking the slightest account 
of hygienic requirements…the hovels [are] dank and dark so that cholera 
is rife there.
tillema 1913, in coté 2002:334
Even the characteristics that kampongs did have represented a lack of some-
thing more positive: the dust and mud of the unsealed roads and paths pro-
duced a lack of hygiene and a lack of traffic flow; the bare-breasted women 
who washed clothes in the Molenvliet canal, and who figure as a recurrent 
theme in films about Jakarta (Berita film no. 18 1943; Nederlands Indië voor 1942 
(14) 1939), lacked decency; the autonomy of the kampong administration 
meant being ‘sadly’ excluded from municipal administration and implicitly, 
therefore the kampongs lacked efficient administration. The persistent con-
cern of administrators about the condition of the urban kampong and the 
efforts at kampong improvement represented, then, the symbolic celebration 
of modernity as the indispensable condition of humanity. Expressed in the 
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5 Kampongs were actually ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, and the population was more 
accurately described in terms of class than ethnicity (Colombijn 2010:73–180).
political context that was colonialism, by a self-righteous and self-serving 
minority, it represented a concern to protect its advantaged position.
Some urban reformers, such as H.F. Tillema, attributed the ‘backward’ con-
ditions of the urban kampong to the attitudes, values and practices their uned-
ucated and illiterate inhabitants brought with them from their traditional rural 
villages. Such characteristics and behaviours were both inappropriate and 
dangerous in the ‘foreign environment’ of the urban centre. Rather than 
expecting kampong dwellers to voluntarily change their ways, Tillema believed 
changes needed to be imposed from above. He therefore, for instance, spent 
time to design a ‘fool-proof’ toilet to ensure ‘the native’ would no longer ‘shit at 
random’, and recommended the appointment of housing inspectors as ways of 
solving the hygiene problem (Coté 2002). But similar criticisms were directed 
at the communities of poorer kampong-dwelling Europeans, largely of mixed 
parentage, whose economic and educational characteristics differed little from 
those of their Indonesian neighbours.5
Even for progressive, colonial reformers, modernity was not an undifferenti-
ated condition. As the architect and town planner, Thomas Karsten, most 
famously argued, even in the modern city difference needed to be recognized, 
if not in racial terms then in terms of social class. This was, he believed, in the 
interests of orderly social planning which needed to be reflected in the type, 
scale, and quality of housing and calculated on the basis of an unquestioned, 
equally modern, calculus of differential socio-economic capacities. The aim of 
town planning, indeed, was to regulate the necessary diversities innate to the 
urban condition. This necessary ‘order of things’ was tangibly demonstrated at 
the Colonial Exhibition mounted in Semarang in late 1914. The exhibition was 
intended as a ‘tentoonstelling’ of all things modern: motors, cars, electric light, 
scientific agriculture, modern machinery, modern telegraphy, modern archi-
tecture and the latest in building materials such as asbestos sheets, galvanized 
iron and steel frames, all of which disseminated the promise of progress. The 
exhibition specifically modelled ‘modernity’ for the inlanders who passed 
through its turnstiles, presenting them with model housing constructed from 
wood and bamboo, didactical models of village agriculture, and modern enter-
tainment in the form of a lunapark specifically erected to attract their atten-
dance to this pedagogical wonderland (Coté 2006:12–13).
The efforts to modernize the city went beyond targeting its material aspects: 
ultimately modernization of the urban environment was intended to affect a 
change in human behaviour. Traditional behaviour was often seen as unruly 
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behaviour that needed to be disciplined. The colonized subjects were in all 
sorts of ways ‘subordinated […] to colonial modernity’, and this was particu-
larly the case in cities, where the
domestic and public behaviour [of the indigenous people] had to con-
form to the scientific standards that safeguarded public health and sani-
tation, public order and decorum.
coté 2006:7–8
Modernization in a colonial context was therefore, in the first place, also a 
pedagogical activity in which professionals took the ‘traditional’ people by the 
hand. The drive to modernize the city and train indigenous people became the 
crucial form of legitimization for the colonial presence and therefore an 
important manifestation of the exercise of its power.
The upshot of its efforts to modernize and order the urban space, and disci-
pline the behaviour of its inhabitants was that the state penetrated deep into 
‘traditional’ places and institutions. This had real consequences on the ground. 
Quite often the colonial state concluded that objects or behaviours that lacked 
or protested modernity had to be removed from the cityscape. Sometimes the 
victims were ‘collateral damage’, as for example, the trees that were cut to 
widen roads or to install overhead wires, and dwellings that obstructed trajec-
tories of road widening or drainage projects. In other cases objects that did not 
befit the modern cityscape were deliberately targeted to be removed from the 
cityscape: Chinese cemeteries, dairy farms, and complete kampongs became 
the victims of modernization (Barwegen 2006; Husain, this volume).
If this amounted to social engineering – and it is arguable whether the colo-
nial state intended to produce changes beyond ensuring conformity to its 
rules – it was, of course, not always meekly accepted by the subjects of this 
experiment and was often successfully contested (Houben 2008:32; Stoler and 
Cooper 1997:21–22). The Chinese in Surabaya, for instance, continued to bury 
their dead in the city centre according to custom. Indigenous people invaded 
the well-organized space of the Malang alun-alun to set up food stalls. 
Dockworkers still left the Uniekampong whenever they wanted. The colonial 
efforts at ‘developing’ the indigenous people were inadvertently subverted by 
the countervailing weight of the limits placed on indigenous people to access 
to Dutch language education. As Van Roosmalen observes, the efforts of urban 
reformers were thus thwarted by the fact that not until the 1930s were town 
planning regulations translated into Malay. Even then municipal authorities 
depended on a small cadre of Western educated Indonesian intermediaries, 
such as Thamrin (Versnel and Colombijn, this volume) to mediate between the 
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kampong residents and the city government. In the most modern of modern 
colonial cities, it was not until 1938 that the vorl radio began to transmit pro-
grammes about urban planning in Malay in efforts to disseminate the princi-
ples of modern urban design to the radio-owning residents of Bandung.
The evidence suggests that colonial administrators who worked hard to 
modernize the cityscape and educate its inhabitants saw themselves as tech-
nocrats who worked for the purported public interest and aspired to work for 
the public good. Some few, like the architects Henri Maclaine Pont or Thomas 
Karsten, took time to study indigenous traditions to incorporate these into 
their planning proposals. For instance, Maclaine Pont advocated that new 
kampong designs should allow room to facilitate the indigenous custom of 
adding new housing near the parental home (Van Roosmalen 2008:70). Karsten 
warned that new houses should incorporate ‘the essence’ of traditional life 
style in order to generate attachment to the more modern and hygienic dwell-
ing. More generally, however, the apparent objectivity of science helped under-
pin unquestioned assumptions of class and race. In the most carefully 
considered plans a disproportionate share of urban land was reserved for the 
well-to-do and to accommodate the needs of a dominant economy, or the need 
of faster traffic.
Whether, as Karsten advocated (and as stated in the seminal Explanatory 
Memorandum on Town Planning, which is generally acknowledged as being 
largely his work), this class-based sociological approach actually resolved the 
obvious racial implications of earlier reforms (Nas 1986), or merely disguised 
them, became apparent after independence.
Beyond the question of the racist implications of colonial modernity, is the 
evident self-interest of the new breed of the professional directors of urban 
reform in the colony – the urban administrators, architects, town planners, 
doctors, teachers, and even the directors of the Uniekampong and the oil refin-
ery at Plaju. To shore up their position as professionals vis-à-vis their European 
neighbours and ultimately their position in a colonial administrative hierar-
chy, they had to establish themselves as ‘experts’. It was their ostensible know-
how, their science, that legitimated their intervention in and policy 
recommendations regarding the kampong and the cities at large. Through stra-
tegic action they guaranteed the continued demand for their expertise and 
upheld (and directly contributed to) the universal culture of their professions. 
Activities like town planning, the issuing of licences to becak, the drawing-up 
of traffic rules, the system of issuing building permits, all ensured that these 
promoters of modernization were permanently engaged. The founding of local 
professional organizations like the Vereeniging voor Bouwkundigen in 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Association of Architects in the Netherlands Indies) in 
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1898 or the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen (Association for Local Interests) 
in 1912, specialist journals for architecture (Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift), 
health (Geneeskundig Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch-Indië) or local administra-
tion (Locale Belangen) and a technical college in Bandung confirmed, and 
where necessary defended, their privileged position as keepers of modern 
knowledge. However, the professionals did not have a monopoly on such 
expert knowledge. Van Roosmalen points to the role of citizen associations like 
Bandoeng Vooruit and Groot Batavia (founded in 1932 and 1938 respectively), 
which expressed opinions about the development of their cities. Even earlier, 
it was informal groups of concerned (European) citizens in Semarang who 
pressed their new municipal council to implement the proposals identified by 
the city’s medical officers. In the same city Indonesian community leaders 
demanded representation in these new forms of local level government.
If the modernity that has been the focus of this overview of recurrent 
themes in this volume has emphasized colonial times, the essays in this vol-
ume also make clear that the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), Proclamation 
of Independence (1945) or transfer of sovereignty (1949) did not form a fissure 
in the processes of modernization of the cities. The Indonesianization of the 
urban administration from 1942 onwards did not result in a drastic change in 
outlook, as many of its bureaucrats had been trained by the previous colonial 
regime and had internalized the dream of modernization. Town planning prin-
ciples, for instance, only changed drastically after 1957–1958 when the remain-
ing Dutch experts were expelled from Indonesia and replaced by Americans 
(Van Roosmalen, this volume). Changes at the oil refineries of Plaju, for 
instance, were very gradual. The rationalities supporting water supply delivery 
to the Jakartans changed after 1949, but the differentiation between those 
urban spaces with and without access persisted (Kooy and Bakker, this vol-
ume). Colonial regulations pertaining to town planning, traffic, sanitary mea-
sures and so on all remained in force well after 1949.
While the technical or outward aspects of modernity remained very much 
the same after Independence, the underlying political motives and societal 
goals of the state-led attempts at modernization changed. This becomes clear, 
for instance, in the debate about public housing. The seminal Congress on 
Healthy Public Housing, held in Bandung from 25 to 31 August, 1950 recom-
mended a standard design that closely mirrored colonial, middle class exam-
ples. The model house would include a living room, a dining room, two 
bedrooms, and an annex with a kitchen, bathroom, and a toilet, all with suffi-
cient window openings to allow in sunlight and fresh air. Whilst the design 
implied the living style of a ‘modern’ nuclear family similar to colonial notions 
of the ideal household, the novel proposal to provide a system of finance 
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through the establishment of cooperative housing associations reflected the 
new Indonesian sense of solidarity amongst citizens. The policy goal of build-
ing decent housing for the masses, in contrast to the much more restrictive 
targets of colonial building programmes, had the expressed aim of shattering 
the alleged sense of inferiority that Indonesians had sustained by living in too 
small houses during colonial times (Colombijn 2010:336–340).
One significant change after Indonesian independence is that the state 
ascribed more importance to a symbolic recognition of the Republic of 
Indonesia as a nation taking its proper place among the modern – and there-
fore autonomous – nations of the world. The construction of Hotel Indonesia 
and other modernist architecture, the erection of giant statues in Jakarta, and 
the hosting of events showcasing Indonesia’s participation in global sports are 
well-known examples of this symbolic policy (Brown 2008; Kusno 2000:49–70; 
Leclerc 1993). Kooy and Bakker (this volume) give the example of the new sur-
face water treatment plant Pejompongan, which had as much the goal to be a 
symbol of a modern, national capital, than to provide clean water to the masses.
 Acceptance, Accommodation, Appropriation, and Rejection
The foregoing discussion has emphasized modernity and urbanization as con-
ditions that interfered with, controlled, and oppressed its targets or particu-
larly advantaged, privileged, and benefited its adherents and practitioners. 
This largely confirms established critical studies of colonialism (for example 
Yeoh 1996), except that the particular prism through which the imposition of 
modernity has been examined in this volume has been the colonial city. But 
seen from the vantage point of the contributions to this volume, this apparent 
and typically too readily accepted dichotomy distinguishing between urban 
administrators and colonial professionals who championed modernization on 
the one hand, and kampong dwellers who were imposed upon or resisted on 
the other, does not represent the reality. For one thing, by definition colonial 
‘reformers’ and ‘progressives’ were opposed by powerful interests within their 
own community and, as Stephen Legg suggests, by the ‘bottom line’ of colo-
nialism: the reluctance to expend money (Legg 2007).
Perhaps more controversial in an age of postcolonial discourse is to 
assert – on the basis of empirical evidence – the voluntarily adoption of mod-
ern innovation by the targets of colonial intervention. One piece of evidence 
pointing to this is the use of public transport: statistics make clear that this was 
quickly adopted by the Indonesian communities on the periphery of urban 
centres as the number of passengers travelling third class on the rapidly 
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expanding tramway systems confirm. It is again exemplified by the uptake of 
housing made available by the Semarang municipality in the new residential 
districts of Sompok and Mlaten in the years immediately after the First World 
War, or who enrolled in the limited number of school places available to 
Inlanders. In these cases it can be assumed that these new opportunities 
appealed to precisely the same categories in the Indonesian community simi-
lar to those in the working classes districts of metropolitan cities who took 
advantage of comparable developments.
Modernity, of course, was not a package deal, which had to be bought or 
rejected in its entirety. People endorsed some elements and rejected others; 
some people wanted and were able to adopt more innovations than others 
(Eisenstadt 2000:15). The absence of a hegemonic response, indeed, need not 
necessarily be seen as evidence of colonial incompetence but needs to be 
examined as the evidence of agency. In the active condition of rejecting and 
accepting lay the seeds of decolonization. Accepting and rejecting can, by 
extension, be interpreted as resistance to the colonial project. For, as suggested 
above, it was not ‘modernity’ per se that was at issue, but the assumptions and 
processes in which it was presented. In a society that, over time, had success-
fully incorporated many foreign influences, the gradually accelerating penetra-
tion of Western modernity could be and was in fact often accommodated. 
However, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued in the particular instance of nine-
teenth-century Bengal, the colonized subject desiring modernity was faced 
with the problem of how to buy the package without its Western wrapping 
(Chakrabarty 2000).
The contributors to this volume reveal how selective the ‘customers’ of 
Western modernity were. And we argue in this volume that herein – in the 
acceptance and rejection of aspects of modernity most clearly manifested in 
the urban space – emerged also the counter-colonial process of defining an 
alternative modernity, one that the subaltern residents of the cities could own. 
This alternative modernity did not reject the fundamental ingredients of 
modernity – technology, the desire for material improvement, progress, a con-
sciousness of the now and the future, a nostalgia for tradition – but challenged 
the assumption of exclusive ownership. Some of the evidence for this selective 
embracing of modernity that emerges from the contributions to this volume 
includes the circumstances where residents of some kampongs requested 
the intervention of the municipality to improve their neighbourhood, but 
demanded to maintain their autonomy or be allowed to share in the decision-
making process (Versnel and Colombijn, this volume). Indigenous clerical 
employees of the oil refineries at Plaju eagerly adopted symbols of modernity 
like the wearing of a necktie, and participated in the modern leisure time 
12 Colombijn and Coté
<UN>
pursuits table tennis and dancing, but sported these as the accoutrements of a 
new Indonesian middle class (Tanjung, this volume). As Giddens (1991) and 
Bauman (2000:18–23) have noted in the case of comparable developments in 
the West, modernization led to abandoning fixed, traditional frameworks, and 
the need to make individual choices.
The gradual formation of ‘subterranean modernities’ that eventuated in 
revolutionary processes of decolonization was of course limited and bounded 
by the contingencies of the colonial environment. People were not free to 
make their choices. Many manifestations of modernity were accompanied by 
the creation of boundaries between modern and traditional spaces. The 
Kotabaru neighbourhood, for instance, was partially separated from surround-
ing kampongs by a railway and canal but there was also a social boundary con-
structed from the fear of its modern European inhabitants of a creolization of 
their cultural space. Conversely, adult testimonies report that in their youth 
inhabitants of surrounding kampongs were physically afraid to enter the area 
(Fakih, this volume). In Malang on the other hand, despite the fact that the 
alun-alun was marked out as a European and governmental space by lines of 
trees and imposing Western buildings, indigenous people were not at all hesi-
tant to trespass across the symbolic boundary of the square (Basundoro, this 
volume). Was it because, despite its newness, it was nevertheless their alun-
alun? In the more precisely defined properties of European enterprises, the 
purposely-built boundaries were specifically designed to keep selected indi-
viduals in and exclude others: a guarded gate sealed the oil refinery at Plaju. 
Practices of hygiene drew boundaries between what was modern and clean 
and what was traditional and dirty at the level of an individual house, a kam-
pong or a whole city. The waterworks in Batavia, as in other colonial cities, had 
a certain reach, automatically distinguishing people who had access and peo-
ple who were excluded from the served area. Across the board, different levels 
of Western education awarded a conditional pass to a graded set of sites of 
modernity, the upper reaches of which remained unreachable for Indonesians 
until with Independence the ultimate power to distribute such awards was 
snatched from those who had previously dispensed them.
The existence of boundaries was one modality of a crucial general feature of 
modernization: people had different access to the offerings of modernity. 
While the contingencies of colonialism played a significant role in the con-
struction of such boundaries, evidence from the postcolonial era reveals how, 
whether intentionally or not, the embedded symbolism associated with the 
signs of modernity themselves continued after Independence. In her contribu-
tion, for instance, Murakami has sketched the consequences of the limitations 
of the Indonesian Republic’s health care system in providing modern health 
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services to its citizens despite its best intentions. Kooy and Bakker use the term 
the ‘splintered city’ to capture the unequal access of Jakartans to clean water. 
Almost inevitability, for quite pragmatic reasons, the boundaries of modernity 
under the autonomous Indonesian state closely replicated those under the 
earlier colonial state. The new water treatment plants constructed after 
Independence reached only certain parts of the city, as before, and merely 
reinforced colonial divisions in Jakarta. Another division existed between peo-
ple with and without housing. Urban residents, especially recent migrants, 
without proper and affordable housing (by their own standards) often resorted 
to squatting on vacant urban land and building their own dwellings. The post-
colonial city administrators almost panicked at the prospect of the seemingly 
uncontrollable spread of squatter settlements, which subverted their dreams 
of building a modern city, and by harsh measures tried to rein in, and if possi-
ble remove, squatter settlements. The ultimate effort to create a modern 
cityscape was the development of a satellite town, Kebayoran Baru, built from 
scratch and separated from all the riff-raff of old Jakarta by a safe five kilome-
tre-wide corridor. This project was initiated by the Dutch, but endorsed and 
executed by the independent government (Colombijn 2010:207–224, 297–307; 
Van Roosmalen 2008:183–185).
 Urbanization, Modernity and Decolonization
The colonial state was often not directly the most powerful advocate of mod-
ernization; more often than not it was the agents of modernization who acted 
in its name or, where necessary, appealed to higher authorities in the metro-
pole or in the last resort to their centres of professional and scientific arbitra-
tion. The local responses to these interventions were ambiguous, be they 
resistant or accommodating, but inevitably the interventions came to be asso-
ciated with the colonial state as the foreign locus of power. Processes of mod-
ernization thus became highly politicized so that control over their direction 
and over the instruments of modernization – which ultimately was the 
state – became the goal of a nationalist revolution.
The ironic connection between colonial modernization and nationalism 
has often been pointed out in relation to new administrative techniques that 
helped subjugated people to imagine the nation as an imagined community 
(Anderson 1991; Rappa and Wee 2006:9–10; Rigg 2007:59–60), stimulated the 
spread of new ideologies through both formal education and technical facili-
ties that facilitated assembling a broad national movement (Coté 2006:36; 
Cribb 1994:2; Gellner 1983; Gillen and Ghosh 2007:120–122; Kahin 1952:30–35; 
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6 It is telling how prominently the different modes of transport, moving at different speed, 
figure in films of city life of that time (Berita film no. 18 1943; Dorp en stad 1949; Nederlands 
Indië voor 1942 (10) 1939; Nederlands Indië voor 1942 (14) 1939; Soerabaia 1929).
Shiraishi 1990:8–29), or added to the mounting frustration of nationalist lead-
ers that experienced a glass ceiling in their early professional careers (Duara 
2004:4–5; Kooiman 2009:222–226; Tilly 1973). The material collected in this vol-
ume, however, emphasizes another connection between colonial moderniza-
tion and nationalism. Modernization made the inequality more and painfully 
visible and could increase social inequality in the urban setting.
For instance, with the new options of steam tram, electric tram, bicycle, and 
car available, people who still went on foot, or by dokar (horse-drawn buggy) 
and carts pulled by zebus, had come to be perceived as being relatively more 
backward, or ketinggalan zaman (left behind by the times).6 This must have 
been visible to themselves as much as to other people. Subsequently, the differ-
ent pace of movement, and the different range of travel gave people unequal 
opportunities to earn a higher income and gain more knowledge. Likewise, 
people who lived in sanitized kampongs or profited from water from the mains 
experienced improved health, which consequently increased their chances to 
appropriate a higher income, or at least reduce unproductive periods of illness. 
The relations between modernization and inequality are, of course, far more 
intricate than we sketch here, but the general point is clear: modernization 
sharpened social inequality in the cities. And where inequality followed ethnic 
lines, modernization fed nationalism and ultimately decolonization.
It is no coincidence that the confrontation between modernity and social 
inequality was most palpable in the cities. Urban centres represent places of 
concentrated humanity engaged in and confronted by a multitude of circum-
stances and opportunities. Cities, and especially the port towns, formed the 
primary point of contact between the colonized world and the West, through 
which foreign innovations entered the archipelago. In the view of the colonial 
state, the cities formed the centres where it was most urgent to modernize the 
human and material conditions. Opportunities for Western education, which 
were also identified by nationalists with progress and modernization, were 
also almost exclusively found in the city. Cities, as concentrations of people of 
all kinds, acted as incubators for many nationalist organizations (Coté 2006:7; 
Dick and Rimmer 2003:71; Houben and Schrempf 2008:13; Owen et al. 2005:263–
265). As Adrian Vickers asserts:
cities represented all that was modern, both good and bad. A sense of the 
modern, especially the need for progress, was important in forging 
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7 Ferguson’s study of the Copperbelt at a time of economic decline is, by the way, an important 
reminder, that modernization is not an inevitable, unilinear process. For the miners these 
emblems of modernity had become more something of a myth from the past seemingly gone 
forever than a physical reality. Modernization has erroneously become a teleological narra-
tive with a certain outcome (Ferguson 1999; see also Houben and Schrempf 2008).
nationalism among Indonesians. […] [N]ationalism was an idea that 
could only develop in the urban context.
vickers 2005:60–1
Henk Schulte Nordholt puts in an important caveat against the teleological 
view that that modernization kindled nationalism. He argues that the rising 
indigenous middle class in colonial Indonesia was interested in moderniza-
tion, but on the whole not in nationalism. Nationalism was too risky and a 
potential threat to their recently acquired standard of living. They strove for a 
certain lifestyle, or ‘cultural citizenship’ and not independence (Schulte 
Nordholt 2009:106–107). Indeed, for miners in the Copperbelt of Zambia, mod-
ernization was, among other things, ‘cars, suits, fine clothes, a decent necktie’ 
(Ferguson 1999:13).7 Advertisements in newspapers and journals from the 
1950s promoted fashionable clothes and modern kitchenware. Also less tangi-
ble things and certain behaviour conveyed the idea of modernity: Western 
music, keroncong music – nowadays considered old-fashioned – American 
films, sprinkling daily speech with English or Dutch words, drinking lemonade, 
smoking cigarettes, modern sports like tennis and football, and, especially for 
women, the use of toothpaste and a fresh breath (Bogaerts 2012:235–236; Kusno 
2010:168–181; Maier 1997; Schulte Nordholt 1997:20; Schulte Nordholt 2009:109–
110; Shiraishi 1990:30). Recognizing the ambiguous nature of and response to 
modernity – the conditions created by the processes of modernization – sug-
gests there exists a crucial linkage between urbanization, modernization and 
decolonization. A study of the Indonesian Revolution must necessarily con-
clude that the overthrow of the colonial state was undertaken by a combina-
tion of those who had appropriated and those who had resisted the processes 
of modernization. Without the popular resistance of the Indonesian masses, a 
minority indigenous Western-educated and acculturated elite could not have 
snatched control of the state. While for some, independence was the logical 
upshot of the ideal of modern society and the liberal thesis of equality and 
individual and national autonomy, it was the denial of these conditions of 
modernity that energized them. For others it was precisely because modernity 
made apparent the realities of traditional values, social structures, or ethnic – 
and in particular religious – identities, that the overthrow of the colonial state 
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seemed to offer the possibility of a return to a neo-traditional state, be it 
Islamic or feudal, which would accord to them, at last, the promise of 
equality.
 A City Tour
The contributors to this volume taken together have begun the task of tracing 
the empirical links between modernity, urban modernization, and decoloniza-
tion. Less ambitious in avoiding the theorization that marks much of the pres-
ent debate on (colonial) modernity, and consciously avoiding the ideological 
binaries that continue to obscure the investigation of colonialism, they begin 
to shine a light on real social processes. There is no claim here that ‘the story 
has been told’; the aim of these contributions is to contribute to the task of 
exploration in the belief that an understanding of the present world requires a 
more accurate accounting of the past. Collectively, the articles of this volume 
tell about the various interconnections between modernization – both techni-
cal and social – evident social inequality, colonial state intervention, resis-
tance, and decolonization, which did not take place in a spatial vacuum, but 
were typical of, and bound to, the urban society in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century.
The twelve contributions that make up this volume begin to sketch three 
scenarios. The first section, incorporating the contributions of Murakami, 
Kooy and Bakker, and Van Roosmalen take a big picture approach, stretching 
their view across the twentieth century – and thus across both colonial and 
national states to survey specific elements of modernization. They demon-
strate the universality of many aspects of modernity across regimes suggesting 
that much of what is laid at the feet of colonialism was embedded within 
modernity’s project itself. This general conclusion can be applied to each of 
the later, more specific and detailed studies. The subsequent sections look 
more closely at specific sites in which Indonesians respond in specific ways to 
the changes that colonialism was introducing.
In the opening chapter of the section ‘State impositions and passive accep-
tance’, Saki Murakami discusses some of the dilemmas faced by the leaders of 
independent Indonesia in modernizing their country and decolonizing society 
at the same time. The government wished to develop a modern public health 
system based on biomedicine, but had to build on a system inherited from 
colonial times. It wished to decolonize public health care and put Indonesian 
doctors in the leading positions, but could still not do without the services of 
European doctors. Finally, it aimed at doing better than the colonial state by 
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distributing the provision of health care more evenly between urban and rural 
areas and between Java and other islands, but at the same time dreamed that 
the major urban centres could boast of the most modern facilities to boost 
national pride. For want of an abundant supply of doctors that would go volun-
tarily to peripheral rural areas or places outside Java, the state tried to provide 
health care more evenly by regulating the domicile of medical staff by law. This 
policy was frustrated by medical staff reluctant to give up the freedom of set-
tlement and by residents of the major urban centres on Java who refused to 
give up anything of their prerogatives in health care.
In the following chapter, Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker make the same 
point in a different context: that modern facilities were very unequally avail-
able for different groups. Rather than looking at differences between cities and 
the countryside, they focus on intra-urban differences. They analyse spatial 
patterns of water supply in colonial and postcolonial Jakarta. Until today, many 
households do not have access to the system of water mains. The ideal of devel-
opment experts is an integrated, universal and homogeneous system of piped 
water supply, and the fact that Jakarta does not have such an integrated system 
is often interpreted as a retarded or lapsed modernity. Kooy and Bakker chal-
lenge this framework of ‘failure’ and, following the work of Stephen Graham 
and Simon Marvin (2001), instead propose the model of a ‘splintered city’. The 
splintered city concept abandons the Western ideal of a homogeneous, inte-
grated urban space and offers an alternative analytical framework. In the splin-
tered city of colonial times, the waterworks were concentrated in quarters 
where Europeans predominated (and a few kampongs) and thus reinforced 
the distinction between clean, modern Europeans and not so clean, traditional 
Indonesians. After Independence the state built new water treatment plants, 
which consciously served only the most modern parts of the city; this limited 
reach was not a failure, but part of a conscious strategy to create some modern 
exemplary neighbourhoods to give Jakarta its place among other world cities.
The next two chapters, by Pauline van Roosmalen, and Hans Versnel and 
Freek Colombijn, deal with various aspects of colonial urban planning and 
Dutch ideals of a modern city in late colonial times. Urban planning is, of 
course, a prime example of the modernization of the city because of planners’ 
claim to be able to rationally determine the best fit between means and goals. 
Their adoption of Western techniques such as zoning and the use of statistics, 
and the preoccupation with planning schemes implied a clear notion of prog-
ress. Planning was not only the product of the modernization of society, but 
also a major agent in the ongoing modernization of the city. In the view of 
planners the lower-class neighbourhoods, or kampongs, embodied the oppo-
site of what the modern city should look like: clean, orderly, and prosperous. 
18 Colombijn and Coté
<UN>
Van Roosmalen shows that order was not merely a functional tool in planning, 
but an aesthetic ideal: order is beauty. Van Roosmalen makes a case for seeing 
planning as a terrain where decolonization was postponed. The influence of 
Dutch planning concepts did not decline until 1957, when the Dutch professors 
in planning at the Bandung Institute of Technology were replaced by 
Americans, who emphasized the pivotal role of the motorcar.
Hans Versnel and Freek Colombijn open the section on ‘Partial accommoda-
tion’ by zooming in on one particular aspect of planning and state intervention, 
namely kampong improvement. In the eyes of the city administrators the 
urban kampongs were chaotic, disorderly, and unhygienic, in short they dis-
rupted the ideal of cities as centres of modernity. Versnel and Colombijn com-
pare two men who used their social capital trying to improve the living 
conditions in the kampongs: J.J.G.E. Rückert and Hoesni Thamrin. Rückert was 
a Dutch bureaucrat, who combined many functions in the civil service, arguing 
for the need to reserve more of the state budget for kampongs. Hoesni Thamrin 
was an Indonesian politician, who operated in several representative bodies to 
which he was elected. Hoesni Thamrin demanded in heated speeches that the 
state do more for the kampongs. In other words, in this case it was an indige-
nous political leader who pleaded that the colonial state should modernize the 
allegedly traditional areas of the town, and penetrate deep into the kampongs 
taking over the administration of the previously semi-autonomous kampongs.
The next three articles form a counterweight to the previous studies of top-
down interventions. The three articles by Farabi Fakih, Radjimo Sastro Wijono, 
and Gustaaf Reerink are case studies showing local residents’ response to, and 
sometimes active resistance against, state intervention. Fakih analyses the 
appearance of housing estates, which were inspired by the garden city concept 
for their layout and by Art Deco for their architecture. These housing estates 
formed islands of modernity in the cities. Beneath manifestations of moder-
nity lay the fear of the opposite of modernity, the behaviour of indigenous 
people in the kampongs. Fakih focuses in on one such estate, Kotabaru built in 
Yogyakarta in 1919. Kotabaru allowed its residents, mostly Europeans, to escape 
from the social environment of the rest of the city. As we learn from oral his-
tory, the fear of the residents of Kotabaru of the kampong dwellers around 
them was matched by the fear of some of the indigenous people living outside 
the estate who barely dared to enter Kotabaru. Nevertheless, some indigenous 
people were permitted access to provide services for the residents, so that a 
significant degree of contact was nevertheless maintained between the resi-
dents of Kotabaru and the environs. After Independence, when middle class 
Indonesian professionals moved into the area, the contrast between modern 
Kotabaru and traditional environs persisted.
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Radjimo Sastro Wijono, who has also interviewed former residents, sketches 
the life in two kampongs in Semarang. The progressive city government of 
Semarang, seeing that various measures to improve hygiene in existing kam-
pongs fell short of expected results, took the initiative to build new, healthy 
housing complexes for low ranking civil servants. The local administration 
built the housing complex Sompok between 1920 and 1923, based on a plan 
drawn up by the Semarang-based planner Thomas Karsten. When people 
occupied the houses in Sompok and another Karsten designed kampong, 
Mlaten, they adopted new ‘modern’ habits as well. For instance, unlike the tra-
ditional Javanese house, which was not divided into rooms, houses in Sompok 
were, and this introduced a new notion of privacy. People had to become 
accustomed to using toilets and bathing facilities in Sompok, but once these 
facilities were appreciated, residents opted to have a private bathroom rather 
than making use of the existing public shared facilities even though they had 
to pay higher rent for this convenience. Thus, modernization led both to grow-
ing individualism and social class differentiation. While Karsten specifically 
intended the new residential district to be ‘multi-ethnic’, his housing estates 
were designed to house a definable socio-economic class, in particular to 
accommodate what he saw as the emerging Javanese middle class who could 
afford the rental level that applied.
The third article of this set, by Gustaaf Reerink, focuses on the relationship 
between state and kampong dwellers in Bandung between 1930 and 1960, that 
is, from Dutch colonial times, through the Japanese period, and the first decades 
of independence. Reerink builds his case partly at the level of the city of 
Bandung, and partly at the level of one kampong, Taman Sari, studied in detail. 
The municipal government characterized kampongs as informal slums and in 
1927 launched a programme for kampong improvement. However, as Reerink 
argues, the municipal government never really gained effective control over 
the kampongs to effect its policies. During the colonial period, this lack of state 
control was the result of the so-called ‘desa autonomie’, a formal state policy of 
legal dualism that granted administrative autonomy to kampongs that lay 
partly or wholly within municipal boundaries. Thus, although urban kampongs 
gradually lost their autonomy, a process that continued after Independence, 
kampongs nevertheless managed to maintain a large degree of de facto auton-
omy. In the first years after Independence the government had more pressing 
matters on its mind than controlling the kampongs. In the 1950s so many peo-
ple moved from the countryside to Bandung that the city government was over-
whelmed by numbers and could do little against the many new residents that 
squatted on land and built houses without a legal permit. Building codes, con-
sequently, were simply irrelevant to kampong residents and ignored.
20 Colombijn and Coté
<UN>
All articles thus far have dealt with state interventions, but the next article 
by Arjan Veering, in contrast, deals with a project instigated by the private sec-
tor. Rapid technological developments in shipping and freighting required a 
new organization of the ports in the Archipelago. Fast and reliable loading of 
the ships became essential, and this required, among other things, a stable 
labour force. However, this requirement was jeopardized by the casual nature 
of the labour force and the enduring problem of scarcity of labour. Therefore 
the four main shipping lines of the time sought ways to create a stable labour 
force of dockworkers in the port of Tanjung Priok (Jakarta). They found a par-
tial solution in the provision of housing in the so-called Uniekampong, estab-
lished and managed by the shipping lines in 1919. The Uniekampong developed 
into a labour pool that, as envisaged by the shipping lines, broke the traditional 
organization of labour in the port. The labour pool was less casual and more 
disciplined than previous organizations of labour. Concern on the part of ship-
ping companies to increase productivity were mixed with ethical motives to 
create better, more hygienic living conditions that existed in the kampongs 
where the dockers used to live. The Uniekampong provided better housing, 
linked to water supply, sewerage, electricity, and paved roads. Despite these 
facilities, dockworkers were not eager to live in the Uniekampong since in so 
doing they sensed that they would be sacrificing something of their 
independence.
The final section deals with four cases of ‘selective appropriation’. The first 
article, by Johny Khusyairi and Freek Colombijn, focuses on the modernization 
of traffic. Using material from Surabaya in the 1920s, their main argument is 
that people had uneven access to the means of transportation and, conversely, 
some new means of transportation accentuated social difference. Ownership 
of cars and, to a lesser degree, bicycles was obviously constrained by financial 
means. Various economic groups also used different means of public transpor-
tation. Low-income people tended to take steam trams, which served indus-
trial, port, and market areas, whereas middle class people preferred the more 
comfortable electric trams that connected suburbs to the city centre. One con-
sequence of the modernization of transportation was a considerable number 
of traffic accidents, often caused by differences in velocity of the participants. 
The propensity for accidents in part at least can be attributed to the uneven 
degree of modernization resulting in some people moving at a higher velocity 
than others. The accidents and more complex traffic situation invoked a 
response from the government to regulate the traffic.
The next three articles shift the emphasis from modernization of urban 
space (with nationalism and decolonization in the background) to national-
ism and decolonization (with the modernization of urban space as backdrop). 
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All three articles analyse the transformations of urban spaces that were heavily 
loaded with symbolic meanings. Purnawan Basundoro discusses the contested 
meanings of the alun-alun in Malang. Traditionally an alun-alun was a square 
imbued with ritual meaning, but in Malang the alun-alun was built by the 
Dutch with another conception in mind. From its inception in 1882, the square 
was intended as a colonial space in which was located, as well as a mosque, a 
church, a jail and the official residence of the representative of the colonial 
government, the Assistent-Resident. Later were added newer emblems of 
European society, the sociëteit (the European club house), two banks, and a 
cinema. A second alun-alun, built in 1922 and designed by Karsten, while based 
on a traditional Hindu model but specifically designed to accommodate the 
needs of a modern colonial society, was even less frequented by the city’s 
Indonesian inhabitants. Ordinary indigenous people could not take part in the 
modern activities on the alun-alun, but they did resist the Dutch appropriation 
of this urban space. They encroached on the square and began their own activ-
ities, such as selling foodstuff from stalls. As Basundoro shows in his account of 
their various subsequent transformations, through the last decades of colonial 
rule, during the Japanese occupation and early years of Independence, while 
the buildings remained the same, the symbolic meanings given to the build-
ings and square and the use made of the public space changed repeatedly.
Ida Liana Tanjung depicts the symbolic changes taking place in Plaju during 
decolonization. Plaju is an oil town near Palembang; it is conventionally con-
sidered an economic enclave, but in the context of this volume is perhaps bet-
ter called an enclave of modernity near the very old city of Palembang. By its 
image of modernity (the high-tech oil industry, the rational spatial planning of 
Plaju, the high percentage of technical experts living in Plaju, the cosmopoli-
tan composition of its population, and facilities like a tennis court and swim-
ming pool), Plaju is in many ways the opposite of an alun-alun. Nevertheless, 
Indonesians and Europeans to some extent contested the control of this space 
as they did with the alun-alun of Malang. Because of its economic importance, 
but also because of its symbolic function as showcase of modernity in the 
whole of South Sumatra, the oil town and refinery became a desirable object 
during the Second World War and Revolution. The area regularly changed 
hands and these changes in political control were followed by symbolic 
changes, such as changing street names. The symbolic Indonesianization of 
the oil town was a protracted process starting long before 1942 and completed 
long after 1949.
In the final article of this volume, Sarkawi B. Husain studies what happened 
to Chinese cemeteries in Surabaya in the 1950s. Finding a decent burial place 
for the deceased is for Chinese people arguably even more important than for 
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others. The Chinese cemeteries in Surabaya gradually became an irritant to 
urban reformers because they hampered an orderly urban development, the 
more so because indigenous residents squatted on the graves. During the 
Dutch and Japanese times, the cemeteries were relatively quiet without seri-
ous problems. There was still ample building land in the city and the Dutch 
and Japanese resolutely protected the burial grounds and upheld public disci-
pline. However, after Indonesia became independent, the conflicts between 
the Chinese and other residents about the use of urban space intensified. 
Indigenous people used the cemeteries increasingly for housing and resisted 
new burials taking place. After several incidents with intense negotiations the 
municipal administration decided to close most of the cemeteries, which were 
seen as no longer befitting a modern city centre.
 Conclusion
Residents of Indonesian cities witnessed the introduction of modern technol-
ogies, organizational innovations, and new forms of social life at a staggering 
speed in the first half of the twentieth century: new means of transportation, 
the concept of a planned urban development, new notions of sanitation and 
hygienic housing, new models of urban administration, and the organization 
of health care, and so forth. Modernization was neither a phenomenon that 
happened naturally to a society, nor was it an unequivocally positive develop-
ment as its proponents suggested. Modernization was an ideal striven for by 
certain actors and contested, perhaps detested, by others. Income, ethnicity, 
and gender influenced one’s opportunities to take part in or to be seen to 
actively resist, the processes and technologies of modernization.
This volume has aimed at exploring the implications of these broad cultural 
processes and material changes in Indonesia in the course of the twentieth 
century. It has sought to investigate how widely accepted theoretical ‘models’ 
that have been applied to studies of colonial and postcolonial states operated 
‘on the ground’. Its contributors have implicitly and explicitly asserted the view 
that explanations of social, cultural and political change need to be grounded 
in empirical historical detail. At the same time, they remain convinced that 
such grounded historical explanations need to be directed by clear theoretical 
frameworks which must form the basis of historical explanation. Inevitably, 
detailed localized, empirical studies remain just that: individual samples of a 
possible larger history. The contributions to this volume therefore can be seen 
as pointing to a potential rich stream of research that will lay the basis for a bet-
ter understanding of the rich social history of Indonesia’s twentieth century.
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Call for Doctors!
Uneven Medical Provision and the Modernization of State  
Health Care during the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1930s–1950s1
Saki  Murakami
 Introduction
The prolonged period of war, which had begun with the Japanese invasion in 
1942 and ended with the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, had an enormously 
destructive impact on the economy (Booth 1987:10). As this decolonization 
process had been fuelled by ‘anti-colonial’ feelings, the remaining non- 
Indonesian element had, if possible, to be replaced by Indonesians; this 
meant a structural change in most of the modern sectors of the economy 
and the state apparatus after 1949 (Lindblad 2008). However, ‘anti-colonial’ did 
not necessarily mean ‘anti-modern’ and opposition to the modern advances, 
which had come with the last phase of colonialism. On the contrary, more 
modernization, or the equal distribution of modernity of the late-colonial 
society to non-European segments of the society, was one of the nationalists’ 
objectives.
Two related objectives, political decolonization and the pursuit of moder-
nity, produced a paradox: the desire to build a newly independent nation-state 
but with particular ‘modern’ characteristics adopted from the colonial state. 
Unquestionably, the most modern sectors tended to be those most dominated 
by the former colonial overlords and it was these moderns sectors in which 
decolonization was most urgently needed. This chapter examines one such 
paradox of decolonization and modernity. I shall describe how the Indonesian 
national government attempted to decolonize the modern state by taking 
medical provision in the 1950s as a case study.
Despite its importance to an understanding of both the process of decoloni-
zation and the rise of the succeeding authoritarian state structure in Indonesia, 
the period of the 1950s has still not been thoroughly discussed for a number of 
reasons (McVey 1994; Vickers 2005). Especially when compared with issues 
related to the nation and nation-building, the question how the state was 
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(re-)established has been less well explored (Schulte Nordholt 2004). Health 
forms an important entry point for such an inquiry into the state.
The collective treatment of diseases had only become a function of the state 
quite recently, preponderantly during the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
in step with the development in modern biomedicine. In practice, this collec-
tive treatment in Indonesia has been dominated by modern medicine both 
before and after Independence. As will be shown, the newly independent 
nation-state pursued the standardization of public health care throughout the 
archipelago for two reasons: to enhance its standing externally and to build 
national solidarity. The rub was that this function of the state required scien-
tific expertise and this had been dominated by the Dutch colonizers. In the 
process of decolonization they had to be replaced. In this respect, health can 
provide important insight into the complex nature of decolonization of the 
modern state.
The standardization, or equal distribution, of health care throughout 
Indonesia was composed of two elements: medical provision pure and simple 
and the nation-wide imposition of sanitary regulations. My choice has been to 
focus on medical provision, the appointment of new medical personnel and in 
particular doctors, throughout Indonesia as one of the tasks of public health 
administration. This is a convenient topic of study because the national elite in 
the public health sector made public statements on the matter and also the 
opinion of the general public made itself heard, in their demands made in 
printed mass media. The national elite in the health sector was characterized 
by a strong nationalistic predisposition and, as health was unquestioningly 
seen as beneficial, its members publicly demanded the standardization of 
proper medical provision in all regions of Indonesia and in all layers of society. 
Although the development of medical institutions and the provision of drugs 
were equally as important as the provision of medical staff, they are less suited 
to analysis as such research is hampered by the scarcity of reliable sources on 
these other important health-care issues.
The first section gives a picture of colonial medical provision: how did it 
begin, who were the personnel, and how were they distributed? After an exam-
ination of the complexity of providing medical personnel, a panoramic view of 
their distribution will be given. In the second section I shall discuss how 
national leaders, in attempts to distinguish themselves from their colonial pre-
decessors, fostered health for the whole nation by instigating many projects to 
promote rural public health. Unfortunately, the number of human resources 
necessary to achieve this goal at the time was inadequate. The first state effort 
to solve the scarcity of medical staff in certain areas consisted of regulations 
designed to control the distribution of medical personnel. In the third section, 
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I shall argue that the legislation process failed to give due consideration to 
the complex demands, and thereafter show that the prescriptions on how to 
distribute medical personnel failed to have any real effect on the equal distri-
bution of staff. The fourth section looks at the way government efforts concen-
trated on doctors, ignoring any attempts to expand the number of other 
qualified medical personnel in the short run as an alternative means to correct 
the structural dearth. Ultimately the shortage of medical personnel was not 
solved. The last section demonstrates that the inability or unwillingness of the 
government to change the situation was not criticized publicly by the popula-
tion. Instead, public requests and complaints turned against individual doc-
tors, putting moral pressure on them; these public demands in turn were seized 
upon to legitimize greater state control of medical personnel.
 Colonial Medical Provision: Its Priorities and Geographical 
Distribution
Medical provision and health administration in general began to be institu-
tionalized at the beginning of the twentieth century keeping pace with the 
general development of medical science, the expansion of both the European 
population and Western enterprise in the colony, the ravage wrought by sev-
eral epidemic diseases, and the expansion of missionary activities. Up to the 
end of nineteenth century, medical institutions were pretty much limited to 
the military. The Burgerlijke Geneeskundige Dienst (bgd, Civil Medical 
Service) was subordinated to the Militaire Geneeskundige Dienst (mgd, 
Military Medical Service) until 1911 and military doctors were also expected to 
provide medical care for civil servants. By the turn of the century, this system 
was considered inadequate and inefficient, and voices were raised arguing for 
the need for a proper institution to provide medical care for the civilian popu-
lation. Just at this time, private institutions also commenced undertaking 
medical work. Missionary doctors began to build a network of hospitals and 
clinics. Plantation companies in East Sumatra issued sanitary regulations and 
organized medical provision for their employees. Their successes made other 
companies realize the benefits in labour control, eventually even pushing the 
government to institutionalize public health care (Murakami 2003: 4–11).
The 1906 Subsidy for Private Hospitals Act paved the way for the granting of 
subsidies to private hospitals, allowed the purchase of land for the construc-
tion of hospitals, and regulated the management of indigenous patients or 
those who were entitled to free medicine (Indisch Staatsblad 1906/276). In the 
same year, the Commissie tot Voorbereiding eener Reorganisatie van den 
32 Murakami
<UN>
2 Dr Willem Thomas de Vogel (1863–1955), who had a Eurasian background, studied medicine 
in both Leiden and Berlin. He was active in the administration as well as in the academic 
field. He played an important role in the expansion of the city area of Semarang as a member 
of the newly founded Municipal Council of Semarang in 1906. He was also active in the Bond 
van Nederlandsch-Indische Artsen (Association of Doctors in the Netherlands Indies), which 
played a role in pushing the government to reorganize the bgd systematically rather than 
simply by essaying a haphazard expansion of medical provision. In 1907 he co-founded the 
Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Tropische Geneeskunde (Dutch Society for Tropical 
Medicine) and maintained a strong connection with the newly established Instituut voor 
Tropische Hygiëne (Institute of Tropical Hygiene) of the Koloniaal Instituut (Colonial 
Institute) in Amsterdam. He investigated the plague in Malang, malaria in Sibolga, as well as 
health problems in a more general sense. After retirement as the Director of bgd in 1921, he 
represented the Netherlands Indies government at the Office International d’Hygiene 
Publique at Paris until the outbreak of the Second World War.
Burgerlijken Geneeskundigen Dienst (Commission Preparing a Reorganization 
of the bgd) was constituted. At this point, the bgd had very few staff members 
of its own. It consisted of three Inspectors at the central level and 164 doctors 
at the local level in Java (Rapport der Commissie 1908:225–237). On the recom-
mendation of the Commission, the Regulation governing the bgd was revised, 
making it fully independent of the Military Medical Service, assigning it a 
larger budget and eight staff members at the central level, including a director 
as of 1910 (Indisch Staatsblad 1910/648; Koloniaal Verslag 1911:147).
Soon after this reorganization, the bgd expanded rapidly because it was 
required to take measures to control the dreaded plague in 1911. The second 
Director of the bgd, Dr W.T. de Vogel, was convinced that preventive medicine 
was a prime state function, but actual medical provision should be entrusted 
to private institutions and local governments.2 The bgd followed this idea and 
transformed itself into the Dienst der Volksgezondheid (dvg, Public Health 
Service) in 1924. Even at that time, De Vogel foresaw the need to expand 
Western medical provision, primarily to make it easy to supervise the medical 
conditions, but he was also concerned with changing people’s sanitary habits 
(De Vogel 1917:7–12). With these requirements in mind, the central government 
continued to provide subsidies and to put its staff at the disposal of local gov-
ernments and private institutions.
The negative corollary of the state priority accorded to preventive medicine, 
especially the control of epidemics, was the lack of attention paid to the medi-
cal providers. As a consequence, the actors in the health service were diverse. 
On the basis of the prevailing financial and management structure, medical 
institutions in the Netherlands Indies were divided into ten categories. In 1939 
there were six central government hospitals, two provincial government 
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hospitals, one other local government hospital with a subsidy, 60 unsubsidized 
hospitals, 62 hospitals in semi-autonomous indigenous states, 95 subsidized 
private hospitals, seventeen contract hospitals in semi-autonomous indige-
nous states (which were compensated for treating poor patients by the central 
government), 34 private contract hospitals, two contract hospitals under the 
auspices of other government services, and 238 unsubsidized private hospitals 
(Indisch Verslag 1940, II:80). Besides these hospitals, a growing number of 
clinics was set up and then there were doctors with a private practice. 
Most government doctors ran a private practice in their spare time to supple-
ment their salary.
Not only hospitals, but also doctors were firmly placed into various catego-
ries. Legally, civil medical practitioners in modern Western medicine (doctors 
or geneeskundigen) were divided into two categories: those educated in medi-
cal faculties at university level with the Dutch title of arts and those educated 
in the colonial medical school with the title of Dokter-Djawa (Javanese Doctor) 
and later Inlandsche arts (Indigenous Doctor). When the first European doc-
tors arrived in the Indonesian archipelago, the title ‘arts’ was not yet legally 
protected and medical qualifications in the motherland were still diverse. At 
that time, most doctors from Europe were surgeons. In the nineteenth century, 
most of the civilian doctors or doctors with a private practice had been retired 
military doctors. In the Netherlands, qualifications approved and protected by 
the central government were established in the medical reforms of 1865, and 
this qualification was also followed in the colony (Querido 1968:13–16, 31–33).
The establishment of the Dokter-Djawa School as a government response to 
the famine and the smallpox epidemics in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury meant that medical education preceded the general institutionalization 
of health administration in the Netherlands Indies. Even after the foundation 
of the Dokter-Djawa School, medical personnel continued to be scarce 
throughout the nineteenth century: on average one civil doctor (whether he 
was a private doctor, medical officer working for the bgd, or a Javanese Doctor) 
to around 180,000 persons.3
Gradually, because of the continuing scarcity of Javanese doctors and the 
high cost of recruiting European doctors, medical education in the colony was 
extended both in length of time and quality and was opened to other ethnic 
groups. In 1901 the Dokter-Djawa School was renamed School tot Opleiding van 
Inlandsche Artsen (stovia, School for the Education of Indigenous Doctors). 
With this change, the title of Dokter-Djawa became Inlandsche arts (and later 
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Indische arts), and the salary and status of this category of doctors were raised. 
In 1913, the Nederlandsch Indische Artsenschool (nias, Netherlands Indies 
Doctors’ School) was established in Surabaya. As was the stovia in Batavia, it 
was financed and supervised by the central government. This expansion of the 
education of indigenous doctors followed the recommendations of the 
Commission Preparing a Reorganization of the bgd (Rapport der Commissie 
1908:26). Soon after its new rival in Surabaya had opened its doors, stovia fol-
lowed the example of nias and accepted non-indigenous students as well. 
Besides attending medical schools in the colony, even before the turn of the 
century indigenous and other Asian students began to study in Europe in order 
to obtain the title of arts.
Despite the upgrading of the Dokter-Djawa School to stovia and nias, 
Indische artsen were clearly distinguished from European-educated doctors bear-
ing the title of arts in salary and status. On the initiative of Abdul Rivai, member 
of the Volksraad (consultative house of representatives), stovia was trans-
formed into the Geneeskundige Hoogeschool (ghs) in 1927. The ghs offered 
medical education at university level and bestowed the title of arts on its gradu-
ates. The fact that, in contrast to ghs, nias continued to produce graduates with 
the title of ‘Indische arts’ and was dominated by indigenous students was per-
ceived by indigenous doctors as a persistent racial discrimination (vig 1939).
The education of auxiliary medical personnel was never formally or cen-
trally institutionalized in colonial Indonesia. Mantri perawat or djuru rawat 
acted as (male) nurses in hospitals or as basic medical providers at clinics 
under the supervision of a doctor who visited the establishment several times 
a week. The impetus to train auxiliary medical personnel came from mission-
aries who began to develop networks consisting of one hospital with a doctor 
at the centre and clinics headed by mantri perawat in the periphery. Mantri 
perawat were trained by the hospitals that employed them; they were not 
allowed to provide independent medical care. This non-standardized and 
decentralized training was in sharp contrast to the education of doctors, which 
was tightly state-controlled.
Meanwhile, most of the indigenous population continued to use indigenous 
traditional healers to cure their ailments. It seems that the colonial govern-
ment almost totally ignored them. De Vogel vehemently rejected indigenous 
medicine as unscientific and judged the efficacy of traditional medical practi-
tioners in confronting the cholera epidemic in 1908/09 disappointing 
(Handelingen Volksraad 1921:890). Even though there were several studies of 
traditional medical practices and also calls for more thorough research, espe-
cially from Indische artsen, traditional medicine was clearly considered some-
thing to be studied rather than to be institutionalized (Astrohadikoesoemo 
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1940; Margoendiningrat 1940). Only traditional midwives attracted some inter-
est, but only in as far as they could be supervised and utilized by offering them 
some short courses in hygiene.
On their side, traditional medical providers put up neither an organized 
reaction to the ignorance of the government nor made any kind of effort to 
modernize their own system, as happened in India, China, or in Japan.4
By the end of the colonial period, the Netherlands Indies had 1,400 doctors 
in total, supplemented by 211 European nurses and 1860 mantri perawat 
(Indisch Verslag 1941, II:78–79). Examining the distribution over the Residencies, 
we note that private doctors, who made up more than half of all the doctors, 
were concentrated mostly in Java and in some other centres of Western enter-
prise. Although government doctors were found throughout the Archipelago, 
the number of people per doctor varied enormously according to place. 
Dr P. Peverelli, the Director of the Municipal Health Service of Batavia, gave fig-
ures on the medical provision in each of twenty-six city municipalities in around 
1937. It shows that 458 doctors (33 per cent of all doctors) were settled in autono-
mous municipalities (Peverelli 1938:6–8). The comparison between municipali-
ties and the rural areas of the Residencies in which the municipalities were 
situated reveals a large urban-rural difference in medical provision (Table 2.1).
Of course, not everybody actually visited doctors to seek a remedy. A high 
number of persons per doctor, such as in the Residency of Buitenzorg outside the 
municipalities, was not an indication that many people shared one doctor, but 
conversely that the majority did not have a chance to see a doctor at all. Hence 
the differential access to medical care was even starker than Table 2.1 suggests.
Besides urban-rural differences and the huge discrepancies between 
Residencies (especially in the rural areas of these), we can also observe a rela-
tively plentiful medical provision in some parts of the Outer Islands. As the 
colonial government was happy to allow private actors the lion’s share of the 
provision of medicine there, more doctors were concentrated in centres of 
economic activity. Consequently, besides churches or other charitable institu-
tions, planters, plantations, and mining companies had been important pri-
vate actors employing medical doctors. Certainly, the companies could restrict 
the medical care to their company employees, but this was not always the case. 
They sometimes offered their medical personnel to the government to 
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Table 2.1 Number of persons per doctor in urban and rural areas, around 1938
Residency Municipality  
within residency
Persons per  
doctor in the  
whole residency
Persons per  
doctor in the 
municipality
Persons per 




Batavia Batavia 9,384 4,522 12,753
Buitenzorg Buitenzorg,  
Soekaboemi
58,237 4,185 190,909
Priangan Bandoeng 26,529 3,029 52,303
Cheribon Cheribon 98,557 5,778 168,141
Pekalongan Pekalongan, Tegal 101,543 8,583 181,223
Semarang Semarang, Salatiga 26,243 6,306 43,748
Kedoe Magelang 87,480 14,750 99,117
Soerabaja Soerabaja,  
Modjokerto
14,907 5,405 24,673
Malang Malang 42,171 3,333 75,460
Kediri Blitar 96,448 12,400 117,460
Madioen Madioen 123,034 7,833 192,155










Fort de Kock, Sawah 
Loento
59,697 3,000 81,883
Palembang Palembang 37,887 12,111 49,486
Manado Manado 49,507 6,600 61,425
Celebes Makassar 77,331 8,000 100,442




source: number of persons per doctor calculated on the basis of indische verslag 
(1938, 1941) and peverelli (1938:6–8).
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C.E. Barre, 1931; na, mmk 100, MvO Resident Madioen, V. de Leeuw, 1932.
6 See for example, na, mmk 190, MvO Gouverneur Oostkunst van Sumatra, B.C.C.M. van 
Suchtelen, 1936; na, mmk 225, MvO Resident Djambi, Ph. J. van der Meulen, 1936.
facilitate medical care for the surrounding areas, set up hospitals accessible for 
the neighbouring population, financed medical institutions of churches, or 
joined other local actors to provide medical care.5
Unquestionably, indigenous economic activity often did not lag far behind 
the large Western enterprises in the Outer Islands, and their activity also 
affected health provision. Indigenous smallholder production of export crops 
had developed rapidly in the Outer Islands at the beginning of the twentieth 
century and made up about one-third of all exports in 1929 (Booth 1990:200–
202). Rubber production led the way. Taxes collected on the basis of the rubber 
restriction scheme set up by the International Rubber Agreement of 1934 were 
often used for medical care in areas were smallholder rubber proliferated.6 
Therefore, the uneven distribution of medical care was not invariably defined 
by the urban-rural divide, as nationalist leaders were later to allege.
Summing up the colonial situation, we can point out three characteristics of 
medical care. Firstly, the health administration had become institutionalized 
with its principal focus on the prevention of infectious diseases; it left the bulk 
of medical curative care to local or private initiatives (although the state did 
support these initiatives by granting subsidies). This policy resulted in a great 
diversity of medical providers and an uneven geographical distribution. 
Secondly, Western-educated doctors enjoyed the highest status and a concomi-
tant salary. Indigenous doctors had to struggle for a very long time to overcome 
the inferiority of their qualifications. Thirdly, while the proportion of doctors to 
the population differed greatly from place to place, the network of both govern-
ment and private clinics based on Western medicine had penetrated the society 
to some extent. At least it was not completely alien to the population. After 
Independence, the nationalist leaders tried to redress these imbalances in care.
 Rural Health and the Need to Phase Out Urban-Rural Differences 
after Independence
The point of departure for this section is how the ‘ideal’ national health system 
and the role of the state in this were imagined by national leaders in the health 
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1936, and went on to enjoy a productive career in both academic and research fields in 
Surabaya and Batavia. In 1947 he joined the newly formed Ministry of Health in Yogyakarta as 
Head of the Education Section. He served as Minister of Health in the Halim Cabinet of the 
Republic of Indonesia, a constituent of the short-lived United States of Indonesia. After 
the United States of Indonesia had been merged into the unitary state, Soetopo headed the 
Lembaga Penelitian dan Pembasmian Penjakit Kelamin (Institute for Research into and 
Eradication of Venereal Diseases) and contributed to the eradication of yaws until his retire-
ment in 1958. After his retirement he remained active in many fields of health and was awarded 
a Doctor Honoris Causa by the Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya in 1968 (Pidato 1969).
8 Dr J. Leimena, a stovia graduate of 1930, became famous both as a politician and as a tech-
nocrat. As a Christian from Ambon, he joined the nationalist movement in the 1920s and 
became one of the founders of the Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo, Indonesian Christian 
Party). In colonial times he had worked for Roman Catholic hospitals in West Java. After 
Independence, he served as Minister of Health for more than twelve years in twelve different 
cabinets between 1945 and 1959, and thereafter served other Ministers of Health without 
interruption until 1966. After 1966 Leimena worked for the Department of Health as Advisor 
for the Minister (Hitipeuw 1986).
9 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (anri), Arsip Kabinet Presiden Republik 
Indonesia (Kabinet President ri) 636, Jawaban atas pertanyaan seksi kesehatan di dpr, 
1-8-1951.
sector. In their policy statements, these leaders publicly advocated ‘rural 
health’, that is the concentration of more services in rural areas. In doing so, 
they often explicitly contrasted this goal with the situation in colonial times. 
Projects related to ‘rural health’ necessitated a more even distribution of doc-
tors, but in reality the number of doctors in government service was decreas-
ing, especially among those in rural areas.
In a speech to university students, Dr M. Soetopo criticized the Dutch for their 
long time tendency to concentrate on cities and explained the ‘philosophy of 
public health’ of the new nation.7 With these words, Soetopo referred to the 
directions decided at the Conference of Officials in Yogyakarta in 1947. Health 
was identified as one of the major requirements in the development of the 
nation and the state, and a national public health service was said to be essential 
to secure a healthy and happy life for each national citizen. As this public health 
service should cover the ‘whole of society’, as a logical corollary the state should 
expand its health service to villages (Soetopo 1957:4–6; Harian Umum 17-9-1957).
Dr Leimena, the first Minister of Health after the transfer of sovereignty, was 
also an advocate of rural health.8 He distinguished his national policy from 
that of the colonial government by emphasizing that the Indonesian govern-
ment was trying to expand health care to the villages (desa) and he endeav-
oured to build a health organization, which hinged on rural health.9 He also 
39Call for Doctors! Modernization of State Health Care
<UN>
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government in rural areas, became the Head of Medical Hygienic Propaganda in 1939. 
After Independence he served as the Head of Public Health Education until 1957 
(Gunseikanbu 1944:330–331; Mochtar 1954).
explained at a World Health Organization congress in Geneva that ‘since more 
than 70 per cent of the population in Indonesia lives in rural areas, proper 
attention has to be paid to the health services there’ (Leimena 1953:7). Another 
influential figure, the Head of Public Health Education, Dr R. Mochtar, com-
mented as he was about to depart to the United States on study leave, that so 
far health activities had been limited to the cities and after his return, he would 
like to set himself the task of changing the organization of public health in 
order to expand health care right down to the level of hamlets (dusun-dusun) 
(Harian Indonesia 27-9-1950).10
This growing interest in rural health was certainly stimulated by the nation-
alist ideals of standardized services throughout the nation, but international 
interests and academic trends also had an impact. Public health, developed 
mostly under urban conditions in Europe in the nineteenth century, had begun 
to expand to rural areas in the twentieth century, especially after the First 
World War. When the typhus epidemic in Eastern Europe posed a real menace 
to public health after the First World War, the League of Nations Health 
Organization organized the Epidemic Commission and later held the 
Intergovernmental Conference on Rural Hygiene for European countries in 
1931, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation. Japan, China, and India pushed 
the League of Nations Health Organization to hold a similar congress for Asia, 
and their demand was realized as the Intergovernmental Conference of Far-
Eastern Countries on Rural Hygiene, held in Batavia in 1937 (lnho 1937; Dubin 
1995; Balińska 1995).
Even before that intergovernmental conference, in 1924 the Netherlands 
Indies government had already commenced rural health care activities with 
the assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation. In 1935 the regentschap (district) 
Purwokerto was designated to become a model and training field for rural 
health staff.
In the theory of public health, of which the roots were in the United States, 
preventive medicine and curative medicine were strictly segregated fields in 
both budget and personnel. Dr Hydrick, an American doctor dispatched to 
Indonesia by the Rockefeller Foundation, basically stuck to this principle in his 
own project but the 1937 Intergovernmental Conference concluded that the 
integration of preventive and curative medicine was sometimes unavoidable if 
success was to be achieved (Hydrick 1937; lnho 1937:3–15). Debating the tasks 
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11 Dr J. Sulianti Saroso was a much more recent graduate than other leaders of the time. She 
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1989:277–278).
of district doctors, indigenous doctors also considered a model in which both 
preventive and curative medicine were integrated in the person of the district 
doctor more realistic. They felt they should personally take the initiative in this 
respect (Mochtar 1938:55; Zahar 1938:60–67; Soemedi 1940). This tendency 
towards integrated rural health programmes was continued into the post-war 
period through a who initiative (Leimena 1955a:19; 1955b:6–7).
Against this background of the standardization of urban and rural health 
care as a national and nationalist ideal, the continuities in pre-war health care 
concepts and personnel, and international assistance, three model plans were 
developed to make ‘rural health’ an attainable goal. The first of these was the 
Bandung Plan, followed by the Purwokerto Project and finally the Bekasi 
Project.
The Bandung Plan was a project, which was modelled on the missionary 
method of a network consisting of a central hospital and dependent small clin-
ics. The project pursued the aim of the ‘integration’ of preventive and curative 
medicine. This project, first initiated by the municipal government of Bandung 
in 1950, was strongly pushed by Dr Leimena who aimed to launch it in 1951. 
Under this project, both the urban and the rural area of Bandung, administra-
tively different areas but bearing the same name, acquired more medical facili-
ties financed by the central government (Harian Indonesia 21-7-1950; Antara 
17-12-1953; Antara 1-6-1956).
In Central Java the Purwokerto Project, begun in the colonial period, was 
extended by the above-mentioned Dr R. Mochtar to the whole of Banyumas 
(of which Purwokerto is part), Yogyakarta, and Magelang. He, as had Dr Hydrick 
before him, emphasized the importance of health Education and the deploy-
ment of educated hygienists (djuru hygiene) in order to construct a hygiene 
organization from the district level down to the villages (Mochtar 1954).
The Bekasi Project was commenced in 1956 by the Division of Rural Health 
and Health Education of the Ministry of Health, headed by Dr Sulianti Saroso.11 
The project received assistance from usaid (finance and staff), who (staff), 
and unicef (equipment) and it was carried out in rural areas in the vicinity 
of  the national capital, Jakarta. This project highlighted public participation 
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and consisted of both medical service in clinics and health education, hence 
combining curative and preventive medicine. The Bekasi Project also aimed 
to  achieve the in-service education of public health field staff. Eight other 
rural areas were selected for the expansion of the project through the expedi-
ent of sending educated staff to work there. Unfortunately, the Bekasi Project 
has been poorly documented (Better health 1960; Depkes 1994:8–9; Antara 
6-8-1957).
Although the emphasis in each project was different -the latter two tended 
to focus more on public health education-, all of these projects were initiated 
by doctors with public health experience. Considering the fact that all these 
rural health projects were in areas relatively near to and accessible from cities 
and controlled by doctors based in the cities, the ideal of national standardiza-
tion of health-care service in these cases meant the integration of the rural 
into the urban areas and not the distribution of medical services to outlying 
rural areas. At the same time, several mass preventive measurements against 
certain diseases, especially malaria and yaws, were launched, the majority of 
them in rural areas. These preventive rural campaigns required the presence of 
doctors for supervision and administration. Obviously, all these ambitious 
projects required more doctors if the project were to be expanded throughout 
the entire nation.
Unfortunately, in reality these plans were simply too ambitious to be realized 
for the whole nation. Exactly at the time when more doctors were needed to 
implement the new state ideals of rural health care, the number of doctors 
began to decline. Most of the Dutch or other European doctors went back to 
their home countries. The leading administrative and academic positions that 
fell vacant were filled by indigenous doctors, who consequently also gave up 
practice. Some of the indigenous doctors who had fought in the struggle for 
independence continued their career in the military and another group of doc-
tors went into politics, both at the local and national levels. After the long period 
of turmoil of the Second World War and Indonesian Revolution there were 
fewer government doctors based in rural areas than there had been in colonial 
times. It is hard to obtain exact data for the whole nation at that time, but the 
Province Series published by the Ministry of Information provide information 
on several provinces. Although the reliability of the data is questionable and the 
method of categorizing in each province obscure, the Province Series does give 
the impression that the alteration in the number of doctors was spread unevenly 
and services with the exception of those in Jakarta and a few provinces in the 
Outer Islands were decreasing (Kementerian Penerangan 1953).
In short, the pursuit of rural health was thought to be the task of the state; 
more than an end in itself, it presented a way to legitimize the national 
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leadership. The goal of the pursuit of rural health required the standardization 
of medical provision throughout the country. Although national health-care 
leaders did not explicitly promote Western medicine, as colonial opinion lead-
ers like De Vogel had done, they never contemplated indigenous or local medi-
cal practice as a frame of reference. The contents of their projects and the 
existence of international support reveal the continuance of the domination 
of modern medicine (or biomedicine), which is predicated on science, in this 
pursuit of rural health. The ambition to achieve rural health by Western stan-
dards was overwhelmingly great, but it was difficult to attain this goal with the 
limited number of trained personnel the state then had at its disposal.
 Simple Solutions for Overwhelmingly Complex Problems
To solve the discrepancy between the government ambitions and the disap-
pointing reality, national leaders realized the time had come to exercise more 
control over their medical personnel. Consequently, three laws were passed to 
regulate a more rational distribution of health-care specialists. These laws 
were the first laws issued by the Ministry of Health. In this section, I shall begin 
by describing the content of the laws and the legislative process, arguing that 
the complexity of the demand at the local level was actually accorded scant 
consideration in the legislative process. The preference was given to ‘national 
needs’ and the discussion concentrated on the professional liberty of the spe-
cialists to set up practice where they wished.
Ever since the end of the colonial era, the task of assigning doctors had been 
in the hands of the central government. In 1940, out of 703 government-
employed doctors only eighty-nine were employed by local governments 
(Indisch Verslag 1941, II:78–79). Hampered by the lack of doctors outside the 
major urban centres in Java, local governments repeatedly requested the cen-
tral government for the placement of more doctors in their respective regions. 
Juggling with this problem, the Law to Give Authority to the Government for 
Distributing Doctors according to the Interests of the State (kepentingan 
Negara) had begun to be discussed even before the unitary state came into 
being (Antara 25-7-1950).
In June 1951, the government passed three acts. The first, Law 8/1951, required 
newly qualified doctors and dentists to work for the government for three 
years before being granted permission to set up as an independent practitio-
ner. The second, Law 9/1951, prohibited the opening of new medical practices 
by doctors, dentists, and midwives in areas declared closed by the Minister of 
Health. The third, Law 10/1951, gave the government the authority to 
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requisition the services of private doctors temporarily in such ‘times of crisis’ 
(keadaan jang genting) as natural disasters, epidemics and other major calami-
ties (Lembaran Negara 1951, No. 44, 45, 46). Law 9/1951 was implemented by the 
Ministerial Decision of 15 August 1951, prohibiting the opening of new medical 
practices in a number of the most important urban centres: Jakarta, Bandung, 
Semarang, Surabaya, Medan, and Malang; subsequently Makassar was declared 
closed in October 1951, Palembang in December 1954, and finally Tanjung 
Karang and Pangkalpinang in January 1955.12
It would be interesting to know why the Ministry decided these bills were 
necessary and on what grounds the said cities were declared closed to new 
practitioners. Unfortunately, no records of the internal discussions in the 
Ministry of Health have survived in the archives of the Ministry. Nevertheless, 
the discussion in Parliament does give some insight into the argumentation 
used to support the bills. The Ministry of Health presented each of the three 
bills first to a Committee from the national Parliament (Panitia 
Permusyawaratan), then to an Ad Hoc Committee (Panitia ad hoc), set up to 
discuss the bills for four days, and only then to the Plenary Session (Rapat 
Pleno) of the Parliament. No records have survived of the proceedings in either 
committee, but the minutes of the Plenary Session, of 20–21 June 1951, still 
exist. The following analysis of the argumentation of the Ministry is based on 
proceedings of that Plenary Session.13
In response to the questions posed earlier by the Ad Hoc Committee, 
Minister of Health Leimena explained that these drafts were based on the ide-
als embodied in Article 42 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia of 1950, which stated that the government should never cease to 
make a sincere effort to improve overall hygiene and public health. The 
Committee had asked for clarification about what criteria the government 
used to decide that a serious shortage of medical specialists existed in a region 
or, conversely, decided that a certain city had enough specialists. The Minister 
only answered that his choice of certain regions expressed the ‘reality’ of the 
local needs without giving particular numbers or other hard criteria from 
which to evaluate the demand at the local level.
The discussion in the Plenary Session showed the Parliament was basically 
prepared to go along with the government plans. The main point of discussion 
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was the question of whether it was fair that only newly graduated medical per-
sonnel be obliged to work for government, and that only medical specialists, 
and not other specialists such as lawyers, were required to fulfil this obligation, 
which restricted their professional liberty to exercise their specialty. The 
Minister did not give an unambiguously satisfactory explanation of the first 
point, merely considering it a psychological problem for the new graduates, 
which was less important than the ‘real’ needs. On the second point of friction, 
the Minister said that a basic law on the utilization of specialists (doctors, law-
yers, teachers and so on) was being considered by other ministries. If such a 
basic law expressed the same idea as that in his bill, Minister Leimena argued 
a generic law for all specialists presented no problem but it would take five to 
ten years for it to reach the stage of legislation. Pending such a law for all spe-
cialists, it was better to pass these bills of the Ministry of Health first and make 
doctors ‘pioneers’ (pelopor). The term pelopor was coloured by its meaning 
derived from the vanguard of freedom fighters during the Indonesian 
Revolution; this positive connotation cannot have eluded the members of 
Parliament less than two years after the revolution. Finally, Leimena made a 
vaguely worded emotional appeal reminding his audience of the difficulties 
experienced by people far from cities and followed this by an evocation of the 
‘spirit of Independence Day’ (semangat dari 17 Agustus 1945). On the second 
day of the discussion, these three bills were passed with the general consent of 
the members of Parliament.
The public reaction did not diverge greatly from the tenor of the parliamen-
tary discussion. It seems that only those medical specialists mentioned in the 
laws were seen to be the interested parties. Only these specialists personally 
and their professional associations had previously been consulted. University 
students from the Faculties of Medicine in Jakarta and Surabaya sent the gov-
ernment the resolutions of a students’ meeting, which rejected the draft. They 
argued that restrictions placed only on newly graduated specialists and on 
new practices were not the right way to tackle the problems, because the for-
mer did not really solve the present shortage of specialists and the latter would 
protect vested interests. Nevertheless, they did basically agree on the need of a 
rational geographical distribution of specialists and requested the government 
consult more representative groups, not just the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (idi, 
Association of Indonesian Physicians).14 As had been the case with the 
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15 Antara 21-6-1951; Harian Umum 25-6-1951; Pemandangan 2-8-1951. Besides the Antara 
News Agency Reports (Antara), the following newspapers were checked: Berita Indonesia 
(Jakarta), Fikiran Rakjat (Palembang), Harian Indonesia (Bandung), Harian Penerangan 
(Padang), Harian Umum (Surabaya), Indonesia Berjuang (Bandjarmasin), Kedauratan 
Rakyat (Yogyakarta), Malang Post (Malang), Merdeka (Jakarta), Pedoman Rakjat 
(Makassar), Pemandangan (Jakarta), Soeara Rakjat Sumatera (Palembang), Suara 
Merdeka (Semarang), Trompet Masjarakat (Surabaya), Waspada (Medan). I was helped by 
Irwan Yudhi from Universitas Indonesia, Ida Liana Tandjung and Budi Kristanto from 
Universitas Gadjah Mada. I would like to convey my sincere appreciation to them.
questions asked in Parliament, this request does not seem to have been consid-
ered grounds for making a policy change by the government.
It is difficult to say whether there was any reaction from the public over and 
above this or to discover how other specialist organizations reacted. Apart 
from the materials I obtained from newspapers and archives of requests, there 
seems to have been no reaction. Moreover, it appears that these laws were not 
widely disseminated through any concerted public information campaign. In 
the more than fifteen newspapers and Antara News Agency Report of the 1950s 
I checked, I came across only three reports that the bill had been passed.15 
Moreover, I found only three newspaper reports, sometimes just in passing, 
about the closure of a city to new medical practices (Antara 15-8-1951; Merdeka 
21-8-1951; Pemandangan 22-8-1951). All of these were news items pure and sim-
ple and there were no opinions or reactions reported.
Even though these laws authorized the government to utilize newly gradu-
ated doctors and to close several big cities to doctors who wished to establish a 
new practice so as to ensure an equal distribution of doctors throughout the 
country, their impact on the actual situation was minimal. At the moment at 
which it was passed, Law 9/1951 already contained a loophole: government-
employed doctors were allowed to open a private practice to supplement their 
income. Hence, whenever government posts were expanded, a new opportu-
nity to set up a new private practice opened up as well. In fact, in the 1950s 
there were many government projects to build new hospitals and to open new 
faculties of medicine or research institutes, which necessitated just such an 
expansion of posts. These activities were especially prevalent in provincial 
capitals, that is, precisely those cities closed to new practices. Furthermore, in 
response to a 1953 resolution by the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, the exception 
was extended to retired government doctors who had worked for the govern-




16 anri, Kabinet Presiden ri 656, Organisasi-organisasi massa, resolusi-resolusi 22-12-1953-
15-8-1957 tentang tuntutan kepada pemerintah untuk menambah tenaga-tenaga ahli kese-
hatan ke pelosok-pelosok desa; Kabinet Presiden ri 659, Organisasi-organisasi massa, 
resolusi-resolusi 16-8-1954-16-10-1954 tentang tuntutan jaminan kesehatan dan fasilitas-
fasilitas kesehatan.
Besides the loopholes in the laws, there was a second reason the laws 
intended to distribute doctors more evenly proved difficult to implement: the 
number of doctors who graduated each year was quite small in the 1950s. One 
professor reported that only three students from among 57 candidates actually 
sat their final examinations at the Faculty of Medicine in Surabaya and even 
the older medical faculty in Jakarta produced only 30 graduates per year at 
most (Harian Umum 7-2-1952). It was also reported that only 84 doctors were 
produced in the four-year period 1950–1953, just at a time most of government 
doctors were approaching retirement age (Harian Umum 7-12-1953). Even if 
most of the new graduates had been posted to rural regencies or had filled the 
vacancies caused by retirement, these were far from enough, as the students 
had anticipated in their above-mentioned resolution of 1951.
I have not found exact numbers to show the distribution of doctors for the 
whole of Indonesia in government materials from the 1950s. However, newspa-
pers often reported that local governments, local parliament members, or non-
governmental organizations had demanded more medical personnel or 
facilities and had complained about a lack of health specialists. Between 
December 1953 and August 1957, 27 requests for health specialists and medical 
facilities from local mass organizations were forwarded.16 So, in spite of the 
insistence of the national government that it fostered ‘good health for the 
whole society’ in contrast to its colonial predecessor, in reality people in some 
places complained there were fewer facilities and fewer medical staff than in 
the colonial period.
Some cases reveal the diversity and complexity of the problem well. In 1951, 
according to the Head of the Health Service of Malang, there were 47 doctors, 
both government and private, in the Residency of Malang, which came down 
to one doctor to 66,000 people. Of these 47 doctors, only three worked in the 
regentschap (district) of Malang, the rural area; in other words there was just 
one doctor to 400,000 people. Nevertheless, it was still thought that, compared 
to other rural areas, relatively speaking the regentschap had enough doctors. 
Before the war there had still been five doctors in the regentschap, two more 
than in 1951, and the newspaper concluded that now most doctors generally 
lived in town (Malang Post 16-7-1951, 3-8-1951).
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Another case, from the Kahayan Hulu District, South Kalimantan, was 
reported in Indonesia Berjoeang in 1954. The district consisted of three sub-
districts and 110 villages (kampong) with a total population of 30,000 people, 
mostly Dayak, situated in the inland from where it was difficult to reach the 
city of Banjarmasin, at least by land transport. In 1934 the population requested 
the regional government (the Resident in Banjarmasin) to station a doctor 
(tabib) in the interior and the next year, in 1935, the request was granted. Then, 
with the profits they had obtained from rubber, the population built hospitals 
and a doctor’s residence. Subsequently, the upheaval caused by the Japanese 
occupation affected medical care, but another doctor did sustain medical care 
in the area. After Independence, when this other doctor opted to go into poli-
tics and moved to Banjarmasin, the area was consequently bereft of any physi-
cian. For years no heed (perhatian) was paid to people’s requests for doctors 
(Indonesia Berjoeang 3-8-1954).
Trompet Masyarakat (31-10-1955) reported the shortage in Blitar, East Java, in 
1955. There had been five doctors in the colonial era, but now there were only 
two. The mayor said that the government’s efforts had failed to bear fruit 
because doctors did not want to open a practice there. He explained that, 
unlike the situation in colonial times when many Dutch people worked for 
plantations or sugar factories, Blitar was now considered a less profitable place 
than other big cities.
The final example is the Organisasi Patien Pejakit Paru-paru (Organization 
of Lung Disease Patients) at the Hospital in Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra. 
This organization requested the President, Minister of Health and other 
authorities to station doctors specializing in lung diseases there, as from before 
the war up to 1956 there had been only one or two lung specialists.17
These four cases show the complexity of the demand on the ground, which 
was ignored by the promoters of ‘rural health’ in the national capital. Some 
rural societies lost their access to modern medicine, which in colonial times 
had been possible on the plantations (in Blitar) or in areas of smallholder 
export agriculture (in Kahayan Hulu). At some places, Pematang Siantar, for 
example, even specialist care had been provided to local population in colo-
nial times and had since disappeared or diminished. The economic changes 
which accompanied the political decolonization and the other physical distur-
bances in the turbulent 1940s affected people in rural areas negatively. The 
national leaders, who discussed the matter collectively and simply, ignored the 
17 anri, Kabinet Presiden 656, letter Penderita-penjakit Paru-Paru rsu Pematang Siantar to 




18 The list named Daftar nama dokter-dokter Dep. Kesehatan dan penempatannja, found in 
the library of the Departemen Kesehatan, does not give the year in which the list was 
compiled. As it includes doctors of ‘Dwikora’, a slogan meaning the Confrontation with 
Malaysia after 1963, and as Sulawesi was already divided into four provinces, I assume this 
list was compiled around 1964. Dwikora doctors were included among those who were 
waiting for placement.
19 I counted the number of districts (kabupaten) on the list without the names of doctors. 
There is a possibility that districts that had never been allocated a doctor were not 
included on the list. Another source comments that there were thirty-three regencies 
without doctors even as late as 1969 (Sumbung 1972:58).
difference in impact from place to place. Nor was this the only fly in the oint-
ment. Local variations in medical care were also the outcome of another factor. 
When the central government considered the question of where to place med-
ical personnel, it demanded the local government or the community supple-
ment the fringe benefits, especially housing. Inexorably, the financial condition 
of local governments, which differed greatly from each other, mattered. In 
some cases plans to post a doctor were cancelled because it was impossible for 
the local government to provide housing (Antara 17-10-1952; Pikiran Rakjat 13-1-
1953; Harian Umum 24-6-1953).
As a consequence, feelings ran high as it was believed that doctors or other 
health specialists were still concentrated in an urban setting, perhaps even 
more than before (Malang Post 16-7-1951, 3-8-1951; Pemandangan 6-5-1954; 
Pikiran Rakjat 2-6-1956). As these cases show, the shortage in medical provision 
was felt more by those people who had already enjoyed its benefits in colonial 
times. The situation was made even more complicated because to boost 
national pride and to meet the need for premier medical care, more modern 
facilities were needed in administrative centres. Those places already touched 
by modernity refused to relinquish these facilities. How little changed in the 
1950s becomes apparent from the national distribution of doctors recorded 
around 1964 (Table 2.2).18 Despite all the efforts made by the government, pro-
vincial capitals and other big cities received the lion’s share of the allocation of 
medical staff, and rural areas were hard done by. Indeed eleven districts were 
still completely without doctors.19
In a nutshell, the newly independent Indonesian government gained formal 
state control over the distribution of medical personnel by law. The legislation 
process focused on the sole issue of whether doctors had the professional lib-
erty to settle where they pleased; this professional liberty was challenged by 
full government control. The state control was legitimized by an appeal to 
‘national idealism’. The upshot of this scrambled situation was that the state 
control of the distribution of medical personnel failed to achieve the ideal of 
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Table 2.2 Distribution of doctors by province around 1964
Province Number of 
government  
doctors
Doctors in provincial 
capitals and other cities
Districts without a 
doctor
Atjeh 32 Banda Atjeh 3
Sumatera Utara 51 Medan 31
Sumatera Barat 15 Padang 13 Pesisir Selatan
Djambi 10 Kota Djambi 9
Riau 13 Pekanbaru 11
Sumatera Selatan 78 Palembang 34 Muara Enim
Lampung 17 Tandjung Karang 12
Djakarta Raya 395*
Djawa Barat 99 Bandung 56; Bogor 10
Djawa Tengah 158 Semarang 74;  
Surakarta 31
Bandjanegara
Djogjakarta 30 Kota Djogja 24
Djawa Timur 199 Surabaja 94; Kota 
Malang 35
Bangkalan
Kalimantan Barat 19 Pontianak 11 Sintang
Kalimantan Tengah 2 Kuala Kapuas
Kalimantan Selatan 12 Bandjarmasin 12
Kalimantan Timur 17 Samarinda 7
Sulawesi Utara 29 Manado 11
Sulawesi Tengah 4 Poso
Sulawesi Tenggara 3 Koleka, Muna
Sulawesi Selatan 31 Makassar 30 Bonthain
Maluku 13 Ambon 12
Nusa Tenggara Barat 30 Den Pasar 14
Nusa Tenggara Timur 9 Kupang 8 Timor Tengah 
Selatan
Irian Barat 45
Indonesia 916 11 districts
* Another 272 doctors were waiting for placement.
source: daftar nama (1964).
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20 Also compared to the neighbouring former colonies, the number fell far short. Moreover, 
Antara reported that, according to the un Statistical Yearbook, the Indonesian ratio of 
doctors to people, 1 to 71,000, was lower than in African countries (Antara 15-4-1957).
‘rural health’. This failure was caused partly by the insistent call for (more) 
modernity in the major urban centres, which overrode and undermined the 
call for equality. Another cause, which contributed to the failure, was that the 
prescription demanding the even distribution of doctors was too simplistic in 
the face of the overwhelmingly complex reality. After all, the really alarming 
dearth of qualified personnel had to be solved if national leaders meant to 
achieve both modernity and equality.20
 Seeking Other Solutions for the Shortage of Medical Personnel
If the problem really could be reduced to the shortage in medical personnel, 
the solution was obvious: the government should increase their number. In 
this section, I show how the government did indeed try to increase the num-
bers of personnel and on which groups of personnel it focused.
In some countries, especially in the early stages of state building, priority is 
given to quantity. Quality has often been allowed to go by the board. This is 
done by enlarging the scope for gaining qualifications by the expedient of sim-
plifying the training, by including traditional providers or by institutionalizing 
auxiliary personnel. For instance, the government of Japan allowed traditional 
medical providers to obtain modern medical qualifications by simplifying the 
examinations to allow them to practise at the end of nineteenth century 
(Hashimoto 2003:117–120). In China, ‘bare foot doctors’ at the commune level 
enjoyed great fame in the 1960s and a similar system also existed in Vietnam 
(Purcal 1989; Beresford 1995).
Interestingly enough, despite the enormous dearth of qualified medical per-
sonnel, the Indonesian government did not choose to adopt such methods. 
One reason was that the national leaders in the health sector, who consisted 
mostly of doctors, absolutely refused to acknowledge other auxiliary personnel 
as legitimate medical providers. As I have said, the mantri were categorized as 
nurses who had no legal right to practise medicine independently, a restriction 
which had been carried over from the colonial period. In 1952, the Minister of 
Health, Dr Leimena, issued an announcement (maklumat) stipulating that 
medical practice was unconditionally a job for doctors whose professional 
position was protected by law. Nevertheless, it was possible to take some judi-
cious measures (tindakan bidjaksana) on private medical practice provided by 
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21 anri, Kabinet Presiden ri 641, Menteri kesehatan, Maklumat II 19-1-1952 tentang praktek 
dokter oleh mereka yang tidak berhak (onbevoegd).
22 This ambivalence has continued to the present time (Sciortino 1995).
23 I have not obtained any further information on these schools so far. On the strength of its 
name, it is even unclear if the latter was expected to educate medical personnel.
nurses, whose speciality was to care. He showed compassion for the economic 
difficulties suffered by nurses at the time, but stated in unequivocal terms that 
medical practice was the exclusive right of doctors. Doctors had followed a 
specialized educational training, and nurses or mantri should only be allowed 
to practise under a doctor’s supervision. One reason the Ministry found it dif-
ficult to pass on more responsibilities to mantri was the fact that auxiliary per-
sonnel were educated in local hospitals, and their training was not supervised 
by the central government.21
When this proclamation was reported in newspapers and on radio, the 
Persatuan Djuru Kesehatan Indonesisa (pdki, Indonesian Nurses’ Association) 
reacted strongly. They perceived it as an insult and accused the government of 
unfairness in allowing government doctors to pursue private practice in office 
hours. The Minister hastened to make his excuses and to insist he had intended 
no offence. He was forced to apologize both publicly and in Parliament (Antara 
7-2-1952, 20-2-1952, 21-2-1952; Harian Umum 25-6-1952). Even after this incident, 
the government continued to rely on the medical expertise of nurses or mantri 
to supplement local needs (Antara 15-2-1955). The point was that national lead-
ers needed the nurses, but could admit them only in governmental institu-
tions, as the leaders wished to protect the doctors’ market. The upshot was that 
neither the role nor the presence of nurses working as medical providers was 
to be either admitted or discussed publicly.22
If nurses were banned from acting as formal medical providers, were any 
other categories created for auxiliary medical providers on a local basis? This 
never seems to have been discussed. The Japanese occupation authorities did 
establish a school for auxiliary doctors (Hodjoi Gakko) and a (medical) techni-
cal college (Senmon Gaku) in Semarang to educate nurses and junior high 
school graduates for each role in 1944, but these two schools were closed at the 
end of Japanese occupation (Panitya Peringatan 1976:128).23 After the closing 
of the two Japanese schools, no such schools or plans were ever heard of again.
Only the school for assistant pharmacists, which was also founded in the 
Japanese period, raised some discussion in the 1950s. As there was no school 
for pharmacists in the Netherlands Indies, qualified pharmacists were also few 
and far between after Independence. In 1953, assistant pharmacists or assis-
tants apprenticed to certified pharmacies were allowed to head a pharmacy 
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24 Perpustakaan dpr, Risalah Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat 1959, Masa Persidangan II, Rapat 57 
(27-5-1959), Rapat 58 (29-5-1959) and Rapat 59 (1-6-1959), without pages.
independently for five years under the Law 4/1953 on emergency pharmacies 
and the schools to train assistant pharmacists were expanded. In 1959, after 
due consideration of the still unsettled situation, this law was extended for 
another five years. At this point in time, Indonesia had about 200 qualified 
pharmacists and 2,000 assistant pharmacists. To give these assistant pharma-
cists a chance to become qualified pharmacists, Faculties of Pharmacy opened 
special courses in which they could continue their studies. These special 
courses were seen as a transitional measure.24 I refrain from going into this 
discussion or the problems encountered in pharmacies, but this measure to 
establish proper courses for auxiliary personnel and to up-grade them in a 
time of transition would have seemed more rational had the government really 
meant to train and distribute enough medical personnel. In reality the mea-
sures were only applied to doctors.
Two government measures to solve the shortage of doctors were of some 
importance. The first of these was to employ doctors from overseas. Just after 
the transfer of sovereignty, the Indonesian government commenced recruiting 
doctors on a three-year contract basis (Antara 3-11-1950). Foreign doctors began 
to come in 1952 and at one point more than 300 foreign doctors were working 
for the government (Antara 12-3-1952, 5-2-1955). It is unclear when and how 
this policy was discontinued. Most of the contracted doctors seemed to 
have  returned to their homelands after their three years had elapsed. It is 
highly likely the scheme stopped around 1957 when nationalistic sentiment 
increased and simultaneously the number of Indonesian medical graduates 
began to rise.
The policy of contracting foreigners was not always welcomed by society. 
The Ikatan Dokter Indonesia (idi, Association of Indonesian Physicians) 
stated that the salary of foreigners should not be much higher than that of 
indigenous doctors and repeatedly expressed their discontent with the differ-
ence in treatment (Pemandangan 10-12-1952; Merdeka 8-12-1953; Antara 18-1-
1954). In some places minor health staff went on strike or submitted petitions 
objecting to the policy or attitude of the imported doctors to them (Pikiran 
Rakjat 29-9-1953; Antara 5-5-1955, 11-6-1955). Generally speaking, however, the 
need for these foreigners weighed more heavily than the problems they cre-
ated and there were never any drastic alterations in the policy to attract for-
eigners before it silently petered out. It was not so much the objections of 
Indonesian medical staff, but other factors which ultimately ended the recruit-
ment of foreign doctors. Bringing in doctors was not cheap and their quality 
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25 Another result of this co-operation was that 112 staff members of the Universitas 
Indonesia were given the chance to study and be trained as lecturers in the usa, for a 
period of between three weeks to twelve months. Moreover, 38 American staff members 
from the University of California, including administrative personnel, spent a period of 
six years in Indonesia (fkui 1960b). The languages of instruction were both Indonesian 
was not always guaranteed, because the doctors were not selected but had 
applied personally. Moreover, in due course it had become more and more dif-
ficult to obtain foreign doctors (Antara 25-10-1956).
The second solution to the shortage of doctors was to improve the efficiency 
of medical training in Indonesia and to raise the standard of graduates from 
Indonesian medical faculties. As mentioned above, the numbers of doctors 
produced per year were very small in the early 1950s. Although the number of 
medical faculties had increased from three in 1950 to twelve in 1963, this growth 
did not portend a quick end to the shortage of doctors, since it took time for 
qualified graduates to come through (Panitya Peringatan 1976:130-131). 
Consequently, from a very early stage, there were calls for the reform of medi-
cal education (Harian Umum 7-2-1952). The Ikatan Dokter Indonesia made 
resolutions to augment the quality of the medical training in both 1952 and 
1953 (Pemandangan 20-12-1952; Harian Umum 7-12-1953). However, as the edu-
cation of doctors was the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, the Ministry of Health could not change the curriculum.
A major change was initiated in the educational programme for quite 
another reason. The Universitas Indonesia (ui, University of Indonesia) 
decided it had to increase the numbers of its own lecturers, in particular as 
Dutch lecturers had begun to leave Indonesia just as student numbers were 
rising. After a few twists and turns, an ‘affiliation’ programme with the 
University of California was commenced informally in 1952 and was made 
official in 1954. To hammer out the new system, in 1954 the Faculty initiated 
a Panitia Kurikulum (Curriculum Committee) to change the system 
(Tjokronegoro 1956; fkui 1960a:16–17). The biggest change introduced was 
that the length of the education was shortened from seven to six years. The 
programme was shortened by abolishing what was known as the free system 
(sistim bebas), inherited from Dutch times. Under the free system, students 
had been free to choose their own time of examination without any time limi-
tation but, under the influence of American ideas, the free system was thought 
to be ineffective and promoting delays. In response, the Universitas Indonesia 
introduced a system of structural courses with a fixed schedule of examina-
tions, which was called guided study (studi terpimpin) (fkui 1960b; 
Pemandangan 6-4-1957; Antara 6-11-1958).25 Under the new scheme, in 1959 the 
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 and English. Indonesian had begun to be the medium of instruction in the Japanese 
 occupation period. It is unclear whether the government or an assistant agency funded 
the translation of textbooks, but books were contributed in this scheme. The idea that 
more guidance was necessary as a means to restrict too much freedom was, of course, 
also introduced into the political system with the term Guided Democracy (Demokrasi 
Terpimpin) in the late 1950s.
26 Antara 10-8-1959; fkui 1960a:88; interview with Dr Soebekti 13-7-2004.
27 Interview with Dr Soebekti 29-3-2004, 30-7-2004.
28 I have obtained only scant information about how political parties made decisions at the 
national level (but some of the local requests for doctors submitted to the central govern-
ment were the work of local branches of a political party). The only case I found of a 
Universitas Indonesia could produce 158 doctors, of whom 98 had passed 
through the new system. A university spokesperson declared it was possible to 
produce more than 150 doctors a year ‘without lowering the quality’.26
It was not just the programme, which was altered; the relationship between 
students and professors changed drastically. One of the last graduates from the 
old system told me that in the Dutch system students could be arbitrarily dis-
qualified by a professor as professors were ‘like God’, but in the American sys-
tem students and professors were ‘in one community’ and any students’ failure 
was attributed to the professors’ inability to teach properly. Although some 
students expressed dissatisfaction stating that the new system had increased 
the burden on students, on the whole it was seen as a success and it was gradu-
ally extended to other universities (Pikiran Rakjat 5-4-1958; Tumbelaka and 
Mardjono 1976:70).
Worthwhile though they may have been, these government efforts were as 
yet insufficient to satisfy the demand for new doctors and also failed to meet 
the ambitious plans. Even though the shortening of medical education from 
seven to six years bore fruit in the long run, much water had to flow under the 
bridge before the structure was changed drastically; Indonesia did not begin to 
benefit fully from the growing number of doctors until the 1970s.27 In the 1950s, 
the Indonesian government still seemed to be lacking in initiative or perhaps 
was unwilling to make structural changes.
 The Popular Demand for Doctors: Ambivalent Consequences
How did society respond to the shortage of doctors? Remarkably, apart from 
the already mentioned ‘requests’ and ‘resolutions’ to increase medical provi-
sion in certain regions, little discontent about the inability of the state to do 
something about the medical services was voiced.28 It was the doctors, rather 
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 political party, which did discuss the position of doctors at the national level, was the 
Partai Kebangsaan Indonesia (parki, the Indonesian Nationalist Party). The Partai 
Kebangsaan Indonesia demanded the government socialize health care (sosialisasi kese-
hatan) by making all doctors state-employed (Harian Umum 17-4-1952).
29 A disproportionate number of doctors had a Chinese background. Students of Chinese 
descent had been entitled to enrol in medical schools since the colonial period. In 1943 
the Japanese authorities counted 163 doctors of Chinese descent out of 648 doctors in 
Java (Jawa Shinbunsha 1944:158). The 1964 list reveals that almost half the doctors on the 
list had a Chinese name (Daftar nama 1964).
30 Dr M. Ali or Lie Kiat Teng served as Minister of Health from October 1953 to August 1955 
in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo and Wongsonegoro as a politician from the Partai 
Sarekat Islam Indonesia (psii, Indonesian Islamic Union Party). As Minister he installed 
the Madjelis Pertimbangan Kesehatan dan Sjara (mpks, Council for Consideration of 
Health and Islamic Law) and reminded doctors of their moral obligations. His ambivalent 
personal position as a Chinese Muslim politician is a possible explanation of his strong 
than the government, who found themselves the target of public criticism and 
complaints. Subsequently, these critical public voices were picked up by doc-
tors themselves or by government leaders urging the doctors to shoulder their 
‘moral obligation’, echoing the call for doctors to become pioneers (pelopor) 
voiced by Leimena in 1951.
The first moral appeal to doctors was made in Surabaya in 1951. Several local 
newspapers criticized doctors of Chinese descent for allegedly often not 
answering a house call for a doctor.29 Although the root problem was the 
dearth of doctors itself, and indeed doctors were sometimes right in ignoring a 
call, as there was no urgency, these Chinese doctors began to organize a rota 
shift to cover the night hours (Harian Umum 20-10-1951). When the criticism 
began to heat up again despite the initiative of launching a rota shift, the 
Surabaya branch of Ikatan Dokter Indonesia also felt impelled to take action. 
The association sent questionnaires to 130 doctors in Surabaya, of whom about 
80 practised privately, asking about their readiness to be on call at night and on 
holidays. Among the 35 private doctors who responded, only five declared they 
were willing to work night hours and 27 were prepared to be on call on holi-
days, but under several specific conditions (Antara 13-12-1951, 6-1-1952).
Another moral call to doctors was made in South Sulawesi. When the provi-
sion of medical services in South Sulawesi grew precarious, the Minister of 
Health, Dr M. Ali (Lie Kiat Teng), appealed to private doctors’ ‘moral obliga-
tion’ to work there voluntarily, and referred to the possibility that Law 10/1951 
might be invoked to force them to do so (Antara 16-1-1954; Harian Umum 17-1-
1954).30 Confronted by the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, which construed the 
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 moral appeals. After his replacement, he was accused but later acquitted in a corruption 
scandal.
31 The term’warga negara’ (state citizens) in the original was used only to refer to people 
whose loyalty was questioned, in particular the Chinese.
32 Dr Ali Akbar from West Sumatra was a prominent doctor from the Islamic community. 
After Independence he became ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 1950–1954, and then taught 
reference to Law 10/1951 as a threat, Ali explained that the health of a nation of 
80 million had to be the priority of the doctors (Harian Umum 21-1-1954). 
Moreover, at a meeting with the Semarang Branch of Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, 
Ali stated: ‘In some places the people themselves were threatening and harass-
ing private doctors, fed up with suffering from the dearth in medical provision’. 
Ali continued by asking the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia representatives:
Can I say to the people that private doctors, especially those of non- 
indigenous descent, sincerely feel they are ‘citizens’ [warga negara] of 
the Unitary Republic Indonesia and feel that Indonesia is their mother 
country [tanah airnja]?31
Merdeka 22-1-1954
This crisis in South Sulawesi seems to have been solved with the voluntary help 
of private doctors in South Sulawesi itself (Merdeka 16-2-1954). However, simi-
lar appeals to a ‘moral obligation’ continued and swelled to a larger proportion 
in the middle of the 1950s.
Yet more moral appeals were made to doctors. The mayor of Jakarta gath-
ered private doctors in his office to ask them to work part-time for the govern-
ment clinics to cover the lack of government doctors and only two doctors 
from around the 150 doctors present refused the request (Antara 21-10-1954). 
The Bandung Branch of Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, also spurred into action by 
the mayor, organized a rota shift for night and holiday hours (Antara 3-2-1955). 
Observing this rota shift, one of the readers of Pikiran Rakyat from Tasikmalaya 
complained about the ‘inhumanity’ of several doctors who had failed to 
respond to a call, when assistance for her child had urgently been needed; the 
child had died. She consequently urged the Ikatan Dokter Indonesia to super-
vise doctors more strictly (Pikiran Rakjat 30-6-1955). When similar complaints 
were made, some doctors tried to explain the situation from the doctor’s point 
of view and appealed to the understanding and morality on the part of patient. 
Yet their voice was too subdued to impress the public. Dr Ali Akbar, a member 
of parliament and also a medical doctor, supported a proposal to set up some 
kind of agency to supervise doctors’ morality.32 This proposal sparked off a 
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 at several universities. As a member of the Masjumi political party, he became a member 
of parliament in 1955. He had already been working for the Ministry of Health since 1954 
helping to organize the mpks (Roeder 1971:20).
33 Trikora was a slogan to mobilize people to wrest New Guinea (Irian Jaya) from the Dutch.
34 The Dewan Pelindung Susila Kedokteran (Council for the Protection of Medical Ethics) 
was established in 1959 by Ministerial Decision (Soerat Kepoetoesan Menteri Kesehatan 
No. 247090/UP/Kab 5-11-1959). The first ethical code was published by the Musawarah 
Kerdja Susila Kedokteran Nasional (Workshop on National Medical Ethics) in 1969 (idi 
1959; Musawarah Kerdja 1969).
discussion between members of Parliament and Minister of Health Leimena 
after a child of one of the members of the parliament lost its life under similar 
circumstances to the child in Tasikmalaya. Leimena admitted that there were 
doctors who forgot the Hippocratic Oath, but also seized the opportunity to 
explain the difficulty in building up the number of doctors (Pikiran Rakjat 11-11-
1955, 16-11-1955; Antara 21-11-1955, 24-11-1955).
The inability of the state to solve the dearth of medical personnel in the 
short run had been transformed into a questioning of the morality of individ-
ual doctors by both the government and the public at large. What interests me 
is that the popular demands or discontent never really developed into a strong 
surge of public opinion criticizing the state. Instead, the public ‘complaints’ 
assumed the guise of public backing for, hence legitimized, state intervention 
in the professional freedom of the small community of doctors. By the end of 
the period of Parliamentary Democracy, it was already difficult to raise objec-
tions to such state intervention in the doctors’ freedom (as had been intro-
duced by the legislation of 1951). The process of state intervention reached its 
apogee in the period of Guided Democracy with the passing of Law 9/1961 on 
the conscription of university graduates and the organization of ‘volunteer’ 
doctors of Trikora and Dwikora to be stationed in a war zone (Antara 26-1-1958; 
Depkes 1980:94).33 By that time Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, which had still 
threatened the government with a strike in 1954 when the Minister of Health 
had commenced appealing to moral obligations (Antara 18-1-1954; Harian 
Umum 22-1-1954), no longer raised a dissenting voice. Instead, Ikatan Dokter 
Indonesia co-operated with the government in formulating a moral code for 
doctors.34 This new strong, in a way arbitrary, control of health specialists was 
continued under the New Order. In conjunction with the steady rise in the 
number of doctors as a consequence of the reform of the curriculum of medi-
cal faculties described above, the firmer control gained over doctors finally 
enabled the state to achieve the ideal of having one doctor for 30,000 people at 




In this chapter I have examined the decolonization of one modern state func-
tion, medical provision, in the 1950s. In their efforts to distinguish themselves 
from their colonial predecessors, national leaders in the health sector did not 
reject modern Western medicine, but criticized its uneven distribution and 
insisted on filling the gap with the emphasis on rural health. The professed 
goal of spreading the benefits of national independence to the whole popula-
tion necessitated the integration of rural health projects into national pro-
grammes, by way of the more standardized distribution of medical personnel 
throughout the country. This tendency espoused by national leaders is not sur-
prising, given their educational background, international support, and not 
least the rapid development in modern medicine at that time.
Nevertheless, the historical progress depicted in this chapter reveals a more 
complicated picture of modernity. The first point to consider is that, taking 
account of the voices complaining about the loss of or deficiency in medical 
personnel in various places, the uneven distribution of medicine in the colo-
nial period was not determined simply along racial lines or the urban-rural 
divide, as the national leaders had vaguely suggested. Actually, the distribution 
of medical provision was a patchwork experience of modernity, which was 
influenced by the modern sector economy. A more careful examination of the 
relationship between the economic conditions and the exact status of medical 
provision in each place before and after the war years will be a necessary step 
in future research.
The second point, which emerges, is that national leaders in the health sec-
tor, who took over the state health administration from their colonial prede-
cessors, inherited the standard already set by the colonial experience. The 
discussion of the quality of medical education and the scant consideration 
given to the possible employment of other medical providers revealed a strong 
conviction in the importance of scientific expertise. Western medical science 
was at top of the hierarchy and should be used to fill the voids in medical provi-
sion in outlying areas of Indonesia. Whether this choice was right or wrong, 
this claimed universality of science restricted the workable arena for national 
leaders to (re-)establish the state function in their own way.
As a consequence, state control of the placement of medical personnel was 
the most important measure taken. Voices initially raised to defend profes-
sional liberty were quelled in the course of the 1950s. Gradually strong state 
control over medical personnel, especially doctors, was justified by reminding 
the doctors of their moral obligation toward their patients. This aspect of the 
doctors’ calling was voiced by the population in the form of complaints, which 
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were subsequently picked up by national leaders as a jumble in sore need of 
reorganization. The shared assumption that the state should assume responsi-
bility in medical provision and that medical personnel should sacrifice them-
selves for the sake of the nation had prevailed. In sum, the state function as a 
provider of medicine had been strengthened by the complex experience of 
modernity in decolonizing Indonesia.
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(Post)Colonial Pipes
Urban Water Supply in Colonial and Contemporary Jakarta
Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker1
 Introduction
Like many megacities in the South, Jakarta’s water supply system is highly 
fragmented. The formal water supply system reaches less than 50 per cent of 
the city’s inhabitants; extending to mostly higher income areas of the city, 
the spatial distribution of the piped water supply system recalls a scattered 
archipelago rather than a homogeneous network (Bakker 2003). The majority 
of Jakarta’s residents make use of a variety of highly differentiated sources – 
bottled water, vendor water, shallow and deep wells, public hydrants, network 
connections – to meet their daily water needs (Kooy 2008), often relying exclu-
sively on water provided, managed, delivered outside of the network (Bakker 
et al. 2008; McGranahan et al. 2001; Surjadi et al. 1994). Indeed, a significant 
proportion of households with connections to the networked water supply sys-
tem continue to rely primarily upon other sources of water supply given low 
water quality and low network pressure.
This fragmentation of access to water supply and sanitation has been char-
acterized as one of the key development challenges for the South in the next 
century. Halving by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access 
to safe drinking water and basic sanitation is one of the Millennium 
Development Goals established by the international community at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002). The World 
Health Organization estimates that 1.1 billion people worldwide do not have 
access to safe drinking water, and 2.4 billion are without access to adequate 
sanitation (who 2004). An increasing proportion of users without access to 
adequate water supplies live in urban areas; despite residing in a metropolitan 
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area, poor families in large cities in the South frequently do not have networked 
water supply access.
Various authors have explored why this fragmentation has emerged, and 
attempted to explain why it has proved to be so generalized and persistent in 
cities in the South (see, for example, Balbo 1993; Graham and Marvin 2001; 
King 1990). However, many of these analyses are predicated on the assumption 
of a modern infrastructural ideal of universalized, homogeneous provision of 
networked utility services; their central concern is with the ‘fragmentation’ 
which these supposedly universal networks are experiencing. In addition to 
presuming the existence of this universal network, most of the analyses 
applied to interpret the conditions of water access in Jakarta also presume the 
goal of universal access through a centralized networked system (Graham and 
Marvin 2001).
In contrast, this chapter chronicles the historical construction of Jakarta’s 
urban water supply system to illustrate how the city’s water supply has always 
been fragmented. Our analysis of the absence of an urban infrastructural ideal 
in Jakarta explains the persistent fragmentation of access in Jakarta as the 
product of (contested and contradictory) colonial and postcolonial govern-
ment. We assert that the flows of water in the contemporary city of Jakarta 
must be understood as a historical product, both of colonial infrastructure and 
discourses. We are wary of any simplistic comparisons between the colonial 
past and present, but – in agreement with other scholars (for example, Myers 
2006) – we believe that a postcolonial optic is necessary to unlock crucial ele-
ments of colonial legacies. Specifically, we argue that the optic of postcolonial-
ism provides the understanding required for dissecting the power relations 
which continue to structure access to water supply and urban space in Jakarta, 
a dynamic which complicates Northern-rooted narratives of urban infrastruc-
ture, and also the developmentalist narratives of international aid and multi-
lateral financial organizations.
We employ a framework of (post)colonial governmentality to explore the 
interrelationships between urban governance and infrastructure in Jakarta. 
This analytical framework is operationalized to understand how power 
operated through discourse and material practice to shape access to water 
supply in Jakarta, from 1920–1960. Documenting how relations of power 
were materialized and contested via hydraulic networks through the project 
of colonial government in the early twentieth century, and through later 
attempts of postcolonial governments to modernize selected spaces in the 
city through the provision of large-scale water supply projects. The case study 
that follows uses this framework to demonstrate how (post)colonial rela-
tions  of rule both shaped, and were shaped by the material and discursive 
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2 In 1929, 6,926 kampong households were supplied with 24 L/s, while 10,392 European house-
holds were supplied with 84  L/s. The European population in Batavia in 1930 was 37,067, 
while the native Indonesian population was over 400,000 (Eggink 1930).
differentiation of water supply networks, urban spaces, and urban residents 
in Jakarta.
 Colonial Control: Governing Urban Water, Urban Populations, 
Urban Spaces
The history of Batavia’s urban water infrastructure begins with the rise of the 
sanitary city in the nineteenth century, in which a new discourse around water, 
identity, and citizenship emerged and was articulated to a new system of colo-
nial authority. In the following chronology of the development of a modern 
urban water supply in colonial Batavia we begin with the construction of the 
artesian and piped spring water infrastructure prior to the 1920s. This is neces-
sary, as it illustrates how the construction of the city’s water supply infrastruc-
ture was, from inception, intersected with constructions of the civilized and 
modern colonial subject. Governing water in the colonial period, implied and 
enabled new categorizations and divisions: most importantly, the delineation 
of the public into different categories of populations (European versus mixed 
races versus native; hygienic versus contaminated), which guided the pattern 
of provision of these first urban water supply systems.
By the end of the 1920s, after five decades of development of the city’s water 
supply system, only 7 per cent of the European colonial residents consumed 
78 per cent of the city’s piped water supply.2 This is explained by the conflict-
ing ethical mandate of the colonial government in the last years of colonial-
ism: the mandate to uplift versus desire to dominate; the project to modernize 
but yet retain distinctions and hierarchical relations between authority and 
subject. These conflicting mandates explain why the construction of the first 
centralized water supply system intended for eventual universal coverage facili-
tated new fragmentations of populations and urban spaces.
 Artesian Water Supply (1870–1920)
The problematic of urban waters and the unhealthy city plagued the colonial 
town of Batavia from its founding in 1619. High rates of mortality in the 1700s 
that demoted Batavia from the Queen to the Graveyard of the East were attrib-
utable to water borne disease (Abeyasekere 1987); however, prior to the nine-
teenth century there were no direct links made between the health of body 
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3 In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the resident, ‘mixed blood’ or Indische popula-
tion and their characteristic lifestyle was gradually eliminated in favour of a more rigid, 
racialized European population and domestic milieu (Milone 1967; Taylor 1983).
4 Between 1890–1920 the number of European men in the colony doubled, while the number of 
European women increased by almost 300% (Locher-Scholten 1997; Van Doorne 1983).
and consumption of a standardized quality of clean water, and concerns 
regarding the health of the city and its citizens focused more generally on the 
urban environment’s ‘killing vapours’, and miasmas (Blussé 1985). Flight from 
the contaminated spaces and surrounding populations characterized by death 
and disease was the only solution, and European residents repeatedly tried to 
escape the ziektenhaard (breeding ground for disease) by continually moving 
southwards away from the northern old city.
It was not until the mid-1800s that connections began to be made between 
healthy urban spaces, populations, and water supply, motivating the first sig-
nificant governmental intervention into the production of a hygienic water 
supply, enrolling the governance of a new urban water supply within the gov-
ernment of a newly emergent city and its citizens, and marking the beginning 
of our genealogy.
In 1873 the central government, represented by the Raad van Indië (Council 
of the Indies) in Batavia, concluded a decade of commissions investigating the 
problem of water supply for Batavia by financing the construction of a series of 
artesian wells. From 1873–1876 seven wells were drilled, with all costs covered 
by the central government (Maronier 1929), and the architecturally elaborate 
communal hydrants located in the central areas of the city provided – free of 
charge – an emerging new class of European population with a secure, scien-
tifically monitored water supply.3 The production capacity of the artesian 
water supply system increased along with the influx of an entrepreneurial 
European population who brought with them domestic habits and habitats 
from the metropole.4 In 1920 at the end of the era of artesian water, there were 
28 wells and 12 reservoirs with a capacity of 750 m3, providing an increasingly 
clustered European urban population with a modern water supply through 
individual house connections (Maronier 1929).
The new mentality of colonial government which arose in the late 1800s was 
central to the ways in which Batavia’s water supply was first problematized, 
and then addressed through interventions constructed as rational solutions. 
When the artesian water supply began construction in 1870, the management 
of the colony shifted from the Cultuurstelsel (Cultivation System) monopoly, 
a form of colonially administered market capitalism (Robison 1986). The 
purpose of colonial government subsequently altered from being an estate 
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5 From the 1870–1890s, the construction of railways, harbours, steam-powered trams for intra-
city transport, and electricity networks paralleled the construction of the city’s water supply 
network (see Mrázek 2002).
manager of a vast government plantation to that of facilitator of private sector 
participation. The provision of public infrastructure to facilitate private sector 
profits (providing the conditions for capital) thus justified the modernization 
of urban infrastructure,5 and inaugurated unprecedented government-led ini-
tiatives to combat public health issues threatening the image of the colony as 
a place for private sector investment (Argo 1999). The project of creating a 
modern city with all of the attendant infrastructure to support the influx of 
European bodies and European capital was begun, setting in motion a process 
that would change the urban landscape and the relationship between urban 
populations (see Milone 1967).
Paralleling the government’s new strategy for ensuring the colony’s eco-
nomic security was a new level of concern for the health of particular kinds of 
colonial populations. Prompted by a scientific understanding of water intro-
duced by recent application of microscopes and the study of bacteria, new 
connections made between water supply and human health began to rational-
ize government investments and initiated the development of new discourses 
around ‘safe’ water supply sources and water use practices. With the advent of 
new scientific technologies, the definition of water – its properties and poten-
tials – became standardized, with the methodologies of analysis and scientific 
properties of water circulating through the professional journals of Europe. In 
the Netherlands Indies, an increasing uniformity of taste and understandings 
of quality was fostered by analyses of drinking water quality by military doc-
tors (Moens 1873). Amongst the colonizers, previous appreciations for the dis-
tinct qualities of different waters (with specific properties of water linked to 
treatment of specific ailments, or religious rituals, see Hamlin 2000) were to be 
replaced by a more unified understanding of water as defined by a scientific 
analysis of its biophysical properties, since it was
questionable whether there has been enough care [by the European pop-
ulation] to purify the water […] concern for hygienic water supply is often 
remarkably neglected by otherwise very civilized people and the inher-
ent danger is very little respected.
moens 1873:311
The shift from recognizing many waters of various beneficial properties, to 
only one scientifically defined nature for water with its quality determined 
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negatively (in other words, by what it did not contain) precipitated the devel-
opment of centralized systems of water supply throughout the world (see 
Melosi 2000). Within the Netherlands Indies this new understanding of water 
also circulated a new discourse around modern identities and development 
that re-rationalized colonial authority upon the basis of technological mastery 
and increasingly racialized the previous class based divisions between urban 
spaces and urban populations (see Milone 1967). In other words, the colonial 
authority which imposed European domination upon an indigenous popula-
tion was now constructed as legitimate because of its advanced technical and 
scientific knowledge about the relationship between water and health. As is 
further documented in the following paragraphs, the use of clean versus 
unclean water sources by European colonial residents in comparison with 
indigenous residents was seen to demonstrate the rationality of colonialism, 
and naturalize racial divisions.
With the influx of a new kind of European population leading the wave of 
private sector penetration of the colony (Gouda 1995), the development of 
increasingly homogeneous, modern, and distinctly European settlements were 
to be provided with a modern, hygienic water supply. As ‘science was giving 
completely different insights concerning hygienic requirements’ (Maronier 
1929:230), traditional water supply sources (surface water) were now rejected 
as contaminated, necessitating their replacement by a centralized, controlled, 
and scientifically monitored artesian water network. Facilitating the emerging 
concentration, and isolation of new European neighbourhoods within the city 
centre (see Abeyasekere 1989), the new class of European colonials became 
increasingly removed – both physically, and temporally – from the unhygienic 
native populations who remained ‘in the past’, still crowded alongside the tra-
ditional surface water sources that they continued to rely on for all of their 
water needs (Argo 1999).
The connections established between knowledge of the scientific proper-
ties of water supply and an individual’s status as developed underpinned the 
construction of a new hierarchy of waters, and of water users. The continued 
use, and preference, of untreated surface water by native populations for 
drinking, bathing, and washing served to reinforce in a variety of ways the 
superiority and advanced knowledge of the purified and modernized European 
population and led to the production of a discourse linking undeveloped 
native bodies with surface water, disease, and contamination. The fact that 
‘natives take pleasure bathing, washing, and defecating in streaming water 
[demonstrated] their insensitivity to cleanliness and order’ (Van Leeuwen 
1920:198), and the recorded distaste of the native population for artesian 
water (Van Breen 1916) – a water supply that required a time consuming 
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and expensive process of aeration and cooling before consumption – seemed 
to affirm their evident lack of modernity, and their status of non-citizens 
within a modernizing urban landscape. Remaining reliant upon the traditional 
and unscientific properties of water (colour, clarity, taste, smell) to determine 
its quality, native water users were ‘not yet modern’, and actively excluded 
from membership within the public that the artesian water supply was built 
to serve.
The division of urban spaces and populations according to their racialized 
level of modernity and development was incorporated into the water supply 
infrastructure of the late nineteenth century. Intended to help define what was 
then a rather racially ambiguous European population (Stoler 1997), the arte-
sian water supply provided a hygienic, safe water supply, and cleansed a prob-
lematic, heterogeneous European population that had begun to jeopardize the 
strategy of colonial domination based upon demonstrated racial superiority 
(Stoler 1997). By locating the artesian hydrants within the emerging concentra-
tions of new kinds of European settlements, the provision of urban water sup-
ply was in line with the overall governmental strategy to both discursively and 
physically secure a more modern, more European, population. As subsequent 
phases of the development of the city’s water supply network channelled even 
more modern waters through later pressurized piped networks, the fragmenta-
tion between different kinds of urban populations, urban space, and water 
supply continued to be guided by the physical and discursive artefacts of the 
artesian hydrants.
Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, the increasing 
advancement of European water supply from non-piped provision to private 
household connections was made possible by the initial construction of the 
artesian water hydrants and reservoirs within European spaces of the city, and 
high reservoirs and piped networks providing a pressurized water supply to 
European households contrasted with the emerging development of the ‘cor-
poreal networks’ of native water vendors serving the native population, a pat-
tern of provision still evident in present day Jakarta (Figures 3.1 and 3.2).
 Hydraulic Modernity: The Development of the Spring Water Network 
(1920–1945)
The second phase of colonial intervention into urban water supply emerged 
after the composition of a demonstrably different European class of citizen 
was secure (Milone 1967; Van Doorn 1983); then the colonial administration 
turned to the task of constructing a new kind of native population. Seeking 
to address the increasing anti-colonial critiques calling for a more ethical and 
humane government of the Netherlands Indies (Gouda 1995), the 1901 Ethical 
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Figure 3.1  Water vendors in Batavia filling gas jerrycans with artesian water from a public 
hydrant (1918)
Source: Drost (1918: plate opposite page 54)
Figure 3.2  Water vendor in North Jakarta filling ‘pikuls’ of water from a public hydrant (2005)
Photograph: M. Kooy
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6 Investigations into rehabilitating and/or replacing the artesian water supply system began in 
1906, following the Decentralization Act of 1903 that established Batavia as a municipality 
with its own local government.
Policy laid out intentions for new relations between the population and the 
state, partially materialized through the construction of a better quality and 
quantity of water supply that would increase the possibility of eventual uni-
versal distribution. Repositioning itself as a parental caretaker of the native 
population, the state was still authoritarian in nature, but now with the 
development of the native population into modern, self-productive citizens 
at the heart of its policies. The new priorities, purposes, and political strate-
gies of government (both central government and the newly established 
municipal government of Batavia, in 1905) were embedded in the changing 
rationalities around urban water supply. Public health and economic effi-
ciency (of water supply and of the population as a whole) became sometimes 
contradictory guiding principles determining decisions made about urban 
water: the selection of technology (high pressure versus low pressure net-
works; public hydrants versus household connections), water supply sources 
(spring water versus artesian water), and patterns of provision for different 
populations.
Although the transition between what was now described as an inadequate 
and antiquated artesian water supply system and a modern, centralized, high 
pressure, spring water supply stretched out over two decades,6 from 1900 to 
1920, colonial chroniclers describe the technological shift as though it were a 
notable break with the past eras of water supply, indicating the significance 
invested in this material symbol of a new kind of government (Maronier 1929). 
With the transition to the spring water network, water production capacity 
increased to over 350 L/s, reservoir size grew from 780 m3 to 20,000 m3, the city 
network was extended by over 150 kilometres (Smitt 1922), and best of all – the 
water from the pipes could be used straight out of the tap without need for 
purification, or cooling, as was the case for artesian water. The planned provi-
sion of 90% of European households with a supply of 140 L/capita/day (Van 
Breen 1916) enabled a new kind of life,
imparting to the Batavia house a more European character […] as most 
bathrooms have nowadays a shower from which the fresh water from the 
tap may be showered over the body.
gemeente batavia 1937:70
Based upon scientific knowledge developed in the West, for Western cities, 
demonstrating technological mastery over the health conditions thought 
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7 Residents of the urban kampongs in the beginning of the twentieth century were not only 
native, but also included lower class European residents. Residential segregation between 
the planned European neighbourhoods and the urban kampongs were based on socio- 
economic class as well as race, although scholars such as Stoler (1997) have noted the imbri-
cations of class with race by the colonial government in its concern to uphold the moral 
superiority of the European population.
8 The spring water supply network eventually went between two to five million guilders 
over its original budget (Eggink 1930). The total cost of the spring water network system was 
endemic to the tropics, and facilitating a modern urban lifestyle, the spring 
water network symbolized the emergence of a new kind of colonial govern-
ment, a new kind of city, and a new kind of urban citizen.
The new colonial project of modernizing the native population, and the 
need to urbanize their traditional habits around water supply not consid-
ered conducive to the modern city supported both the construction of the 
spring water network and subsequent interventions of the colonial govern-
ment into these problematic urban spaces. As articulated at the time, if it 
was ‘the intention of the Municipality to keep the population out of the kali’s 
[canals]’, there would naturally have to be an alternative supply provided – a 
hygienic supply would have to be ‘more easily placed under everyone’s reach’ 
(Van Raay 1915:142). Public health professionals in the Netherlands Indies 
believed that
the first requirement for improving kampong conditions is seen as the 
adequate supply of good drinking water […] adequate supply is impor-
tant because every necessary reduction [in supply for natives] can lead to 
the use of suspect water,
gomperts 1916:11
and so previous plans for the spring water network only intending to supply to 
the European (profitable) areas of the city were revised, and the cost calcula-
tions increased from eight and a half to ten million guilders in order to extend 
the supply into kampongs (Van Leeuwen 1917).7
Identified as a crucial strategy for securing public health, and an important 
component of government’s mandate to develop a modern, productive, and 
efficient native population, the spring water supply to native communities was 
at first provided free of charge from public hydrants (1922–1926). However, 
as the financial health of the newly established municipal water supply com-
pany (1918) became strained by the high costs of construction of the spring 
water pipeline,8 the efficiency of the native population was targeted for 
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 nine million guilders, with the municipality financing the costs of the city distribution net-
work (two million guilders); the central government financed the fifty three kilometres of 
pipes which brought the spring water from Buitenzorg (Bogor) into the high reservoir at the 
edge of the city, almost seven million guilders (Maronier 1929).
improvement, and the payment for water supply was justified on the grounds 
that a new system of valuation around water supply would help to develop 
more economically efficient users. Water that was paid for would ‘gain more 
value in the eyes of the [native] population so that it is no longer wasted in 
despicable ways’ (Brandenburg 1924:153). When the municipality established a 
system of paid delivery in 1926, formally appointing existing native water ven-
dors to sell water taken from the public hydrants at a determined profit margin 
(Eggink 1930), the introduction of new economic regulations around water 
supply through a system of ‘paid kampong water delivery’ were supposed to 
circulate a new understanding of water, and its economical value – a key aspect 
of a modern mentality – amongst the kampong population.
As the municipal distribution network was paid for by the city, and not the 
central government, this was important for the fiscally conservative municipal 
council who financed only two of the total nine million guilders needed to 
build the spring water network. The increasing costs to the municipality for its 
‘free water’ supply budget as a result of increased use by native households was 
documented from 1920–1924; in 1920 the municipality spent only 54,000 guil-
ders on ‘free water’, but by 1924, it paid out 120,850 guilders (Eggink 1930). 
However, after the regulation of 1926 charged a cost price of 60 cents/m3, 
native residents returned to their traditional habits, resulting in a correspond-
ing decrease in demand for network water supply in native areas (Maronier 
1929). As recorded by colonial engineers, there was a dramatic reduction in the 
demand for networked water in the kampongs after the implementation of the 
paid water delivery system; by 1927 the budget for ‘free of charge’ water had 
dropped from 120,850 guilders to only 6,000; by 1930, ‘concerning the free of 
charge water provision, so little is being expended that the amount of it is not 
expressed in the company’s budget anymore’ (Eggink 1930:63).
The use of hydrants and water vendors for kampong water supply was 
described as a merely transitional measure, an early stage in the development 
of universal water supply, because the willingness and ability to pay for direct 
connections of all kampong households was expected to follow from the 
adoption of sufficiently efficient and economically rational identities by the 
native population. The development of the native population into modern 
citizens whose health, economic productivity, efficiency, and aspirations led 
them into a higher socio-economic class would ‘stimulate water use from 
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9 With the cost of a connection to the network set at 25 guilders, monthly fees for meter rental 
(0.5–1.5 guilders) and the cost of the actual water being 0.30 cent/m3 (Jaarboek van Batavia 
1927), networked water supply was well out of reach for the average native resident, when 
‘the largest category of the native city population can not pay a rent of five guilders/month’ 
(Van der Wetering 1939:325).
house connections’ (Maronier 1929:236). At the same time, whoever was not 
motivated to maintain a sufficiently modern, economically rational, and 
hygienic lifestyle was subsequently displaced, as the necessity of recovering 
the costs of the expensive iron pipes that stretched 53 kilometres between the 
spring and the city meant that the occupation of these predominantly native 
urban spaces now modernized through the provision of piped water supply 
were only affordable to a certain class of urban resident.9 The provision of 
water supply services and other improvements to the kampong areas increased 
land values and house rents, and moved poorer families to the outskirts of the 
city boundaries, or to more undesirable unimproved kampongs (Van der 
Wetering 1939). The changing demographic composition of these improved 
areas into middle class housing areas (Abeyasekere 1989) was reflected in the 
decreasing number of hydrants, and increasing number of house connections 
within improved kampongs (see Maronier 1929). The poorer segment of the 
native population subsequently moved out from the modernized kampongs in 
the urban centre to the outskirts of the city, while those areas with piped water 
became populated by the new administrative middle class of salaried 
Indonesians, and Eurasians (Abeyasekere 1989; Van der Kroef 1954). As the 
‘silent battle for living space’ (Van der Wetering 1939:315) continued to displace 
native communities for the building of new European residential districts and 
associated services (railways, tramways) (Wertheim 1956), the spatial separa-
tion of two increasingly distinct urban societies was also in part facilitated by 
the spring water network.
Reflecting the conflicts contained within colonial policy, the ‘raising up’ of a 
relatively small percentage of the Indonesian population entailed creating 
new divisions of urban populations, urban spaces, and access to services, along 
the new colonial hierarchy of modernization. Modern natives, with suitably 
economically rational and productive identities motivated to improve their 
socio-economic status occupied urban spaces provided with networked urban 
water, and the larger lower class of undeveloped Indonesians still reliant upon 
day labour and low paying wages remained in the un-serviced areas of the city, 
or moved outside of the municipal boundaries altogether (Van der Wetering 
1939). Urban water supply also embodied other conflicts that became acute in 
the last years of the colonial government. The colonial project to modernize 
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10 In 1929 European households comprised only 7% of the population, but consumed 78% 
of residential urban water supply (see footnote 2).
11 From 1927–1931, 1.25 million guilders was spent on improving kampongs in cities through-
out Java, with the central government paying 50% of the costs; after 1931 government 
funding stopped, only to be revived again in 1938 when 500,000 guilders/year was again 
allocated to be distributed amongst all urban areas in the colony (Cobban 1974, 1988).
12 Although income disparities amongst the native population grew during the last years of 
the colonial economy, there is no doubt that it was disparities between rather than within 
ethnic groups that continued to be the most obvious as income gaps even increased dur-
ing the 1930s. In 1939 a European made 61 times the average Native wage, while a Chinese 
worker earned eight times the average Native wage (Booth 1988).
but yet retain distinctions and hierarchal relations between authority and sub-
ject explain why the construction of the first centralized water supply system 
intended for eventual universal coverage facilitated new fragmentations of 
populations and urban spaces.
With a design that planned for 140 L/day to be distributed to 90% of the 
European households in Batavia, in contrast to an expected delivery of only 
65  L/capita/day to only 33% of the native population (Van Breen 1916), the 
European population consumed the vast majority of the water from the spring 
water network.10 Provided with a convenient supply of water piped directly 
into the home, and delivered at a higher pressure than through hydrants, 
European households naturally (or, as expected and designed) came to use the 
majority of this water supply. With the worldwide depression in the 1930s, and 
the drop in colonial economy because of falling sugar prices, the campaigns of 
kampong improvement ended, along with the Ethical nature of colonial gov-
ernment policies (Cobban 1974, 1988; Coté 2003).11 By the time the colony’s 
economy had recovered, and programmes of kampong improvement were 
resuscitated in 1938–1939, the Second World War had begun. Suffice it to say, up 
until the end of Dutch colonial occupation access to the city’s public services 
remained limited to Europeans and a very small section of the native popula-
tion whose living standards had improved.12
 Postcolonial Transformations: Urban Water for the Ideal Citizens  
of an Independent Nation, 1950s–1965
The next significant moment in the history of the city’s water supply infrastruc-
ture followed Indonesian Independence. Following the tumultuous and pro-
tracted transition to an independent Indonesian government (1945–1950) – the 
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13 Population increased in Jakarta from 823,000 residents in 1948, to 1.8 million in 1952 
(Abeyasekere 1989).
14 The spring water source did continue to contribute a small portion of the city’s water sup-
ply up until 1994; in 1957, after the completion of Pejompongan I the colonial spring water 
supply would have provided between 15–30% of the total production capacity (see pam 
Jaya 1992a for details on water production capacity over the years).
15 See Leclerc (1993) for a discussion of the politics of Sukarno’s production of urban space.
events including Japanese invasion, the return of Dutch colonial government, 
and the subsequent War for Independence – the city’s spring water supply 
system was all but destroyed (Fischer 1959; Van der Kroef 1954). With a 
rapid increase in urban population,13 and the capital city of Jakarta emerging 
as the centrepiece of the new nation of Indonesia, the postcolonial develop-
ment of Jakarta’s urban water supply system was quick to follow formal 
independence.
As in the previous eras of the artesian and spring water networks, the physi-
cal changes to the city’s water supply system materialized the introduction of 
new relations of rule. With the construction of the first two large scale surface 
water treatment plants (Pejompongan I & II) replacing pure mountain spring 
water with treated surface waters (enabling a much larger volume of produc-
tion at lower cost), a new nature of urban water supply was produced to flow 
through the new citizens and spaces of the postcolonial city. Physically, the 
transition from colonial water supply technologies – to the postcolonial placed 
the priority on water quantity over quality, in order to provide a larger volume 
of water for the growing Indonesian population migrating to the capital city of 
Jakarta. However, the (post)colonial water supply priorities also discursively 
represented the rescuing of surface waters (and their users) from the past and 
their connotations with contamination by treating them through Western 
technologies, thus reinforcing the transformation of colonial Batavia into inde-
pendent Jakarta.14 By 1957, Pejompongan I was operational, adding 2000 L/s of 
treated river water to the network; Pejompongan II (completed in the mid-
1960s) later added another 1000 L/s (pam Jaya 1992a).
However, just as the new surface water supply continued to be distributed 
through the colonial piped network, the discourse embedded within previous 
layers of urban water infrastructure continued to guide postcolonial patterns 
of supply. Newly modernized surface water supply was still limited to a par-
ticular kind of urban population – the symbolically modern spaces and 
citizens of President Sukarno’s Jakarta.15 In short, urban water supply in post-
colonial Jakarta came to reinscribe colonial patterns of provision within the 
postcolonial city.
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At the outset, national government investment to increase the capacity of 
urban water supply by 3000 L/s could have been envisioned as the first steps of 
a new nation towards the democratization of urban water. Following the dam-
age to the colonial water infrastructure during the wartime period, the existing 
system was incapable of meeting water demands from the rapidly growing 
population of Jakarta (Hanna 1959). The production of a new source of water 
to increase the volume of supply could be interpreted as a first effort of a new 
kind of government to serve its newly emancipated citizens, reclaiming public 
water as the government began to reclaim key industries and land from the 
colonial owners and its corporations (see Robison 1986).
However, this was not the case; the postcolonial centralized water supply 
network was important for its symbolic significance within a modern Jakarta, 
rather than its ability to provide water to city residents. Just as the first postco-
lonial investments into the city’s urban water supply reflected the rationality of 
the ‘city beautiful movement’ whereby President Sukarno envisioned national 
greatness to be expressed through the physical transformation of Jakarta 
(Geertz 1963; MacDonald 1995), the networked water supply remained limited 
to certain modernized areas of Sukarno’s ‘monumental’ Jakarta. Although not 
often recognized as a material component of this political programme, the 
geographical location of the water treatment plants, and the spatialization of 
networked water supply that they enabled demonstrate their material and dis-
cursive functions in this new rationality of rule, and reveal the mechanism by 
which colonial patterns of supply were inscribed within the postcolonial city.
Viewing the spatial relations between the urban water infrastructures and 
the other monumental structures of the ‘city beautiful’ movement, the signifi-
cance of the water supply infrastructure to the national government project of 
an internationally modern Jakarta becomes visible, in a way that its subterra-
nean presence usually obscures. With the location of the water treatment 
plants within the centre of the representative modern spaces of Sukarno’s 
Jakarta (Figure 3.3) the piped network mirrors the above ground highways and 
flyovers built to connect the modern elements of the city, and was neatly posi-
tioned by the government to channel the increased flows of water to follow the 
new flows of international traffic into modern areas of the city, simultaneously 
excluding the vast majority of un-modern spaces and populations from both 
spatial proximity to, and services from, the network.16 The significance of the 
16 The construction of the Asian Games complex and adjacent inner-city thoroughfare 
involved the removal of 47,000 kampong residents, moving them out of the central areas 
of the city needed for these modernist monuments and relegating them to the periphery 
(Abeyasekere 1989), beyond the boundaries of the water network. After the construction 
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Figure 3.3  Reach of primary and secondary water pipes, 1950s
Map drawn by Eric Leinburger
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 of Pejompongan I piped water was reported to be available to only 12% of Jakarta’s popu-
lation (Fischer 1959).
17 The central government later provided 50% of the costs of Pejompongan II, with the gov-
ernment of Jakarta responsible for the other half of the us $7 million investment (pam 
Jaya 1992b).
new urban water infrastructure to the image of the nation was such that the 
central government provided all of the money for the construction of 
Pejompongan I, the argument given that Jakarta’s water supply was part of the 
national project, not just for Jakartans (pam Jaya 1992b).17
With people from all corners of Indonesia coming to Jakarta (pam Jaya 
1992b), investments into a centralized water network serving the international 
centres of the city served the function of demonstrating a modern nation to 
the visitors; Jakarta was a ‘modern city, with modern ways and urban conve-
niences’ that (for some) drew the intended comparisons to other world cities, 
such as Paris (Van der Kroef 1954:157). Supporting the more frequently recog-
nized components of Sukarno’s Jakarta – the Asian Games complex, Indonesia’s 
first international standard hotel (Hotel Indonesia), the high rise development 
along Jalan Thamrin-Sudirman, and the new upper class satellite city of 
Kebayoran Baru – the network water supply helped to brighten the beacon of 
Jakarta as it projected Indonesia upon the world stage.
The limited provision of piped water outside of this symbolically modern 
space in the centre of the city was therefore not a ‘failure’ of the government to 
invest in public infrastructure, but rather an integral part of a broader political 
strategy. As with the rest of the city’s monuments that were planned to ‘sub-
sume the sober realities of life in Jakarta’ (Kusno 1997), the investments of the 
first postcolonial government into Jakarta’s urban water supply were intended 
to remind the nation (and Jakarta’s residents) not of what they currently were, 
but what they (and the kinds of modern identities) they should aspire to. In 
the light of this nationalist discourse circulating through urban water supply, 
the fact that the majority of the urban population could not afford to connect 
to the network, or could not afford to use the water even if they were con-
nected to the network (Fischer 1959) was not a failure of government to achieve 
the modern infrastructural ideal. Rather, postcolonial rule in the first decades 
after independence maintained the splintered nature of urban water supply 
through its rationality for the modernization of Jakarta.
Recognizing the Pejompongan I & II water treatment plants as part of 
Sukarno’s modernist monuments illuminates the ways in which colonial dis-
courses around modernity, urban water, and citizenship were inscripted into 
postcolonial Jakarta, and rescues them from their obscurity in the history of 
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18 Pejompongan I & II were each built at a cost of approximately $7 million us (pam Jaya 
1992b) but these significant investments are not addressed in either discussions of 
Sukarno’s monumental Jakarta (see Kusno 2000; Leclerc 1993; MacDonald 1995), or the 
history of public infrastructure in Jakarta (see World Bank 1974; Hamer, Steer, and 
Williams 1986; Chifos and Suselo 2000). The familiar argument that Sukarno’s govern-
ment neglected public infrastructure in favour of public monuments ignores the con-
struction of Pejompongan I & II as both public infrastructure, and a monument for the 
modernization of the city.
Jakarta’s public works.18 Excavating this first layer of postcolonial infrastruc-
ture also allows us to trace the continuing fragmentation of urban space 
through water supply, as the tripling of water supply in the central, interna-
tionally modern, areas of the city was both produced by and productive of 
postcolonial distinctions between modern/un-modern urban spaces and citi-
zens. With the additional 3000 L/s of postcolonial waters supporting the pro-
duction of a ‘new space intended to be different from both colonial Batavia as 
well as the surrounding sea of poor urban neighbourhoods’ (Kusno 2000:52), 
the different natures of urban water circulating through selective areas in the 
city supported the government’s intended differentiation between these areas 
of the postcolonial city. Divisions established between the kampong and the 
modern city were reinforced by the national government’s consistent exclu-
sion of kampongs from network access, leaving the majority of the non-mod-
ern residents to continue their historic (precolonial) reliance upon open wells 
and surface waters (Argo 1999).
In contrast to the kampong, where absence of piped water remained the 
norm, substantial investments were made to both rehabilitate and expand 
water supply into upper class residential areas of Jakarta. Recognizing certain 
kinds of residential areas of the city as part of the modern Jakarta (those that 
were planned, formal, and demonstrated rational spatial arrangements along 
orderly roads), the old colonial neighbourhoods in the central areas of the city 
were laid with postcolonial pipes, and new neighbourhoods constructed for 
the Indonesian elite in the south were immediately included within the mod-
ern strip of the city, connected both to each other, and to modern waters 
through the postcolonial network. Kebayoran Baru, the satellite town origi-
nally planned by Dutch post-war government in 1948, had already been fitted 
with 17 km of network pipes prior to postcolonial government, and pipelines 
from Pejompongan I were laid to channel its new waters into these modern 
urban dwellings now occupied by the Indonesian elite. In contrast, the 
migrants streaming into Jakarta during the 1950–1960s settled in open spaces 
of the city, with an increasing density gradually creating ‘vast block interiors 
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that became the sites of the un-serviced urban kampong’ (Cowherd 2002: 173). 
In continuity with colonial patterns of provision, postcolonial urban water 
supply remained limited to modern areas of the city.
These patterns of provision remained the norm throughout the next three 
decades, as the subsequent New Order rationality of urban water supply both 
maintained and exacerbated the previous (post)colonial patterns of provision: 
layers of New Order infrastructure continued to benefit selectively targeted 
areas of the city, and the majority of the city’s poorer residents continued to 
rely upon non-networked water supply, as the New Order’s promise of devel-
opment excluded these areas of the city (see Jellinek 1991; Kusno 2000).19 
Public hydrants to provide access to clean water in kampongs, non-existent 
under President Sukarno, were still a rare occurrence in kampongs in the late 
1970s (Argo 1999), and the few that did provide services repeated the discrimi-
natory economic policy of the earlier colonial era. Until the mid-1980s public 
hydrants charged higher tariffs than those paid by the individual household 
connections to middle and upper income households, creating a perverse 
cross-subsidy from the poor to the middle and upper classes which persisted 
for the next two decades.20
 Conclusions: Flowing from Past to Present
In documenting the genealogy of water supply in Jakarta, this chapter has 
argued that the city’s water supply network has been highly ‘splintered’ 
(Graham and Marvin 2001) since its inception, and the roots of this highly frag-
mented pattern of water access lies in the colonial era. This spatial fragmenta-
tion of supply continued to be a pattern of growth inscripted into the 
postcolonial development of Jakarta’s waters, and was therefore not substan-
tially altered by the rise of the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’. Documenting 
how a contested and evolving process of social differentiation of classes and 
races was linked to the differentiation of water supply infrastructures and of 
19 In 1994, over 60% of the upper income population had direct access to network water sup-
ply through household connections, but only 10% of the kampong residents were directly 
connected (Azdan 2001; Cestti, Batia and Van der Berg 1994; Porter 1994; jica 1997).
20 Until the early 1980s, household tariffs were 25 rupiah per cubic metre for the first 15 m3/
month; public hydrants and water trucks paid 60 rupiah per cubic metre, more than dou-
ble the tariff of households, and more than even small businesses, who paid 50 rupiah per 
cubic metre. Lower prices for hydrant water were only introduced in the mid-1990s (Kooy 
2008).
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urban spaces, we traced the legacy of the colonial constructions of urban water 
supply and citizenship within the postcolonial city.
We began our story at the moment of the first major colonial intervention 
into urban water supply – the construction of a system of artesian wells in 
Dutch Batavia in 1870 – and followed the development of urban waters through 
the first two decades of Indonesian independence. As illustrated, the direct 
and indirect exclusion of much of Jakarta’s kampong residents from access to 
piped water supply was articulated with both colonial and postcolonial prac-
tices of governance, which reinforced the spatial and social fragmentation of 
the city. In each period, the division of urban spaces, and the city’s inhabitants 
into categories of modern and non-modern served specific political economic 
ends: the reaffirmation of Dutch sovereignty and racial superiority, as concret-
ized in the provision of artesian, and later networked water supply solely to 
colonial neighbourhoods; the success of Sukarno’s postcolonial ‘guided democ-
racy’ as epitomized in water treatment plants serving as ‘monumental archi-
tecture’ connecting elite areas of the city.
Examining the urban water infrastructures of the colonial and postcolonial 
governments and the accompanying rationalizations and discourses that legit-
imated these interventions and prevented others, we have demonstrated how 
an ongoing fragmentation of Jakarta’s water supply accompanied its concur-
rent (and current) centralization. We explain the operation of these seemingly 
contradictory processes as the product of both colonial and postcolonial 
attempts to differentiate people by class and by race, and to create a modern 
governable subject. We argue that the project of producing modernized, lib-
eral, productive, ethical and obedient colonial citizens within a hygienic and 
economic urban environment entailed not only physical re-workings of urban 
space, but also discursive re-workings of the rationalities supporting water 
supply delivery; the associated classification of types of urban citizens was 
actively translated into differentiated urban spaces which persist in the con-
temporary city. This imbrication of water and constructions of citizenship is a 
persistent feature of the urbanization of water supply, and is still visible in the 
contemporary project of modernizing urban spaces and urban citizens accord-
ing to neoliberal rationalities.
This genealogy reminds us that we should be wary of viewing cities such as 
Jakarta through a Northern lens, and provokes the need for alternative analyti-
cal frameworks acknowledging the city’s (post)colonial construction. In 
Jakarta, fragmentation of utility services such as water is due not to the recent 
trends of ‘splintering urbanism’ characteristic of cities in the North, but is due 
rather to a model of urbanization with roots in the colonial era that has pro-
duced persistent patterns of differentiation of spaces, classes, and races. Using 
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21 The involvement of the private sector in water supply, devolution of governance to lower 
orders of government, or deregulation of the water sector have all occurred in Indonesia 
over the past decade.
a postcolonial perspective to interrogate the contemporary urban geography 
of Jakarta is – like in other cities of the South (see Myers 2006) – necessary in 
order to unlock the crucial elements of colonial legacies. The contemporary 
lack of access is not simply due to neoliberal trends in urban governance.21 
Rather, the roots of disconnection and disenfranchisement are structured 
within patterns of governance that have been materially inscribed in the city’s 
infrastructure over the past century. This analysis underscores the limitations 
of conceptual frameworks predicated on an ideal-type of homogeneous and 
universal modern infrastructure networks, and reinforces calls for alternative 
theories of urbanization in the South.
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Netherlands Indies Town Planning
An Agent of Modernization (1905–1957)
Pauline K.M. van Roosmalen1
 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the evolution of town planning in the Netherlands 
Indies from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards and on the role 
this – at the time – still new discipline played in the modernization of the 
Dutch colony and independent Indonesia. What made development in the 
Netherlands Indies remarkable is that twentieth-century town planning, 
alongside other disciplines, contributed to a significant extent to the colony’s 
modernization. The chapter does not go into concrete town plans, but is in 
large part devoted to reflections on town planning by architects and local 
administrators, framed in the administrative context and against the back-
ground of the specific conditions in the Indies. Architects and town planners 
followed trends in their field back in the Netherlands rather closely, adopting, 
for instance, the idea that the city should be seen as a coherent entity, that 
general expansion planning and even regional planning were necessary to that 
end, that statistical data and a survey were indispensable for the formulation 
of large-scale planning, and that traffic was an important factor to be consid-
ered in the formulation of a town plan.
Town planning not only played an important role in the modernization of 
the Netherlands Indies, but also in the social integration of the colony. In the 
plural society of the Netherlands Indies, ethnic boundaries hindered social 
interaction. State policy often targeted, explicitly or implicitly, one ethnic cat-
egory. Town planners, in contrast, increasingly looked at the city as an organic 
whole, in which people from all ethnic and social backgrounds had to find a 
place. Town planners therefore championed not just the interests of European 
inhabitants, but increasingly also the interests of the indigenous population as 
well as ‘indigenous’ approaches to resolve problems. The result was the gradual 
emergence of a modern town planning quite specific to the Netherlands Indies: 
inspired by architecture and town planning trends in the Netherlands while 
adapted to local conditions.
The grounds that underpinned and steered Netherlands Indies town plan-
ning ran parallel to and to a certain extend accommodated and facilitated the 
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socio-political developments in the Netherlands Indies: the gradual transi-
tion  from the Netherlands Indies, a colony that until 1942 was governed by 
the Dutch, to Indonesia, an independent state from 1949 onwards. The 
approach and application of town planning evolved analogous to this evolu-
tion. The colonial cities of the early twentieth century, in which rulers and 
the ruled lived and worked in accordance with their own cultural customs, 
evolved in the course of 50 years into Indonesian cities, in which differ-
ent urban quarters were defined by social and functional rather than ethnic 
criteria. The course of this evolution is recorded in numerous discussions 
and debates in which the political and administrative context was often 
determinant.
This chapter also describes the gradual expansion of the domain in which 
the town planner was able to operate in the colony and, for a couple of 
years, in the independent republic. This expansion, spurred by locally impera-
tive developments, was facilitated and sanctioned by the colonial central 
government in Batavia. The start of this evolution – and consequently of 
the emergence of Netherlands Indies town planning – was the Decentraliza-
tion Act of 1903 (Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1903/329). Until the enact-
ment of this law, the Netherlands Indies had been centrally administered 
by the colonial authorities in Batavia. The creation of local councils, indepen-
dent entities with their own administrative and financial responsibilities 
established in accordance with the Decentralization Act, changed all that. 
It was the establishment of these local councils that created the conditions 
for the development of a Netherlands Indies town planning practice. In the 
years following the proclamation of the Decentralization Act, the administra-
tive scope of the  municipalities expanded steadily, inwardly as well as 
outwardly. Town planning echoed this trend closely. The first and most promi-
nent administrative and financial responsibility of the local councils – soon 
dubbed town councils – concerned the construction and maintenance of pub-
lic works.
Obviously, the local administrators – and town planners – had to take the 
social and geographic circumstances of the towns in the Netherlands Indies 
into account. They were working in a multi-ethnic society to begin with. The 
major division was formed by a legal tripartite division into three broad ethnic 
categories. Besides a relatively small group of Europeans, the Netherlands 
Indies were inhabited by indigenous people and the so-called Foreign Orientals: 
Chinese, Arabs, and Indians. While there was no rigid segregation between the 
different ethnicities and they frequently came in contact with one another in 
the course of doing business and daily routines, the different ethnic groups by 
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and large lived in separate areas. Not that this geographical distribution was 
entirely exclusive: besides ethnicity, financial means were also a factor in set-
tling in a particular residential area. It was thus possible for well-to-do Chinese, 
Indo-Europeans, and indigenous people to live in the European areas along-
side the Europeans while, conversely, less well-off Europeans and Indo-
Europeans lived in non-European areas. Another exception was formed by the 
indigenous people who were in domestic service and thus often lived on the 
property of their European and Chinese employers, or in the immediate vicin-
ity. This, however, did not diminish the fact that the Netherlands Indies society 
was characterized by a hierarchy based on ethnicity, reflected in the layout of 
its cities and the design of its residential areas.
European districts generally occupied a relatively sizable portion of land, 
were usually situated in better areas (locations of higher elevation) and fea-
tured spacious accommodations (Figure 4.1). Housing and employment were 
normally kept separate in the European districts. The latter was also partially 
true in the considerably more densely populated indigenous quarters. The 
indigenous and other Asian areas consisted of small plots of land with small 
Figure 4.1  Batavia: European houses constructed in the 1920s
Source: Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen, Leiden, RV-10761-96. courtesy of 
nationaal museum van wereldculturen
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dwellings, narrow streets, and little public space. What distinguished indige-
nous quarters from Chinese, Arab, and Indian quarters was that the latter 
groups usually lived above or behind their businesses while many indigenous 
people, when being employed by Europeans or Chinese, worked in offices or 
homes outside their home districts.
Other characteristics of Netherlands Indies towns were their widespread 
configuration and low population density; these two aspects had profound 
consequences, in particular from a financial and social standpoint. Widespread 
built-up areas, after all, meant great distances. Great distances in turn required 
long infrastructure links and therefore considerable investments in construc-
tion and maintenance – investments which the municipalities, given the 
limited means at their disposal particularly in the early years, often could not 
afford.
 Decentralization as a Stimulus for Town Planning
The expansion and consolidation of the colonial territory during the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the increase in the number of European private 
entrepreneurs and the resulting increased needs for houses, schools, hospitals, 
shops, and cultural institutions led to dramatic socio-economic changes and 
altered demands with regard to architecture and town planning. In addition, a 
new political course was initiated, that of the Ethical Policy. The essence of the 
Ethical Policy was that Dutch colonial policy should no longer merely benefit 
the interests of the motherland, but also the interests of the colony and its 
inhabitants.
One of the consequences of the introduction of the Ethical Policy in the 
archipelago was the decentralization of the administrative system. The 
Decentralization Act that was enacted to that end, ended Batavia’s century 
long administrative hegemony over the islands. To assist the Governor General 
in the elaboration and implementation of the Decentralization Act and to 
inform the relevant authorities about the objectives and consequences of the 
new arrangement, a Regeeringscommissaris voor Decentralisatie (Government 
Commissioner for Decentralization) and a Deputy Government Commissioner 
were assigned to the Department of the Interior. In accordance with a proposal 
by the Government Commissioner, a Local Councils Ordinance was enacted in 
1905. This ordinance gave the central government the power to establish 
regional and local councils that, taking existing administrative hierarchies into 
account, would be able to administer a clearly demarcated territory, using their 
own financial resources, as they saw fit (Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 
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2 The denomination ‘local council’ (locale raad) was soon changed to ‘municipal council’ 
(gemeenteraad); for the sake of consistency the term ‘municipal council’ will be used 
throughout the remainder of this chapter.
1905/181). As a result of the Local Councils Ordinance, the first local councils 
on Java were installed in Batavia, Meester Cornelis and Buitenzorg on 1 April 
1905.2 These were followed a year later by the councils of Bandung, Blitar, 
Cirebon, Kediri, Magelang, Pekalongan, Semarang, Surabaya and Tegal on Java, 
Makassar on Sulawesi and Padang and Palembang on Sumatra. Over the fol-
lowing years, more municipalities followed.
One of the most evident consequences of the new administrative system 
was the direct confrontation of administrators with local issues. This confron-
tation did not immediately produce fully engaged local councillors and central 
civil servants – a considerable section of the civil service corps remained mis-
trustful towards the decentralized principle – but it definitely influenced the 
way in which cities were administered. The challenge facing the municipal 
councils was far from simple. Acute housing shortages, inadequate and poorly 
maintained infrastructure and an obvious lack of administrative experience, 
combined with limited financial, technical and legal resources, represented 
major obstacles. The problems were all the more serious because the central 
government, before decentralization, had done very little in the way of main-
taining public works, and had passed on a severely neglected legacy to the 
municipalities (Woesthoff 1915:24).
An essential problem for the municipal councils, particularly in the early 
years, was the limited way in which the central government interpreted the 
decentralization principle. To leave the power of the central government and 
its civil servants as intact as possible, the operational scope of the municipal 
councils had been kept to a minimum: the construction and maintenance of 
roads, including the plants and trees lining them, sewers, water supplies, pub-
lic slaughterhouses, and covered markets (Woesthoff 1915:128). In addition, 
municipal authorities were responsible for the provision of fire fighting, cem-
eteries, ferries, and the collection of refuse along public highways, streets, and 
squares. Although these tasks were too limited to allow an effective approach 
to town development and the budget was too limited to appoint the expert 
personnel to execute these tasks, the municipal councils were highly ambi-
tious (Van der Zee 1927:22).
In addition to this already complicated situation, there were two more fac-
tors that severely handicapped the municipal councils in the exercise of their 
work. One of them was land ownership. As the Topographical Service and the 
Land Registry had already noted in the nineteenth century, the indigenous 
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3 ‘wat eenmaal tot zich getrokken [was, kon immers] nooit meer aan de kampongs worden over-
gelaten’. Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (anri), Departement Binnenlandsch 
Bestuur (bb) 1691, letter from the Regeringscommissaris to the Gouverneur-Generaal, 23-10-
1905, No 857.
people of the Netherlands Indies abided by an array of land rights of a com-
plexity scarcely imaginable to Europeans. In addition, municipal territories 
often included many sizable private estates (particuliere landerijen). The conse-
quence of this situation was that when a municipal council wished to carry out 
a building project on a piece of land to which it did not have legal title, it first 
had to establish the owner of the title to the plot in question and subsequently 
negotiate transfer of ownership – a costly and time-consuming procedure that 
seriously compromised the progress of projects (Van Roosmalen 2008:40).
A second serious obstacle that handicapped municipalities in their work 
was the lack of jurisdiction over the autonomous indigenous land (desa or 
kampong) within their municipal boundaries (Van Roosmalen 2008:28–29). 
This problem had arisen as a result of the enactment of the Municipal 
Ordinance of 1906 that decreed that indigenous lands fell under the jurisdic-
tion of indigenous authorities, the autonomous desa. A situation that signifi-
cantly hindered, complicated, and even harmed the execution of town plans 
and in worst-case scenarios forced town administrations to give up carrying 
out plans entirely. Although municipal authorities recognized that circum-
spection in interfering with autonomous desa was warranted – ‘what (respon-
sibilities) had been acquired [could, after all,] never again be left to the 
kampongs’3 – they nevertheless attempted to persuade the central govern-
ment of the need for a broader mandate by suggesting two alternatives: abol-
ishing the administrative autonomy of indigenous communities or granting 
municipalities priority rights to land. Although it took the municipalities more 
than a decade, the government in 1918 revised the Governmental Code of the 
Netherlands Indies, which functioned as the Constitution of the colony, in 
order to empower municipal authorities to carry out public works projects 
throughout their municipal territory, including the autonomous desa.
 Support for Town Planning
The Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen (Association for Local Interests) played 
an important role in the gradually more accommodating attitude of the cen-
tral government towards the arguments of municipal administrators and town 
planners. The Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen, founded in 1912 at the 
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initiative of several members of the Semarang municipal council, was an 
umbrella organization for Netherlands Indies municipal authorities that 
served as a platform for local administrators and as an intermediary between 
municipalities and the government. A year prior to the founding of the asso-
ciation, its initiators had organized what they called a Decentralisatiecongres 
(Decentralization Congress): a congress at which national and municipal 
administrators could meet and exchange ideas about a variety of issues related 
to the local administration. The success of this congress marked the start of a 
series of annual congresses, organized from 1912 to 1942.
Held alternately in Bandung, Batavia, Malang, Semarang, and Surabaya, 
these Decentralization Congresses, along with the papers drawn up for these 
gatherings and the Association’s publication Locale Belangen (Local Interests), 
were one of the few opportunities for government and municipal civil ser-
vants, lawyers and planners to meet, trade experiences and exchange ideas 
about a broad range of subjects: policy, administration, finances, health and 
hygiene, housing, and not least, developments in town planning. As the long 
distances in the archipelago prohibited regular contact, the congresses and 
Locale Belangen were instrumental in exchanging information and debate.4
While a major part of the debate about town planning and public housing 
was carried out by professionals, well educated members of the public increas-
ingly began to take an interest in the development of their municipalities as 
well. In Bandung, for instance, the association Bandoeng Vooruit (Bandung 
Forward) was founded in 1932: an association consisting mainly of prominent 
citizens endeavouring to promote Bandung as a place to live and work. Six 
years later, a similar association called Groot Batavia (Greater Batavia) was 
formed in Batavia. Among less well-educated people, notably the indigenous 
people, interest in town planning developments remained minimal: not out of 
indifference per se, but because other, more basic issues called for their atten-
tion and particularly indigenous people, due to a high level of illiteracy and 
extremely deficient knowledge of Dutch, were barely able to obtain informa-
tion about administrative and related developments. Only in the 1930s, when 
publications of reports and articles in Malay became more common, and 
information was also disseminated over the radio, did this change somewhat. 
4 Beginning in 1932 the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen also published Locale Techniek 
(Local Engineering). Locale Techniek merged in 1934 with Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift 
(Indies Architecture Journal), the organ of the Vereeniging voor Bouwkundigen in 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Association of Architects in the Netherlands Indies), founded in 1898. 
The merged publication was called ibt Locale Techniek. In 1938 the name was changed to 
Locale Techniek Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift. Publication of the journal ceased in 1942.
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5 Tillema financed these publications out of the fortune he earned from the sale of bottled 
mineral water. He had been a pioneer in developing a market strategy. Buoyed by his experi-
ence as a promoter and producer of bottle mineral water as an alternative to the often con-
taminated water from pipes or wells, Tillema was convinced that, if presented in the right 
way, the essence of the message about the causes and effects of hygiene, or rather the lack 
thereof, could be made clear to all and consequently public health would improve (Vanvugt 
1993).
In 1938, for example, the indigenous broadcasting company Vereeniging 
Oosterse Radio Luisteraars (vorl, Association of Eastern Radio Listeners) in 
Bandung broadcasted Malay and Dutch programmes entitled The Indies city as 
a social problem, Property rights in the municipalities and Town planning and 
kampong improvement (Inheemsche belangstelling 1938). Given these titles, 
vorl clearly aimed at involving all Bandung residents, indigenous and other-
wise, in local affairs, including issue related to town planning.
 Motives for Town Planning
The initial lack of interest and participation among the majority of the indig-
enous population in administrative and other municipal affairs did not mean 
that there was nothing to remedy in the kampongs, the neighbourhoods pri-
marily inhabited by indigenous people. On the contrary, the epidemics of 
plague and cholera that continued to break out until the second decade of the 
twentieth century were often a direct result of the exceedingly unhygienic con-
ditions in these neighbourhoods.
As in Europe and in other colonies, in the Netherlands Indies medical experts 
were first to call attention to the link between the epidemics, public health, and 
housing conditions. The leading figures in the Netherlands Indies were the 
pharmacist H.F. Tillema and the physician W.T. de Vogel. Both lived in Semarang 
and were members of the municipal council. While De Vogel and Tillema 
pointed out the causal relationship between housing conditions and public 
health, it was particularly Tillema who explained this link to policy makers and 
other professionals and tried to convince them of the need for improvement. In 
the many lectures he gave and the various books he wrote and published (at his 
own expense), Tillema demonstrated the relationship between construction, 
town planning, and public health on the basis of statistics, maps and photos of 
dwellings, estates, vegetation, and streetscapes. (Tillema 1911, 1913, 1915–1922; 
Tillema and Tillema-Weehuizen 1919; Figure  4.2).5 Tillema also repeatedly 
pointed out that, in order to bring about improvement, it was crucial that the 
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6 ‘waarschuwende verschijnselen der volksontwaking’ (Karsten 1930:159).
way in which houses and residential areas had been constructed up to the early 
twentieth century should make way for a modern and well-considered archi-
tecture and town planning – a change Tillema held to be urgently required, not 
just from an aesthetic but above all from a medical standpoint.
In their attempt to improve the insalubrious housing conditions in Semarang 
and other cities, De Vogel and Tillema generated ideas about the modern city. 
One way of doing this was by presenting the counter-image of the modern city: 
dirty, disorderly, and impoverished spaces, indigenous and traditionally built 
quarters inhabited and built by people seemingly ignorant about the hygienic 
and other shortcomings of their living environment. To overcome this ignorance, 
education and enlightenment were the first steps towards the process of mod-
ernization. It was this process that De Vogel and Tillema helped to instigate.
Although the arguments of Tillema and De Vogel found a receptive audi-
ence among the largely leftist-oriented municipal council of Semarang, it was 
not enough to win the battle. Convincing other municipal authorities and 
especially the central government required more time and more persuasion. 
As for the latter, an inadvertent boost for the advocates of improvement came 
from the kampongs, in particular, where over the years an argument that even-
tually convinced the central government began to emerge: the ‘warning signs 
of popular awakening’.6 Poorly maintained kampongs provided a fertile 
Figure 4.2  Semarang: flooding in an unidentified kampong (c. 1910)
Source: Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen, Leiden, RV-10754-183. Courtesy of 
Nationaal Museum van Wereldculturen
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7 The Adviser on Decentralization (Adviseur voor Decentralisatie) was formerly known as 
Government Commissioner for Decentralization.
breeding ground for this ‘popular awakening’, which had started to crop up as 
a result of advancing democratization.
The opportunity seized by indigenous intellectuals, starting in the second 
decade of the century, to champion their own regional, cultural and economic 
interests and form indigenous political associations, in part fostered the discon-
tent felt by many of the indigenous population. The signals of discontent inspired 
fear in the central government, leading it on the one hand to pursue a more 
politically conservative course, but on the other hand to enact measures to coun-
ter the indigenous opposition to colonial rule, through the facilitation of system-
atic urban expansions and improvements, including kampong improvements.
Such was not the situation immediately following the introduction of decen-
tralization, however. As mentioned previously, municipal councils around 1905 
were anxiously seeking ways to fulfil their responsibilities in the area of public 
works and urban development as effectively as possible. One of the solutions 
proposed in this regard, following the example of the Netherlands, was to 
introduce a Housing Act in the archipelago. However, after several attempts, at 
last in 1916 when a draft text for such legislation was finally presented to the 
central government for approval, the sitting Adviser on Decentralization indi-
cated that he had little faith in the effectiveness of a proposal of this kind.7 First 
and foremost, this was because he felt that the housing question was less well-
served by a separate Housing Act that primarily and perhaps even exclusively 
focused on the housing issue than by a housing policy imbedded in a town 
planning policy. Secondly, his doubts came from the conviction that the most 
effective element of the Dutch Housing Act, the right to declare houses unin-
habitable, was not desirable in the Netherlands Indies due to the archipelago’s 
wholly insufficient housing stock and the fact that a substandard dwelling was 
still preferable to no dwelling at all. Thirdly, a Housing Act would not necessar-
ily bring an end to the housing shortage, as evidenced by the situation in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the Department of Public Works, due to a chronic 
shortage of personnel, would not be equipped to monitor compliance with 
such a law. Last but not least, the Adviser reasoned, the introduction of a 
national law was in violation of the decentralization principle.
Following the response of the Adviser on Decentralization, the 1916 draft for 
the Netherlands Indies Housing Act was put aside More attempts to introduce 
a Netherlands Indies Housing Act in the archipelago only came to a definitive 
end when the central government, on 10 May 1926, issued a decree on the regu-
lation of urban developments. This decree, which in reference to its listing in 
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8 ‘Agrarische aangelegenheden gemeenten. Voorkeurrecht der gemeenten bij uitgifte van 
gronden in eigendom’, Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië, Bijblad 11272, 1926.
9 The regulation affected land within municipal boundaries as well as lands that, while 
outside these boundaries, were still within the municipality’s sphere of influence.
10 The Commissie voor de Bestudeering van het Vraagstuk der Stadsvorming (Commission 
for the Study of the Problem of Urban Development) was informally referred to as Town 
Planning Commission.
the appendix to the gazette, the Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië, became 
known as Appendix 11272, was the first concrete step towards a systematic and 
integral approach and a legal basis for town planning projects.8 Appendix 11272 
stipulated that municipal authorities could obtain priority rights on land and 
subsidies for, for example, the construction of roads and sewers, if they sub-
mitted a request to this effect, accompanied by an town planning proposal, to 
the central government (Jansen 1930:148).9
Although this decree was a major step forward in terms of the systematiza-
tion of the town planning practice in the Netherlands Indies, it was in no way 
the centralized regulation or town planning that municipal administrators and 
town planners had been advocating for so long.
The central government, however, was not yet convinced of the need for 
such a regulation in the mid-1920s. Indeed the government rejected the pro-
posal to establish a commission that would consider the drafting of such a 
regulation, as, according to the government, there was really very little to do for 
such a commission (Poldervaart 1933:5).
A few years later, during which many, including political, arguments for 
town planning were put forward, the central authorities finally conceded. The 
threat of communist revolts in kampongs ultimately convinced the govern-
ment in 1929 of the need to subsidize their improvement up to 50 percent of 
the costs. In 1930, two advisory commissions on building and town planning 
respectively were established. The findings of these commissions eventually 
culminated in an apotheosis in 1934: the establishment of a Town Planning 
Commission.10 It was this commission, of which the majority had also been a 
member of the two previous commissions, that formulated the legal founda-
tion for town planning in the Netherlands Indies (Instelling Commissie 1934).
 Findings of the Town Planning Commission
The assignment of the Town Planning Commission was two-fold: making an 
inventory of the fundamentals of urban development and formulating a legal 
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town planning regulation for towns on Java and Madura to replace 
Appendix  11272. The Town Planning Commission presented its findings 
in 1938 in the form of a Stadsvormingsordonnantie Stadsgemeenten Java  
(Town Planning Ordinance for Municipalities on Java), along with an 
Explanatory Memorandum. Although the ordinance would not be enacted 
due to the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands Indies the Town Planning 
Ordinance and its Explanatory Memorandum were milestones: earlier than 
in the Netherlands, they set out the methodological, procedural, and legal 
principles for town planning.
One of the findings of the Town Planning Commission presented in 1938 
was that the situation in the Netherlands Indies at the time was typical of a 
country or society in development. Politics and town planning had evolved in 
Europe in a similar way in the nineteenth century as was happening now in the 
Netherlands Indies. In Europe, as a result of a liberalism and a withdrawing 
state, responsibility for town planning had been reduced to ensure a certain 
minimum level of quality for given technical details, such as street and mains 
construction, and the allocation of abundant funds to roads with a representa-
tive function (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:96). As this situation 
gradually changed, the unsystematic approach to town planning issues in 
Eruope was gradually replaced by an integral approach. This shift had pro-
duced a rapid increase in town planning legislation and the gradual rise of 
town planning training and education.
The Town Planning Commission expected that developments in the 
Netherlands Indies would follow a course analogous to developments in 
Europe: in the Netherlands Indies too, ad hoc urban development, from which 
the state distanced itself as much as possible, would gradually make way for an 
integral town planning practice in which the state would play a central role. 
The Town Planning Commission saw indications of an evolution in that direc-
tion, first and foremost, in the fact that the Commission had been established 
and in the fact that Netherlands Indies municipalities were increasingly issu-
ing ordinances concerning construction and town planning.
The Town Planning Commission emphasized that, if the issue of urban 
development were subjected to a centralized approach, the disordered devel-
opment of towns and urban conglomerations would make way for harmonious 
towns, operating efficiently in technical, social, economic and political terms. 
Harmonious, in this context, was not limited to technical or social aspects: it 
was also explicitly related to the aesthetics of the urban landscape.
A conscious organization of the physical elements comprising a town plan 
to realize functional and visual coherence was a major departure from the way 
in which neighbourhoods and towns had been arranged until the early 
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11 ‘Zeker de schoonheid, doch reeds, op lager plan, de verzorgdheid, de ordelijkheid en de 
behagelijkheid van de stad, zijn uiterlijke teekenen van een innerlijke orde en harmonie, zij 
vormen een getuigenis omtrent het karakter der samenleving, zooals de trekken van een 
aangezicht omtrent dat van de dragers’ (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:64).
twentieth century: incidental, unsystematic, incoherent and inefficient. 
Because the urban landscape expressed the essence of a society:
Certainly the beauty of a city, or at least, at a lower level, its maintenance, 
orderliness, and comfortableness, are external signs of an internal order 
and harmony; they are a testament to the character of the society, as are 
facial features to that of an individual.11
The transfer toward a more conscious organization, the Commission argued, 
should be given urgent priority (Figure 4.3).
According to the Town Planning Commission, modernization of the city 
was more than a functional reorganization; it was also an aesthetic ideal. 
Beauty, in the eyes of the town planners, was order. In addition, a well-kept 
urban landscape was important because it served a societal interest:
just as children raised in a disorderly and uncomfortable home become 
slovenly and indifferent, so too, in a people compelled to live in 
Figure 4.3  Bandung: Frisia Street before and after modernization (c. 1936)
Source: ibt Locale Techniek (1936:28–29)
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12 ‘zooals in kinderen, opgevoed in een onordelijke en onbehagelijke woning, slordigheid en 
onverschilligheid worden aangekweekt, zoo zal in een volk, dat moet leven in rommelige en 
onvriendelijke steden, versterkt worden de neiging tot sociale ontevredenheid en onordelijk-
heid. De zeker bovenal ideëel belangrijke graad van harmonie, schadelijkheid en welstand 
onzer steden, heeft dus bovendien een zeer concrete, ja welhaast politieke, reële beteekenis’ 
(Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:64).
disordered and inhospitable towns, the tendency towards social discon-
tent and disorder is reinforced. The assuredly largely ideal degree of har-
mony, harmfulness and aesthetic quality of our cities therefore also has a 
very concrete, indeed virtually political, actual significance.12
The Town Planning Commission felt that urbanization in the Netherlands 
Indies in the 1930s was characterized by two kinds of problems: concrete ele-
ments (construction, traffic, municipal works) and problems of a more general 
nature such as aesthetics, property rights, and finances. Rather than just iden-
tifying these problems, which had been done in a number of publications over 
the years, the Town Planning Commission also examined their causes. 
According to the Commission, the first major causes of the identified problems 
were the mistrust among the population towards the new phenomenon of 
urbanization and the refusal of many town dwellers to abandon an agrarian 
mode of living. Furthermore, the layout of towns reflected the colonial policy 
(Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:78, 80): the amalgamation of vari-
ous spheres in the colony – indigenous and non-indigenous, an intermediate 
form (Chinese) and a mixed form (Indo-European) – had produced significant 
economic, social, legal, and technical differences.
On an administrative level, the Commission observed the lack of an integral 
approach and efforts to attune regulations to the various tasks and responsi-
bilities of the authorities. It was because of incongruences like these, which 
had come about because the interconnection between various urban phe-
nomena had not been recognized, that the development of towns had hith-
erto been less than harmonious (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 
1938:86).
A third cause of an inadequate Netherlands Indies town planning practice, 
according to the Commission, was the reserved attitude of administrators 
towards the work of planners. Aside from exceptions, the majority of the 
administrative apparatus still demonstrated a striking lack of enthusiasm to 
address urban issues that were in the general interest. The lack of enthusiasm, 
according to the Commission, was due to the absence of a ‘genuinely felt local 
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13 ‘werkelijk-gevoelde locale patriottisme, dat voor een gelukkige stadsontwikkeling […] van zoo 
groote beteekenis kan zijn’ (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:81).
patriotism which can be of such major significance to successful urban 
development’.13
 Town Planning Procedures and Increase in Scale of the Plans
The draft for the Town Planning Ordinance described in six sections the meth-
odological, procedural and legal aspects of town planning. To delineate the 
various concepts under discussion, the first section opened with a listing of 
definitions of terms and elements related to a town plan that were employed 
in the ordinance. The second section, entitled ‘On urban development pre-
scriptions’, outlined the elements that should make up a town plan, the contri-
butions and responsibilities assigned to various levels of the administration, 
the procedures to be followed in drafting and enacting a plan, the duties of 
inhabitants in terms of compliance with the implementation of a plan, the 
measures the state was empowered to apply to compel inhabitants to comply 
if necessary, the various kinds of permits required and, finally, the mandates 
available to municipal executives and municipal councils in extreme cases if 
inhabitants did not comply. The section also described the objective and func-
tion of a town plan and its attendant prescriptions. It was intended as a guide-
line for the development of a city or town in accordance with its social and 
geographical characteristics, seeking a balanced fulfilment of the needs of all 
sections of the population and the harmonious functioning of the city or town 
as a whole (Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:12).
With reference to public involvement and input, the ordinance stipulated, 
in part, that interested parties would be able to submit objections to a detailed 
plan before it was adopted by the municipal council. To provide inhabitants 
the opportunity to do this, designs were to be made available for inspection at 
the town hall to all citizens, including those in indigenous communities, for six 
weeks. The period of public inspection was to be announced in municipal 
newspapers or in any other locally read publication. The ordinance stipulated 
explicitly that the mayor, with or without the cooperation of the Resident, was 
to ensure that the announcement of plans be made in such a way that illiterate 
citizens would also be informed (Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:17).
The considerably more succinct third and fourth sections of the Town Planning 
Ordinance dealt with the financial aspects of urban development: compensation 
claims and the cost of tax levies. The fifth section described among others the 
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powers of the Governor General to void decrees, the responsibilities of the 
municipalities and the necessity of compiling an annual report. The final, sixth 
section stipulated that unless they were revised to comply with the ordinance, all 
current municipal decrees related to urban development would expire within 
five years, and all current town plans would expire within 10 years of the Town 
Planning Ordinance coming into effect. It also stipulated that the ordinance 
would come into effect on a date to be determined by the Governor General.
The jurisdiction of the proposed ordinance was subject to three restrictions. 
The first, in accordance with the operational scope of the municipalities, was 
that it did not apply to defence installations, railways and ports. The second 
restriction was that it would not apply to towns on Java that did not have 
municipal status (Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:9; Toelichting Stadsvormings-
ordonnantie 1938:105, 112). The second stipulation was motivated by pragmatic 
considerations. The physical and administrative differences between Java and 
the Outer Islands, as well as the differences between the mostly urban munici-
pal towns and the considerably more rural regency towns, would have signifi-
cantly hindered the formulation of a uniform programme. In addition, the 
Commission members felt that they were insufficiently knowledgeable about 
conditions in the Outer Islands. Should a need for a Town Planning Ordinance 
arise in the Outer Islands, however, the Commission was confident that a simple 
addendum to or revision of the ordinance would suffice to make it applicable 
to the municipalities in these areas (Toelichting Stadsvorm ingsordonnantie 
1938:105–107). The third restriction was that the Commission had refrained 
from including regional plans in the Town Planning Ordinance. The reason for 
this was that the Town Planning Commission considered regional plans to be 
relating to a wider socio-economically cohesive area – which in the Netherlands 
Indies could be an island, for instance – and therefore well beyond the scope 
of a Town Planning Ordinance.
Before the Town Planning Ordinance was presented to the responsible senior 
official, it was discussed by various professionals (architects, town planners, 
legal experts, administrators) during the first Planologische Studiedag (Planning 
Workshop) – an initiative of a subcommittee of the Vereeniging voor Locale 
Belangen (Association for Local Interests). In general, attendants of the Planning 
Workshop praised the broad, rational and objective approach of the Town 
Planning Commission, the ordinance and its accompanying Memorandum.
There was also criticism, however. Many who attended the workshop particu-
larly criticized the Commission’s lack of attention for elementary aspects of the 
modern planning practice: traffic, regional planning, and ‘planology’. They 
pointed out that, given the proved impact of motorized traffic on the develop-
ment of urban areas and given the evident and irreversible nature of this trend, 
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it was incomprehensible the Town Planning Commission had barely taken these 
issues into account. To support their argument, the critics referred to the increas-
ing numbers of buses, trams, and private cars which placed new demands on 
the layout, the construction and the cross section of roadways, while also 
increasing possibilities to easily cover greater distances and thus generate an 
entirely different use of space. The effects of the latter were already visible in the 
Indies towns where the financially well-off segment of the population increas-
ingly settled further away from urban centres and developed a new form of lei-
sure activity: going for a drive in the countryside. To avoid the already extensive 
towns and cities of the Netherlands Indies from continuing to spread in an unor-
derly fashion, addressing the issue of traffic was of the essence in the late 1930s.
Equally baffling to critics was the lack of references to two recently introduced 
planning approaches: regional planning and what the Dutch called ‘planology’ 
(planologie). Regional planning had caught on in the Netherlands Indies starting 
in 1930, when it became clear that isolated town plans no longer sufficed, because 
the economic, social, and spatial development of municipalities was intricately 
linked to the areas surrounding them. ‘Planology’ by 1939 was a nearly 10-year-
old interdisciplinary method that combined various disciplines related to anal-
yse various processes that determined the organization, the use and the design 
of space: geography, sociology, town planning, and research (Bosma 2003:44–45). 
‘Planology’ took an academic approach to the challenge of designing the physi-
cal space. Through planology, town, regional, national and even international 
planning would acquire the rational basis it currently lacked, but, according to 
the critics who attended the Planning Workshop, it so sorely needed.
A major problem that had faced planners in the early days of Netherlands 
Indies town planning was the lack of data about essential aspects that played a 
role in drafting a plan and that were also mentioned in the Town Planning 
Ordinance: the size and composition of the population, as well as growth, 
birth, and mortality figures. Towards the 1930s, efforts to remedy this had borne 
fruit after nearly 30 years. Based on reliable statistics on the demographics of 
the population, town planners in the early 1930s were finally able to estimate 
the population (breaking down the overall figure into smaller categories) and 
map urban areas.
 Post-War Reconstruction
The professionalization and modernization in town planning in the 
Netherlands Indies during the interwar period came to an abrupt halt with the 
Japanese invasion of the archipelago (1942). In 1945, when the war was over 
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and Japan had surrendered, the geo-political situation was so different from 
the pre-war situation that a continuation of pre-war developments in the 
Netherlands Indies was far from self-evident. Yet, although the Japanese occu-
pation between 1942 and 1945 and the proclamation of the independent 
Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945 (only two days after Japan’s surrender) 
had fundamentally undermined the unassailability of Dutch rule in the archi-
pelago, Dutch administrators and town planners were undeterred to resume 
work in the territories in which the Dutch colonial government had more or 
less re-established its authority after August 1945: on Java Batavia and its sur-
roundings, on Sumatra around the cities of Medan and Palembang, and on the 
islands that formed the ‘Great East’: Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and New 
Guinea.
One of the major challenges facing town planners was the reconstruction of 
towns destroyed or damaged by the war (Figure 4.4). Material damage was par-
ticularly severe in the Great East.14 Except for a few dozen houses, Balikpapan, 
an important oil-producing town on Kalimantan, had been razed to the 
ground. In Manado, in North Sulawesi, only ten to fifteen percent of the build-
ings were still in tact, while in the city of Ambon, the capital of the Maluku 
Islands, only six to seven percent of the original buildings remained, of which 
the majority had suffered damage. In and around large cities on Java and 
Sumatra, war damage was primarily the result of neglect and looting.
Apart from an insecure political context, town planners in 1945 faced many 
other problems as well: unfamiliarity with the challenges of reconstruction, 
lack of materials and data, but most of all insufficient expertise and profes-
sionals. Of the pre-war contingent of architects and town planners, only fifteen 
(out of about 80) were available in the immediate aftermath of the war.15 The 
rest, including Karsten, had not survived Japanese occupation or had left the 
archipelago. If reconstruction was to be undertaken as efficiently as possible in 
spite of the enormous shortage of expertise, a fundamental organizational 
revision was imperative. Proposals to this effect were submitted by architect 
14 anri, Algemeene Secretarie 1891–1942 (as) 926, ‘Rapport Technische Commissie 
ingesteld door de Directeur van Verkeer en Waterstaat ten behoeve van de wederopbouw 
in de Grote Oost en Borneo’, s.l., (January 1946); Het Nieuwe Instituut, Rotterdam (Het 
Nieuwe Instituut), Thijsse thij d53, Jac.P. Thijsse, untitled note (‘Just to prevent…’), 
s.l.,s.a.:2.
15 Het Nieuwe Instituut, Thijsse thij d39, Jac.P. Thijsse, ‘Verslag van de studiereis naar 
Nederland en Engeland van 24 Augustus tot 31 October 1946 van het hoofd van het 
Planologisch Bureau van het Dept. VenW’, Batavia (10-11-1946):6; Akihary 1990. See Van 
Roosmalen (2008) about the number of architects in the archipelago.
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16 Kloos 1939, 1945; anri, Algemene Secretarie en Kabinet van de Gouverneur-Generaal 
1944–1950 (as&kgg) 923, letter Minister van Overzeesche Gebiedsdeelen to the 
Gouverneur-Generaal, 22-3-1946, No 5/191. Because the population density and popula-
tion growth were greatest on Java – and consequently the issue of spatial planning most 
urgent – Kloos’ proposal focused mainly on Java. anri, bb 1683 contains a copy of this 
proposal, dated 5-5-1945. ComTech (Combinatie van Technische Diensten, Combination 
of Technical Services) was a group of private building companies founded in close coop-
eration with the Departement voor Burgerlijke Openbare Werken (Department of Public 
Works) in October 1945; it only accepted orders from this Department (Colombijn 
2010:316).
17 Het Nieuwe Instituut, Thijsse thij d53, Jac.P. Thijsse, ‘Werkzaamheden van het 
Planologisch Bureau van het Departement van Verkeer en Waterstaat over het eerste jaar 
van zijn bestaan’, s.l., s.a.:1; Het Nieuwe Instituut, Thijsse thij d53, Jac.P. Thijsse, ‘Bespreking 
2 December 1946 met den heer Wahban Hilal’, Batavia Centrum, 2-12-1946.
W.B. Kloos, who was working in the Netherlands, and ComTech.16 Based on the 
proposals of Kloos and ComTech, a Planning Bureau (pb) was established as 
part of the Department of Transport and Waterways in 1946. A year later the 
bureau was renamed the Central Planning Bureau (cpb). The principal task of 
the (c)pb was the drafting and coordination of local, regional and national recon-
struction plans. In addition, it was to formulate legal urban development prin-
ciples for municipalities or areas that did have a town planning department.17
Figure 4.4  Ambon: bombed town centre (c. 1945)
Source: Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies 
(niod), Amsterdam, 54399. Courtesy of niod
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18 The regional plans have not been located.
Out of political and pragmatic considerations, the Great East was the region 
on which the (c)pb focused most of its attention. Not only were the towns of 
the Great East most heavily damaged, this was also the region were the Dutch 
were firmest in control. Although data and manpower were scarce, work pro-
ceeded rapidly: within four months all devastated areas and shortages had 
been inventoried and reconstruction plans for Makassar and Ternate were 
ready within seven months. Town plans and construction codes were next 
drawn up for Ambon, Balikpapan, Manado, Palembang, and Samarinda 
(Figure  4.5). In addition, the (c)pb drafted regional plans – the first in the 
archipelago – for the region of Minahasa, in North Sulawesi, and for the area 
southeast of Buitenzorg on Java.18
Figure 4.5 Samarinda: figures collected by the Balikpapan Planning Bureau for use in 
designing the urban development plan (1949): flood areas, war-torn districts, centres 
of malaria outbreaks
Source: Het Nieuwe Instituut, Rotterdam, Lüning LÜNI 50, Toelichting op het 
Stadsplan Kota Samarinda (1949). Courtesy of Het Nieuwe Instituut





19 Het Nieuwe Instituut, Thijsse thij d53, Jac.P. Thijsse, ‘Werkzaamheden van het 
Planologisch Bureau van het Departement van Verkeer en Waterstaat over het eerste jaar 
van zijn bestaan’, s.l., s.a.:2–3; Het Nieuwe Instituut, Lüning lüni 30, 44, 50; Het Nieuwe 
Instituut, Thijsse thij d39, J.W. Keiser, 1980, ‘Ruimtelijke ordening in het Indonesië van 
omstreeks 1950’, s.l.:9 [manuscript].
20 anri, as&kgg 925, letter Directeur Departement van Binnenlands Bestuur to Minister 
Departement van Binnenlandse Zaken van Oost Indonesië, 26-6-1947, No A.Z.30/1/38.
21 anri, as&kgg 925, Draft Town Planning Ordinance, s.a.,1. To make this change possible, 
two articles (51 and 52) were added to the last section of the ordinance. Article 51 stipu-
lated that the ordinance was applicable not only to administrative entities with the status 
of a municipality, but also to areas that showed signs, or would soon be showing signs, of 
urban development. Article 52 stipulated that non-municipal entities could also be 
assigned temporary administrative powers, so that the ordinance would also be legally 
valid in these administrative entities.
The (c)pb was well aware that the reconstruction plans were hampered by two 
significant limitations: they were based on incomplete demographic and eco-
nomic data and, due to the unstable political situation, their life expectancy 
was uncertain, but short. In view of these limitations, the (c)pb emphasized 
that the plans were only provisional, and would have to be thoroughly revised 
as soon as the missing data were obtained and more definite future expecta-
tions could be determined.19
While designing the reconstruction plans, the (c)pb also had to deal with an 
important issue in the short term, namely drawing up their legal basis. To fill this 
void, the (c)pb together with representatives from the Departementen van 
Verkeer- en Waterstaat, Justitie en Binnenlandse Zaken voor Oost Indonesië 
(Departments of Transport and Waterways, Justice and the Interior for East 
Indonesia), looked into the adjustments necessary to make the pre-war drafts of 
the Town Planning Ordinance and its Memorandum applicable to the post-war 
situation.20 The most important change needed concerned the nature of the proj-
ects to which the ordinance applied. Unlike in 1938, the Town Planning Ordinance 
in 1948 was no longer intended solely for carefully considered urban develop-
ment, but also for the rapid reconstruction of areas affected by military conflict.21 
Another necessary adjustment, expanding the jurisdiction of the Town Planning 
Ordinance beyond Java to the Outer Islands, was a simple, but in this context also 
crucial, change that was effected without much discussion. Once adapted to cur-
rent power balances, organizational structures and the extraordinary challenges 
of war damage, the pre-war Town Planning Ordinance and its Memorandum pro-
vided an outstanding legal foundation for post-war town planning.
After the colonial government in Batavia had approved the revised draft, 
the Town Planning Ordinance, drafted in 1938, was thus finally enacted in 
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22 anri, as&kgg 925, Ontwerp Stadsvormingsordonnantie, 15-10-1948.
23 See Van Roosmalen (2008) for the composition of this commission.
mid-1948 (Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 1948/168). The first town where it 
was put into effect was Banjarmasin on Kalimantan (Staatsblad van Indonesië 
1949/331). Several months later, the Town Planning Ordinance was imple-
mented on Java for Batavia and areas in its vicinity (Kebayoran, Pasar Minggu), 
Bekasi, Cilacap, Malang, Pekalongan, Salatiga, Semarang, Surabaya, Tangerang, 
and Tegal (Staatsblad van Indonesië 1949/241). On Sumatra it was first put into 
effect in Padang.
The consultations between the (c)pb and the departments also resulted in 
the drafting of a regulation that was necessary for the implementation of the 
Town Planning Ordinance, the Stadsvormingsverordening (Town Planning 
Regulation).22 The Town Planning Regulation set out which functions, build-
ing types and roads should be listed in an urban development plan and the 
minimum standards these elements should meet. The Regulation also defined 
how drawings and maps should be produced, what legends should be used and 
even the quality of the watercolour paint that planners were to use for their 
designs. A year later, in 1949, the Town Planning Regulation was also enacted 
(Staatsblad van Indonesië 1949/40).
 Developments Around the Transfer of Sovereignty
The enactment of the Town Planning Ordinance marked a turning point in 
town planning in the Netherlands Indies – and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
for that matter. On the one hand the ordinance consolidated the way town 
planning and the town planning practice had evolved since 1905. On the other 
hand it formed the prelude to the future of town planning: rationalization and 
an expansion of scale.
Barely three months after the Town Planning Ordinance had been enacted, 
the colonial government appointed another commission in 1949 – this time 
charged with formulating a draft legislation for the spatial planning of non-
urban areas. In order that the various spheres of influence and operational 
areas were coordinated as productively as possible, representatives of vari-
ous departments sat on the commission along with the director of the (c)pb 
and two members of its staff.23 In mid-1951, less than three years after it was 
established and one and a half years after the Netherlands transferred sover-
eignty to Indonesia, the commission presented the draft for legislation on 
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spatial planning, including an explanatory memorandum, to the Minister of 
Public Works and Energy (Pekerdjaan Umum dan Tenaga).24
In its preface to the draft legislation, the commission outlined the argu-
ments for the introduction of spatial planning. The most important argument 
was the profound impact of industry on spatial, economic, and social develop-
ments. If this impact was not managed properly, the line between city and 
countryside would blur, cities would expand uncontrolled while ribbon devel-
opment and deforestation would occur on a massive scale. A situation that 
could be avoided if, with the application of a national plan, regional or local 
plans, and sector plans, land-use allocation was codified in a timely fashion, 
making it possible to properly manage spatial, economic, and demographic 
changes.25
A second argument for the introduction of spatial planning was that, unlike 
in Europe where a large-scale reorganization of land allocation was an 
extremely complicated operation as all the land was already in use, a compa-
rable operation in Indonesia would be simpler due to the still extensive use of 
land. The rapid introduction of spatial planning, according to the authors of 
the draft legislation, was therefore crucial. The longer the delay, the more 
intensive the use of land would become and consequently the more compli-
cated the introduction of spatial planning would be.
Aside from an economic and pragmatic argument, there was, according to 
the commission, also an aesthetic argument for the introduction of spatial 
planning – an argument that had also been used in the 1938 Town Planning 
Ordinance. To realize a harmonious landscape, it was indispensable that all 
the factors that had an impact on the landscape should be rationally attuned 
to one another, something that could only be achieved if spatial planning was 
the underlying ordering principle to organize the factors and interests that 
impacted on spatial development.
As had been the case with the Town Planning Ordinance, enacting the draft 
for legislation on spatial planning took more time than drafting it. The chair-
man of the commission responsible for drafting the new legislation, Jac.P. 
Thijsse, in hindsight suggested two possible reasons for the problems with its 
enactment. The first reason could be that the draft was written in Dutch which 
24 Het Nieuwe Instituut, Thijsse thij d39, J.W. Keiser, 1980, ‘Ruimtelijke ordening in het 
Indonesië van omstreeks 1950’, s.l.:18–25 [manuscript]; Private archive Ir. Suyono, Jakarta, 
Regeringscommissie voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, Wetsontwerp op de Ruimtelijke 
Ordening. Inleiding, Djakarta, June 1951.
25 Private archive Ir. Suyono, Jakarta, Regeringscommissie voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, 
Wetsontwerp op de Ruimtelijke Ordening. Inleiding, Djakarta, June 1951:2.
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26 Het Nieuwe Instituut, Thijsse thij d48, Jac.P. Thijsse, ‘Building Legislation in Indonesia. 
Appendix III for ecafe Report 1954’, s.l., s.a.:2; Private archive Drs E.E.M.Th. Bogaers, 
Amsterdam, letter J.W. Keijser to Erica Bogaers, 12-10-1983. According to Keiser, translation 
of the draft proposal was entrusted to Go Djam Ing.
27 Fifteen years later, the 1992 Spatial Planning Act was replaced by Undang-Undang 
26/2007. Correspondence author with Ir Hendropranoto Suselo (2-7-2007).
most responsible Indonesian officials in 1951 did not master sufficiently to fully 
grasp the content of the draft. The second reason could be that administrators 
realized that once the legislation was enacted, ‘the execution of this law will be 
very difficult owing to lack of competent personnel’.26 To sidestep this prob-
lem, Thijsse suggested, the minister probably deemed it better to have no act at 
all than to have an act he could not observe. A situation that echoed the argu-
ments not to pass the Housing Act in 1916.
As the enactment of the Spatial Planning Act was delayed, the Town 
Planning Ordinance remained the legal and methodological basis for town 
planning, regional planning, and spatial planning in independent Indonesia 
until 1992 when it was finally replaced by a new Spatial Planning Act (Undang-
Undang 24/1992 tentang Penataan Ruang).27 It was thus the 1948–1949 legisla-
tion, a legislation rooted in Indonesia’s colonial history, that for decades 
provided the independent republic with a fitting methodological and legal 
foundation for its spatial planning practice. The absence of an updated legal 
foundation for the spatial planning in Indonesia echoed the situation in the 
Netherlands Indies: as in colonial times, legal and methodological practice was 
only codified into law after the planning practice had more or less consoli-
dated already.
 Prelude to a Definitive Rupture
The political rupture that followed the Japanese invasion in 1942, the 
Indonesian Declaration of Independence in 1945, and the official transfer of 
sovereignty in 1949 initially hardly influenced the town planning practice in 
the newly established independent Republic. The explanation given by Thijsse 
concerning the deferred enactment of the Spatial Planning Act from 1951 were 
directly related to the Indonesianization that followed the 1949 transfer of 
sovereignty: Indonesians were appointed in the executive positions previ-
ously  occupied by Dutch professionals, Indonesian replaced Dutch as the 
administrative language, and cities, towns, villages, and streets were being 
given Indonesian names. Notwithstanding the transfer of sovereignty and 
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28 Correspondence author with Ir Maarten Westerduin (14-2-2007, 16-2-2007). Westerduin 
graduated from Delft Polytechnic in 1951.
29 Interviews with Ir Ardiman, Bandung (14-11-2000), Ir Harisanto, Bandung (19-12-2000), 
Ir  Achmad Noe’man, Bandung (8-1-2001), Ir Kwee Hin Goan, Rotterdam (16-6-2003), 
Ir  Adhi Moersid, Jakarta (5-1-2001), Prof. ir Purnomohadi, Jakarta (5-1-2001), Prof. ir 
A. Sidharta, Semarang (28-11-2000); correspondence author with Ir Maarten Westerduin 
(14-2-2007, 16-2-2007).
30 Interview with Prof. ir A. Sidharta, Semarang (28-11-2000).
Indonesianization, the procedures for town planning as developed during the 
colonial era and formalized in the post-war period, remained unaltered. The 
use of pre-war practices was also consolidated and even regenerated when in 
the early 1950s, following the return of political order in the archipelago in 
1950, many newly graduated Dutch architects and urban designers once again 
opted for a career in Indonesia, with or without being interviewed the 
Indonesian embassy in The Hague.28
During the early years of the Republic, the town planning practice thus 
hardly differed from the pre-war and post-war colonial system. What did grad-
ually change in this period though, were the possibilities and the organization 
of higher (technical) education. At the Faculty of Engineering of the University 
of Indonesia (Universitas Indonesia), founded in 1950, Thijsse, who by then 
had resigned as head of the (c)pb, established the Architecture Section (Seksi 
Arsitektur) in 1951.29 As before the war, the curriculum was modelled on the 
curriculum of the Polytechnic in Delft. The Architecture Section consequently 
offered four courses: monumental architecture, utilitarian architecture, social 
housing, and planning. Much attention was devoted to the theory and design 
of applied mechanics, and hardly any to the theory and design of contempo-
rary architecture and town planning.30 What was taught, at the initiative of 
President Sukarno, was Hindu-Javanese art and the history and construction of 
Hindu-Javanese architecture. The number of architecture students who gradu-
ated from the school was initially quite small: the first two qualified in 1956, 
five more in 1957 and another five in 1958. The number of alumni with a town 
planning specialization was even smaller.
 Definitive Rupture
The collegial atmosphere in the Indonesian planning practice and education 
in the first half of the 1950s, attested to by Indonesian and Dutch partici-
pants  alike, stood in sharp contrast to the precarious political relations 
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31 Interviews: Ir Ardiman, Bandung (14-11-2000); Ir Harisanto, Bandung (19-12-2000); 
Ir Achmad Noe’man, Bandung (8-1-2001); Ir Kwee Hin Goan, Rotterdam (16-6-2003); Ir Adhi 
Moersid, Jakarta (5-1-2001); Prof. ir Purnomohadi, Jakarta (5-1-2001); Prof. ir A. Sidharta, 
Semarang (28-11-2000); correspondence author with Dr. ir Yuswadi Salya, Bandung (19-2-
2007); Prof. William A. Doebele, Cambridge (29-6-2007); Ir Maarten Westerduin, 
Heemstede (17-7-2007). Alumni and correspondents recall, again not in full and with pos-
sible inaccuracies here and there, the following names: Kopeinig (architecture), 
Mrs.  Lechner, Natt Messnig (architecture), Noffsinger, Mrs. Schonherr (interior design). 
The Hungarian Obolensky taught History of Civilization until the 1959–1960 academic year.
32 itb had been created in early 1957 after the faculties of engineering, mathematics and 
physics were split off from the University of Indonesia and reformed into an independent 
institution.
33 The unusual appellation for this new itb division was chosen ‘[i]n order to emphasize the 
importance of regional issues in a nation as far-flung as Indonesia’ (Doebele 2000:3).
34 Although the intention was for it to eventually become an independent institute for 
urban studies and research for South and Southeast Asia (Doebele 1962:95, 97), the tpdk 
has remained part of the itb to this day.
between the two countries. The Netherlands found it difficult to accept that 
the Republic was charting its own course. The controversy over the constitu-
tional position of New Guinea was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
In late 1957, the 50,000 Dutch nationals living in Indonesia were forced to leave 
the country.
More than the transfer of sovereignty, it was this event that led to profound 
changes in town planning. The vacancies in planning departments and univer-
sities left by the forced departure of the Dutch were rapidly filled by Indonesians, 
but also mainly by American, German and Austrian professionals.31 The result 
of these changes soon became apparent, initially primarily in education, but 
soon also in the planning practice, and consequently in the design and the 
functioning of cities and towns.
One element of the growing modernization of Indonesia, and the role of 
town planning therein, was the increasing orientation of Indonesian planners 
towards American planning. At the Faculty of Architecture of the Institut 
Teknologi Bandung (itb, Bandung Institute for Technology) more time was 
allotted to architecture, town planning, and landscape design.32 In addition, 
the Bagian Tata Pembangunan Daerah dan Kota (tpdk, Division of Regional 
and City Planning) was established at itb. The name deviated from the cus-
tomary order of terms, in which ‘city’ would be listed first, followed by 
‘regional’.33 The tpdk, which opened its doors at the start of the 1959–1960 
academic year, aimed to meet the growing demand for education and training 
in the planning field.34
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35 There is no (complete) overview nor certainty about the teachers who worked in itb’s 
Faculty of Architecture and the Division of Regional and City Planning. According to 
Doebele, teachers from the University of Kentucky worked exclusively in Yogyakarta. 
Oetomo and Watts, however, write that Walter Hunziker (Housing) and George Hinds 
(Urban and Regional Planning Process), both from the University of Kentucky, worked for 
the Division of Regional and City Planning. What is certain is that, through the United 
Nations Technical Assistance Program, the following instructors taught at itb: Kenneth 
Watts (City Planning in Indonesia), George Franklin (British, urban planning for the 
Overseas Development Administration), Prof. Rosenberg (geographer from New Zealand, 
for urban geography, initials unknown), Dr F.W. Ledgar (Melbourne University, for urban 
and regional planning), Dr Väinö Kannisto (demographics), Prof. V. Milone (Stanford 
University, for urban design). Due to the suspension of diplomatic relations between 
Indonesia and the United States there was no instructor from Harvard in Bandung during 
the fourth year. During the seventh year – which was also the last year American teachers 
would be stationed in Indonesia – a Harvard instructor of Canadian origin taught at itb. 
Doebele (1962); Oetomo (2004:55–56); Watts (1997:109–113); Private archive Prof. William 
A. Doebele, Cambridge, ‘A Few Reminiscences about the Founding of the Division of 
Regional and City Planning at the Institute of Technology Bandung’, 2000; correspon-
dence author with Prof. William A. Doebele, Cambridge, 29-6-2007.
The tpdk was an initiative of the Indonesian architect Kus Hadinoto, the 
United Nations Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations, the Harvard School 
of Graduate Design, the Biro Perancang Negara (National Planning Bureau) 
and the ministries of Pekerjaan Umum dan Tenaga (Public Works and Energy) 
and Pendidikan (Education).35 The influence of American town planners and 
teachers led to a change in town planning and architecture design practice in 
the archipelago in the second half of the twentieth century. Whereas designers 
educated in the Netherlands or elsewhere in Europe had worked according to 
European design principles and methods during the first half of the century, 
designers in the second half of the century predominantly applied to American 
viewpoints and methods. The result was that the attention to the small scale, 
detail, and ensembles that typified Dutch and European town planning and 
architecture made way for a design approach with entirely different principles. 
In particular, the introduction of personal transport by car, championed in 
America, as the basis for planning represented a radical turnaround in the way 
in which towns and cities were designed and laid out (Figure 4.6). Through the 
input of the Americans, the car, the paramount symbol of modernization, 
acquired a primary place in Indonesian town planning after 1957.
A comparison of residential areas from the first and from the second half of 
the twentieth century illustrates the formal implications of this change. 
Whereas in the Netherlands Indies the proportions and layout of residential 
and commercial districts, conjure up reminiscences of contemporaneous dis-
tricts in the Netherlands, Indonesian residential areas increasingly resemble 
115Netherlands Indies Town Planning
<UN>
American suburbs. Leafy avenues, enclosed shopping streets, and contempo-
rary architecture have made way for boulevards, six-lane highways and retro 
architecture predominantly copied from Western models. This was not a 
change exclusively reserved for new districts. Numerous inner-city areas 
underwent similar transformations: streets were widened as much as possible 
while relatively modest dwellings and shops made way for large-scale, fully air-
conditioned homes, high-rises, and shopping malls.
Beyond changes in the urban landscape, the introduction of American plan-
ning principles had an additional effect. Whereas town planners in the first 
half of the twentieth century made an effort to take local climatic, technical, 
material, and socio-cultural conditions into account, this town planning prac-
tice seemed increasingly irrelevant in the Indonesian Republic. Aside from a 
few exceptions, Indonesian town planners increasingly applied global design 
methods and measures. As a result, Indonesian plans, as well as the elements 
that make up urban development plans, are scarcely, if at all, typical or specific 
to their local, Indonesian context (anymore). This is a development that has 
not only reduced town planning in the archipelago to a superficial imitation of 
an imported principle, it has also robbed town planning of its autonomy and 
its role as an agent of modernization.
 Conclusion
Town planning is premised on a belief in progress, modernization, and the 
engineering of society. Modernization and town planning, by definition, focus 
Figure 4.6  Jakarta: Jalan Thamrin (1972)
Source: Djakarta membangun 1972
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on improvement. In this sense, town planning in the Netherlands Indies was a 
manifestation of the broader societal process of modernization and, simulta-
neously, one of the major agents of the modernization of Indonesia in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Town planning in the Netherlands Indies in the 
first half of the twentieth century evolved from an intuitive process scarcely 
supported by any data to a discipline based on rational, objective and legal 
principles. This process, the gradual professionalization of town planning in 
the Netherlands Indies, ran virtually parallel to the modernization of the archi-
pelago. As agents of modernization, town planners defined what was modern. 
Kampongs formed the antithesis of modernization: unplanned, disorderly, 
unhygienic, and dangerous. Modern town plans and cities were orderly, har-
monious, organic, and pleasing to the eye.
The necessity felt by many architects and town planners to raise what 
around 1900 was a fairly poor level of architecture and town planning in the 
archipelago to a higher level resulted in a campaign for recognition of architec-
ture and town planning as professional disciplines, as well as a search for a 
systematic, rational method to design modern, harmonious cities, neighbour-
hoods, and buildings. The establishment of professional associations such as 
the Vereeniging voor Bouwkundigen in Nederlandsch-Indië in 1898 and the 
Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen in 1912, as well as the publication of profes-
sional journals such as Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift, Locale Belangen and 
Locale Techniek, are a testament to that quest for professionalization. The for-
mulation of the Town Planning Ordinance in 1938 was an important step for-
ward: it paved the way for a legal, methodological foundation for a professional 
spatial planning practice.
It was not only town planning that modernized: the state apparatus, instru-
mental in creating the context for planners to work in, modernized as well. The 
shortage of data that had haunted planners in the early days of Netherlands 
Indies town planning was finally solved in the 1930s, when the state was able to 
provide reliable demographic statistics and detailed maps of urban areas. The 
modernization of the state also entailed the development of a legal foundation 
for town planning. The juridical underpinning of town planning culminated in 
the 1938 Town Planning Ordinance, which was finally passed in 1948.
The enactment of the Town Planning Ordinance in 1948 underscores the 
continuity in town planning practice before and after Indonesian  Inde-
pendence. A major change in thinking about town planning did not occur until 
the forced replacement of the remaining Dutch planners in 1957 and beyond. 
American planning and the pivotal role of the car became the new standard, 
with cars seen as the embodiment of modernization.
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The attention for the car and suburbs in the late 1950s erroneously suggests 
that planning only concerned the residential areas of the elite. From the early 
twentieth century onwards, planners were concerned about all groups. 
Although attention initially was limited mainly to issues that mattered to a 
small segment of the population, the Europeans, colonial town planners did 
not accept the backward state of kampongs as permanent. Modernization was 
to be brought to everyone. Netherlands Indies town planning was consequently 
marked by a clear evolution. Almost immediately after the Decentralization 
Act of 1903 was implemented, town planners and administrators shifted their 
attention to living conditions in non-European areas as well. The planning area 
of urban development therefore expanded, from the residential quarter level 
to the urban level, and finally to the regional level, doing away over time with 
any distinction between European interests and those of indigenous and other 
groups. It was this evolution that turned town planning into a powerful instru-
ment of modernization in the archipelago: besides properly managing the 
development of towns, it also contributed to a growing awareness among the 
local population about the scope of the colonial administration and the devel-
opment opportunities of their country.
Town planning modernized society not only through interventions in the 
built environment, but also by educating and enlightening the population, 
particularly the indigenous people. Professional training programmes were 
established and non-European intermediaries were installed between the 
non-European population and the civil administration. In addition, radio pro-
grammes were increasingly broadcast in Malay, and Malay translations or sum-
maries of Dutch articles on urban development appeared in publications. The 
gradual increase in interest and participation by non-Europeans concerning 
urban problems that resulted from these efforts belied the assumption, widely 
shared during the first years of decentralization, that non-Europeans a priori 
did not care about such issues. Nothing could be further from the truth, it 
turned out: the more access they had to the civil administration and the better 
they were educated, the more non-Europeans participated in the debates. The 
evolution of and the discourse about Netherlands Indies town planning there-
fore largely followed a course parallel to the democratization of Netherlands 
Indies society.
The gradual rationalization of Netherlands Indies (and Indonesian) town 
planning and its evolution into a systematic, rational, and even scientific disci-
pline, as well as the increasing participation by non-Europeans in the town 
planning practice and the town planning debate, are evidence of the role of 
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Rückert and Hoesni Thamrin
Bureaucrat and Politician in Colonial Kampong Improvement
Hans Versnel and Freek Colombijn1
 Introduction
One of the activities through which the modernization of the Indonesian city 
became manifest was the large-scale improvement of substandard housing 
districts. Usually referred to as kampongs, by the early twentieth century these 
areas came to be widely considered as unregulated and unplanned housing 
areas inhabited mostly by lower income people. Some kampongs originated 
from a village located close to a city’s urban boundaries and were subsequently 
absorbed as the city expanded. Other kampongs had evolved within the city 
boundaries, for instance, from original settlements of squatters occupying 
vacant land. Whatever the exact origin, most kampongs had developed gradu-
ally in a haphazard way since the late nineteenth century as the colonial econ-
omy and its urban centres expanded.
As interest in town planning and public health developed, it became increas-
ingly apparent that the conditions in these unplanned and unregulated 
housing areas, exacerbated by an ever increasing population density, were 
unacceptable in a number of ways. Streets and alleyways were mainly unpaved 
and meandered amongst indiscriminately placed dwellings making access by 
strangers almost impossible. No two houses were the same and many occu-
pied houses were considered derelict and unsuitable for living. Non-existent 
or inadequate water supply and sewerage facilities compounded these cha-
otic and unhygienic conditions. Local medical officers convinced city adminis-
trators that these kampongs were not only unacceptable in appearance but 
also downright dangerous to the health and prosperity of the city as a whole. 
In the eyes of residents, however, the historical and village-like arrange-
ments within kampongs provided a secure sense of familiarity, with established 
points of orientation linking them to the mosque, the pasar (market), warung 
(food stalls), and other landmarks. Kampong residents may have cared less 
about the poor physical condition of their living environment: in any case, if 
they did there was little they could do to change it and they had learned to make 
do. However, to the city administrators, intent on modernising and improving 
124 Versnel and Colombijn
<UN>
2 Active and passive voting rights were restricted to persons with a minimal annual income of 
600 guilders, and this criterion restricted the electorate to a minority.
their city, these chaotic and uncontrolled kampongs were blots on the 
landscape.
The city administrators as well as the central colonial government consid-
ered the apparent chaos of the kampongs a problem for at least two reasons. 
First of all, the ostensible disorderliness represented the opposite of the ideal 
of modernity; kampongs not only challenged their aspirations of being enlight-
ened administrators of modern, rationally planned towns, but also their ability 
to regulate the behaviour of their inhabitants. Secondly, these inaccessible 
kampongs with their unhygienic environment were considered breeding 
grounds not only of epidemic diseases but also of criminal behaviour. For these 
reasons, the administration at all levels considered kampong improvement 
both a necessity and a public interest. It was also self-evident that the authori-
ties had to take the lead both because of the massive financial costs involved 
and the perception that ‘natives’ would not understand the rational and epide-
miological factors underpinning their intentions. Thus kampong improvement 
became a policy characterized by a strong top-down approach typical of colo-
nial reform policies.
The Netherlands Indies has been characterized as Beamtenstaat, a society in 
which political decisions were taken by leading civil servants based on alleg-
edly rational and technocratic evidence: ‘the state as efficient bureaucratic 
machine’ (McVey 1982). The development of this Beamtenstaat was fostered by 
the perceived need to implement and control what was considered as desir-
able change, unchecked by any democratic representative bodies. Although 
the Decentralization Act of 23 July 1903, gradually established forms of local 
government, beginning with municipal councils, these only extended and 
deepened the role of the Beamtenstaat as municipal councils, at least initially, 
began with only appointed councillors and a civil servant acting as chairman. 
While councillors were gradually selected by elections (in which, however, 
income and other qualifications restricted active voting rights), as late as 1916 
the mayors, who replaced local civil servants as head of the municipal admin-
istration, were still being appointed by the central colonial government.2 At 
the central level, the Volksraad, which first met in 1918, as a colony-wide repre-
sentative body, could merely advise the colonial government, and did not have 
the competence to approve a budget or issue laws. Moreover, members were 
largely a mix of bureaucrats, and civil servants, a majority of whom were at first 
appointed by the central government. Nevertheless, despite the considerable 
125Rückert and Hoesni Thamrin
<UN>
level of state control of the local and central representative councils, heated 
debates did often take place.
Kampong improvement was one of those topics that attracted vociferous 
exchange of opinion in these emerging political arenas since kampong 
improvement was not merely a technical expression of the modernization of 
the city but directly facilitated the ability of colonial authorities to increasingly 
penetrate the lives of the kampong people. It also involved a new process in 
how administrative decisions were made and implemented. Equally signifi-
cant, as it drew on a range of modern sciences, kampong improvement opened 
up new venues for ambitious men to exert political influence in an expanding 
state. These represented the new class of educated, professional, and public-
minded individuals who articulated a modern future.
On the question of kampong improvement, there was no better example of 
one who embodied the Beamtenstaat than Johannes Jacobus Gerardus 
Everwijn Rückert. Rückert was a first rate bureaucrat who also fulfilled political 
functions. He came to the Netherlands Indies in 1913 to start his colonial career 
in Semarang as director of the Department of Public Works. Later he became 
chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen (Association for Local 
Interests), an association of professional people working for local governments 
and broadly supportive of decentralization of government. Rückert was 
appointed member of the Volksraad in 1927, while holding a position as civil 
servant at the Decentralisatie Kantoor, the office of the central government 
overseeing decentralization affairs.
It was generally assumed that elected members of municipal councils and 
the Volksraad – and professionals – would speak for the ‘common interest’ and 
not defend the interest of specific groups. This assumption that such men – 
and of course there were only men – because of their public or professional 
positions, and more generally, that appointed European colonial officials, 
would best interpret the common interest legitimized the gross over-represen-
tation of Europeans in municipal councils and the Volksraad. The same cri-
terion determined that the selection of representatives of the Indonesian 
population to be appointed, both at the central and municipal level, was care-
fully controlled. However, as Indonesian political organizations evolved, and 
municipal councils became more representative, councillors increasingly 
came to consciously and openly defend the political interests of specific 
groups. This development was personified by Mohammed Hoesni Thamrin. He 
was elected councillor to the Batavia municipal council in 1919, and in 1927 
became the first indigenous alderman (wethouder) in Batavia. In the mean-
time he had also been appointed member of the Volksraad, which provided 
him with a platform for espousing his moderate nationalist political ideas. 
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Combining his municipal and Volksraad responsibilities, he used his dual posi-
tions to promote the interests of Indonesians. In doing so, he was particularly 
outspoken in his views on the question of kampong improvement.
In this chapter, we wish to compare the ways these two men, Rückert and 
Thamrin, a European bureaucrat and an Indonesian politician, approached 
the question of how the kampong should be improved. Rückert’s natural allies 
were civil servants, including the persons gathered in the Vereeniging voor 
Locale Belangen, where he served as chairman. Hoesni Thamrin found sup-
porters among the Indonesian community in his constituency, although as his 
position in the Volksraad was as an appointed, rather than elected member, it 
could not be said he represented them. One could have expected that their dif-
ferent functions and support base would have influenced their way of operat-
ing: Rückert, a strong technocratic approach and paying much attention to 
financial aspects; Hoesni Thamrin, the politician, politicizing discussions and 
making emotional appeals. Moreover, in beginning our research, we assumed 
that Indonesian politicians like Hoesni Thamrin would have been most keen 
on dealing and seeking compromises with potential allies to achieve their 
goals. In the end, however, we found the bureaucrat Rückert just as much suc-
cessfully employing strategic alliances to achieve his goals as Thamrin. 
Regardless of the strategies each adopted to improve the kampongs, however, 
an examination of their efforts is instructive in providing insight into the pro-
cesses underpinning the modernization of the Indonesian city.
 The Emergence of the Kampong Question
Initially, municipal administrations had very few options to intervene in urban 
kampongs, due to the limitations set by the 1903 Decentralization Act and 
existing colonial laws protecting the administrative autonomy of so-called 
autonome desa’s or inlandsche gemeentes (villages with their own administra-
tion) located within the municipal boundaries. However, the autonomy of 
these inlandsche gemeentes, with their traditional rural characteristics located 
within the boundaries of modern urban centres, was perceived as standing in 
the way of efficient urban management. This, and the insalubrious conditions 
in the kampongs, formed an administrative challenge that was dubbed the 
‘kampongvraagstuk’ (the kampong question) by colonial administrators. The 
abolition of the principle of kampong autonomy was considered a necessary 
condition to tackle the other half of the kampongvraagstuk, the chaotic appear-
ance and the perceived unhygienic conditions of the kampongs (Reerink, this 
volume).
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(of central state competencies to local administrators); in practice the congresses could deal 
with any topic relevant for urban (and sometimes regional) administrations.
The condition of kampongs was in the first place discussed at the local level, 
in the respective municipal councils, but there were also a number of supra-
local institutions where ideas about kampong improvement were exchanged 
between representatives of relevant professions increasingly employed by the 
newly established municipalities and concerned colonial bureaucratic figures. 
Of prime importance in this regard was the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen. 
This association organized an annual congress (Decentralisatiecongres) to dis-
cuss issues related to local government and published a bi-weekly journal, 
Locale Belangen, in which new ideas were canvassed and old ‘chestnuts’ regu-
larly debated.3 A considerable degree of consensus on these issues was also 
achieved through decisions and reports emanating from the office of the 
Regeringscommissaris voor Decentralisatie (Government Commissioner for 
Decentralization, later called Adviser – Adviseur – on Decentralization). The 
position of Adviser responsible for advising the central government in matters 
of local administration was a powerful civil service post in an era of colonial 
reform. The two, the professional lobby group, the Vereeniging voor Locale 
Belangen, with its journal and annual Decentralization Congress, and the gov-
ernment appointed Government Commissioner for Decentralization, contrib-
uted significantly to the emergence and definition of a colonial kampong 
improvement policy. The so-called Kampongverbeteringscommissie (Com-
mission for Kampong Improvement) published its first, and as it turned out, 
last, survey on kampong improvement in 1939.
The abolition of the autonomous kampongs was not only prevented by 
juridical constraints, but also by financial limits. Already in 1907 D. Tollenaar, 
the then Government Commissioner for Decentralization, had pointed out the 
enormous amounts of money that would be required if urban authorities had 
to take over administration of autonomous kampongs once these were abol-
ished and remarked that these high expectations could not be fulfilled. 
Tollenaar had made this observation in response to a request from the munici-
pality of Batavia for a subsidy for the construction and maintenance of roads, 
bridges, water supply, and street lighting in the kampongs located within its 
city boundaries. At the time the central government rejected the request on 
the grounds that the municipality did not have the authority to intervene in 
these kampongs. In 1915 Tollenaar, this time in his capacity of head of the 
Binnenlandsch Bestuur (Department of the Interior), again pointed out the 
costs that would have to be incurred if kampong autonomy were abolished and 
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(bb) 1683, Memorie van Toelichting op de ontwerpbegroting 1929: Volksraad Zitting 1928–
1929, Ond. 1/ Afd. IV / st.5, p. 72, post 463, onderdeel 500.000 guilders.
the central government held accountable for the cost of improving the 
kampongs.
A revision of the 1903 Decentralization Act solved at least in theory the juridi-
cal aspect of the kampong question in 1918. The 1918 revision amended the 
Decentralization Act and henceforward the autonomy of individual kampongs 
situated within municipal boundaries could be abolished by central government 
ordinance, with the kampongs being placed under the authority of the munici-
pality. In practice however, the actual abolition of autonomous administration 
of kampongs, so long advocated, was not so easily achieved in individual cases. 
As H.J. Bussemaker, Mayor of Surabaya, stated in a paper for the Decentralization 
Congress of 1929, when kampong improvement would result in the abolition of 
the kampong autonomy, the loss of such autonomy should be compensated. He 
argued that this would mean giving a greater say to indigenous people in munici-
pal politics, including the extension of voting rights in council elections. A simi-
lar point had already been made by the Mayor of Semarang in 1921 (Coté 2011).
Meanwhile, scepticism about the financial aspects of the kampong question 
continued. In October 1921 the Resident of Surabaya, S. Cohen, stated that noth-
ing prevented the solution of the kampong question ‘but simply and solely and 
absolutely nothing else then the lack of money’ (Flieringa 1930:38).4 He held the 
opinion that it was not the abolition of the kampong autonomy that was the 
stumbling block, but the financial costs required to improve the kampongs, par-
ticularly if this were done on a large scale. Gradually, however, and even before 
the official changes to the law, the central government began to furnish money on 
a case by case basis from their annual budget to this end. In 1916 it contributed for 
the first time 8,500 guilders to costs for improvements in a kampong in Malang. 
The following year the central government granted a total of 102,000 guilders 
for the improvement of kampongs in Surabaya, Bandung and Malang. The view 
of the colonial government was that as a rule the municipality and central gov-
ernment had to share the costs of the public works in improved kampongs unless 
the municipality lacked the financial means (Flieringa 1930:43–45).
During discussions on the 1929 budget in the Volksraad, the colonial govern-
ment decided to commit 500,000 guilders annually to finance kampong 
improvement. This amount would be available to meet half of all annu-
ally approved kampong improvement costs, the other half being the responsi-
bility  of the municipalities.5 The central government stipulated that a local 
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the length of their frontage along the street, and the quality of the street; opcenten were sur-
taxes on the income tax.
7 ‘de kampongs zoo spoedig mogelijk behooren te worden overgedragen aan de gemeente 
Semarang en dat in afwachting daarvan, reeds onmiddellijk door de gemeente de aller-ergste 
toestanden dienen te worden verbeterd’ (Locale Belangen 1-10-1927:760–761).
government needed to have sufficient income of its own to be eligible for cen-
tral state support. If, for instance, a municipality did not levy straatbelasting or 
opcenten,6 it would not receive a subsidy for kampong improvement. Contrary 
to previous views of the government, a note to this item in the budget explained 
that the question of funding kampong improvement was detached from the 
question whether or not the kampong concerned was still autonomous or part 
of the municipality (Kampongverbeteringscommissie 1939:53–64).
The discussion concerning the kampong question circulated within and 
beyond professional European circles. In 1927 the moderate nationalist organi-
zation Boedi Oetomo held a conference in Semarang in an attempt to involve 
kampong inhabitants in the question. Mohammad Yoesoef, chairman of the 
Semarang branch of Boedi Oetomo and member of the municipal council 
pointed out to the meeting that the question of kampong improvement had 
been dragging on for many years and had still not been resolved. He spoke 
enthusiastically about the intention of the Governor General, De Graeff, dur-
ing an impending visit to Semarang, to also visit some kampongs. The meeting 
concluded that, in daily practice kampong autonomy no longer had much sig-
nificance: they had ineluctably become part of the city, no longer owned prop-
erty such as ambtsvelden (agricultural land owing to the position of village 
head) and their boundaries had become indistinct. The meeting then endorsed 
a motion proposed by Yoesoef, which was subsequently communicated to the 
Governor General, the Voksraad and the council, that
the kampongs should, as soon as possible, be transferred to the munici-
pality of Semarang, and that, in anticipation of this being formalized, 
remediation of the worst conditions [in them] should be undertaken 
immediately by the municipality.7
In a further minute, however, the meeting also added that the kampongs 
should be allowed to retain their autonomy.
A little earlier the Surabayan Indonesische Studieclub, a local Indonesian 
forum to discuss social and political issues, had reported in its periodical, 
Soeloeh Indonesia, the results of its survey on the development of housing in 
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10 anri, BB 1395, Verslag Conferentie inzake Kampongverbetering, 11-2-1928.
Surabaya between 1900 and 1925. Over this period it concluded the population 
had doubled but that proportionately, the availability of housing had declined 
tenfold. Recognizing that much had already been done in terms of improving 
hygiene conditions, it emphasized that the situation in the city’s kampongs 
was deplorable. Life for the indigenous residents was described as ‘moordend’ 
(killing):
[These conditions] not only represent a danger for the lives of indigenous 
people, but for society in general which must draw its labour force from 
the kampongs. Nursemaids who must care for the children, and cooks 
who are responsible for preparing meals, come from such environments 
and the danger of contamination from numerous diseases is no figment 
of the imagination.8
Improvement in kampong conditions meant not only reducing the chances of 
contamination but especially in ‘increasing the life expectancy of the better-
off sections of society’.9 The same survey also concluded that over the last 
quarter century the position of the indigenous person had declined from one 
where he was a property and homeowner to one where he had become merely 
a tenant and day labourer.
The elevation of kampong improvement as a major policy issue was con-
firmed by a Conferentie inzake Kampongverbetering (Conference on Kampong 
Improvement) convened by the Government Commissioner for Decen-
tralization, A.B. Cohen Stuart, in the Lodge of the Freemasons of Batavia in 
1928. The participants included city mayors, municipal secretaries and direc-
tors of municipal services. The central government was represented by Rückert, 
who at the time was seconded to the Government Commissioner for 
Decentralization. The invitation list included only one Indonesian name: that 
of Hoesni Thamrin, who at the time was an alderman in the Batavia city coun-
cil.10 In the following sections we will see in detail what these two men, Rückert 
and Thamrin, achieved in this conference.
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 The Bureaucrat: Rückert
During his colonial career in the Indies, Rückert had occupied many – often 
overlapping – positions in government departments and commissions. After 
being educated in the Netherlands, he began his career in the Indies in 1913 as 
assistant director for Public Works in Semarang. In 1927 he was appointed to 
the Volksraad and seconded to the Decentralisatiekantoor (Office for 
Decentralization Affairs) of the central government and later for a brief time 
he was mayor of the city of Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara). Central to his 
career, however, was his involvement in the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen.
Rückert found a progressive environment in Semarang. Semarang, the third 
largest city of the Netherlands Indies at the time, had the reputation of being a 
pioneer in urban development, planning, public housing, and kampong 
improvement, and it was no coincidence that the board of the Vereeniging 
voor Locale Belangen resided in that city. There was indeed an unusual con-
centration of people with advanced ideas and professional interest in urban 
development in Semarang. The entrepreneur H.F. Tillema, while resident 
there, galvanized attention on the conditions of the city’s health and hygiene 
conditions and on his return to the Netherlands in 1914 spent much of his for-
tune on compiling and publishing his masterwork Kromoblanda on housing 
problems and sanitation (Tillema 1915–1923). Earlier Dr W.T. de Vogel, the 
regional health authority and like Tillema member of the municipal council in 
Semarang, had sought to address the city’s health problems by convincing the 
council to engage an architect to draw up plans for an extension of the city. J.E. 
Stokvis, a socialist and editor of the influential progressive daily De Locomotief 
from 1910 to 1917, used his paper to advocate colonial reforms, including 
improvement to the condition of indigenous housing. In recognition of his 
interests and influential position, Stokvis was elected as the first chairman of 
the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen and held this position from 1912 to 1917. 
In 1923 he was elected to represent the isdp (Indische Sociaal-Democratische 
Partij, Indies Social-Democratic Party) in the Volksraad. The activities of these 
two ‘amateurs in urban development’ was reinforced by the arrival in 1914 of 
Thomas Karsten, a private architect soon to gain a colony-wide reputation for 
his ideas on town planning. The activities of men as these ensured that in the 
first decades of the twentieth century, a climate had evolved in Semarang, 
which favoured the activities of reformers. Many of their progressive ideas 
were incorporated in municipal planning and implemented. Rückert was cer-
tainly able to make use of these progressive forces in Semarang and he himself, 
while not a member of a political party, was later associated with the progressive 
think tank, De Stuw. He even signed a petition organized by this group of 
132 Versnel and Colombijn
<UN>
colonial progressives, dated 12 January 1930, calling for a Commonwealth of the 
Netherlands and Indonesia (Jonkman 1971:71–75).
Rückert’s rapid rise to prominence was in part due to one of the first major 
projects he was assigned to as the bureaucrat responsible for overseeing the 
major urban development projects: the planning and construction of a vast 
new housing development in the hills overlooking the city, Nieuw Tjandi, on 
which he worked closely with the architectural firm headed by Thomas 
Karsten. In 1919, after having been appointed director of the city Department 
of Public Works two years previously, he was promoted to chief city engineer 
with responsibility to prepare a development plan for Semarang’s future 
expansion. Working again with Karsten, Rückert was responsible for integrat-
ing the various sectional plans into one organic whole. These were imple-
mented in stages in the years after 1925 and the main elements of this blueprint 
remained the guide for the city’s growth even after Independence.
In the meantime, after a reorganization of the city’s technical services, 
Rückert was appointed director of Municipal Housing Service, a multi-faceted 
role which included responsibility for city expansion, overseeing housing and 
business development, and supervision of building construction. This new 
position provided him with the power to oversee and implement the broad 
vision that he had earlier developed for Semarang.
Rückert became an important national opinion leader when he became 
member of the board of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen in 1921. He was 
elected chairman the following year, a position he held till 1931 when he 
resigned after a serious disagreement – more of which later. As chairman, he 
not only led the organization but was also member of the editorial board of its 
fortnightly publication, Locale Belangen. This periodical, because of its prac-
tice of including relevant government documents, such as advisory reports, 
and regulations, was widely seen as a mouthpiece for the government. 
Although on occasions the journal did discuss state policy critically, this per-
ception was especially generated by the prominence given to articles on decen-
tralization written by government officials and advisers, which were regularly 
included without editorial comment. Rückert, however, in his capacity as 
chairman but no less in his capacity as editor expressed his criticism of policy 
or policy proposals at times, even in areas in which he himself was involved.
Rückert obtained another key function in 1923 when he was appointed to 
chair a commission to enquire into reorganization of the financial relations 
between the central and local governments following plans to extend the prin-
ciple of decentralization. The commission was dubbed Commissie Rückert 
(Rückert Commission). Whether Rückert owed his position to the fact that he 
was chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen, or because of his 
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prominent role in local government is not clear. The commission was dis-
banded in 1925 when new regional governments were created at the provincial 
and sub-provincial (regency) level and a new commission – Commissie voor 
de financieele verhouding tusschen het Land, Provincies, Regentschappen, 
Gemeenten en andere Locale Ressorten (Commission on Central-Local 
Financial Relationships) – was established to deal with the new circumstances. 
Rückert was however retained as adviser to this new enquiry. In this capacity 
he complained in Locale Belangen that the work of the commission was ham-
pered by a lack of manpower given its task to report on the affairs of the entire 
archipelago, and to attempt to standardize all local budgets in order to make 
them comparable. Rückert was publicly praised for his work on these commis-
sions in the pages of De Locomotief  by his friend, the former paper’s editor J.E. 
Stokvis who by then was a member of the Volksraad representing the Indies 
Socialist Party. In the meantime Rückert had also become chairman of the 
Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging (stv, Social-Technical Association) which, 
amongst other things, organized two very influential public housing con-
gresses. The first congress was held in 1922 and was held, appropriately, in 
Semarang. This congress discussed a series of position papers amongst which 
was an influential paper by Thomas Karsten, in which he called strongly for the 
adoption of guidelines for kampong improvement. Rückert’s work in leading 
this influential gathering of experts was warmly praised by Semarang’s mayor, 
D. de Iongh. After the conference, Semarang’s public was invited to inspect a 
housing exhibition, which had formed part of the congress. The exhibition 
drew 142 European, 52 indigenous and 29 Chinese visitors (Sociaal-Technische 
Vereeniging 1922:48).
In 1927 Rückert attempted to further expand his network of influential con-
tacts by applying for one of the seats in the Volksraad. However, both the 
municipal council of Semarang and De Iongh, Mayor of Semarang, at first 
refused to nominate him on the grounds that he could not be missed from his 
office in Semarang for any length of time. During subsequent negotiations, the 
Semarang council eventually dropped its opposition, coming to see the advan-
tage that might accrue from having a strong spokesman in favour of decentral-
ized government in the Volksraad. Eventually Rückert was also offered the 
opportunity to be seconded to the office of the Government Commissioner for 
Decentralization, headed by A.B. Cohen Stuart. The creation of this new, and 
costly position that Rückert would occupy, that of Hoofdambtenaar ter bes-
chikking van de Adviseur voor de Decentralisatie (Principal Officer responsi-
ble to the Adviser for Decentralization) evoked considerable debate in the 
Volksraad, but ultimately also the Volksraad approved of Rückert’s appoint-
ment with a narrow margin of 22 to 20 votes. His position would involve 
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11 ‘Tot nu toe is de kampongbevolking rustig gebleven, maar de bron van onrust, de voort-
durende bedreiging van rust en orde blijft bestaan in de zoo verwaarloosde kampong.’ anri, 
BB 1395b, 26. It is worth noting that the year before Stokvis had written critically about 
the argument that kampong improvement was necessary to reduce the risk of infection 
of Europeans by their indigenous servants. Such a motivation was painfully selfish, 
according to Stokvis (Locale Belangen 16-5-1927:349-50). The argument had originally 
been advanced by councillor Tillema in his early publications on health and sanitation in 
1911 and 1913.
responsibility for the technical aspects related to the financial relations 
between the central and local governments, kampong improvement, and the 
abolition of kampong autonomy in urban areas (NRC 25-11-1927, 7-12-1927).
Half a year after this appointment, Rückert tabled a motion in the Volksraad 
on kampong improvement; it was supported by Stokvis and the moderate 
Indonesian nationalist Soejono. The motion, put forward during the debate on 
the Netherlands Indies budget for 1929, urged the central government to con-
tribute financially not only to construction work involved in kampong improve-
ment, but also to contribute to the costs of maintaining such kampong 
improvement works. It proposed concretely that the central government 
should pay half the costs associated with local kampong improvement. In 
speaking to his motion, Rückert pointed not only to the poor housing condi-
tions which he had himself seen during his travel to municipalities, but also 
emphasized the danger of epidemics, such as cholera and the plague, which 
could infect inhabitants outside the kampongs. He also pointed out that better 
health would benefit employers and he emphatically stressed the possibility of 
disorder breaking out amongst kampong inhabitants: ‘Until now the kampong 
population has remained calm, but the source of unrest, the continuous threat 
to peace and order, persists to exist in the so neglected kampongs’.11 It was an 
argument that was designed to carry weight since the colony had only recently 
recovered from the shock of the communist-inspired uprisings of 1926 and 
1927, which, despite their actual small scale, left a strong impression on the 
European residents.
In fact Rückert’s personal opinion was that all costs related to kampong 
improvement and their subsequent maintenance should be funded by the cen-
tral government, not just half so that his motion can therefore be seen as a 
compromise. Rückert and his supporter Stokvis had earlier argued that, since 
kampong improvement was a new budget item for which existing municipali-
ties did not have the means to provide, it was the central government that 
should pay. As it turned out Cohen Start, the Government Commissioner for 
Decentralization representing the government in this debate, indicated the 
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13 Hoesni Thamrin had a good relationship with Stokvis and corresponded regularly with 
him until Stokvis returned to the Netherlands for health reasons. It is known that Soejono, 
although he was a senior member of the Volksraad, greatly admired Thamrin as Chairman 
of the Comité voor de Inlandsche Meerderheid in de Volksraad (Committee of the Native 
Majority in the Volksraad).
14 ‘een zeer bekwaam werkend lid heeft in de persoon van ons geacht medelid, de heer Rückert’. 
anri, BB 1395, Handelingen van de Volksraad, zittingsjaar 1928–1929, Onderwerp 1, Afd. 
IV, Stuk 34, Begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1929:45.
government was prepared to favourably consider the proposed principle were 
it not for the fact that the dire condition of the colony’s finances made this 
impossible. The proposal should therefore first be sent for advice to the 
Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships.12
When the motion was put to a vote it did not, as was often the case in the 
Volksraad, divide along racial lines. It was accepted with 28 votes in favour and 
eleven against, but did not gain the unanimous support of the council’s indige-
nous members. Hoesni Thamrin voted in favour but like the other Indonesian 
members, had not participated in the discussions. Why Thamrin had stayed on 
the sideline is not clear. One possible reason was that he did not want to fur-
ther divide the Indonesian group on this issue more than it clearly already was. 
It was also likely that he fully shared the political views of the motion’s second-
ers, Stokvis and Soejono, and had nothing further to add to what they had 
presented.13
The debate on this motion shows perhaps better than anything else how 
Rückert’s various roles had become totally mixed up. The Volksraad member, 
Rückert, debated with the representative of the government, Cohen Stuart, to 
whom civil servant Rückert was seconded as principal officer. The principle of 
freedom of speech in the Volksraad also applied to Rückert, so in principle he 
was free to criticize the state policy; in reality this double role of civil servant-
member of the Volksraad gave rise to awkward situations (Jonkman 1971:60). 
During the debate among the Volksraad representatives, the motion was 
opposed by Fruin, representative of the Politiek Economische Bond. Fruin 
deemed Rückert’s motion premature pending a proposal to be formulated by 
the Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships, the more so as, 
according to Fruin, that commission ‘has a highly competent member in the 
person of our fellow representative, Mr Rückert’.14 When the Volksraad recon-
vened Rückert thanked Cohen Stuart, in daily life his direct superior, for his 
preparedness to accept the principle but pointed out that it remained unclear 
from Cohen Stuart’s reply when this would be implemented if they had to wait 
136 Versnel and Colombijn
<UN>
15 For a complete overview of Rückert’s position it should be added that he also exerted 
influence in two precursors of the Commission that drafted the very influential Town 
Planning Ordinance of 1938. These precursors were the Bouwbeperkingencommissie 
(1930) and the Grond- en Woningcommissie (1932), together with among others Karsten 
and Hoesni Thamrin. Rückert had pleaded to appoint a commission for urban develop-
ment in the Volksraad.
for an advice from the Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships. 
With fine irony he suggested that, even the most optimistic person could see 
that it would be some time before the Commission on Central-Local Financial 
Relationships would have its report ready. Rückert of course knew what he was 
talking about because he was adviser to the very commission that was investi-
gating these relations! The upshot was that civil servant Rückert, as member of 
the Commission on Central-Local Financial Relationships, gave advise to the 
government about a Volksraad motion, tabled by representative Rückert 
(Rückert 1930:172).
In the end, despite the fact the motion received a positive reception from 
Cohen Stuart during the debate in the Volksraad, the central government failed 
to act on it. The final regulation related to subsidies for kampong improvement 
only included costs for construction, and not maintenance as the motion had 
proposed. A decade later, around the time of the Kampongverbeteringscom-
missie, F.H. van de Wetering (1939) observed that people could not count on 
the government to maintain improvement works. This commission had rec-
ommended that the costs and maintenance of improvements should, as far as 
possible be left in whole or in part to those who would benefit from them, 
alluding to the so-called ‘profijtbeginsel’ or the principle of self-interest. 
(Kampongverbeteringscommissie 1939:24). Thus, despite his best efforts and 
wide connections, the inevitable conclusion in this respect must be that there 
was a limit to the power of Rückert.
The combination of multiple functions may have helped Rückert to gain 
power, but ultimately it also created an insoluble conflict of interests, which 
finally forced him to resign as Chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale 
Belangen.15 The government had announced a salary cut of five per cent for all 
civil servants as one of the measures to meet the budget deficit caused by the 
Depression. Rückert supported the decision because he thought it a reason-
able response to the current economic difficulties. The majority of members of 
the association of city mayors and secretaries of which he had been a member 
since 5 May 1931 due to his appointment as acting mayor of Meester Cornelis, 
were, however, opposed to the economy measure. The Vereeniging voor Locale 
Belangen also did not share his opinion, influenced no doubt by the fact that 
137Rückert and Hoesni Thamrin
<UN>
16 Rückert later pursued a successful career as mayor of Enschede in the Netherlands. He left 
office in 1946 and died in 1949.
there were two mayors in its executive. Given this opposition it seemed to 
Rückert that it was best if he resigned from the Vereeniging voor Locale 
Belangen before discussion on the 1932 budget began so that it could more 
clearly represent the views of the majority of its membership regarding the 
economy measures (Locale Belangen April 1931:344–345; May 1931:447; Het 
Vaderland 17-7-1931:344–345). In any event, he had already decided to return to 
the Netherlands in 1932. Rückert did however retain his membership of the 
editorial board of Locale Belangen.16
To sum up it can be said that Rückert was an important figure in the decen-
tralization process in the Netherlands-Indies, in particular in relation to its 
financial aspects. He made effective use of his extensive ‘old boys’ network in 
his bureaucratic and administrative functions. In the decision-making pro-
cesses related to kampong improvement he played a significant role and here 
too he exploited an extended lobby network. Although as member of the 
Volksraad it might have been expected that he would have played a more polit-
ical role, here Rückert chose to act more in line with his bureaucratic and 
administrative function, emphasizing the technical and practical aspects of 
issues. In this he contrasted to Hoesni Thamrin. The calm, business-like ora-
tions of Rückert, apparent, for instance, in his address in relation to the motion 
on the funding of the maintenance of kampong improvements, were in sharp 
contrast to the heated speeches of Hoesni Thamrin in which he regularly 
described the scandalous conditions in urban kampongs and in so doing 
severely criticized colonial government policy. This might explain why Thamrin 
did not participate in the debate on the Rückert motion: there was little politi-
cal emotion to be generated from this technical approach to the issue.
 The Politician: Thamrin
One reason why the municipal administrations found it difficult to work in the 
kampongs was the lack of communication with the indigenous residents, the 
majority of whom had little formal education. Culture and language barriers 
stood in the way of smooth communication. On their side, many indigenous 
residents found the town hall somewhat intimidating when they had to do 
business there, or with its agents. As Bob Hering (1996:61) remarks, kampong 
people knew the municipality mostly through ‘soesah [nuisance] measures’, 
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like building lines and the building inspection. Kampong people nevertheless 
were quick to request the technical services of the municipality to solve minor 
problems. Cultural differences hampered mutual understanding, and the 
municipal administration, based on urban Dutch models, was much more 
comprehensible to European and wealthy non-European residents accultur-
ated in Western ways than to the majority of Chinese and indigenous residents. 
Thus those individuals who could act as intermediary between the town hall 
departments and the kampong people played a crucial role. Hoesni Thamrin 
was an important, arguably the most prominent, of these intermediaries. He 
fulfilled a crucial role in explaining the administration’s intentions to the kam-
pong people, but equally, played a key role in translating the feelings of the 
kampong people to policy makers.
One occasion where Thamrin’s role as the voice of the kampong people was 
evident was in 1925, at the second of the two congresses organized by the 
Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging focusing exclusively on kampongs. Together 
with two other indigenous councillors from Batavia, Thamrin presented a 
paper, in which they explained why the kampong population expressed not 
the least interest in municipal affairs. More directly, he argued that the kam-
pong community regarded the intervention of the municipality as contribut-
ing to their financial burdens. Thamrin had made the same point in the Batavia 
council on various occasions (Flieringa 1930:116–119).
Hoesni Thamrin’s upbringing made him ideally equipped to act as an inter-
mediary. He was born on 16 February 1894 in Sawah Besar in Batavia, where his 
father, Mohamad Thabrie, was adjunct-hoofdjaksa (assistant public prosecu-
tor). Already in 1919 Hoesni Thamrin had been elected to the Batavia city coun-
cil at the youthful age of 25 by the small political party, the Kaoem Betawi, 
which participated in the elections of the city council in 1917 for the first time. 
The Kaoem Betawi, of which Hoesni and his father were leading members, was 
a small political party of well-to-do people, which took its name from that of 
the original population of Batavia. Although Hoesni Thamrin was legally cate-
gorized as an ‘Inlander’, in the colony’s legal tripartite division of the popula-
tion, he also had European ancestors. This, and his father’s prominent position, 
ensured that he was raised in a European oriented environment, which 
included a European education. After attending a Christian pre-school in Pasar 
Baroe, he was sent to an exclusive Dutch elementary school in Mangga Besar 
(Instituut Bosch), at which time he took on the name of Jacob. Following this 
he went to an even more prestigious school, the Koning Willem III Gymnasium 
in Salemba to complete his secondary school education. Here as in his previ-
ous schools, teaching and learning were entirely in Dutch and he mixed with 
well-off Dutch and Eurasian schoolmates.
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After a short period as apprentice at the office of the Resident of Batavia, 
Thamrin moved to the accounting department of the Koninklijke Paketvaart 
Maatschappij (kpm, Royal Packet Navigation Company). During this period he 
came into contact with Daan van der Zee, who encouraged him to go into poli-
tics. Van der Zee, a member of the isdp, worked at the town hall of Batavia and 
in 1920 was appointed to the position of town clerk one year after Thamrin 
became member of the municipal council. Van der Zee put Hoesni Thamrin in 
touch with his social-democratic friends, including Schotman and Stokvis. 
Their regular meetings were held in the Maison Versteeg & Rikkers, a well-
known restaurant in Noordwijk, Batavia, noted for its wide garden and terrace 
in a French style. Thamrin did not become member of the isdp, but sympa-
thized with the social-democratic aims of this party. His relationship with 
Stokvis, the former chief editor of the newspaper De Locomotief in Semarang, 
alongside whom he sat in the Volksraad, was particularly important to Thamrin 
and remained of great influence to Thamrin even after Stokvis left to stay per-
manently in the Netherlands.
Thamrin’s political position was that of a ‘cooperative nationalist’. This 
position was entirely acceptable to the progressive groups in the European 
society such as the membership of the isdp who were also strong propo-
nents  of the need to improve the conditions of the Indonesian population. 
He was, moreover, financially independent and thoroughly at home in Euro-
pean society, and could afford to devote all his time to politics. Although his 
party had only one seat in the Volksraad, Thamrin himself played a very 
active role as he was a member of many of the Council’s advisory commit-
tees  including the Technische Commissie (Technical Committee), the Belas-
ting Commissie (Taxation Committee), the Commissie voor Begraafplaatsen 
(Cemeteries Committee), the Kampongcommissie (Kampong Committee), 
and the Financiële Commissie (Finance Committee).
In the beginning of his term, Thamrin more often than not supported pro-
posals put forward by other members rather than presenting proposals of his 
own, while he sharpened his political skills during question time. After a cau-
tious beginning however, Hoesni Thamrin gradually developed an eloquent 
style of debating which impressed both political friends and opponents. He 
was very polite in his addresses, his voice was soft but emphatic, but he could 
also be sarcastic; for instance in April 1923 he called the meagre municipal 
resources made available for kampong improvement so far merely an amount 
to appease the municipal conscience (Hering 1996:53). He consistently stood 
up for the interests of the ‘Betawi wong tjilik’, the original ordinary inhabitants 
of Batavia. His concerns were to get improvement in methods of rice distribu-
tion, the maintenance of drainage systems, the supply of fresh drinking water, 
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and action to prevent the constantly reoccurring floods, which annually 
attacked Batavia.
Despite Thamrin’s eloquence, multiple public positions and connections, 
Batavia’s, indigenous community had limited clout. In municipal elections, 
each ethnic category (Inlanders, Vreemde Oosterlingen, and Europeans) had a 
specific number of seats assigned to them in the council but it was not until 
the elections of 1938 that the municipality introduced the so-called ‘pariteits’ 
or parity principle. This finally gave the indigenous community an equal num-
ber of seats to those of ‘other Asians’ and Europeans combined. In fact, of 
course, this still left the indigenous people heavily under represented given 
their majority share in the total population (De Vletter, Voskuil and Diessen 
1997:21). Moreover, because the indigenous councillors often did not vote as a 
block, they typically did not make the most of the fact that they occupied half 
of the council seats.
Thamrin himself, however, often succeeded in gaining support from 
European councillors in his battle to gain improvements in urban kampongs, 
in particular from social-democratic councillors who shared his view that the 
municipality’s responsibilities extended to their maintenance. In pursuing his 
declared role in the council of looking after the interests of the kampong peo-
ple, he questioned why it prioritized the development of the elite neighbour-
hood of Menteng at the expense of the kampongs such as Kramat and Kwitang. 
One of the specific issues he raised was the question of the municipality’s 
responsibility for kampongs located on private estates (particuliere landerijen). 
At the meeting of 21 March 1921 Thamrin proposed that owners of private 
estates had to financially support the improvement of kampongs on their 
estate. It had been common practice for such landlords to provide and main-
tain the drainage systems in their estate kampongs in earlier times, but this 
custom had been lost (Gemeenteblad 1921/77). Unable to force private estate 
owners to undertake this responsibility, Mayor Meyroos also resisted the idea 
that the council – or indeed the central government – could be held account-
able for the improvement of roads and drainages in the kampongs on the pri-
vate estates.
In this debate Thamrin found strong support from councillor Van Marle. 
According to Van Marle the Council could not eschew responsibility for the 
kampongs simply because they were located on privately owned land. The 
might of this small group of landlords, he argued, had to be broken because 
their neglect threatened the health of 80 per cent of Batavia’s population and 
made it impossible for them to lead a decent life. Van Marle further drew atten-
tion to the glaring contrast between the condition of the main thoroughfares 
of Batavia and the roads and footpaths in the kampongs: the former he 
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Thamrin belonged by then (Eggink 1930:91).
declared, acted as camouflage for the dirty kampongs and impassable kam-
pong roads. At a council meeting in February 1922 Hoesni Thamrin supported 
Van Marle’s demand that work on improving Batavia’s kampongs was an urgent 
necessity. Van Marle had compared Batavia to a painting in a beautiful frame, 
which depicted fine villas and broad avenues while the kampongs represented 
the worthless canvas on which these beautiful scenes were painted. Thamrin 
immediately proposed that a budget of 100,000 guilders be set aside for kam-
pong improvement by introducing economies in other budget items. He pro-
posed that this money could be spent on ‘flying brigades’ of a hundred coolies, 
which would travel from kampong to kampong. Amongst other things these 
brigades would be required to clean out drains to ensure better drainage 
(Hering 1996:52).
Initially Thamrin’s proposal was rejected. The mayor argued that tax reve-
nues raised in the kampongs were insufficient to pay for the kampong improve-
ment, and he was not prepared to use more than 30,000 guilders out of the 
municipal budget for kampong improvement. In 1923 however the council 
approved the introduction of a new tax on real estate that made more funds for 
kampong improvement available. A list of kampongs that needed to be 
improved was immediately drawn up – including Sawah Besar, an area where 
Thamrin owned property – but the central government disallowed the intro-
duction of the new tax. In the end Thamrin’s earlier motion to spend 100,000 
guilders on kampong improvement was unanimously accepted, in part in an 
attempt to demonstrate to the central government the need for new taxes. The 
council also voted to establish a special commission to draw up plans for kam-
pong improvement, which, would draw on the knowledge and experience of 
indigenous officials (Hering 1996:51–55).
At the end of 1923 Thamrin was again successful in diverting funds for kam-
pong improvement. His proposal was to spend the so-called Jubileumfonds 
(a fund reserved to mark the silver jubilee of the reign of Queen Wilhelmina) on 
kampong improvement instead of on a memorial statue. The existing Kwitang-
Kramat fund (created to help victims of a blaze in the Kwitang and Kramat kam-
pongs in 1913) was added to the Jubileumfonds and the municipality also voted 
further money to this fund. In 1924 it was agreed that the target of the combined 
funds would extend to the whole of Batavia (and not just the two kampongs 
that had burnt down) and the scope enlarged to include public housing in gen-
eral.17 Another of Thamrin’s initiatives to raise funds ultimately failed. The 
council had endorsed a proposal by Thamrin to contract a loan of 2.5 million 
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guilders, of which 740,000 guilders would be devoted to kampong improve-
ment and 600,000 guilders for road repairs. However, elected deputies in the 
West Java provincial council rejected this loan on technical grounds. The term 
of the loan was 46 years, deemed too long, and it was uncertain the project 
would be able to finance the repayment.
An unintended consequence of Thamrin’s original proposal to devote the 
Jubileumfonds for kampong improvement was a process of gentrification and 
the gradual expulsion of the original kampong population. Kwitang, which 
before the fire had been an ordinary kampong, had in the process of rebuild-
ing become too ‘beautiful’ (mooi) – hence too expensive – for the kampong 
inhabitants themselves. The former mayor, Meyroos, commented in an inter-
view in 1933 that the new houses were being rented out to the ‘kleinen man’ 
(little people) in the European community and thus Kwitang had become a 
European neighbourhood. He added, however, that perhaps this was not so 
bad as there was also a need for cheap housing for the European community 
(NRC 11-5-1933). Meyroos might have had a point, but he ignored what may 
have become of the original inhabitants of the kampong.
It is unclear what Hoesni Thamrin thought about this replacement of kam-
pong people by a predominantly European, lower middle-class. However, he 
definitely pleaded against overly expensive works where he argued a balance 
should be struck between sustainability and permanence. So for instance, in 
relation to kampong Sawah Besar where he himself owned property, he pointed 
out that roads that had been constructed without the appropriate foundations 
nevertheless remained perfectly serviceable after sixteen years. Although 
roads were later much better made, using for instance coral as foundation, 
which ensured better drainage and general serviceability, these were much 
more expensive to construct and thus limited the reach of the budget expendi-
ture (Hering 1996:61).
A new opportunity to exert influence opened up for Thamrin after the gov-
ernment of Batavia introduced the position of aldermen (wethouders), and, in 
October 1926, proposed to appoint Thamrin to one of three such positions. 
Ironically, it was precisely in this month that Thamrin had elicited a great deal 
of criticism from European councillors for his suggestion that a connection 
existed between the endless stream of complaints by indigenous residents 
about housing and living conditions and the communist uprising of that 
month. This analysis did not go down well with his European colleagues who 
believed that the indigenous kampong residents loved law and order and were 
loyal subjects of the Dutch colonial state and that Thamrin’s suggestion slan-
dered them. Mayor Meyroos attempted to soften the effects by asserting that 
while he endorsed Thamrin’s view on kampong improvement, he judged the 
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recent communist uprising not a suitable subject to be discussed in the munici-
pal council. Thamrin clarified (or perhaps adjusted) his point by saying that he 
had not suggested a connection did exist, but that communists might find sup-
porters in the kampongs if nothing was done about the living conditions. On 
an earlier occasion he deplored the fact that there was so little contact between 
the kampong community and the municipality. He pointed out that for the 
vast majority, that is the constituency of the Kaoem Betawi, the whole contact 
it had was through the imposition of taxes and the ‘soesah’ (nuissance) occa-
sioned by the directives of Rooiwezen (Building Line Surveyors) and 
Bouwpolitie (Building Inspectors). Only indigenous intellectuals, Thamrin 
argued, had frequent contact with the municipality. Whatever the European 
councillors may have thought about Thamrin’s explanation, he was elected as 
the first indigenous alderman in Batavia. He took up this new position in 
November 1926 and received, as his portfolio, responsibility for kampong 
improvement and public housing as well as supervision on the operation of 
markets, cemeteries, slaughterhouses, food inspection, fish auctions and 
Indigenous affairs.
Three years later, on 29 October 1929, Thamrin stepped down, because he 
felt bypassed when a European colleague, Van Zalinge, was appointed loco-
burgemeester (deputy mayor). According to Thamrin, this honourable position 
rightfully fell to him, being the alderman with the highest seniority. Mayor 
Meyroos, however, declared in a meeting of the mayor with the aldermen, 
where Thamrin was of course present, that Thamrin could not be appointed to 
the position because it could only be occupied by a European, as the Indies 
municipalities were modelled on Dutch municipal administration.
The affair brought to a head a simmering discontent. In an extensive letter 
setting out his motivations for resigning, Thamrin declared his decision was 
based not only on the fact that he had been by-passed for the position of dep-
uty mayor which was rightly his on the grounds of seniority but in particular 
because he felt he was not being treated with equality. Racial discrimination 
was being practiced in Batavia, he declared. In other municipalities indigenous 
deputy mayors had been appointed. In support of Thamrin, the entire indige-
nous fraction of the council resigned. Many councillors, and also Mayor 
Meyroos regretted Thamrin’s decision and in the media the resignation was 
depicted as a great loss for the council and for the city as a whole. In the end 
the situation was resolved by the early retirement of Van Zalinge due to his 
impending return to the Netherlands so that finally, Thamrin was appointed 
deputy mayor and resumed his role as alderman on 14 January 1930.
In the meantime Hoesni Thamrin had also been appointed member of the 
provincial council of West Java, which had resulted from the administrative 
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reforms of 1925 and had been inaugurated by the Governor General in January 
1926. This provided him with a base from which later, in 1935, he was elected to 
the Volksraad with the support of Boedi Oetomo to represent the West Java 
electorate. In 1939 he was re-elected as representative of Parindra (Partai 
Indonesia Raja) – in the West Java constituency. Despite his membership of 
the Provincial Council, Thamrin could not prevent that body rejecting the 2.5 
million guilders loan proposed by Thamrin and accepted by the municipal 
council of Batavia as mentioned above. Thamrin could not help either that the 
central government rejected an appeal from the municipal government to 
revoke the decision of the Provincial Council.
Thamrin had of course already been a member of the Volksraad prior to his 
election, since 1927 when, at the age of 33, he had been appointed (not elected) 
representative for the Kaoem Betawi. In the Volksraad he led the Fraksi 
Nasional (Frani), which consisted of ‘cooperative’ representatives of the indig-
enous population. Even though the Kaoem Betawi had only one seat in the 
council, Thamrin was able to consolidate his position by gaining membership 
of the College van Gedelegeerden (Board of Delegates) on 27 June 1931. Led by 
the chairman of the Volksraad, this College van Gedelegeerden met on a weekly 
basis unlike the full Volksraad, which only met in two plenary sessions a year. 
Obviously the college had a significant influence on the decisions arrived at by 
the Volksraad. Further adding to Thamrin’s growing political position was his 
election in 1939 by 45 of the 59 Volksraad members as first deputy chairman of 
the council.
For a long time Thamrin combined his work as alderman with his member-
ship of the Volksraad. Physically this was not so difficult since the town hall, 
situated on the south side of the Koningsplein, was quite close to the Volksraad 
building located on the eastern edge of the square. But in practice, Thamrin 
had to juggle two quite different roles: as alderman he was an administrator 
while in the Volksraad he was a politician. In the Volksraad Thamrin focussed 
particularly on broader policy issues alongside economic and financial ques-
tions (Jonkman 1971:213). Where he saw exploitation of the indigenous popula-
tion he made extensive use of his right to question and carried on extensive 
debates during budget discussions in which he was often supported by his 
socialist colleagues, such as the isdp member, Stokvis. But here kampong 
improvement was not a major topic. It was in the municipal council where 
Thamrin made his mark in the debates on kampong improvement (Hering 
1996:123).
Another forum where Thamrin exerted considerable influence was in the 
Town Planning Commission, which prepared the Town Planning Ordinance. 
This commission, installed in 1934, drafted the very influential Bill on Town 
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18 ‘de overheid de kampongproblemen niet beheerscht; dit wortelt voor een deel in hare onvol-
doende kennis omtrent de daar gegeven omstandigheden en geldende levenseischen’ 
(Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:33).
Planning and its extensive Explanatory Memorandum (Van Roosmalen, this 
volume). While Thomas Karsten, also member of the Commission and 
appointed for his established reputation in town planning, emphasized the 
town planning aspects, Hoesni Thamrin would have been more interested in 
those aspects that directly affected the poor housing and living conditions of 
kampong inhabitants. It is quite likely that the Commission’s observation that:
the government has been unable to resolve the kampong problem; this is 
in part due to the fact that it has insufficient knowledge of the conditions 
and the existing life circumstances that pertain there
stemmed from Thamrin.18 However, Karsten and Thamrin would have seen eye 
to eye on the underlying problems of the urban kampong.
It is perhaps surprising that Hoesni Thamrin was not a member of the 
Kampongverbeteringscommissie (Commission for Kampong Improvement). 
However, this would have put him into serious conflict with his position as 
alderman since the commission had the responsibility of advising the central 
government how it should distribute the 500,000 guilders amongst the various 
municipalities. More immediately, it may have been because Batavia was 
already represented by its mayor, Van Heldsingen, the chairman of the 
commission.
From outside the commission, Thamrin must have been pleased that it had 
made clear that in its view, any improvement plan had to be appropriate to 
the existing situation: that is, the basic principles applied to kampong improve-
ment had to ensure that the character of the kampong would be maintained. 
Roads, for example, had to replace existing roads and could not, ‘Hausmann-
like’, break through a kampong at the cost of existing houses (Stadsvor-
mingsordonnantie 1938:26–29). The commission argued that the period of 
individual experimentation had delivered sufficient evidence for best prac-
tices now to be applied, even though too little was as yet generally known 
about what had been done in the past and what approaches had worked. It had 
dawned on many people that kampong improvement had to be implemented 
in an austere manner. The commission was critical of negative attitudes 
that  still persisted regarding kampong improvement, the limited interest 
shown in previous years, and about the fact that numerous other and less 
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19 ‘hoe lastig de positie is van een wethouder, die tegelijk belang heeft bij grond- en huizenpoli-
tiek’ (Het Vaderland 14-2-1928).
20 Nevertheless, Thamrin definitely trespassed the limits of European forbearance when 
together with other Parindra leaders he met a Japanese delegation to discuss the future of 
the Netherlands Indies in January 1941. This move was considered treacherous during the 
Second World War (De Graaff 1997:321–323; Jonkman 1971:212).
urgent projects were given priority over the improvement of the living condi-
tions in kampongs (Kampongverbeteringscommissie 1939:21).
The combination of different positions in one person and the existence of 
Old Boys networks bore the risk of nepotism and self-enrichment. Thamrin, 
for example, combined his political work with a business in the exploitation of 
land and housing. In February 1928, shortly after he had taken up his duties as 
alderman, the municipality published a report about one of Thamrin’s transac-
tions as businessman. He had purchased the building material that had 
become available after the market hall of Pasar Tanah Abang was taken apart 
and it was rumoured he had misused his position as alderman to strike a bar-
gain. Thamrin had ordered a municipal civil servant to ask the Hollandsche 
Beton Maatschappij, which was doing the demolition job, when the building 
material would become available and how much the material would cost. 
When the Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij and the civil servant agreed on the 
price of 1,200 guilders, the company had erroneously assumed that it was the 
municipality that purchased the scrap material. In reality Thamrin had bought 
the building material in his capacity of private entrepreneur, intending to recy-
cle the material to build small dwellings. The potential scandal blew over when 
the company declared it had not received a higher bid from any private side 
and did not want to make a fuss about it. Despite the fact that the whole affair 
was reduced to a misunderstanding and Thamrin was immediately rehabili-
tated, a newspaper drew the conclusion that it had become sufficiently clear 
‘how difficult the position of alderman is, who at the same time has an interest 
in land and housing policies’.19 However, in the view of European leaders so 
few indigenous leaders that enjoyed trust in both the indigenous and European 
community were available at the time, that a strict prohibition on the combi-
nation of public and private functions was impossible and therefore reputa-
tions of persons like Thamrin could not be damaged light-heartedly.20
Thamrin died after a short illness on 11 January 1941. His funeral was attended 
by the chairman of the Volksraad, Jonkman who observed:
Thamrin was buried as a sovereign, amid great public interest and condo-
lences on the side of the Indonesians community. They gathered at the 
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21 ‘Als een vorst is Thamrin begraven. Onder overweldigende belangstelling en deelneming van 
Indonesische zijde. Aan het sterfhuis, langs de weg en op het kerkhof. Door de secretaris van 
de Volksraad vergezeld ben ik naar het sterfhuis gegaan. Wij zijn meegereden in de stoet en 
hebben de plechtigheden op het kerkhof bijgewoond’ (Jonkman 1971:214).
22 “een bekwame oppositie [is] een steun der democratie”.
23 Kusno 2000:125–135; Barker 1999:106–120; Cobban 1974; Colombijn 2010:185–206; Van 
Roosmalen 2008:100–101.
mortuary, along the road and at the cemetery. I myself went to the mortu-
ary with the secretary of the Volksraad. We joined the funeral procession 
and participated in the ceremonies at the cemetery.21
After the funeral Jonkman commemorated Thamrin and praised him for his 
collegial manner and his contribution to the friendly atmosphere, which 
characterized the Volksraad. Commenting on Thamrin’s political opinions, 
Jonkman declared that ‘A competent opposition is a cornerstone of democ-
racy’ (Jonkman 1971:213–214).22
Hoesni Thamrin lies buried at the Karet cemetery in a place now called the 
Golden Triangle. Ironically it is an area where office towers have replaced kam-
pong houses and in the process destroyed investments made in kampong 
improvement in the 1970s, which were named after Thamrin to honour him. 
The Golden Triangle is a prime example of the displacement of kampongs, 
against which Thamrin had fought during his lifetime. It is equally ironical that 
his name has been used for Jalan Thamrin, one of Jakarta’s main thorough-
fares, for which many kampong houses were also demolished.
 Conclusion: Spiders in a Network of Relationships
The poor living conditions of the kampongs formed one of the many concerns 
of the late colonial government. The government’s attempts to modernize the 
kampongs have been extensively analysed elsewhere.23 We have focused on 
the strategies of two men working on kampong improvement, Rückert and 
Hoesni Thamrin, who were both spiders in a network of relationships. Rückert 
combined at one moment the functions of Principal Officer seconded to the 
Government Commissioner for Decentralization (but formally still in the ser-
vice of the municipal administration of Semarang), chairman of the Vereeniging 
voor Locale Belangen, and appointed member of the Volksraad. This combina-
tion of functions became most apparent when he debated as Volksraad 
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24 ‘Geruimen tijd bleven de bezoekers onder een koele dronk genieten van een prachtige zons-
ondergang, zoodat voor velen het scheiden moeilijk viel’ (Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging 
1922:48).
representative with the government representative, the Government 
Commissioner for Decentralization Cohen Stuart, who in daily life was his 
superior. Hoesni Thamrin was alderman of Batavia, member of the Volksraad, 
member of the Provincial Council of West Java and member of the commission 
that prepared the Bill on Town Planning. The combination of functions was not 
always successful. A Volksraad motion proposed by Rückert (and two others) 
that the central government would bear 50 per cent of maintenance costs of 
kampong improvement was accepted but not implemented by the government. 
Thamrin in vain tried to have the 2.5 million guilder loan proposed by the 
Batavia municipal council approved by the Provincial Council of West Java.
Although not always successful, the combination of functions in different 
state organs enabled both Rückert and Thamrin to develop a tightly-knit Old 
Boys network. The same names appeared time and again in these debates, 
even though in the course of these years some of the Europeans concerned 
with kampong improvement took their furlough or returned permanently to 
the Netherlands: Tillema, De Vogel, Stokvis, Karsten, Van der Zee and others. 
They did not only meet at official gatherings, and Thamrin, for instance, was a 
regular visitor at Maison Versteeg & Rikkers, a café where leaders of the isdp 
often met in Batavia. Despite Thamrin’s sociability, for the European Rückert it 
must have been much easier to move in high government circles and interact 
with European intellectuals than for the Indonesian Thamrin. Sometimes we 
get a glimpse of the informal gatherings at the club (sociëteit), on the tennis 
court, and around the dinner table where Old Boys networks are forged. For 
example, the participants of the 1922 Congress on Public Housing (organized 
by the Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging) went on a sightseeing tour to the hills 
in the hinterland of Semarang on the afternoon of the first day. A new suburb, 
Nieuw Tjandi, was being developed there. The trip ended at the home of 
Koreman, architect and member of the board of the Sociaal-Technische 
Vereeniging, who occupied a house at the northern edge of the area. The con-
gress report sketches the social gathering: ‘For a considerable time the visitors, 
while nipping from a cool drink, enjoyed the beautiful sunset, so that many 
found it difficult to take their leave’.24
The combination of different positions in one person and the existence of 
Old Boys networks bore the risk of nepotism and self-enrichment. Two con-
flicts of interests severely damaged the position of both Rückert and Thamrin. 
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Rückert was forced to step down as Chairman of the Vereenging voor Locale 
Belangen when he defended a five per cent salary cut of civil servants in the 
Volksraad. Thamrin’s cooperative stand with the colonial government finally 
clashed fatally with his nationalist aspirations when he met Japanese repre-
sentatives to discuss the future of the colony during wartime.
The dilemma Thamrin faced was that his constituency existed of lower 
middle-class indigenous people, but he was a well-to-do businessman himself. 
Moreover, despite being a nationalist, he needed the support of Europeans in 
both the municipal council of Batavia and the Volksraad to gain majorities for 
his proposals. At the end of the day, the combination of functions that had 
made Rückert and Thamrin successful brokers in kampong improvement, also 
badly scratched their positions.
The final conclusion must be that the two men were also remarkably similar 
in tactics. We had started from the assumption that they offered an interesting 
comparison between a European appointed civil servant and an Indonesian 
elected politician. It has turned out that the differences between the civil ser-
vant and politician were smaller than we had envisaged. As councillor (a politi-
cal function) Thamrin was elected alderman and assumed executive 
responsibilities, and the civil servant Rückert became an appointed member of 
the Volksraad and lobbyist as chairman of the Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen. 
The main basis of their power was the combination of various functions.
At a deeper level they shared the same view on the modernization of the 
city. The simultaneous decentralization of urban administration and the rise 
of an interventionist attitude provided scope for vigorous people to take on the 
question of the abolition of kampong autonomy and to address the question of 
kampong improvement in a top-down manner. Modernization of the city, 
including eradicating blots on the cityscape, had to be led by the government 
and be under firm control of the government. The alternative strategy, namely 
to empower the kampong residents, and to give them more instead of less 
autonomy, plus the funds to improve their neighbourhood according to their 
own priorities, was never even considered.
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Kotabaru and the Housing Estate as Bulwark 
against the Indigenization of Colonial Java
Farabi Fakih
 Introduction
With the passing of the Agrarische Wet (Agrarian Law) in 1870, which provided 
the legal structure for a more liberal economic development of the Netherlands 
Indies, the number of foreign companies and Europeans arriving in the colony 
steadily increased. By 1930, the European population in the Indies had grown 
to around 300,000 in a total population of approximately 60 million. In the cit-
ies, their ratio was much higher; in some cities, Bandung is a good example, the 
European population amounted to as much as twelve per cent while even in 
other, more native cities, as for instance Yogyakarta, it had amounted to around 
4 per cent in 1930 (Volkstelling 1930 1936, VIII:2, 78–81).
The upshot of the emergence of European communities at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was the creation of 
small civil societies within the cities. These were composed mostly of European 
men, educated in Europe, who possessed technical and managerial skills. This 
was one reason why these colonial cities became the first sites of autonomous 
local administration in the Netherlands Indies. Another reason was the need 
for local authorities to address the crises in housing and sanitation. The cen-
tralist bureaucratic structure of colonial government clearly hampered the 
capacity of the cities to provide its citizens with such amenities essential to 
modern living as paved roads and clean water. The Decentralization Act of 
1903 changed this situation radically and the first cities to acquire some form of 
autonomy in 1905 were Batavia, Meester Cornelis, and Buitenzorg. Legal auton-
omy in the understanding of the Act meant the creation of a gemeente or 
municipal government, with a town hall and, initially, an appointed municipal 
council composed mostly of European men who could make recommenda-
tions to the central government through the channels of the regional bureau-
cracy. This sort of advice pertained to the allocation of funds disbursed to the 
city. It also authorized the collection of local taxes (such as the Dog Tax) to 
generate local funds for its own use (Schrieke 1918:184–217).
This was also the period in which the peculiar modern fetish for hygiene 
and cleanliness appeared on the scene in the Netherlands Indies. The concept 
of bacteria and viruses and their association with disease and the environment 
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was becoming more generally understood. Uncovering the secrets of the 
deadly tropics and how white men could avoid succumbing to the diseases 
that lurked there became popular knowledge. In 1913, W.J. van Gorkom, a well-
known doctor in the Netherlands Indies, published a book about the require-
ment of hygiene in the cities of the Netherlands Indies, especially the colonial 
capital, Batavia. Van Gorkom urged Europeans to put the information acquired 
about health and hygiene into practice in their cities. He was especially con-
cerned about health in the native quarters in the cities and the necessity of 
creating a municipal board of health to tackle these matters (Van Gorkom 
1913:156–165).
This recommendation coincided with the movement towards greater urban 
autonomy; cities had to be able to take control of their own space so as to 
improve the hygiene of the city for the benefit of everyone. The emergence of 
a new type of European, often newly arrived from the Netherlands and well 
educated, who was punctilious about not being seen in a sarong, who lived in 
European-style houses, read newspapers containing articles about travel, 
European theatre and the latest fashion from Paris, was a significant shift from 
the older type of colonialist (Mrázek 2002:129–154). The older type of European 
in the Netherlands Indies had grown up in the land in which they had been 
born and who had had a much closer relationship with indigenous people. In 
the older cities, the spatial structure meant that, of necessity, European and 
indigenous urbanites generally rubbed shoulders with one another.
Modernity and its fetishes produced a new type of city design, which 
allowed for greater space and separation. This in turn meant that their inhabit-
ants could distance themselves further from the land. Dirt roads were paved 
and the traditional linear Indies town development, which had provided 
opportunities for significant contact with kampong people (because kam-
pongs were usually located behind main roads lined by European houses) 
(Wertheim 1956:171), was discarded in favour of one, which consisted of com-
pact, insular housing estates producing a concentrated European environ-
ment. This development also exerted an important influence on the emergence 
of the housing market. There were now enough people constituting a middle- 
class in the Indies to represent a housing market sufficient to motivate devel-
opers to embark on the construction of housing estates. My purpose in 
exploring the history of one such housing estate, Kotabaru in Yogyakarta, in 
this chapter is to see how the development of housing estates affected the idea 
of the house in the Indies, how it intruded on the relationship between the 
Javanese and Europeans, and how, with the establishment of the government 
of the Republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta, the colonial era estate continued to 
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influence relations between those living in the former Europeans, housing 
estate and the surrounding kampongs.
 The Discourse of the Netherlands Indies Housing Estate
Most of the new housing estates present in most of the cities of the Netherlands 
Indies (but especially in cities which had been granted municipal autonomy) 
were built in the course of the 1920s. The Nieuwe Wijk (Kotabaru) housing estate 
in the city of Yogyakarta was begun in 1919. Other examples were Menteng and 
Gondangdia in Batavia, Nieuw Tjandi in Semarang, Gempol in Bandung, Djati 
Oeloe in Medan, but there were many more (Flieringa 1930). These new housing 
estates formed part of the changing shape of cities in the Netherlands Indies. 
Designed using contemporary town planning technology and incorporating 
many of the contemporary modern amenities of European cities, including mains 
delivering potable water, paved roads and footpaths, they were usually rounded 
off with the provision of a wide range of sporting and educational facilities.
These new housing estates grew at a time when the idea of the garden city, 
promoted by such people as Ebenezer Howard in England and Frederick Law 
Olmsted in the United States was gaining ground (Tafuri and Dal Co 1986:22–33). 
The architect Thomas Karsten, one of the main town planners in the Indies, 
designed housing estates which took account of the contours of the land and 
constructed curvilinear streets to accentuate the atmosphere of the European 
countryside, but still working within a strict plan of regulated space that pro-
vided for the needs of what he saw as the differing socio-economic categories 
of a modern society that he believed the Netherlands Indies would become 
(Coté 2004:19). The idea of using nature, particularly trees in urban landscapes, 
to conjure up an image of nostalgic romanticism for the then fading old rural 
life of Europe but now integrated with modern technology, was gaining ground. 
The houses themselves were now being designed according to the new ideas 
about what constituted modernity; in Bandung especially, houses were being 
designed with a decidedly modern Art Deco style. The old Indies-style houses, 
with their main galleries and front and back verandas, their outhouses and 
spacious living arrangements were being replaced by compact, two-storey 
houses, very European in style and design, with a modern bathroom and even 
some air conditioning.
Modernity arrived in the Indies city in full force via various new discourses 
such as those associated with the idea of hygiene and health, but it also came 
as part of the burgeoning sense of European-ness in white colonial society 
in  the Indies (Locher-Scholten 1997). This new awareness was probably 
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accelerated by advances in modern communications technology and modes of 
travel. The pervasiveness of Hollywood in colonial Dutch-language newspa-
pers indicates the development of a sense of closeness with the West and con-
sequently such images transmitted by the media demolished the sense of 
insularity of Indies life. But this sense of connectedness to the West also pro-
duced a different sense of insularity within the Indies. The new housing estates 
can be considered to have represented islands of modernity; places in which 
the presence of the non-modern, that of the Javanese and their kampongs, was 
relegated to a well-concealed background. By looking at one housing estate, 
the Kotabaru housing estate in Yogyakarta, it is possible to see that its design 
went beyond the intention to establish a romantic sense of old rural life; it was 
a deliberate attempt to disconnect it physically from the rest of the ‘native’ city.
I shall come back to this later, but at this juncture I am interested in looking 
at the ideas some Europeans fostered about their living space. It was difficult 
to find former European inhabitants to interview and I was therefore com-
pelled to try to find other sources. A good fount of information is housing 
advertisements. In what follows I shall examine a series of housing advertise-
ments in an effort to analyse the spatial discourse about housing current in late 
colonial Indonesia.
As the purpose of advertisements is to sell dreams, they tend to be quite 
explicit in their message. Housing advertisements, therefore, can provide a 
rich source for understanding a wide range of the elements, which composed 
the European perspective in the colony. Only a preliminary glance can be 
attempted here and this should be the subject of a much deeper research. They 
represent an interpretation of part of a much more extensive European dis-
course which first and foremost encompassed the idea of the house and then 
went a step further to include the idea of who the house-seekers were and 
where they wanted to go. Unfortunately the use of housing advertisements 
seems to have stopped after Independence. I have not yet been able to find any 
advertisements for privately constructed housing estates placed in the news-
papers in the 1950s and 1960s. Only after the end of the 1960s, during the New 
Order era was there a return to housing estates and with this, of the reappear-
ance of their advertisements in newspapers and magazines.
The series of advertisements I want to use for this purpose is related to the 
Villa-Park Tretes in Tretes, not far from the city of Surabaya. Unlike the major-
ity of housing estates developed by local governments, this one was developed 
by a private company named Woning-en Administratie Bureau van Vloten. 
Created by the Surabaya-based real-estate developer C.F. van Vloten Augustijn, 
Tretes was widely advertised in the newspapers and in Van Vloten’s own fort-
nightly catalogue of vacant houses. Located at around 900 metres above sea 
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1 The original poem reads: ‘Trètès 26 Maart 1936 Beste meisjes en jongens! Ik ben een neef van/ 
BUNGALOW BILL, Ik mag rijden en zwemmen Zooveel als ik wil, Ik klauter op bergen En zwerf 
level on the lower slopes of Mount Arjuno, in the environs of the city and con-
nected to it by a good road and a bus service, the villa estate contained around 
100 villas for sale or for rent (fwd 1935a, 1935b). The principal target group of 
this housing estate was Dutch families living in Surabaya, who wanted a chance 
to live in the cooler climate of Tretes. The housing estate offered electricity, 
water mains, a swimming pool, restaurant, schools and a sporting field, which 
appear to have been the kinds of amenities expected to be on offer in these 
types of housing estates. It also offered a daily bus service to Surabaya.
One such advertisement for Villa-Park Tretes was published in the Dutch-
language newspaper De Indische Post on 26 March 1936. It pictures a boy smil-
ing at the camera wearing a type of traditional clothing worn by a German boy, 
suggesting a rural idyll. He is placed alongside a letter that he has written to his 
readers. Written in rhyme, the letter runs as follows:
Tretes, 26 March 1936
Dear Girls and Boys!
I am a nephew of BUNGALOW BILL,
I can ride and swim, as much as I like
And climb mountains, and wander through valleys
And I can go to the SPORTPARK without having to pay
In VILLA-PARK TRETES, at the edge of the forest
BUNGALOW BILL has built a LOG CABIN for me,
I have a [illegible] there, dressed in hiking clothes
And I go to the VILLA-PARK SCHOOL, Oh what a joy it is to learn!
It is an unforgettable spot here,
You learn all sorts of things here people need to know
And when I am grown up, I shall hang out the signs
And I want to become a builder of bungalows myself!
Of course, I shall also open a school myself
And for the children of the future, learning will become the 
watchword
But what I actually would like to ask you here
Is: shall I see you all show up in TRETES for EASTER?
Well, that’s all done and dusted! Goodbye
From me and of course from BUNGALOW BILL
A firm paw
From your Billy Ketjil1
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 door de dalen En ik mag in het SPORTPARK Zonder betalen. In het VILLA-PARK TRÈTÈS Aan de 
zoom van het woud, Heeft BUNGALOW BILL Mij een BLOKHUT gebouwd, Ik heb daar een [illeg-
ible] In mijn bergklimmerskleeren En ga naar de VILLA-PARK SCHOOL Om fijn wat te leeren! 
Het is daar een tempat Om nooit te vergeten Je leert er van alles Wat een mensch dient te weten 
En ben ik straks groot Dan verhang ik de borden En wil zelf een bouwer van BUNGALOWS wor-
den! Dan open ik natuurlijk Ook zelf een school En voor toekomstige kinderen Wordt dan het 
leeren parool, Maar wat ik jullie eigenlijk Bij deze wilde vragen: Ik zie jullie met PASCHEN; Toch 
allemaal op “TRÈTÈS” opdagen? Nou, dat is in orde en verder gegroet, Van mij en natuurlijk van 
BUNGALOW BILL En een ferme poot van je BILLY KETJIL’. Interestingly, Billy’s other name, 
Ketjil (Indonesian for ‘little’) and hence Little Billy, is a reference away from a strictly 
European to an ‘Indies’ styling, as is the term tempat (Indonesian for place). For the transla-
tion I have received kind help from Tessa de Ryk van de Gracht.
Billy Ketjil is a very happy boy, because he lives on the Villa-Park Tretes housing 
estate. The Villa Park offers amenities where he can play all day and attend a 
good school. And this is not all; he can play wearing his hiking gear (bergklim-
merskleeren) and can smile at the camera in the guise of a boy from the German 
Alps.
The idea of escaping to the cool, healthy mountains away from the debilitat-
ing tropics and the concomitant fear of the effect of the heat and disease had a 
very long history in European discourse on Indies. Almost every major city in 
the Indies had a local mountain retreat where Europeans holidayed and recu-
perated. In the 1920s such places were transformed into destinations to which 
‘ordinary’ Europeans flocked at the weekend. Modernity now offered the 
mountain as a place where families could relax all day long. They could rent or 
even own a house in such a resort and yet remain in easy reach of the city via a 
daily bus service which would transport the working father to the hot, tropical 
city below while his wife and children continued to enjoy the clean, fresh, 
healthy mountain air.
Almost all the advertisements show a sketch of what was on offer as a poten-
tial client’s future home. None bears any resemblance to the traditional 
European Indies house; instead they were modelled on and reminiscent of tra-
ditional European houses, even traditional European mountain chalets. One 
advertisement ran:
One misses one’s own fireplace as strongly in the tropics as one misses 
the sun and blue sky for a significant part of the year in Holland. But…in 
Tretes one has to forfeit neither one nor the other. So buy or rent one of 




2 The original texts (all from issues of De Indische Post in 1936) are: ‘DE EIGEN HAARD mist men 
in de tropen even sterk als men in Holland gedurende een groot deel van het jaar de Zon en de 
Blauwe Hemel ontbeert. Maar…OP TRÈTÈS mist u het een, noch het ander. Koopt of huurt dus 
een der knusse bungalows, zooals alleen VanVloten die bouwt in HET VILLA-PARK “TRÈTÈS”’; 
‘HOOG in de KOELE BERGEN vindt uw gezin gezondheid en geluk – Bouwt of huurt Uw eigen 
Bungalow in het dichtst bij Soerabaia gelegen bergdorp, in het VILLA-PARK “TRÈTÈS”’; ‘BOSCH 
EN ZON en HOOGE BERGLUCHT schenken uw gezin gezondheid en geluk. Koopt of huurt voor 
tijdelijke of permanente bewoning een van die intens gezellige Bungalows in het VILLA-PARK 
“TRÈTÈS”’.
Another declared:
High in the Cool Mountains, your family will discover health and happi-
ness. Build or rent your own Bungalow in the mountain village closest to 
Surabaya [of all mountain resorts], in the Villa-Park Tretes.
Yet another advertisement stated:
Forest and sun and the high mountain air will ensure your family’s 
health and happiness. Buy or rent for temporary or permanent resi-
dence one of these enormously cosy bungalows in the Villa-Park 
Tretes.2
The texts were accompanied by drawings of an open fireplace, a chalet with 
pine trees, and a Dutch-looking villa.
The idea that air and coolness were important to health was a major ele-
ment in the discourse of the housing estate. This was the time when climate 
was believed to have an influence on any number of matters. People even 
believed that living in cooler climates encouraged intelligence. In a sense it 
was another version of today’s air-conditioned lives of the Indonesian middle 
class who, equally apprehensive about battling tropical heat, cocoon them-
selves in the modern amenity of technological cooling.
 Modernization and the Fear of the Kampongs
What was not explicitly expressed in these advertisements was a fear of the 
Javanese. In fact, the Javanese did not exist for the Europeans. If one did not 
know the geographical location of Surabaya or Tretes, one might have thought 
the estate was in Europe. Only in one of the advertisements referred to above 
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was there a fleeting recognition of the tropics. Sketches of American-looking 
houses and German-looking bungalows or a European fireplace hint at what 
the Europeans were thinking when they read these advertisements. They were 
published in the company of articles on film stars such as Greta Garbo and 
Jean Harlow or advertisements for ship sailings or what was on at the Capitol 
Theatre in downtown Surabaya (such as Call of the Wild with Clark Gable, 
Loretta Young, and Jack Oakie).
European colonial society was composed of Europeans, whether trekkers or 
blijvers. The trekkers were those Europeans who had migrated to the Indies 
with plans to return to Europe; the blijvers had grown up in the Indies and 
planned to remain there (Van Doorn 1994:23–24). Many of the latter were of 
mixed parentage with familial links in Javanese society and had lived in the 
colony for generations (Bosma and Raben 2008). Although somewhat simplis-
tic, these were expressive terms and, confronted with newspapers filled with 
references to the outside European world, whether in the usa, Australia, or 
Europe itself, one is forced to draw the obvious conclusion that increasingly, 
the European community in the Indies was dominated by the trekkers.
Modernity in the form of segregating people on the basis of a ‘racial’ cate-
gory and modernization in the Indies, as Locher-Scholten (1998) has shown us, 
was providing many forms of refined racism. Although not necessarily exclud-
ing rich Javanese or Chinese, the entirely Dutch-focused advertisements for 
Villa-Park Trètès were clearly responding to European ways of thinking. 
Therefore it is safe to suppose that these advertisements were published only 
in Dutch-language newspapers. Even the image and appeal of the little boy was 
chosen to expand this sense of exclusiveness, underlying the assumption that 
this housing estate was intended for Europeans.
Modernity, represented here at many levels, was not liberating people from 
the segregation of the past; quite the opposite in fact: it was evidently developing 
new ways and forms of segregation defined by the logics of the market and tech-
nology. Fear is not highly apparent in these advertisements. As we have seen, 
instead the Javanese is conspicuous by his absence, as is the indigenous kampong 
of the old city. However, it is precisely the social and environmental exclusiveness 
suggested by the advertisements that reveals the new fear of the kampong. It is a 
fear, which had been submerged by the manifestations of modernity.
 Kotabaru and Its Relationship with the Surrounding Kampongs
The bulk of my research was conducted on Kotabaru, where I have had the 
opportunity to interview fifteen people who had lived there or in one of the 
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3 Respondents: Ms AD, age 77; Mr DS, age around 70; Ms E, age 55; Ms I, age around 50; Ms L, 
age 72; Mr N, age 56; Mr PM, age 78; Mr P, age 40; Ms R, age 66; Mr S, age 84; Ms SUK, age 75; 
Mr S, age 39; Ms SZ, age 76; Ms S, age 71; Mr TS, age 59.
neighbouring kampongs at one time or another.3 The interviews aimed to 
probe in detail the nature of the relationship between the kampong and the 
housing estate. The interviews themselves were difficult, because I needed to 
obtain information about what my interviewees had felt and understood in the 
past, typically when they were children. This knowledge of the past is now clut-
tered with, and obscured by, knowledge of the present and, in some cases, this 
hampered the respondents’ ability to make definitive statements. I shall try to 
explain what I have obtained from the interviews I conducted, but before I do 
so, I need to explain the history of Kotabaru itself.
The Nieuwe Wijk, or Kotabaru, was built around 1919 and at the time was 
located right at the edge of the city (Dingemans 1926:109–112). The city of 
Yogyakarta is a relatively new city, founded in 1756 as a result of the splitting of 
the Mataram kingdom into the two principalities of Surakarta and Yogyakarta 
in 1740 (Noorduyn 1986:89). The city was unique in that it was still the seat of a 
sultanate and was endowed with privileges, which few other cities in the 
Netherlands Indies enjoyed. Every new Sultan had to negotiate his power with 
the Dutch upon his succession to the throne (Houben 1994:75). With each suc-
cession, the Sultan inexorably felt his grip over his city weakening. The situa-
tion was certainly changing for Yogyakarta in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. The train service arrived here in the 1870s, its lines slicing the city in 
two. Yogyakarta was increasingly industrialized to accommodate the expand-
ing sugar industry. Much of the outskirts of Yogyakarta was transformed into 
sugarcane plantations, equipped with their own sugar factories. The conse-
quence of this expanding industrialization was that more and more Europeans 
arrived in the city. The yellow pages of a telephone directory issued in 1938 
reveal that Yogyakarta offered a number of amenities which the European pop-
ulace could enjoy; including some jewellery shops, a piano shop and several 
motor car dealers (Interlocale telefoongids 1938:247–260). The Europeans also 
had the European Club (sociëteit) at their disposal. This had a room for gentle-
men and organized plays and dances.
Under the prevailing national agrarian law, Dutch as well as other foreigners 
were not allowed to own land, but on the orders of Resident Canne and the 
Sultan, a commission on land was formed (Commissie voor het Grondbedrijf) 
resulting in the Sultan’s Law 1917/12, which permitted the sale of the Sultan’s 
land to foreigners. In fact, in 1925 the former intricate Patoeh system of land-
ownership was completely dismantled. Yogyakarta was becoming a modern 
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city and it was shedding many of its feudal laws. Two years later, work on the 
Nieuw Wijk was begun. It was designed by Thomas Karsten and its purpose 
was to provide for the housing requirements of Europeans, allowing them to 
obtain land and a house. It was also designed to avoid land speculation, which 
was becoming a problem in some cities in Java at the time. Like Tretes, Kotabaru 
was in a way an insular piece of ground. It had the best schooling facilities in 
the city; it also boasted a sports park, including a swimming pool.
A bird’s eye view of Kotabaru reveals that, at the time it was built, it was 
bounded on the west by the Code River, on the south by the train lines, and 
on the north and east by farmlands. Its curving streets betray the garden-city 
concept– the introduction of a village atmosphere into the housing estate. 
Within its borders it contained a public hospital (the Petronella Hospital, 
today the Bethesda Hospital) and a military hospital. Barracks for the soldiers 
stood in the vicinity of the military hospital. It also had a complete set of 
schools: Kweekschool voor Inlandsche Christelijke Onderwijzers (Training 
College for Indigenous Christian Teachers); a Normaalschool voor Inlandsche 
Onderwijzeressen (Training College for Indigenous Female Teachers); the 
Keucheniusschool (a Christian high school); an ams (High School for Girls), 
a  Christelijke mulo (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, Christian Advanced 
Elementary School); and a State Europeesche Lagere School (European 
Elementary School). Furthermore, a seminary and Protestant church were 
also established in Kotabaru. There was even a museum of antiquities. In the 
 centre, there were tennis courts and a football field.
At first glance, it can be seen that the designer maximized a sense of being 
somewhere else than in Indonesia. The riverside of the housing estate, a 
respondent informed me, was once lined with trees, obscuring the other side 
of the river from view. The train lines were an effective means to disconnect 
the area from the rest of the city to the south. Kotabaru itself was designed 
with newer types of houses. Although not the types of highly modernized 
houses which could be found in Menteng (Batavia), or the Art Deco styles in 
Bandung, there was a definite difference from the previous, more hybrid 
Indies-European houses which then existed in other parts of the city. 
Technically it was possible to live in Kotabaru without having to venture out-
side it.
Apart from the Kotabaru housing estate itself, there were several small kam-
pongs, which encircled the area, including the kampongs west of the river and 
south of the train lines. Before Independence there were two kampongs 
located to the west of the Code River, kampong Gondolayu, located just north 
of what is now known as Jendral Sudirman Street, and to the south of what is 
now the Kampong Code, and kampong Terban. On the southern side of 
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4 ‘Sinyo’ possibly used here generically to refer to Dutch children, or more precisely refers to 
Europeans of mixed descent.
Kotabaru (but north of the railway lines), where present day kampong Krasak 
is located, was once a cemetery and there were also some housing estates and 
a kampong south of the train lines, including kampong Pengok and the 
European housing estate, Batjiro These various kampongs held a special posi-
tion within the spatial hierarchy of the area. As will be seen, although the 
Kotabaru housing estate was built to provide for a sense of being somewhere 
else, it was the kampong that provided for the essential services, which sus-
tained it.
The kampong inhabitants that provided the essential services required by 
those living in the housing estates included housekeepers, gardeners, chauf-
feurs, and even delivery boys who ran the messages. I have interviewed a num-
ber of persons who had lived in the kampongs surrounding Kotabaru during 
the 1920s. When asked what their strongest memory was, one male respon-
dent, Mr S, replied that his strongest childhood memory of Kotabaru was a 
feeling of fear. He never had the courage to venture into the housing estate. 
When I asked why, his answer was:
because my parents forbade me to go there. Kotabaru was a Dutch place 
was it not? First, I was afraid of the Dutch. Secondly I was afraid of their 
dogs…Well, you know everyone was afraid of dogs.
Another informant, Mrs SZ, lived in kampong Klitren Lor, east of the housing 
estate, and adjacent to the military barracks. When asked if she had ever gone 
into a Dutch house, she answered: ‘Never, I was afraid. Those who did go into 
their houses were either their maids or their mistresses’. She elaborated:
I was afraid [of venturing into Kotabaru], I was fine if I was at the border. 
That was because I was a girl. It was scary to go into Kotabaru, because 
the sinyos were often naughty. I heard that many kampong kids had fights 
with the sinyos. That’s why people here were afraid of entering Kotabaru.4
Other respondents I talked to recalled that people were afraid to venture into 
Kotabaru because the white children there liked to harass the Javanese. 
Peasants going to their fields would rather go right around it than traverse its 
borders.
I received quite a different response, however, from Mr PM, born in Kampong 
Terban in 1928, whose mother was cook in one of the girls’ schools and whose 
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father worked as an attendant at a petrol station in Kotabaru. For him, playing 
in Kotabaru was not scary at all ‘because, to be honest, the Dutch kids there 
were not as nasty as the ones near the Fort’ (interview with Mr PM). He and his 
friends often went there to steal fruit.
The responses generated by Kotabaru amongst residents of the surrounding 
kampong, therefore, could be quite diverse, ranging from a sense of fear to a 
confidence that this estate presented new opportunities. The childhood mem-
ories of my respondents in turn seemed to depend on the extent to which adult 
kampong residents had established a linkage with the neighbouring European 
estate. Thus, it is notable that Mr S, who recalled only a sense of fear with 
regard to the European estate, also believed that no one from his kampong, 
Gondolayu, worked in Kotabaru, whereas Mr PM, who recalled confidently 
entering the district averred that many people from Terban worked in Kotabaru 
before Independence. He recalled people, presumably neighbours, working as 
maids, gardeners, launderers, or drivers for the Dutch. These connections 
resulted in an asymmetrical relationship between the kampongs and Kotabaru. 
Where, as in the case of Kampong Terban, that connection was often at the 
level of providing domestic or other service, it generated an ambiguous rela-
tionship, which, as Locher-Scholten has suggested, was both close and distant 
(Locher-Scholten 1998). If Mr PM’s childhood memory is typical, familiarity 
with Kotabaru – presumably provided via his parents’ reports of European 
privilege and behaviour gathered as a result of their close but subservient rela-
tionship – generated in the child a confidence, which extended to a readiness 
to steal. On the other hand, again, according to Mr PM, Europeans almost 
never crossed the boundary of the housing estate into the kampong, the only 
occasion he could recall was when his mother’s employer visited their house 
when his mother was ill.
Another level of relationship with Kotabaru operating amongst nearby 
kampong dwellers, was the relationship with the Roman Catholic church 
located within the European estate for those who had converted – or who may 
have been considered potential converts – to Catholicism. They were visited 
quite regularly by Roman Catholic priests and their Javanese church assistants 
from the seminary in Kotabaru, Mr PM recalled. Mr PM’s family was part of 
this community which is likely to have played a part in his parents obtaining 
responsible positions in Kotabaru. This level of familiarity no doubt also con-
tributed to Mr PM’s confidence in associating with the white and Eurasian chil-
dren of the estate compared to the childhood recollections of the other 
respondents cited above.
The relationship between the indigenous people and the Dutch was always 
ambiguous. There can be no denying that there was a sense of mutual fear. 
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Despite this, they were inextricably linked within a colonial relationship. Even 
the European woman who had to venture into the kampong had some sort of 
relationship with the Indonesian woman she was visiting. The ambiguity is 
depicted in Breton de Nijs’ novel Vergeelde portretten (Faded Portraits) in 
describing the matriarch of the house, Ms De Pauly or Aunt Sophie, and her 
maid, Midin. Aunt Sophie was a formidable lady, who feared that her family 
was becoming ‘Javanized’ and insisted that her family behaved in very European 
ways, in their manners and tastes while simultaneously believing in many of 
the traditional Javanese beliefs about good luck and ghosts. Midin was one of 
the family’s maids who had an uneasy relationship with Aunt Sophie. Every 
time Midin disagreed with Aunt Sophie, she would escape to the kampong 
until her money ran out when she would return. Although each seemed to dis-
like the other, they were both bound together in a strange colonial relationship 
(Breton de Nijs 1999). The relationship was thorny but nevertheless emotional 
and quite real and it was a relationship that was changing as a result of modern-
ization itself. As Elsbeth Locher-Scholten has shown, because of books such as 
Catenius van der Meijden’s Ons Huis in Indië, modernity made people less eas-
ily ‘touchable’. The overriding concern of modernity with hygiene and cleanli-
ness translated into cleanliness from the ‘pollution’ of ‘verindischen’ (becoming 
indigenized). This was also what Aunt Sophie was most worried about.
The housing estate formed part of an onrush of modernization and the con-
comitant formalization of relationships. Housing estates formed a way of pro-
tecting Dutch people from the process of ‘verindischen’. Kotabaru formed a 
secluded zone, designed to be separate from the city. This fear of indigeniza-
tion was not immediately evident in the advertisements discussed above, but 
it lurked behind the advertisements. Fear formed the backdrop to the desire to 
build secluded housing estates. The same fear might explain the obsession 
some Dutch-language newspapers, such as the De Indische Post, had with 
travel, Hollywood films, and Paris fashion. These items in De Indische Post lift 
the tip of the veil of the desire of European colonials to escape from the Indies. 
Similarly, advertisements for housing estates show houses, which were not in 
the Indies at all; they showed chalets straight from the Alps, houses reminis-
cent of Europe. This ‘running-away-from’ tendency was perhaps a form of self-
protection: the housing estate can be seen as an evasion; modernization as an 
attempt to escape from the colonial encounter. Encountering was a form of 
pollution and housing estates provided the seclusion which precluded such a 
danger: they enabled people to live in one city but not have to meet its colonial 
reality. The irony was that to preserve this illusion of separation, it was neces-
sary to have Javanese to fetch daily necessities for the modern, European 
neighbourhood.
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 The Postcolonial Discourse of the Housing Estate
The Kotabaru housing estate was taken over by Japanese authorities during the 
Second World War. With its Dutch occupants gone, they began to offer the 
houses to Javanese on lease. Some of the houses were also commandeered by 
the Japanese military forces. Practically all the indigenous people who came to 
live on the housing estate were middle to upper class. A number of them were 
schoolteachers, which at the time was a very respectable, well paid occupa-
tion. But the new occupants who came to settle there during the Japanese 
occupation and the subsequent Revolution also included many upper class 
Javanese, regents, and aristocrats from other parts of Java who sought to reside 
in the formerly European-owned houses.
Although a small battle was fought in Kotabaru during the Japanese occupa-
tion, few buildings were destroyed so that after the war practically all the 
houses were still intact. Although there were few physical changes, there was a 
definite social change in the housing estate. There were no more Europeans 
walking their dogs in the morning or the afternoon. And, although many peo-
ple were traumatized by the events of the war, especially because Kotabaru 
had been the main place of residence of the Japanese army of occupation, 
there was an unequivocal sense among kampong dwellers according to those 
I was able to interview that the spatial meaning had changed.
Almost all the respondents who had lived in Kotabaru after Independence 
came from a middle or upper class family and had enjoyed a good education. 
Three of the respondents were academics from the local Universitas Gadjah 
Mada. Their parents had been fluent Dutch speakers and all had enjoyed 
a good education, some even in the Netherlands. They had been subject to a 
fairly strict upbringing that instilled in them a blend of Dutch and Javanese 
manners. Since upper class Yogyakarta people already had a house or dalem 
(residence of a high official) in the city and had not needed to move to 
Kotabaru, almost all of the new residents of the estate had been born outside 
the city of Yogyakarta.
When Yogyakarta was declared the capital of the Republic of Indonesia in 
1945, it became a highly desirable location, particularly given the instability 
elsewhere in Java. Many people holding high positions in the new government, 
as well as regents from other regencies in Java, professionals including doctors 
and lecturers, teachers as well as some high-ranking army personnel, came to 
live in the city. Many of them were highly Westernized, holding parties and 
wearing Western-style dress as they were photographed posed in front of their 
cars. Even before Independence, they had already been enjoying a life-style, 
which was beyond the ken of ordinary people in the archipelago (Figures 6.1 
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and 6.2). Their manners, the way they brushed their teeth everyday or dropped 
into a bookshop indicated that they were a prototype for the present-day, middle 
class Indonesian.
For many who formed this Indonesian middle class, living on a housing 
estate was something very new. The Javanese lower classes lived in kampongs, 
but the Javanese middle to upper classes had also lived in kampongs in colo-
nial times.5 The Javanese nobility of Yogyakarta lived in dalem, which were 
Figure 6.1  A party in an Indonesian-owned house, circa 1930
Courtesy of Fort Vredenburg, Yogyakarta
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essentially kampongs with a big house in the middle (O’Connor 1983:10). 
Around the houses of the nobility clustered the dwellings of abdidalem, people 
who functioned as their servants. The abdidalem provided the owners with 
various services; some mundane, others imbued with more complex social and 
cultural meanings. Interestingly, after Independence, the houses of Kotabaru 
Figure 6.2  A dance party at a house in Kotabaru in the 1950s
Courtesy of Ms Esmeralda Sosronegoro
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gradually began to assume some features of a dalem. Their new occupants 
brought their dependants along with them, as seemingly people from noble 
families especially could not do without followers. As a result of this influx, the 
house and yard surrounding these houses became increasingly cramped. 
Outhouses and many of the internal rooms were used to house the 
dependants.
By turning each house into a kind of small version of a dalem, by allowing 
followers to live with them in the relatively large houses, the newcomers frac-
tured Kotabaru into small territorial units. Simultaneously, they changed the 
dynamic relationship between the surrounding kampongs and Kotabaru itself. 
The organic sense of relationship which had existed during colonial times 
between the kampongs (especially Terban) and Kotabaru was gone. The 
mother of Mr S, for instance, had complained to him that ‘beginning with the 
Japanese era, jobs had become scarce. People had to find ways to make a living’. 
This was why Mr PM said:
Some had commenced selling fried snacks, some sold fried peanuts, and 
in the morning some people had begun to sell pecel [salad with peanut 
sauce]. My mother, who had grown used to cooking for the boarders in 
the girls’ school, took up selling pecel then. She used to sell on that slight 
elevation over there, the one being built on, in the morning. There was a 
yard there back then.
As the traditional Javanese way of life remained strong, people from the kam-
pong began to undertake the essential traditional rituals which were common 
in villages in Java, but which could not be performed by the residents of 
Kotabaru. When a person died on the housing estate, for instance, someone 
had to initiate the one week of prayer and the other rituals related to a death. 
When a person was to be married or circumcised, quite a number of people 
were required to execute these complex rituals. To ensure the success of these 
traditional Javanese rituals, people had to gather, pray and chant. It would have 
been impossible for the new people from the housing estate to do this. The 
housing-estate dwellers were mostly professionals, who were unlikely to have 
had the time to spend on performing what they may have regarded as the 
tedious essentials required by the traditional ceremonies and indeed may have 
lost the knowledge of how they were to be performed. The kampong dwellers 
had to do this for them.
At the same time, apart from the ritual occasions, contacts between 
Kotabaru and the kampongs declined; within the residential area people also 
became less close. The spatial arrangement of the houses had made the 
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neighbourhood as a whole less organic. Each family became an island unto 
itself. People met friends and other people at work and not in their neighbour-
hood. Although this situation has become the common state of affairs today, it 
must have been revolutionary at that time. The change must have produced a 
certain type of new Indonesian. The big houses and their big spaces were 
totally different to the narrow footpaths and snug lanes of the kampongs; 
where intimacy was prevalent, and the border between one house and another 
was never clear. When asked about how close she was to her neighbours, a 
respondent who had lived in Kotabaru all her life answered:
Yes, we were close, but not as in the kampongs. That’s because houses in 
Kotabaru were large. It wasn’t as it was in the kampongs, where you’d 
meet your neighbours after waking up. It was different there, there was 
more privacy. So the relationship patterns were a bit different (interview 
with Ms E).
 Conclusion
The development of housing estates can be seen as part of the greater process 
of modernization in the Netherlands Indies. The rise of housing estates was 
also a part of the greater spatial changes taking place in the Indonesian cities. 
The former spatial formation of the Indies cities, which had placed Dutch 
houses side by side with native kampongs, had generated regular interaction 
between the Dutch and the Javanese. Modernization resulted in an ever- 
widening distance between and among the ethnic categories. The housing 
estate presented a closed space; a new form of urban site outside which the 
Europeans (at least the women and children) did not have to venture. Or per-
haps they only crossed the boundary when they wanted to attend a ball at the 
sociëteit or urgently needed to buy something in one of the European or Chinese 
shops. In a way, the situation resembled that in today’s gated communities. This 
fear of the outside was not a fear of crime, but the fear of indigenization. The 
latent fear of Europeans of indigenous people was to some extent reversed 
where some indigenous people living in the surrounding kampongs feared 
Kotabaru. Others, however, went there daily to work for the middle and upper 
class residents of the housing estate, and did so again after Independence.
During the Japanese occupation, the Europeans living in Kotabaru had 
either been interned or had fled the city and their vacant houses were occu-
pied by Indonesian professionals. The change in life-style was less radical than 
the shift from European to Indonesian residents might have suggested. 
170 Fakih
<UN>
The new occupants were people who had already become acculturated to a 
Western way of life. Nevertheless, they introduced a new style of habitation. 
They considered their house to be in many ways similar to a dalem. Many 
began to open up their houses to relatives or other followers in the traditional 
spatial way of giving land or space to dependants, thereby binding them in a 
new semi-feudal relationship. As a corollary of the new social structure taking 
shape on the housing estate, their relationship with the kampongs surround-
ing Kotabaru was obliterated. The daily work relationship between servants 
and the lady of the house of colonial times was replaced by a more traditional 
relationship; one which involved the employment of kampong dwellers in the 
traditional ceremonies which members of the Indonesian middle class in 
Kotabaru were unable to perform, but to which they had been accustomed in 
their childhood.
The change in social relationships prompted other changes as well. During 
the 1950s, some areas of Kotabaru degenerated into seediness. The area near 
the Code River became a place where prostitutes gathered. Inhabitants of 
Kotabaru were reluctant to sit in their front gardens for fear of falling victim to 
a crime. The fear which many Javanese harboured of walking into Kotabaru 
during the colonial days was transformed into a fear of the streets of Kotabaru 
itself. As a consequence of the loss of a sense of community, Kotabaru was 
deprived of its basic sense of boundary. Although still known as a fashionable, 
upper class district, the boundaries of Kotabaru became blurred. Few people 
today know where the boundaries are, as if Kotabaru has finally become fully 
incorporated within the city proper and has become a regular part of 
Yogyakarta.
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 Introduction
As one of the major colonial urban centres in Java, Semarang was one of the 
first cities in the Netherlands Indies to gain a measure of municipal autonomy 
under the Decentralization Act passed in 1903. The newly established munici-
pal council rapidly developed itself into a think-tank, which elaborated a colo-
nial discourse concerning urban health, sanitation, housing, and the indigenous 
urban inhabitants. The kampong became a prime focus of attention of the 
municipal administrators (Nas 1998; Coté 2002; Versnel and Colombijn, this 
volume). Faced with a rapidly expanding urban Javanese community, a tragic 
recent history of cholera and plague epidemics, and a burgeoning commercial 
sector, members of the new municipal council of Semarang and its specialist 
committees urgently began to examine the best ways to set about reforming 
living conditions. The initiatives the council implemented over the next 
decade provided important guidelines for the development of public health 
policy, town planning, and public housing followed by many other cities in Java 
and other islands in the colony.
The pressing health and sanitation issues and the desperate need for ade-
quate housing inevitably led urban reformers to advocate innovations which 
implied a multitude of underlying new ideas and practices. In their turn, these 
had an impact upon the cultural and domestic practices of indigenous urban 
kampong residents as well as on traditional methods of house construction. 
No less important in their impact were the specialization of tasks in the build-
ing process and the diffusion of new materials and new skills which were 
increasingly required for the mass housing projects that were being under-
taken (Nas and Boender 2002).
Hygiene ranked very high on the list of priorities of urban government offi-
cials who were concerned with the effects of regular epidemics of the plague, 
cholera, and typhoid, which occurred with increasing incidence in the latter 
years of the nineteenth century (Tillema 1913). When theories about the spe-
cific causes of such epidemics became more widely understood in the colony, 
policies were developed which directly challenged indigenous practices in tra-
ditional house construction, in particular the pitched roofs and thatching 
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which, it was held, sheltered rats and other vermin. In many cases, such houses 
were torn down or re-roofed using such new materials as corrugated iron. 
Moral arguments, articulated by philanthropic and religious interests working 
in urban Java, and by missionaries in more distant parts of the archipelago, 
were often linked to more ‘scientific’ ones. To the anxieties about the insani-
tariness of traditional housing was added a concern about the domestic 
arrangements their architecture implied. These, for instance, allowed the 
cohabitation of several families in one house or several generations of one 
family in a single space. Intentionally or not, new designs, new materials, and 
new practices often challenged traditional beliefs and rituals related to family 
relations, childrearing, or nutrition.
When ideas and regulations concerning better housing ran counter to the 
existing norms and values of indigenous residents, they can be characterized, 
in part, as a ‘civilization offensive’ against Javanese and Chinese domestic tra-
ditions and as an attempt to bring habitation styles and domestic life in gen-
eral into line with European traditions and recent European scientific 
discoveries. In part, they were also simply the result of a general diffusion of 
new ideas, techniques, and materials, such as taking account of sanitation, or 
the use of corrugated iron roofs, and bricks and concrete in construction. 
These municipal programmes introduced significant changes into the charac-
ter of public settlement and in this sense a house as a residence became a cata-
lytic element of modernization.
This mission civilisatrice through the medium of housing was an early form of 
globalization, or more precisely, the implementation of Western conceptualiza-
tions of health and hygiene in all the colonies. This process was promulgated 
more rigorously in some areas than in others, which might be one explanation 
for the great regional differences in the present-day condition of vernacular 
architecture in Indonesia. Since the first generation of Indonesian architects and 
town planners were trained during this energetic period of professional develop-
ment and experimentation, they largely persisted in following this pattern in the 
immediate postcolonial period. Consequently, in the process of decolonization, 
architecture and town planning in Indonesia, as elsewhere in South-East Asia, 
continued to be largely inspired by such Western models without any significant 
reference to national (traditional) architecture, except for aspects of surface dec-
oration (Colombijn 2010: 281–97, 336–348; Dumarçay 1987:70–71; Van Roosmalen, 
this volume). In subsequent years, Indonesian architects and planners turned to 
the latest overseas – increasingly Asian – models in their efforts to meet the 
demand of expanding and aspiring urban lower and middle classes, constructing 
Indonesian versions of gated communities and high-rise apartments.
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The subject of this chapter is how these developments in housing and the 
concomitant social changes worked out in public housing built by the munici-
pality (gemeente) of Semarang in the last decades of colonial rule. It begins by 
identifying the main trends in public housing, which appeared especially in 
two municipal housing complexes in Semarang, Sompok, and Mlaten. This is 
followed by an analysis of how the new housing introduced the residents to 
some aspects of modernity. Next the changes which inevitably occurred dur-
ing the transfer to independence and those which appeared earlier during the 
Japanese interregnum will be sketched. The chapter will conclude by arguing 
that modernization, both as a conceptual notion and as physically embedded 
in the urban landscape, was such a powerful element in the late colonial period 
that the city experienced very little change in its built form with the end of 
colonialism. The only real change was a dramatic burst in population growth.
 Organizing Public Housing in Semarang
In the first half of the twentieth century, Semarang was the administrative cen-
tre of central Java and it was the commercial hub of the region. It was the cen-
tre of a rail and communications networks, infrastructural services for a 
thriving sugar industry, and a busy seaport (Stevens 1986; Suryo 1982). Between 
1905 and 1920, the population, which was ethnically mixed, swelled from 96,000 
to 158,000 and by 1930 it had grown to 218,000. The expansion of the population 
was primarily attributable to the influx of Javanese from the hinterland, 
attracted by the work opportunities the city provided. It was also home to a 
significant Chinese population, whose leading figures dominated the commer-
cial and financial sector and also had control of much of the land. In 1905, 
78 per cent of the population was indigenous, fifteen per cent Chinese, five per 
cent European and two per cent was made up of Arabs and other Asian peo-
ples. In 1930, the indigenous population continued to dominate, but its share 
had shrunk slightly (Semarang 1919; Volkstelling 1930 1936, VIII:2, 78–81).
The perceived poor condition of the urban kampong of the Javanese and 
Chinese residents of Semarang at the beginning of the twentieth century 
encouraged the municipal administration of Semarang, from its inception, to 
develop programmes of kampong improvement (kampongverbetering) and 
public housing (Westerveld 1910). Semarang was rich in citizens who contrib-
uted to this spate of early urban housing reform in Java in the first half of the 
twentieth century. It was also the home of the progressive colonial newspaper, 
De Locomotief, which had been at the forefront of calls for colonial reform in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, and of a variety of religious and 
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philanthropic organizations. By the end of the second decade of the twentieth 
century Semarang had become known as the ‘red city’, a reference to its role as 
the home of an organized indigenous labour movement which had grown 
under the influence of a group of radical European self-proclaimed socialists 
(Shiraishi 1997).
Among the progressive figures in the town was the colonial architect and 
town planner, Thomas Karsten, who assumes a central place in colonial town 
planning. Karsten commenced his colonial career in Semarang in 1914 and the 
influence of his work and writings soon spread throughout the Indies (Sumalyo 
1993). Another significant Semarang figure was H.F. Tillema, a pharmacist and 
businessman. A resident of Semarang, Tillema played a central role in calling 
for improvement in housing and living conditions for both the European and 
indigenous inhabitants of Semarang and later in the whole of the Netherlands 
Indies (Coté 2002). Tillema pointed to the link between technical elements of 
housing construction and the improvement of health conditions of the indig-
enous population. Tillema (1922, V:ix) considered the traditional house to be 
an important breeding ground of illnesses and stressed that it was essential to 
improve the housing conditions to keep the houses plague free, including to 
ensure good light and ventilation, and to take care of proper sewage and gar-
bage disposal. On the wider scale, he also stressed the importance of adequate 
town planning ordinances to regulate the overall arrangement of residential 
areas.
Semarang was also blessed with a number of well-trained, committed pro-
fessionals, including doctors, such as Terburgh, municipal town engineers such 
as Rückert (Versnel and Colombijn, this volume) and Plate, who went on to 
contribute more broadly to the urban development of Java, and leaders such as 
the Semarang mayor, De Iongh. In conjunction with the businessman Tillema 
and the architect Karsten, these men all made their reputations at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century by tackling the problems of the city of Semarang.
These new technocrats helped convince councillors that overcrowding in 
the densely settled Javanese and Chinese kampongs represented a health haz-
ard to the European community and that these health problems related 
directly to business confidence and investment in the city. Although the lives 
of Europeans were directly affected by the health of their Javanese neighbours, 
it was the latter who were most prone to be the victims of the high incidence 
of cholera and typhoid and who were most affected by the high child mortality 
rates. It was they who had to cope with the lack of fresh water, inadequate sani-
tation, overcrowded dwellings and over-populated kampongs.
By the middle of the second decade of the century, the answer to the prob-
lems that beset Java’s cities was clear to the city government: they could only 
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be solved in the longer term by taking the initiative to build new, healthier 
housing complexes, and separating these from the industrial and commercial 
areas of the city. Therefore, the municipality Semarang made public housing a 
priority and embarked on a programme, which can be seen as one of the suc-
cess stories in the history of the city. The city administration set to work devis-
ing a myriad of rules and regulations to enforce building regulations, impose 
proper sanitary habits, and maintain traffic flows and orderly environments. 
Indeed, it did not try to avoid grappling with the entire issue of settling large 
numbers of poor people in an orderly and regulated way. Through the work of 
highly qualified bureaucrats and technocrats, and pushed through by the pro-
gressive principles of its municipal leaders (including Javanese and Chinese 
representatives), the municipality developed seven public housing complexes. 
One of these, Complex Sompok, will be examined in more detail here.
After some years of debate, the Semarang municipality commenced its first 
large public housing project 1916. Its aim was to supply the needs of its citizens 
by producing large numbers of low cost houses by resorting to mass produc-
tion on a commercial basis. This would have the added advantage that it would 
generate income for the city. It contracted Thomas Karsten, who had arrived in 
Semarang in 1914, as the city planner to develop this project. Karsten was con-
cerned about producing buildings and urban environments which would 
attempt to integrate European and indigenous elements and is widely credited 
with having succeeded in doing so. His ideas about architecture and town 
planning, in particular the arrangement and integration of the city into differ-
ent zones, ensured that his name assumes a central place in the history of colo-
nial and Indonesian architecture (Sumalyo 1993).
The Complex Sompok was developed in two stages: in 1919 Karsten finished 
the design and between 1920 and 1923 the local government completed the 
construction of the housing complex (Liem 1931:261). By the end of 1918, an 
area of 9,900 sq m suitable for the construction of thirty-three units had been 
surveyed, plus another 5,785 sq m to accommodate four houses designated as 
so-called European houses. At the end of 1919, the Council had prepared 
another 28,000 sq m for 156 kampong dwellings, and 12,078 sq m for another 
eight European residences (Gemeente Semarang 1918).
Conspicuous in this early experimental period of public housing were the 
more progressive attempts to combine elements of traditional indigenous 
architecture with the principles of modern Western health, hygiene, and con-
struction. Remarkably, these modern, Western ideas were only just then being 
developed and applied in urban housing projects in Europe. The idea of incor-
porating traditional elements in modern architecture had already been tried 
by a number of Western architects working for colonial administrations in 
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South-East Asia, but had only rarely succeeded. The names of G. Grolier, work-
ing in Phnom Penh and Maclaine Pont in Java are amongst those colonial 
experimenters who did succeed to some extent in achieving this aim. But in 
Indonesia it is Thomas Karsten who is credited with having been most success-
ful in integrating European and indigenous elements in houses designed for a 
modern indigenous urban population.
In developing his kampong house design, Karsten paid due respect to 
Javanese domestic tradition and simultaneously accommodated the latest 
technical innovations related to modern concepts of health and sanitation. 
Despite needing to develop affordable mass housing, he also emphasized the 
necessity of ensuring diversity in the style and structure of the houses. To 
ensure a variety in housing style in this huge complex, Karsten devised a num-
ber of house ‘types’, built to size and cost specifications suited to what he per-
ceived to be the needs of families of different socio-economic levels. Of the 
eighty-one new houses which had been built by 1919, twenty-one houses were 
of Type II, forty of type IV and twenty of Type V (Figure 7.1). Type II houses 
were provided with a simple bathroom, washroom and privy. Type V houses 
had an additional space which consisted of kitchen, with adjacent bathroom 
and privy. This additional space was connected to each group of four houses in 




such a way that one septic tank served every eight houses (in two clusters of 
four). Some of the more expensive designs included a gravel-based septic tank. 
Each house had a brick wall 0.8 m high and 0.3 m. wide separating it from the 
next, avoiding the use of traditional bamboo plaited walls which were brittle 
and decayed too rapidly. These houses were rented out by the Gemeentelijk 
Woningbedrijf (Municipal Housing Corporation) for rents varying according 
to the different size houses: Type II cost 494 guilders, Type IV, 703 guilders, and 
Type V 773 guilders per year (Gemeente Semarang 1919). The most expensive 
type had the added 4 × 4 m space and shared use of a gravel-based septic tank.
The council supervised these pioneering developments closely and inter-
vened in Karsten’s initial plans when it felt that the houses were too close 
together. In 1918, it removed one house from every group of four in Karsten’s 
initial design. At the end of the same year, the council also decided to provide 
the cheaper houses with detached kitchens. These were to be constructed from 
bamboo to cut the extra costs. By the end of 1919, detached kitchens made of 
bamboo were common (Gemeente Semarang 1919).
The municipal government benefited in its building activity from the stable 
economic conditions at the time and the good income it received from taxes. 
Therefore, the years 1916–1922 formed a period of initiative and development. 
In one year alone, the municipal council built 519 houses in Sompok at a total 
cost of 480,000 guilders. So successful was the public housing project that very 
quickly it used up all the available land, including that of the existing kam-
pongs of Kintelan and Lempongsari. While the new project housing did not 
destroy the old kampongs, new municipal houses were built in the interstices 
between the old houses, producing strange juxtapositions. For instance, the 
old housing of kampong Lamper Lor remained in the midst of new housing of 
kampong Jeruk and Rambutan.
The insertion of new kampong housing into the area of old kampongs intro-
duced new divisions in terms of the built environment and in terms of the 
nature of the population. The complex Sompok, also known as Kampong 
Gemeente, for instance, was devoted to housing lower-ranking civil servants. 
Sompok was also distinguished from the older kampongs onto which it abut-
ted by its layout with regularly placed parks (plantsoenen). The green image of 
Kampong Sompok was strengthened by the decorative neighbourhood names, 
taken from fruit trees, such Kampong Manggis, Jeruk, and Rambutan 
(Gedenkboek 1931).
By the end of 1929, the Municipal Housing Corporation of Semarang had 
built 1782 houses (Rückert 1930:167–170). This was a relatively small number 
given the population growth over that time and municipal housing provided 
for only a small proportion of the housing needs of the total population. 
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Despite this criticism, Semarang had made a greater effort than any other city 
in the Netherlands Indies in providing public housing (Colombijn 2011). 
Besides Sompok, public housing in Semarang also included the housing 
development in Candi Baru, Kintelan, and East Semarang. After 1916, a sepa-
rate technical department was created to oversee this development and the 
housing department became an institution, which assumed a range of social 
functions related to public housing. Its duties included surveying and con-
structing roads, implementing policies related to health and sanitation for 
housing and its environment, and designing and implementing infrastruc-
ture for traffic, industry, trade, and other facilities. Generally speaking, its 
tasks were aimed to meet the demands of designing a better life in the pres-
ent and future.
In 1924 responsibility for housing development was taken over by a limited 
liability company, NV Volkshuisvesting. The central government furnished 
75 per cent of the capital and the municipality 25 per cent. Similar companies 
were founded in other large cities of the colony (Flieringa 1930:140–143, 150–
153; Rückert 1930:169). The bulk of the houses of the NV Volkshuisvesting were 
rented, at costs of between three and 35 guilders per month and some houses 
were sold. This housing company operated smoothly and successfully until 
1930 with a capital in 1929 of 1.4 million guilders. In that year, just before the 
onset of the Depression, the company was able to sell around 580 houses, eigh-
teen stores and six shops (Rückert 1930:163–169).
However, during the Depression, NV Volkshuisvesting suffered a severe set-
back. Many occupants moved out of these houses to other dwellings with 
lower rents or moved back to the village. After Independence, responsibility 
for new and existing public housing and the exploitation of urban land for 
housing was taken over by the Dinas Djawatan Gedung-Gedung Kota Besar 
Semarang (Semarang Municipal Department of Buildings). In 1950, it allocated 
a significant number of houses to veterans of the War of Independence.
 Some Problems in Public Housing
Two key issues remained a problem throughout the twentieth century. The 
first was funding for public housing. Municipal autonomy also meant finan-
cial autonomy and, although the central government did provide some finan-
cial support, one of the motivations behind decentralization had been to 
encourage local government to develop its own sources of funding through 
differing forms of taxation. Initially the central government was not prepared 
to support the provision of urban public housing financially. When it changed 
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its policy later, the amount was never sufficient to cover all the needs of 
Semarang. From time to time, municipal councils sold public land to private 
developers to raise money to add to that received from the government in the 
form of loans and during the colonial period, the local government of 
Semarang was able to service its debts. After independence the municipality 
continued building housing complexes to meet public housing needs, espe-
cially those of its own civil servants. Limited financial resources forced public 
housing authorities to co-operate with private companies and to run lotteries 
as a means of raising funds. The political instability, which persisted for much 
of the early period of the Republic, added to its funding problems. The provi-
sion of fresh water was another onerous financial burden associated with the 
housing project.
The other main, recurrent problem was land availability. Land was obvi-
ously crucial to solving the housing problem. One of the initial problems fac-
ing the Semarang council was formed by the legal issues surrounding the 
acquisition of land. In the case of Sompok, there was a major disagreement 
about the compensation to be paid to private owners for the acquisition of 
land needed for the construction of the drainage canal through the complex. 
Indeed, its construction was delayed because the owner of the land was still 
waiting for compensation. A similar problem arose about the acquisition of 
land required to construct the access road to Sompok (near the existing 
Jomlang-Tegalsari crossroads). Again, the landowner affected, Mrs Kastelyn, 
questioned the need of the expropriation and the amount of compensation 
offered for her land. Small landowners whose land was expropriated for the 
construction of housing generally had reservations about the financial com-
pensation (Gemeente Semarang 1917). This led to protracted legal battles 
between the council and landowners who did not want to sell their land.
In January 1918, the Semarang council decided to establish a commission to 
investigate the issue of land ownership and the definition of public land. This 
commission established a basis for assessing land prices. By 1918 it established 
the principle of differential prices, with land for housing along main roads set 
at between 1 and 5 guilders per sq m and land set back from a main road at ƒ 0.5 
per sq m. Initially, the inhabitants did not want to let their land go at these 
prices, but eventually they were forced to accept the compensation being 
offered (Gemeente Semarang 1918).
Learning from such experiences, the municipal administration and the NV 
Volkshuisvesting later ensured they settled the price and the matter of the pos-
session of the land before elaborating their development plans. In the case of 
Candi Baru and Mlaten, this involved making an initial down payment (panjer) 
based on accurate surveys made at the time of the transaction.
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1 At the risk of stating the obvious, I should perhaps emphasize that, of course, conversely 
traditional Javanese domestic practices influenced European domestic life in many ways, 
such as the habit of taking baths daily (Soekiman 2000).
 Kampong Sompok as a Gateway to Modernity
Despite the modest nature of the houses being constructed by the municipal 
council, the public housing estates imposed a dramatic intervention on the 
lifestyle of those Javanese who were selected – or opted – to rent there.1 The 
areas were clearly destined not to be for ‘ordinary’ Javanese. As one interviewee 
expressed it when remembering the pre-war inhabitants of Sompok:
Complex Sompok was one of the colonial housing complexes. They were 
usually the preserve of the well-off families. Another example was kam-
pong Blimbing. We could not live there, because we did not have the 
money to rent. Today, Complex Sompok can be compared to Perum 
Tlogosari [a middle class neighbourhood] (interview with Said, 77 years 
old, 2004).
The new estates were often the subject of newspaper articles. For instance, two 
contributors described the conditions in the housing complex in and around 
the kampong at length in the Malay language magazine Oedaja (Soedarso and 
Amaloedin 1928). These new, innovative projects often featured in the promo-
tion of the ‘modern’ Netherlands Indies. For instance, a book on tourism, 
Nederlandsch-Indië, contained pictures of the modern housing in Candi Baru 
(see also Figure 7.2). The latter photographs remove any lingering doubts that the 
new buildings represented a significant departure from the urban kampong at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, such as those shown in the photos 
taken by Tillema twenty-five years earlier.
Another interviewee emphasized what he remembered about the houses:
The condition of the house was good, because the local government 
always ensured that the area around the housing complex was kept clean. 
They cleaned the small river in the housing complex periodically. The 
houses were small, 6×4 m, but the back and front yards were well laid out. 
So it was very beautiful. In the past there were small paths and parks, 
which were also beautiful. People often spent their time strolling in the 
park. The Europeans usually chose [to live] in the houses on the main 
road (interview with Soeparno, 61 years old, 2004).
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The houses into which these better-off indigenous residents of Semarang 
moved were indeed quite different from those they were used to. Most came 
from inner city kampongs, where the houses were more or less similar to the 
traditional rural village houses, which had evolved as part of Central Javanese 
culture. After moving to the modern housing of Sompok, interviewees recalled 
they felt like a ‘modern person’. The house was distinct from a traditional one: 
it had a bathroom, clean water, and electricity. Moreover, the housing estate 
provided a beautiful park and street lighting. Colonial health regulations 
required that the traditional palm leaf (atap) roofing be replaced by tiles as a 
plague prevention measure. Public health had been a major concern for the 
municipality and it therefore lay at the core in the design of houses.
Generally speaking, the facilities of the housing estate also created a new 
cultural environment. The new configuration of house and locale created a 
new perception of the house and the new environment inaugurated a broader 
change in society as a whole: from what might be termed a paguyuban society 
(Gemeinschaft) to a patembayan society (Gesellschaft); in other words it trans-
formed from a traditional to a modern society (Budihardjo 1986:69). This 
change is vividly remembered by a former resident:
Yes, I still remember Sompok housing. It was a gemeente housing 
complex. The people who lived there were officials of the colonial 
Figure 7.2  A healthy house in Candi
Source: Verslag gemeente Semarang 1918
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government and the [ordinary] indigenous inhabitants were not allowed 
to settle there. Only civil servants could reside there. The estate was con-
trolled and cleaned by the municipal council, we could not put rubbish 
anywhere; there was a privy and also sewerage. Today, the well is still 
there but the privy is not. The sewerage was over there. In front of Mrs 
Lestri’s house there was a drain, [through which] the water flowed swiftly 
(interview with Said).
In contrast to a European house, which had several rooms, each with its own 
function, there were no divisions in a traditional Javanese house. The division 
of the house into rooms introduced the concept of privacy through spatial 
arrangement. Initially these internal divisions made the inhabitants feel 
uneasy since, in Javanese culture, a house was a micro-model of the cosmos 
and belief system. Over time, however, people absorbed the hybrid influences 
introduced by the internal arrangement of the new houses.
Another novelty to which the residents of the Kampong Gemeente had to 
adjust was the integral role of the bureaucracy in their housing. In order to be 
allocated a house in a public housing estate, people had to register with the 
municipal offices and municipal officials would consider their application 
before deciding whether to select them or not. The function of bureaucracy, as 
Max Weber has argued, was to guarantee the impartiality of rule and to define 
the relationship between task and responsibility. In terms of the Weberian 
Idealtype, civil servants needed to work as professional and neutral agents, 
immune to outside interests, and focus on the effectiveness of their work in 
realizing the goals set by government. In that sense, the housing bureaucracy 
as a whole also became a machine, which embodied the modern intentions of 
the municipal government.
One of the effects of the new bureaucratic procedures was increased disci-
pline. Tenants of public housing were now required to pay their rent according 
to a strict time schedule. Failure to pay meant that they had to leave the munic-
ipal kampong.
When I was child…in the colonial era, before Japanese occupation…my 
father worked for the government, so my father was assigned a house in 
Kampong Gemeente (Manggis, Jeruk, Blimbing). The houses were rented, 
so we had to pay the bill every month (interview with Soenarto Padimin, 
75 years old, 2004).
Privies formed another area in which the inhabitants of the public housing 
complexes were faced by new experiences that challenged traditional 
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attitudes and demanded new ‘modern’ behaviour of them. The municipality 
reported in 1919 that many times the inhabitants complained about the sys-
tem of closed drains running behind the houses. Privies were constructed 
along these drains, and at the upper end of the drain there was a facility for 
washing clothes and bathing in the water flowing through this drain. The 
drain with the privies strung along it and a bathing and washing facility at one 
end had been provided for each row of houses in order to improve sanitary 
conditions in the municipal kampong. The municipal administration intended 
to accustom its inhabitants to leading a more hygienic life. The inhabitants 
rarely used the bathroom, because they preferred to take a shower in the open. 
The inhabitants also preferred to put faeces in a hole in the ground and heap 
earth over them, rather than use the privies. In the face of obvious resistance, 
the municipal council hired a person whose job it was to clean the privies and 
gutters to ensure that kampong cleanliness was maintained (Gemeente 
Semarang 1919).
Later inhabitants began to appreciate the toilets. In complex Mlaten, for 
instance, shared facilities were built for bathing, washing, and privies 
(Figure 7.3). It turned out that many people were willing to pay slightly higher 
rents in order to have a private bathroom. This willingness was indicative of a 
growing individualism (Westbroek 1932:16).
Perhaps there were less drastic changes in furnishing the house. One 
European observer remarked in the late 1930s that, even in traditional kam-
pong houses, typically consisting of one room (in rural areas), people were 
inclined to adopt Western habits. Somewhat disparagingly, he continued that, 
if people could afford them, the Javanese were
Figure 7.3  Shared facilities for bathing, washing and defecating, Mlaten
Source: Westbroek (1932:16)
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convert[s] to European furnishings at their very worst. Wardrobes and 
“whatnots,” china cabinets, occasional tables, and Nottingham lace cur-
tains are his delight. He does not feel his home complete without an 
immense iron double bed for the heads of the family.
ponder 1990 [1942]:84–85
 Class Distinctions
The attractions of the new modern housing developments were hard to ignore 
and many people wanted to live there. However, not all people could afford the 
relatively high rents. The majority of those who could were the new class of 
State officials who could afford the rents. Mrs Sutopo provides the following 
picture of such a family, which seems to be typical of the occupants in the 
1930s:
At the time our family was quite prosperous. My husband’s first salary 
was 174 guilders per month. From this, we used ƒ 15 for renting the house, 
ƒ 2 for electricity, ƒ 1.50 for paying the housekeeper, ƒ 5 for the driver, ƒ 5 for 
paying for a sewing machine, ƒ 3 for paying for a generator (dynamo), 
side-dishes (lauk pauk) 20 cent per day or ƒ 6 per month, and 40 kati rice 
of 2.5 cent each. We could save 100 guilders each month. […] We were 
able to resist going to any meetings, let alone parties. We even did not go 
to the cinema. We only played tennis, which was our favourite way of 
keeping healthy.
sutopo 1981:305
An official receiving a salary 174 guilders per month could be classified middle 
class. On such a salary, they could have afforded to go to the cinema, one of the 
characteristic pastimes of the modern family in 1930s, but this woman specifi-
cally identified her family as abstaining from both political and ‘modern’ activ-
ities. Indeed, while the modern surroundings and secure income made many 
new activities possible, this did not mean that traditional aspects of Javanese 
life disappeared. As the following account indicates, in the domestic environ-
ment of the middle class home, many aspects of traditional female-centred life 
continued:
One day at 11 a.m., I had finished my work. The three of us were sitting on 
the veranda […]. Emmy pretended she was at the market with a little bas-
ket filled with coloured leaves and various flowers she had plucked in the 
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schoolyard. Because of the heat, my grandmother had discarded her 
kebaya, and just wrapped a cloth chest (kemben) around her. The long 
cloth decked her torso. She had her favourite game, dakon. I was finishing 
a piece of embroidery around a leg of my trousers.
sutopo 1981:303
Such reminiscences suggest that the lifestyle of these middle class families was 
a combination of traditional and Western culture. The clothing of the grand-
mother and ‘playing market’ suggest a traditional orientation. Embroidery, on 
the other hand, was a popular domestic activity borrowed from European 
women (and popularized in the new Indonesian language women’s magazines 
of the day). Mrs Sutopo’s family was from a priyayi (Javanese upper class) back-
ground. People from this new priyayi class thought they needed to demon-
strate their commitment to Western culture to support and promote their 
prestige in the colonial society. They betrayed this way of thinking in their out-
ward appearance, in the activities they undertook in daily life, in the discipline 
applied to work and so on.
Sompok also included families of a distinctly lower social class. These lived 
in kampong Manggis, Jeruk, and Rambutan. In Complex Mlaten social divi-
sions could also be discerned and here lower class families lived in the kam-
pong Krakatau, Hawa, and Hiri. The everyday classification of people, apart 
from being defined by the quality and style of houses they inhabited, was also 
based on lifestyle and what they ate. These class distinctions were recognized 
in the new housing complexes:
Some people employed by the municipality were lower class. Yes, they 
lived in those houses over there in Kampong Manggis. Today, though, the 
houses in Manggis have been extended. Then, a government employee 
used to live in Kampong Manggis; he cleaned the gutters and could buy a 
house in Manggis. As for the higher class, they lived in Lamper Sari. My 
house was in Kampong Jeruk. […] The houses there were beautiful. Now 
all the houses are beautiful and they have been sold by their former own-
ers (interview with Said).
All in all, housing design and the selection of who lived in which kampong played 
an important role in establishing new class distinctions in Semarang. It should 
be noted that not all residents were indigenous. A 1932 survey in the housing 
complex of Mlaten revealed that 1899 people occupied 663 houses built by the 
NV Volkshuisvesting Semarang. Of these people, 1180 were indigenous, 505 
Chinese, 207 European, and seven were classified as other (Westbroek 1932:16).
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 A Micro-view of Decolonization: Sompok in the Mid-Twentieth 
Century
Towards the end of the colonial period, the intensity of state intervention declined. 
The kampong took on a life of its own. Inhabitants were increasingly accustomed 
to the experience of employment in modern offices and the consumption of 
modern media. Despite rising nationalist politics to which urban intellectuals 
were attracted, in many ways the lives of new urban kampong dwellers came 
closer to that of the Dutch. Although a social and cultural distance remained, 
expressed for instance in terms of address, the urban population as a whole 
became more integrated by the use of terms such as tuan, nyonya, sinyo whereas 
in the village, older terms of respect, such as nDoro, Den, jeng tended to survive.
Typical of many reminiscences of an older pre-war generation is the 
following:
Yes, we lived here, got married here, and have stayed to the present. Well, 
people said that the Dutch were colonial, but they were kind. We did not 
have any complaints. Yes, we are good persons and we have stayed here 
for years. We never fight and we have always got on well with the neigh-
bours, because all of other the people are good, too (interview with 
Bisirkulin, 77 years old, 2004).
Good relations between indigenous people and the colonial overlord can also 
be seen in mixed marriages. For instance, in 1940 a person from an old kam-
pong married a member of the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (knil, 
Royal Netherlands Indies Army) living in a nearby boarding house; the rela-
tionship continued after Independence:
When I was a child, my life was wonderful because my sister married a 
soldier of the knil. At that time their position was good. Sometimes peo-
ple even called me a friend of the Dutch. […] Sometimes we were helped 
by those knil people. They were like us, indigenous inhabitants. They 
often gave us food, like bread. In the 1950s I liked to hang around with 
sinyo-sinyo [European or Eurasian youths]; when they were playing, I just 
watched (interview with Margono, 70 years old, 2004).
Relations between people in the housing complex and the surrounding older, 
unplanned kampongs intertwined. For instance, people living in Sompok 
employed personnel from the older kampong to do domestic chores. As one of 
the former domestic aides recalls:
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We had good relations there. They [middle class people in Sompok] had 
a housekeeper who was one of us and sometimes we also asked to go with 
them. At that time, there was the Dutch Meneer Mengrut. He lived with 
his housekeeper and she gave birth to a baby. Nowadays the child is living 
in Holland. Mr Mengrut has died (interview with Soeparno, 70 years old, 
2004).
 Kampongs during the Japanese Occupation and Beyond
The arrival of Japanese soldiers brought significant changes to the inter-class 
and inter-ethnic relationships, which had developed over the past two decades 
in Sompok and Mlaten. During the first days of the occupation, the Europeans 
fled from their houses. Many indigenous people from the surrounding kam-
pong took advantage of this to steal goods from the empty houses in Sompok.
Indigenous attitudes towards the Japanese were mixed. Semarang-born 
novelist Nh. Dini recalls how one day five Japanese soldiers suddenly appeared 
standing in the field that separated their house from a river. The kampong peo-
ple gathered to watch them and so did, from behind their fence (pagar), Dini 
and her family. The soldiers were speaking angrily. Two of them broke down 
the fence without warning and came into their backyard. They took the iron 
clothesline. The second time they came and took the clothesline, Dini watched 
them from nearby. ‘These people were the army which my father called the 
liberator from the [Dutch] colonizer!’ (Dini 1979:9).
The social differences grew smaller, at least on the surface. The Japanese 
treated the Javanese as equals, especially if they were willing to co-operate 
with the new overlords. Dini was keenly aware of the changing social relations, 
and not only because her father, who continued to work for the railways, 
earned less and less.
The social system kept in pace with the propaganda [proclaiming] that 
all people were of the same status, with the slogans “Japan-Indonesia 
together,” “Co-Prosperity in Great East Asia” and the like. It took my 
mother a long time to get used to being called “Bu,” a title addressed to 
her by the neighbours in the kampong who had once addressed her with 
[the more respectful title of] “Den” of “nDoro.”
dini 1979:10–11
Conditions changed dramatically when the Japanese military government des-
ignated the modern housing complexes of Sompok (Lamper Sari) and Mlaten 
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(Halmahera) as an internment camp for Europeans. These complexes, once 
the sites of modern humanity, became places of inhumanity. The kampongs 
were sealed off from neighbouring housing by a high bamboo fence. The 
houses, designed for modern Indonesian families, were now all occupied by 
Dutchmen. Women and men were separated. Lamper Sari (Sompok) was des-
ignated for women and children, and Halmahera (Mlaten) was occupied by 
men. These kampongs were eventually to house a large majority of all European 
civilians in Central Java. By January 1944, Lamper Sari was the biggest women’s 
and children’s internment camp in Indonesia, with up to 8,000 internees 
(Fenton Huie 1992:69). The small, two-room houses in Lamper Sari were occu-
pied by twenty to twenty-five internees each. Sanitary conditions in the mod-
ern houses collapsed completely; government officers no longer supervised 
the cleaning of the complex. The hygiene deteriorated alarmingly and this 
breakdown caused the death of many internees.
As the Europeans were gradually concentrated in two parts of Sompok and 
Mlaten and thus removed from other parts of Sompok and Mlaten, indigenous 
people had the opportunity to enjoy the modernity more directly. They could 
go into the modern houses without feelings of humility or inferiority. 
Meanwhile, the European internees, increasingly suffering from a lack of food, 
exchanged their possessions for fresh food (eggs, chicken, fish, meat, rice and 
so forth) brought by inhabitants of neighbouring kampongs. Through this 
exchange, items of modernity were disseminated among the indigenous peo-
ple, such as clothes (jackets, shirts, shoes), cameras, jazz records and the like. 
At least at the beginning of the Japanese rule, the boundary between the 
internment camp and the neighbouring kampong assumed the appearance of 
a market.
The Japanese period thus had two contradictory effects on the moderniza-
tion of kampong life. With the disruption of the municipal apparatus, modern 
ideals of cleanliness, hygiene, and order had to be dropped, especially in the 
parts that functioned as internment camp. Simultaneously, however, the con-
sumption of modernity spread to a new group of indigenous people who pur-
chased at bargain prices modern consumer items hitherto unaffordable to 
them. This paradoxical situation ended when the Japanese army surrendered.
Social changes continued after Independence. Many of the new residents of 
kampong Nangka and Mangga were civil servants. After 1958, the proportion of 
indigenous residents increased when the Dutch were forced to leave Indonesia 
as a result of political conflicts between Jakarta and The Hague. Especially 
Kampong Lamper Sari had many newcomers because the military took over 
the houses from the Dutch. Although distinctions remained, the Sompok area 
and its residents came to be increasingly integrated into the surrounding 
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kampongs through a cultural dialogue that, in time, created a common com-
munity characterized by individualism, efficiency, and functionality.
 Conclusion
Housing plays an important role in developing a city and constitutes the larg-
est area of the modern city. Arguably, it is in terms of housing that the mod-
ernizing influence of colonialism in the Indonesia city was most prevalent. 
In Semarang, as in other colonial cities, the colonial municipality was an 
important modernizing agent. It intervened directly in the process of hous-
ing by town planning and by the development of public housing complexes 
such as those of Sompok and Mlaten. In the process, the face of the city 
changed.
The public housing projects gave rise to the formation of new urban spaces, 
new communities, and new habits. Modern housing had an effect on sanitary 
behaviour (for instance, the use of showers and toilets), the discipline to follow 
the calendar in order to pay the rent on time, interaction with neighbours, and 
self-esteem. However, the continued interaction of the residents of the new 
housing projects with older urban and rural communities ensured that a 
dynamic process of multifaceted cultural interaction continued to produce, 
over time, a specifically modern Indonesian urban identity. People adopted 
some of the changes without ever giving up all traditional values and practices. 
As a consequence, modernity in the twentieth century Indonesian urban kam-
pong developed as a homegrown, hybrid way of life.
In this hybrid form, modernization was a powerful force. Since moderniza-
tion, both as a conceptual notion and as a physically embedded part in the 
urban landscape, was such a powerful element in the late colonial period, hous-
ing experienced very little change in its built form at the end of colonialism. 
After decolonization, modernization might have changed pace, but not 
direction.
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From Autonomous Village to ‘Informal Slum’
Kampong Development and State Control in Bandung (1930–1960)1
Gustaaf Reerink
 Introduction
‘In the colonial period, Taman Sari was so different. You wouldn’t recognize the 
place’. Ibu Darsum throws me a meaningful look. She is not happy about the 
current condition of her kampong, Gang Bongkaran, located in kelurahan 
Taman Sari in the northern part of Bandung.2 Like so many people her age, she 
is full of appreciation when she speaks nostalgically about the past, as if every-
thing has been deteriorating ever since she was born.
We sit in front of her house over a cup of tea. Her house is impressive nei-
ther because of its size nor its quality, but it is by far the best in the neighbour-
hood. It even has a small flower garden in front. People in the kampong insisted 
that I should talk to her. She could assuage my curiosity about the history of 
Taman Sari. At eighty-four, she is one of the oldest residents in the neighbour-
hood. More importantly, no one has resided in Taman Sari as long as she has: 
Ibu Darsum was born, raised and has grown old here.
Indeed, Taman Sari must have been a very different place before the Second 
World War. Today it is a settlement of precarious substandard buildings, 
suffering from a lack of adequate infrastructure and proper access to public 
services, and tends to be rather informal in terms of land tenure and land use. 
Most residents live in one of the many small houses built alongside the 
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3 I settled and carried out participant observation in kelurahan Taman Sari from September 
2004–February 2005 and in kelurahan Cibangkong from September–December 2005. Oral 
history research was conducted in kelurahan Taman Sari from September–December 2005. 
In total, about twenty residents were interviewed in five neighbourhoods. The survey was 
organized between September and December 2005 among 420 households in seven kelu­
rahan in Bandung, including sixty households in Taman Sari.
Cikapundung River. Their dwellings can be reached by alleys, some of which 
are so narrow that they are called ‘gang cinta’, love alleys, because people have 
to get pretty intimate to pass one another.
My curiosity about the history of Taman Sari was triggered when I saw a 
map of Bandung dating from the 1930s. At the time the area was already cov-
ered by small kampongs, but it was primarily depicted as a city park. Informed 
of the contemporary conditions prevailing there, I was struck by this radical 
change in land use. Spurred on by this curiosity, I settled in Gang Bongkaran 
in Taman Sari for a period of participant observation. Later I conducted oral 
history research, in close collaboration with two students from Universitas 
Padjadjaran, among a number of the older, well-informed residents. Finally, I 
organized a survey in kampongs in Taman Sari and six other kelurahan.3 This 
chapter is the result of this oral history research, the survey, as well as literature 
research. Although this chapter draws on data mainly acquired from Taman 
Sari, the purpose is to reach some general conclusions about kampongs and 
their dwellers in Bandung.
This chapter is a discussion of the factors underlying the development of 
kampongs in Bandung in the twentieth century. It analyses the legal, spatial, 
and socio-economic characteristics and dynamics of these settlements from 
the colonial times, through the Japanese occupation and Indonesian Revolution 
to an independent Indonesia. Finally, it assesses the impact of the main poli-
cies on kampongs adopted by consecutive colonial and Indonesian govern-
ments. Consequently, the paper explains how and why kampongs in Taman 
Sari and other kelurahan in Bandung have developed into the settlements they 
are today.
The basic argument informing this chapter is that neither colonial nor 
Indonesian governments ever succeeded in exercising effective control over 
kampongs and therefore could not develop, standardize, and regulate these 
settlements to conform to their policies. During the colonial period, this lack 
of state control was a consequence of village or kampong autonomy (desa 
autonomie), which formed part of the official colonial policy of legal dualism. 
After Independence, kampongs actually retained their autonomy, despite 
the effort to decolonize. Taken in combination with various historical events 
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since Independence, the lack of state control has resulted in kampongs 
developing into the kind of settlement the government itself qualifies as 
informal slums.
The structure of this chapter is mainly chronological and after a description 
of Taman Sari in colonial times, it is further subdivided into the three periods 
discussed: colonial times, the Japanese occupation and Indonesian Revolution, 
and Independence. It ends with some concluding remarks, in which reference 
is made to the contemporary characteristics of kampongs in Bandung.
 Rural Villages in a Colonial City
The presence of the autonomous kampongs in Bandung has everything to do 
with the encroachment of the city on its rural environs. Rural villages were 
swallowed by the expanding town. Between the late nineteenth century and 
the end of colonial rule, Bandung developed from a small settlement of about 
10,000 inhabitants into a modern European colonial city with 200,000 resi-
dents. Just as other cities in the colony the expansion of Bandung was largely 
the outcome of a new era in colonial policy, the liberal period, which intro-
duced legal reforms and subsequently a radical increase in commercial activity 
stimulated by the new plantations in the hinterland of Bandung (Voskuil 
1996:31). From 1854, private planters could lease land from the colonial govern-
ment and from 1870 this actually was a commercially attractive proposition. 
The natural conditions of the Priangan region around Bandung proved ideal 
for the cultivation of tea, coffee, and quinine. Tea planters were the most com-
mercially successful and they spent their money in Bandung, or ‘het Parijs van 
Java’ (the Paris of Java) as it was also called on account of its sophisticated 
options for entertainment. More prosaically the city also functioned as a tran-
shipment point for their plantation products.
Later, the economic function of Bandung extended beyond being simply a 
hub of the plantation economy. The city began to attract people from outside 
the region, notably after railway connections opened it up in 1884 (Kunto 
1984:161–162). Another reason for the development of Bandung was the 1916 
decision of the colonial government to move a number of government agen-
cies from Batavia to Bandung. In 1918 the colonial government began to 
amplify plans to make Bandung the capital of the Netherlands Indies but this 
never materialized, principally because finances proved a stumbling 
block. Nevertheless, however ephemeral, such plans contributed to the success 
of the city government in attracting new European residents. A last but no less 
important reason for Europeans – in the 1920s and 1930s the majority of them 
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pensioners – to settle in Bandung was its pleasant climate (Voskuil 
1996:34–35).
Rural-urban migration of Indonesians also contributed to the expansion of 
the city. The status of land in the Priangan region around Bandung was rapidly 
undergoing a change from being an attribute of the community bound by 
genealogical or territorial ties to that of a private commodity. By the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the region already had a reputation for large-scale 
landownership. Over time, the size of the land holdings increased and more 
land was alienated to become the property of (absentee) landowners, includ-
ing members of the menak (noble) families, well-to-do villagers, merchants, 
and hajji. The upshot of the concentration of land ownership was a growing 
group of landless peasants (Van Dijk 1981:363–373). In addition to the concen-
tration of land in a few hands, the growing population pressure and a decline 
in employment opportunities in rural areas left many peasants with no option 
but to uproot themselves and go to the city (Jellinek 1991:4). With an expansion 
in its economic activities and concomitant growing labour demand, Bandung 
proved an attractive destination.
The city was ethnically divided, the railway forming a clear dividing line. 
The cooler part north of the railway was mostly reserved for well-to-do 
European citizens, who lived in old, ‘Indies’ houses surrounded by large 
yards. Although the Europeans formed only twelve per cent of the popula-
tion, they occupied more than half of the urban land (Wertheim 1956:180). 
Consequently, the northern part was relatively spacious. In the many kam-
pongs in the southern part of Bandung, conditions were very different. The 
majority of the Indonesian population was packed into these settlements 
and the area even declined as more land was allocated for urban infrastruc-
ture and European districts. Indonesians formed 77 per cent of the popula-
tion of Bandung, but occupied only 40 per cent of the land (Voskuil 1996:39–40; 
Wertheim 1956:180).
The expanding city engulfed many indigenous desa (rural villages), which 
soon lost their rural character and developed into urban kampongs with an 
almost entirely residential function (Flieringa 1930:36). Kampongs at the urban 
fringe, for the time being retained a rural character, both in physical appear-
ance and social-economic functions. The rural mode of life included primitive 
sanitation, which, in combination with the high population density consti-
tuted a public health risk (Wertheim 1956:175–176).
The urban kampongs were allowed a high degree of autonomy (desa auto­
nomie), which meant that the population could apply its own customary or 
adat law, administration, and justice. This autonomy was justified by the sup-
posedly divergent economic and social needs of the different ethnic groups in 
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4 Article 71 of the 1854 Regeeringsreglement, which functioned as a Constitution, acknowl-
edged the autonomy of indigenous villages and general principles of village administration 
were laid down in the Inlandse Gemeente Ordonnantie (Indigenous Village Ordinance) of 
1906. The autonomy was confirmed by Article 128(3) of the subsequent 1925 Indische 
Staatsregeling, which served as the new Constitution.
the colony.4 In the early twentieth century, seventeen such autonomous vil-
lages existed within the perimeter of Bandung. After the boundaries of the 
Bandung Municipality were expanded, the number of these villages increased 
to forty-four in 1942.
Soekadjadi, a part of Taman Sari, the area where I conducted fieldwork, was 
one such village. Taman Sari lies in the more spacious, northern part of 
Bandung and at first sight this area appeared strictly European. It is located in 
the valley of the Cikapundung, the main river flowing through the city, and 
contained between two main roads, the Lembangweg and Van Houten Parkweg 
(currently the famous Cihampelas ‘Jeans’ Street and Taman Sari Street). A large 
part of the area was covered with the private back gardens, full of trees and 
fishponds, belonging to the predominantly European, middle class people liv-
ing in houses on the two main roads. On the east bank of the River Cikapundung, 
alongside the Van Houten Parkweg, was a European cemetery. This land as well 
as the land alongside the Cikapundung River was municipal land.
Soekadjadi was hidden behind the façade of European property. The area 
around Gang Bongkaran, where I interviewed Ibu Darsum quoted in the vignette at 
the beginning of this chapter, was one of the village hamlets behind the main roads. 
One of the residents I interviewed remembers that in the early 1930s there was a 
handful of houses clustered along this alley. Most houses were owned by Dutch 
people, but there also lived some Indonesians who had bought the land from Dutch 
residents. These Indonesian residents of Taman Sari were relatively well-off com-
pared to the majority of indigenous residents. Most of them were farmers and grew 
vegetables for the urban market, but some had made a fortune in trade.
Behind the façade of ‘European’ houses along the main roads, Taman Sari 
had a rural character. Plots were generally large. Every household owned at 
least a sawah (wet rice-field) or an orchard, often planted with cacao trees. 
There were fishponds too. This land was garapan land, of which rights of own-
ership had, in line with customary law, been determined by opening and culti-
vating it. The houses were constructed in a traditional manner, with a raised 
floor, walls made of wood and plaited bamboo, and a bamboo roof. Paths were 
dirt roads of sand or pebbles. Parts of the area were swampy and muddy. The 
Cikapundung River was so clean it was used for drinking water. Contemporary 
names of kampongs in Taman Sari still reveal the rural character of the area. 
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Wertheim (1958).
For instance, the word maung, part of the settlement name Liang Maung or 
Cimaung, means ‘wildcat’ in Sundanese, the regional language. This animal 
was just one of the wild species which were said to live in the area. Several 
informants claimed that the area retained its rural character until the late 
1930s. In the Explanatory Memorandum of the 1938 Town Planning Ordinance, 
the Cikapundung Valley was referred to as ‘one of the few examples of natural 
scenery having been converted into scenes of natural beauty’ (Toelichting 
Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938).5
The municipal government of Bandung felt increasingly compelled to 
improve conditions in the kampongs, but village autonomy restricted its free-
dom to act. In 1919 it launched a social housing programme, in which hundreds 
of houses were built for low-income residents for a couple of years. People 
could either rent a house or buy it on the basis of a hire purchase system. 
Despite this building programme, the municipality could not provide houses 
for the entire population (Bandoeng 1929:42–48). In practice, only the lower 
middle-class groups benefited from it, since the dwellings built under the pro-
gramme remained too expensive for the masses residing in kampongs 
(Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:34–35). Private real estate firms 
never showed any interest in participating in such housing programmes, unless 
forced to do so (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:74). For most low-
income people, particularly Indonesians, kampongs remained the only option 
to find a dwelling.
In 1926, the city government reserved the southern part of the city for the 
indigenous population (Bandoeng 1929:37–39). This ordinance was meant to 
protect the indigenous residents against further inroads on their land by the 
development of the urban infrastructure and European districts, but in fact 
this measure only sharpened ethnic divisions (Voskuil 1996:39–40).
In the meantime, the central colonial government still refused to grant per-
mission to intervene in the kampongs to municipal administrations, as long as 
the kampong autonomy remained in force. However, the Bandung administra-
tion did not bother to wait for formal approval from the central government 
before taking action in the kampongs. In 1927 it launched on its own initiative 
a kampong improvement scheme (kampongverbetering), although this meant 
it legally infringed on the kampong autonomy. The municipality improved 
roads, constructed drainage and sewerage facilities, provided electricity, and 
built hydrants and public baths (Bandoeng 1929:36).
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6 Van de Wetering (1939:7) criticized the Bandung municipality for not fulfilling its moral obli-
gation to spend as much on kampong improvement as it received from the national govern-
ment for that purpose.
7 See also the reference to the political consequences of the kampong conditions in the 
Explanatory Memorandum on Town Planning (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 
1938:32; Wertheim 1958:19).
Kampong improvement became easier in 1929, when the colonial govern-
ment officially abandoned the idea that the villages could only be improved if 
their autonomy were abolished (Van de Wetering 1939:3). At the same time, it 
also began to reserve a fixed amount of the state budget to subsidize municipal 
initiatives to carry out improvement projects in kampongs (Stadsgemeente 
Bandoeng 1938:1–28).6 The kampong improvement activities received further 
legal backing by the Kampong Verbeeteringsordonnantie (Kampong 
Improvement Ordinance) in 1934. Municipal governments had from now on 
the right to intervene in kampong matters of which the consequences extended 
beyond the kampongs, including housing and hygiene, especially in kampongs 
located in the crowded urban centre. Although this change of policy was based 
on considerations of hygiene and humanity, underlying political motives were 
not far from the surface. It was feared that bad living conditions would drive 
the urban poor into the hands of the nationalists, whose stated aim was to 
overthrow the colonial government (Van Roosmalen 2004:194).7
Despite these various state efforts, the effect on the improved kampongs 
remained limited. Only a few of the problems could be tackled, in particular 
drainage and the construction of pathways. Projects were limited in scope and 
progress was slow (Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:32–33). In some 
cases, kampong improvement only led to gentrification: the lower income resi-
dents were forced out by incoming more well-to-do residents able to pay higher 
rents in an, after improvement, more attractive neighbourhood (Wertheim 
1956:179). Another well-intended policy with negative consequences was the 
state attempt to limit the building of new, poorly constructed dwellings. The 
effect of this policy was a growing shortage of affordable kampong housing, 
with the result that several families could be forced to share one house. 
Consequently, living conditions deteriorated (Toelichting Stadsvorming s­
ordonnantie 1938:33).
In short, despite these measures, the municipal administration never man-
aged to take full control of the kampongs. As the Law on Village Autonomy 
restricted municipal intervention in the kampongs, the municipality could 
still  not intervene in all matters within its territories. As late as 1938, the 
Government Commissioner for Decentralization admitted that it remained 
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8 He made this statement in response to questions posed by a member of the Volksraad during 
a session on the abolition of the autonomy of a number of villages in the town of Malang 
(Handelingen 1937–1938:207–211).
hard to delineate the exact competences of the municipal authorities to inter-
vene in the kampongs.8 Moreover, the municipal administration also experi-
enced great difficulties in enforcing regulations that were legally applicable 
in  the kampongs with village autonomy, such as the Building Code. The 
kampongs continued to develop at a more rapid pace than the municipal 
authorities could control with the said Building Code (Bandoeng 1929:41). On 
top of all other problems to gain control of the kampongs, during the 
Depression, enforcement of regulations was often limited by the financial con-
straints imposed on the municipal budget (Kampongverbeteringscommissie 
1939:42).
By the end of the colonial period, experts acknowledged that the govern-
ment had failed to improve the physical conditions in the kampongs. Kampong 
residents were still resisting compliance with government regulations 
(Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:33). The unfortunate living condi-
tions in the kampongs was one of the reasons to install a Town Planning 
Commission, to which the task was assigned to formulate central instructions 
for town planning. The objective of the Commission was to reach an integrated 
town planning approach. The Commission argued in the Explanatory 
Memorandum on Town Planning that kampongs would form
a complete unity with the rest of the municipality, however, just as other 
neighbourhoods, with their own identity, which requires that they be 
treated in a similar manner.
Toelichting Stadsvormingsordonnantie 1938:95, my translation
 Neglected Settlements in an Occupied City
Between 1942–1949, Bandung was confronted with both an influx and an exo-
dus of migrants. The influx of migrants could be mainly attributed to rural-
urban migration. After the Japanese occupied Indonesia in 1942, the living 
conditions in the West Javanese countryside quickly deteriorated. Jobs on 
plantations disappeared, farmers were forced to deliver large quantities of rice, 
and rural people were recruited as forced labourers (romusha), and to these 
specific difficulties was added the general problem of a significant price infla-
tion (Smail 1964:12). In three years the Indonesian population of Bandung 
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almost doubled, from about 200,000 to 400,000 (Van Bruinessen 1989:3). The 
Japanese tried to force the Indonesian population back to the countryside, but 
this attempt was only partly successful (Wertheim 1956:185).
Detailed data are absent, but it is clear that a large proportion of the refu-
gees settled in existing kampongs or created new settlements. The Japanese 
administration allowed and even encouraged people to squat on private land 
(Colombijn 2010:207). The 1940s was the first decade in which the population 
of Taman Sari grew considerably, although still not as rapidly as would be the 
case in later decades. New houses and a mosque were constructed.
A vast reversed flow of migration occurred during the Indonesian Revolution. 
As soon as Allied troops arrived in Bandung in 1946, the city was effectively 
divided into two parts, with the railway line again as boundary, the northern 
part being guarded by British troops and the southern part by the Indonesian 
Republican Army. In March 1946, following an ultimatum issued by the British 
who wanted to put an end to the division, the Republican Army evacuated the 
Indonesian population to the countryside south of Bandung and set fire to 
large parts of the city. This event is known as Bandung Lautan Api: Bandung a 
Sea of Fire. By the end of March, after four months of utter confusion, an esti-
mated half a million people had moved out of the city. For a year and a half the 
southern part of Bandung remained a ghost city, with people only occasionally 
visiting the area. Only the northern part of Bandung remained populated, 
mostly by Europeans and Chinese (Smail 1964:148–152).
The migration history of Taman Sari was similar to that of the city as a whole 
during the Revolution. Most of the few Indonesian residents of Taman Sari also 
fled to the countryside, to nearby towns like Tasikmalaya and Sumedang. Their 
houses were occupied by the Dutch military. The Dutch, Indo-European, and 
Chinese population generally stayed put. Indonesian residents only returned 
in 1949–1950, after the Dutch had transferred sovereignty to the Indonesian 
Republic.
The subsequent changes of power of the 1940s had consequences for urban 
policy making. In the turbulent years of the Japanese occupation and the 
struggle for independence, state intervention in kampongs continued to be 
limited. The Japanese introduced the tonarigumi system in 1943. Tonarigumi 
were neighbourhood associations designed to control and, if deemed appro-
priate by the Japanese, mobilize the Indonesian population. These associa-
tions were the predecessor of the neighbourhood associations that still exist 
today in Indonesia under the name of Rumah Warga (rw) and Rumah Tetangga 
(rt). After the Dutch resumed the administration of the city, they made end-
ing the unlawful occupation of government land by migrants top priority. In 
1948, the returned colonial government promulgated an ordinance making any 
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9 Ordonnantie Onrechtmatige Occupatie van Gronden. The ordinance was probably in 
force throughout West Java.
10 Formally, the Town Planning Ordinance was not effective in Bandung, as the city was not 
included in the list of municipalities to which the ordinance was declared to apply 
(Aanwijzing van steden, welke voldoen aan het bepaalde in het eerste lid van artikel 51 
van de Stadsvormingsordonnantie, Decision 3 of the Lieutenant Governor General of 
Indonesia of 3-10-1948, cited by Niessen 1999:225).
such occupation a criminal offence.9 In the same year, the central government 
finally laid the foundations for future intervention in kampongs, by enacting 
the Town Planning Ordinance that had been drafted in 1938. By this ordinance, 
the municipalities were required to draw up the blueprint for a town plan, 
detail plans, and a municipal building code. The municipalities were given the 
right to determine plan elements down to the level of individual plots (Niessen 
1999:223–226; Van Roosmalen, this volume).10
 Informal Slums in an Independent City
The first years after transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic in 1949 
were as tumultuous as the period of the Indonesian Revolution. It was a time 
of struggle, uncertainty, and quick transformations, particularly for the popu-
lation of West Java, where an armed rebellion against the central government 
took place. In this period Bandung experienced the most significant popula-
tion growth in its history fed by various incoming flows of migrants. At least 
until the national census of 1961, Bandung was growing fastest of all major 
Indonesian cities (Hugo 1981:81). During the first decade after the transfer 
of  sovereignty, the population grew from about 200,000 to over 1,000,000 
inhabitants.
The first group of migrants to arrive in the city after the Dutch had trans-
ferred sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic were the civil evacuees and 
soldiers who had left Bandung in 1946 (Hugo 1981:84). Informants offered testi-
monies of the difficulties they faced when returning to their homes in Taman 
Sari. Some learned that other Indonesians had occupied their houses and land. 
Others found their houses partially demolished by the residents who had 
remained in Taman Sari. The cacao trees in the orchards had been chopped 
down and the fishponds were empty.
Arguably the most visible consequence of the political and the economic 
decolonization in cities like Bandung was the exodus of the European popula-
tion. It seems that the first affected Europeans still managed to sell their 
203Kampong Development and State Control in Bandung
<UN>
11 According to a survey conducted by the National Labour Agency, only 62.7 per cent of 
males of twelve years and older were formally employed (Hugo 1981:85).
property, although at prices below the market value. The nationalization of 
Dutch enterprises in 1957–1958 forced the Dutch to leave the country. They had 
no option than to simply vacate their houses, which were occupied by govern-
ment officials and the military. Often these houses were later sold to well-to-do 
Chinese.
The movement known as the Darul Islam Rebellion which raged in the 
countryside of West Java had a great impact on the development of Bandung. 
From 1949 to 1962, in what the local people call the ‘zaman gerombolan’ (gang-
ster period), many people fled from the countryside to the city. Caught between 
the two fires of the Darul Islam and the Republican Army, the principal con-
cern of ordinary villagers was to escape the violence. The uprising was particu-
larly violent in East Priangan, around Tasikmalaya and Garut. Each year 
hundreds of innocent people were killed and thousands of houses were burned 
down. As early as in 1951, more than 100,000 people were evacuated. An average 
of 250,000 people annually fled their homes between 1955 and 1962 (Van Dijk 
1981:104–106). Since the towns and cities were relatively safe, most evacuees 
sought refuge there, not least in Bandung. The atrocities only ended in 1962, 
when the last prominent leaders of the Darul Islam movement were arrested.
In the same period Bandung also began to feel the effects of labour migra-
tion. The city became the seat of the provincial government and it resumed its 
role as a centre of education. The industrial sector focused on processing agri-
cultural products and making textiles, and service industries were also devel-
oped. The international Asia-Africa Conference in 1955 created new job 
opportunities, including many jobs suited for low-skilled people. Not surpris-
ingly, however, the new demands for labour lagged behind the growing num-
ber of people moving into Bandung (Hugo 1981:84–85).
By the late 1950s, net migration into Bandung became negligible and in the 
early 1960s it was even negative (Van Bruinessen 1989:4). The number of 
migrants moving to Bandung dropped considerably and many people moved 
back to their home villages after safety had been restored in the West Javanese 
countryside. However, many others stayed, even when initially they had 
planned returning to their village of origin after peace was restored, because 
the employment prospects in the countryside were poor.
Many of the migrants to Bandung, notably those who had sought refuge, 
settled in kampongs. The vast flow of evacuees was disorganized and many 
of  them were unable to find a formal job and were therefore forced to seek 
their livelihood in the informal sector.11 There was a growing shortage of 
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12 Unfortunately Hugo gives no reference for this figure. Considering the cautiousness of 
this estimation, it would not be surprising if it were derived from documents of the 
municipal government.
13 In terms of political support, the strategy proved successful. By the end of the 1950s the 
party had built up a strong, organized base among urban workers and other non-peasant 
groups. In later years, the party tried to gain support from the peasant population, among 
other means by organizing a campaign for land reform in the countryside, as well as draft-
ing and backing bills on this matter, and later by initiating the unilateral action (aksi sepi­
hak) to occupy land in an unlawful manner (Mortimer 1972).
housing. In 1959 there were twelve persons for every house in Bandung (Hugo 
1981:85). Hence, the refugees had no other choice but to build their own houses, 
often without municipal permission. In 1964 an estimated minimum of 11,000 
houses were ‘rumah liar’, houses built without a legal permit (Hugo 1981:85).12 
This is a very cautious estimation. By that year hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple had migrated to Bandung and the city had reached a population of over a 
million, a figure which gives an impression of the vast scale of the develop-
ments discussed.
Some of the migrants moved to one of the many existing kampongs, others 
created new kampongs by squatting on vacant land. The departure of the 
European population offered an opportunity; the vacant plots gave migrants 
the space to build their own houses. Consequently, the ethnic and socio- 
economic division between the northern and southern parts of Bandung 
steadily faded away. Other migrants occupied municipal land alongside rail-
way lines and riversides, and did not even shun graveyards.
The Partai Komunis Indonesia (pki, Indonesian Communist Party), which 
was becoming increasingly influential as an opposition party, supported 
unlawful occupation of vacant land. This strategy tallied with the party’s politi-
cal objective of organizing a strong power base among lower-income groups.13 
The closest I get to evidence of direct support of the pki for illegal occupa-
tion  of land is a general reference in a book by Siregar, stating: ‘In the city, 
the  illegal occupation of land continued and, to a limited extent, it was 
even encouraged by left-wing political factions’ (Siregar 1990:113). Despite the 
paucity of written accounts, several informants confirmed that the practice 
did occur in Bandung, but after half a century of anti-communist state propa-
ganda (since 1965), people are reluctant to talk about the role of the pki, afraid 
they might be deemed accomplices. It is certain that the pki forged alliances 
with specific workers’ groups, for instance with the strategically important 
Serikat Buruh Kereta Api (sbka, (state) Railway Workers’ Union). This union 
was particularly strong in Bandung, where the company’s main office was 
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Buruh Kereta Api (pbka, Railway Workers Association), which was backed by the Partai 
Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) and General Nasution’s Ikatan Pendukung 
Kermerdekaan Indonesia (ipki, Alliance of Supporters for Freedom of Indonesia).
located.14 The actions of the Railway Workers’ Union included the occupation 
of railway company land, and once the unionists began to occupy their employ-
er’s land, other workers followed.
The process of land occupation was incremental, which is typical of coun-
tries in Asia and Africa and unlike the large-scale invasions of vacant land 
common in South America. First a small number of squatters occupied the 
land to test whether the owner or caretaker of the land, which could be either 
a government agency or a private party, intervened. If they were left alone, 
other people would follow their example. Often they needed approval from an 
(informal) community leader before they could do so. This form of social 
screening meant that the growth of these settlements was incremental, a pre-
requisite for the survival of the community (Wibowo 1983:4–5). Too many peo-
ple moving in at the same time would probably have lead to disputes about the 
scarce means of livelihood.
Taman Sari was one of the kampongs that were a target of squatters in the 
first years after independence. The area also proved an attractive destination 
for refugees fleeing from the violence of the Darul Islam rebellion. According 
to various informants, many of the current residents settled in this period, 
coming from places in West Java like Cipendeuy, Malangbong, Garut, 
Tasikmalaya, and Sumbang. Initially they would organize as separate commu-
nities. Liang Maung, for instance, consisted of three separate areas, Kidul, Sisi 
Gawir, and Mesjid, each populated by refugees from three different places of 
origin. Many of these refugees stayed, even after the countryside had become 
safe again. With the inflow of new migrants in later years, the three communi-
ties became mixed and unified.
Taman Sari attracted many migrants because there was plenty of land avail-
able there. Here too the Dutch residents were leaving. Their houses were usu-
ally occupied by the military in the late 1950s. A single Indo-European family 
stayed. Few of the original landowners – regardless of ethnicity – had actual 
control over their land, and newcomers encountered few obstacles when ille-
gally occupying it. Many newcomers would first rent a house or room and then 
occupy land, subdivide it, and build their own house. It seems that some 
bought the land from the Dutch and some had it given to them, for instance 
because they had been employees of the former owners. Most former orchards 
and rice-fields that had been left uncultivated for some time, and also plots 
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owned by absentee landowners, were simply occupied without permission 
from the owner. It did not matter in such cases whether the owner was 
European or Indonesian. If someone later claimed a right to the land, the occu-
pants sometimes agreed to formally buy or rent it. As it so happened, these 
claimants were not always the rightful owners and could be swindlers. One 
informant recalls that a European owner guarded his land strictly and threat-
ened potential squatters at gunpoint when they showed signs of wanting 
to occupy the land. Other private owners had more consideration for the 
exhausted refugees.
Newcomers also occupied public land. Some people took land alongside the 
Cikapundung River. The municipality, which was responsible for the river-
banks, was not as strict as some private landowners and consequently some 
migrants preferred this land. In later years, when population density in the city 
further increased, newcomers reclaimed land by narrowing the course of the 
Cikapundung River. The European graveyard, which had been cleared in the 
1950s and was used as orchard land and playing field, was not a target of squat-
ters. It is likely that potential squatters had not dared to settle on this land, 
where spirits of the deceased were believed to roam around (Van Bruinessen 
1988:40).
I have not heard stories of the involvement of the pki in the occupation of 
land in Taman Sari. Communist involvement is indeed an unlikely scenario, 
since a small number of newcomers managed to take control over large plots 
of land and they had absolutely no interest in a free distribution of land in 
small parcels.
Apparently, the people occupying the land had good connections with the 
municipal government and the army. The occupants enclosed these plots, sub-
divided them, and let or sold them to later newcomers. One such entrepreneur 
who played a central role in the allocation of former European land to new-
comers was the kampong head of Liang Maung. His real name was Pak Karta, 
but one of the informants remembers that he was usually called Pak Apung, a 
contraction of kepala kampung (kampong head). Pak Apung remained in 
charge of the area until around 1960.
Taman Sari did not only attract migrants because of the available land, but 
also because it was located quite strategically in relation to employment 
opportunities. Most migrants found work in the informal sector; becoming a 
petty trader was particularly popular. Migrants from each region developed 
their own specialization in trade. Their modest incomes and dependence on 
customers forced them to settle near markets.
With the first influx of migrants, Taman Sari finally began to develop from a 
rural into an urban residential area. Rice-fields and orchards steadily gave way 
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could check that no Darul Islam members were among the newcomers (personal com-
munication with retired senior official, 20 July 2006).
16 Inlandse Gemeenteordonnantie and Reglement op de Verkiezing, de Schorsing en het 
Ontslag van Hoofden van Inlandsche Gemeenten op Java en Madoera.
17 Personal communication retired senior official, 20 July 2006; see also Otto (1991:214).
to housing. The first buildings were constructed of temporary or semi-perma-
nent building material. Vacant plots were scattered around these first dwell-
ings and later filled in. A new layout of the area took shape: a labyrinth of small 
alleys giving access to more or less permanent constructions.
Despite the enactment of the Town Planning Ordinance in 1948 and legisla-
tion against unlawful occupation, which remained in force after the transfer of 
sovereignty in 1949, the government failed to exercise effective control over the 
kampongs. In the first years after Independence, the government was too occu-
pied with other more pressing matters and besides it did not have the where-
withal to intervene. Although there was a social housing programme, kampong 
improvement activities continued only on a very limited scale (Colombijn 
2010:203–206).
The government could not curb rural-urban migration, which, as discussed 
earlier, was the major cause of the expansion of kampongs and concomitant 
deterioration in the living conditions. Land reforms in agricultural areas to 
keep peasants on the countryside also enjoyed little success. On 1 March 1954, 
the municipal government declared Bandung a ‘closed city’. Each newcomer 
had to obtain a vb (Vestigingsbewijs, residential permit).15 The regulation 
remained in force until 1964, although it was a vain measure. Its only effect was 
that migrants were deflected from registering as permanent residents (Hugo 
1981:85).
The formal autonomy of the kampongs, which hampered the municipal 
government exercising effective control, gradually became untenable. In the 
1950s there were increasingly strong calls to abolish kampong autonomy. The 
object of these calls to abolish kampong autonomy was the 1906 Indigenous 
Village Ordinance, together with the 1907 Regulation on the Election of Village 
Heads.16 The latter ordinance stipulated that only the original residents of the 
villages were allowed to cast their vote during an election of a village head. 
Since the villages which were included in the cities had attracted many 
migrants who did not have active voting rights, this stipulation was considered 
unfair. The ordinances were only rescinded in the 1960s and village autonomy 
finally came to an end in 1964.17
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18 Law no. 51/1960, Undang-Undang Larangan Pemakaian Tanah Tanpa Izin yang Berhak 
atau Kuasanya (Law on the Prohibition to Use Land without Permission from the Rightful 
Owner or the State). The Military Commander had enacted similar regulations as early 
as 1957.
The abolition of village autonomy was an important symbolic step, but 
because this measure had not been bolstered by a consistent set of policies 
affecting kampongs, in practice its consequences were negligible if not com-
pletely ineffectual. The enactment of two pieces of agrarian legislation exerted 
potentially more affect on the legal position of kampong dwellers. The best 
known piece was the Law 5/1960, Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria (uupa, Basic 
Agrarian Law), which was passed in 1960 with the purpose to unify land law. 
Land rights based on adat (customary) law, which were still widely applied in 
the kampongs, would now have to be integrated into a unified system of land 
titles. Integration of kampong land held under adat law into the unified system 
required the surveying and certification of all plots of land by the administra-
tion. For various reasons, however, few kampong dwellers troubled themselves 
with the registration of their plots.
The other piece of agrarian legislation relevant to the kampongs was a gov-
ernment law enacted in 1961. It stated that every person residing on either pri-
vately or state-owned land without permission of the owner would be 
considered an unlawful occupant, who could be evicted at the discretion of the 
Regional Head.18 Unlike the 1948 ordinance on the illegal occupation of land, 
the 1961 law covered a prohibition on the occupancy of state as well as private 
land. Before the 1961 law, private legal owners could base a legal attempt to 
evict squatters on civil law, but this new law made eviction easier, because the 
authorities carrying out an eviction order could be called in by land owners 
without having obtained a court order first. The 1961 law could better prevent 
unlawful occupation of private land, because to do so was henceforth a crimi-
nal offence. The Elucidation to the 1961 law stated that the government was 
sympathetic to unlawful occupation, given the shortage of land for people, and 
yet, in the interests of the orderly development of the state, the use of land had 
to be regulated in an organized manner.
The passing of the two pieces of agrarian legislation of 1960 and 1961 actu-
ally affected the legal position of kampong dwellers more than the abolition of 
the village autonomy had done. From that moment many kampongs were clas-
sified as informal settlements, whose inhabitants had at best weak claims to 
the land if not no legal claim at all.
Nevertheless, these legal initiatives formed no reason for residents to fear 
the intervention of the municipal government. Only one of my informants 
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could give an account of an eviction case in Taman Sari on the basis of unlaw-
ful occupation or the lack of a building permit in that period, so apparently 
this eviction order seems to have been a rare, ad hoc affair. Throughout 
Bandung, the political power of the pki influenced the relatively strong posi-
tion of illegal occupants. By the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, 
two out of six aldermen in Bandung were member of the pki. If legal owners 
went to court to have squatters evicted, they usually lost the case. The pki 
received support from at least one member of the District Court (Pengadilan 
Negeri). Efforts by officials to evict people generally led to protests.19 By their 
actions the officials were giving their own interpretation of President Sukarno’s 
‘hukum revolusi’ (revolutionary law).
The common practice was not eviction therefore, but a process in which 
newcomers to Taman Sari actually received permission to settle in the area, 
not only from the informal kampong leader, but even from local state officials. 
Obviously, the granting of this permission did not mean that the settlement 
of the newcomers in Taman Sari complied with state regulations. As an official 
of the kelurahan explained, the sheer number of migrants into Bandung forced 
the municipal government to allow them to settle in the area, even though the 
land did not belong to the settlers and even though the bulk of it was not des-
tined for residential purposes in the town plan.
 Conclusion
Kampongs in Bandung have by and large developed without too much state 
intervention. Urban kampongs came into being toward the end of the nine-
teenth century as Bandung began to grow significantly, engulfing many rural 
villages. Due to legal dualism between town and village administration, the 
kampongs retained a high degree of autonomy, even when they were fully 
located within the municipal boundaries. The arrival of more Europeans in 
Bandung led to the allocation of kampong land to the development of middle 
class housing meant for Europeans, and, as a consequence, the densification of 
settlement on the remaining kampong land. The primitive sanitation in the 
dense kampongs constituted a risk to public health.
This sort of development worried the government of Bandung, which from 
1919 took measures to try controlling the growing density and increasing dilap-
idation of kampongs. In that year the administration initiated a social housing 
programme. In 1927 it began a kampong improvement programme. However, 
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as its hands were tied by the law on village autonomy, the municipal govern-
ment had little room for intervening in the kampongs. The measures it did 
implement bore little effect. By the end of the colonial period, it was widely 
acknowledged that the colonial government had failed to control the growing 
density and appalling living conditions of the kampongs.
The Japanese occupation and to an even greater degree the struggle for 
independence led to the destruction of houses and infrastructure, especially in 
South Bandung. Indonesians fled the city and for years the southern part 
remained a ghost town. Neither the Japanese nor the returned colonial govern-
ment nor the Republican government paid much attention to the develop-
ment of kampongs in that period.
The loose administrative control of kampongs from the Japanese invasion 
into the first decade of Independence coincided with a vast migration flow of 
people from the West Javanese countryside who were fleeing rural living con-
ditions during the Second World War and later ran before the Darul Islam 
rebellion. The pki supported the formation of new kampongs on squatted 
land alongside riversides and railway lines, and on graveyards. The kampongs 
became informal slums.
The municipal government again proved incapable of preventing or curbing 
developments it did not wish to take place. It lacked funds for kampong 
improvement programmes or a social housing programme. When it announced 
a ‘closed-city’ policy in 1954, the measurement was utterly ineffectual. In 1960, 
only after these social and demographic developments were done and dusted 
did the national government try to put an end to legal dualism and integrate 
the kampongs into the municipal administrative apparatus. In practice, how-
ever, the measures had no effect largely because of the prevailing political con-
ditions. The municipal government simply lost its grip on the kampongs.
Comparing colonial and postcolonial attempts of the municipal govern-
ments to administer the kampongs, we can conclude that both administra-
tions had very little control. But the reasons for this lack of control during 
these periods differ significantly. In colonial times the municipal administra-
tion was reined in by the principle of kampong autonomy. After Independence, 
the municipal administration was overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of 
migrants settling in kampongs, often with support from the pki.
After 1960 the conditions in the kampongs would further deteriorate. The 
kampongs absorbed vast numbers of labour migrants. From the 1970s, the gov-
ernment initiated new measures to exercise control over kampongs, such as 
the Kampong Improvement Project (kip) and various land titling programmes. 
Certainly, as a result, infrastructure has improved, as did people’s access to 
public services. Nevertheless, most contemporary kampongs are settlements 
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with precarious substandard buildings, a lack of adequate infrastructure, poor 
access to public services, and informal arrangements for land tenure and land 
use. Even the Indonesian government implicitly admits that it has failed to 
control kampong development in Bandung, classifying these settlements as 
‘informal slums’ (Departemen Pekerjaan Umum, 1999:32–44).
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3 ‘Zij zijn altijd aan weer en wind blootgesteld, vandaar dat er velen onder hen zijn, die eene koude 
vatten, welke meestal verwaarloosd wordt, omdat zij er mede blijven doorloopen’ (De Locomotief 
18-2-1907).
Breaking the Boundaries




Who does not know them, the wharf-labourers of Tanjung Priok, the 
sturdy, robust blokes, who animate the docks? There are no men working 
harder and more tirelessly than the dockers of Tanjung Priok.2
The harbour workers of Batavia were extolled in this fashion in an advertise-
ment for Abdijsiroop, a cough syrup, published in the Dutch newspapers in Java 
in 1907. These labourers were the epitome of toughness and strength as they 
had to endure very harsh working conditions. ‘They are constantly exposed to 
the elements and many among them catch a cold, mostly left unattended 
because they just keep on going’.3 This advertisement packed a punch, as it not 
only confirmed the tough reputation of the harbour workers, but also drew 
attention to their tough working conditions. Their health and hygiene situa-
tion was a delicate issue as diseases, malnutrition, and bad housing hampered 
the development of a stable docker population in the seaport of Batavia. Of 
course, no panacea was readily to hand.
The lives of the dockers were played out against the background of a mod-
ernization process in an isolated area of Batavia, namely the port of Tanjung 
Priok. The port was constructed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
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4 Nationaal Archief, The Hague (na), Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij-Koninklijke Java-
China-Japan Lijn (kpm), 2.20.35, 197–199.
as the first deep-water ocean harbour in the archipelago. Rapid technological 
developments in transport and shipping as well as the new economic impe-
tus injected by a growing world market required a fundamental shift in the 
organization of labour in the ports, and consequently in the living and work-
ing conditions, which in their turn changed the use of urban space in the 
dock areas. This chapter focuses on the rise of the Uniekampong, which was 
a compound for dockworkers, established in 1919 by the main shipping com-
panies in an attempt to answer to the perpetual scarcity of labour in Tanjung 
Priok.
The Uniekampong developed into a central labour pool and left its mark on 
the labour issue in the port, as it deliberately broke through the traditional 
organization of dock work. Casual labour was gradually replaced by more per-
manent forms of labour. This process of decasualization, which took place in 
many other ports in the world in the same period, involved a centralization of 
the labour market, disciplining and registration of the labour force, regular 
payment and a guarantee of income, as well as an improvement in working 
and living conditions (Weinhauer 2000:582).
The Uniekampong marked not only a radical break in the organization of 
labour, but was also an embodiment of new perspectives on labour conditions 
and housing. From the early 1900s, housing received growing attention from 
the authorities and companies and, after 1910, the port authorities showed a 
heightened interest in the living conditions of the Priok population. Ethical 
motives aside, employers like shipping companies also took more interest in 
the working and living conditions of their men because they recognized that 
social improvements could result in a higher productivity.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe this interplay between economic, 
social, and physical-spatial modernization in the port of Tanjung Priok, spe-
cifically exemplified by the case of the Uniekampong. The research is based on 
archive material in the Netherlands and Indonesia, supplemented by newspa-
per articles. The core of the data is formed by the Uniekampong papers in the 
collection of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (kpm, Royal Packet 
Navigation Company) in The Hague.4 The remit of the labour inspection did 
not extend to work in the docks and when the situation in the port had to be 
described, this was done in general terms.
This chapter aims to provide a contribution to Indonesian historiography in 
which dock labour, like other ‘industrial’ labour, has so far been underrepre-
sented. In a predominantly rural society, most labour studies have focused on 
215The Uniekampong and Modernization of Dock Labour
<UN>
5 Some researchers have focused on non-agricultural labour, like Erman (1995, 1999) on the 
mining industry.
6 The harbour is nowadays known as Sunda Kelapa and is still in operation, used mainly by 
traditional inter-island shipping.
7 A koyang is a unit of measure, depending on the kind of cargo. A koyang rice is equal to 1,668 
kilograms, a koyang salt 1,863 kilograms.
the agricultural sector.5 This bias in scholarship was also a matter of sources. 
The colonial government showed less interest in the industrial labour as well 
as the service sector, and as a result only scattered information from this period 
has survived. John Ingleson was one of the first scholars to look at dock labour 
in Java, focusing on strikes and union activity (Ingleson 1983:476). In his PhD 
research, the Indonesian researcher Agust Supriyono dealt specifically with 
labour questions in the port of Semarang and the development of labour 
unions (Supriyono 2008). In his study of the kpm, à Campo gives a brief but 
illuminating account of the organization of labour in the ports (à Campo 
1992:518–520).
 The Port of Tanjung Priok
Tanjung Priok was the new harbour of Batavia, built between 1877 and 1883 as 
an alternative to the existing, outdated harbour in central Batavia. At that time, 
the harbour of Batavia consisted of a roadstead, the Reede, and a harbour 
canal, the Havenkanaal, which had been formed by the water between two 
long piers at the estuary of the Ciliwung River.6 Ships had to anchor in the 
roadstead in front of the river estuary, as the sea, just as it was along the entire 
northern coast of Java, was very shallow near the shore. Sandbanks obstructed 
the entrance to the harbour canal and smaller boats, the prauwenveren (proa 
ferries, lighters), had to transfer the goods between the ships in the roadstead 
and the warehouses ashore. A proa was a flat-bottomed boat with a loaded 
draught of 4 to 8 feet (1.2 to 2.5 metres) and a loading capacity of 10 to 50 koy-
ang.7 The transfer of cargo onto proas was a time-consuming, precarious pro-
cess. During the wet monsoon, it was often hazardous if not downright 
impossible for the proas to ply between roadstead and town (Bruining 1852; 
De Meijier 1893; à Campo 1992:406; Knaap 1996:20).
The transfer of cargo by smaller vessels for a fee called lighterage is often 
considered a characteristic of ‘primitive ports’, but in fact the system could also 
be found in large, well-equipped ports such as London, Colombo, and 
Singapore, mostly in combination with the loading and unloading on the 
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wharfs (Morgan 1958:68–69; Dharmasena 1980:81–82; Dobbs 1999). Batavia, 
however, was fully dependent on the lighters.
The rise of steamships changed the appreciation of proas. Steamships were 
less hindered by weather conditions than sailing ships and sailed all year 
round, many of them according to a fixed schedule. Operational speed and 
reliable times of departure and arrival were essential. Furthermore, shipping 
companies preferred fixed berths for their steamers, so ports had to adjust to 
the new style of shipping, meaning deeper harbours, longer wharfs, and 
mechanical facilities to guarantee efficient loading and unloading of the ships. 
The process of loading and unloading by proas was slow and expensive and 
caused the steam shipping companies a major headache. Something needed to 
be done, but as the owners of the prauwenveren held an oligopoly, they felt no 
great urge to adapt to the new demands of the maritime sector.
However, in the 1870s it was decided to build a new harbour for Batavia. 
Planning, location, and budget were the subject of long, heated debates in the 
Netherlands Indies, in which colonial administrators, Dutch members of 
Parliament, shipping companies, commercial traders, railway companies, 
engineers and even Prince Hendrik, brother of King Willem III, were involved. 
In 1883 at Tanjung Priok, about 9 kilometres east of the existing harbour canal, 
a completely new port would be opened. Tanjung Priok had the first deep-
water basins in the archipelago in which steamers could tie up directly along-
side the wharf (Veering 2006:59–82).
The new harbour works at Tanjung Priok were ambitious in their scale and 
design and cost 20 million guilders, making it one of the largest infrastructural 
projects of the century. The new port consisted of an outer harbour, protected 
by two piers and an inner harbour basin. Ships could moor at the western 
wharf in the inner harbour, load and unload their cargo using cranes, and store 
it in seven large godowns. Mooring stages were constructed at the Eastern 
Wharf, specifically for the unloading and storing of salt, tin, and coal. In 1891 a 
dry dock constructed by the private Droogdok Maatschappij Tandjong Priok 
provided professional repair facilities. Being located at a distance from Batavia, 
a good connection with the town centre was imperative: railways, a land road, 
and a shipping canal for proas all led directly to the commercial centre of 
Batavia (Veering 2008:211–213).
The growth of Tanjung Priok is unquestionably attributable to the strong 
economic development of its direct hinterland of West Java (Cool 1920) and its 
growing role as transit port for products from the Outer Islands. One crucial 
factor in the development of the transit function was the founding of the kpm 
in 1888. The services of the kpm, initiated, stimulated, and supervised by the 
colonial government, were closely tied up with contemporary military and 
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administrative expansion, as well as the economic integration of the Outer 
Islands into the global market economy (à Campo 1992:635). The archipelago-
wide network of kpm was centred in Batavia, where all its main shipping 
routes called. The kpm had transit contracts with the Dutch international 
shipping lines, the Stoomvaart Maatschappij ‘Nederland’ (smn, Steam 
Navigation Company ‘Nederland’) and the Rotterdamsche Lloyd (rl), which 
gave Tanjung Priok its important role as transit port. These three Dutch com-
panies, kpm, smn and rl, dominated port operations, as they accounted for 
more than fifty percent of all shipping in Tanjung Priok. Tanjung Priok was also 
a port-of-call for smaller packet boat services like the Java-China-Japan Line 
and various other international shipping firms. In short, the port was a link 
between the inter-island and the international shipping networks. The colo-
nial government promoted Tanjung Priok as the ‘national’ harbour of the 
Netherlands Indies, not least projecting it as a counterweight to the rising 
influence of Singapore in the Java Sea. In this respect, the development of the 
kpm and Tanjung Priok ran parallel, as both were used by the colonial govern-
ment to tighten its grip on the archipelago, both politically and economically 
(Veering 2008:235).
Tanjung Priok was not the only port that was modernized in the Netherlands 
Indies. In the 1910s, the Dutch government in The Hague sent two harbour 
experts, who had played a decisive role in the development of the harbours in 
the Netherlands, to the archipelago. The two experts, Jacob Kraus and Gerrit de 
Jongh, sought large-scale, technological solutions for the capacity deficit of all 
major ports around the Java Sea (Cool 1920; Kraus and De Jongh 1910; Veering 
2008:222–230). The expansion of the harbours in the Netherlands Indies coin-
cided with worldwide port development, which had been generated by the 
rapid transformation of shipping from sail to steam. The most striking aspect 
of the process was the perpetual search for space: deeper basins, more and 
longer wharves, increasing storage space. Physically the harbours were increas-
ingly separated from the rest of the towns, as room for their expansion was 
only found at the outskirts of the towns. Economically the ports grew increas-
ingly independent of the towns and the traditional ties with the urban com-
mercial establishment loosened (Veering 2008:236).
 Changes in Dock Work
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the way dock work was carried 
out changed fundamentally as a result of the shift from sailing to steamships. 
This change occurred irrespective of whether a port relied on lighters or offered 
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wharves at which ships moored. In the era of sail, the loading was carried out 
under supervision of specialized sailors, who were responsible for the rigging 
of the ship and for the stowage of the cargo. The riggers were assisted by casual 
labourers who carried the goods to and from the ships. With the coming of 
steamships, the specific skills of the riggers became obsolete and, to their dis-
may, they had to accept ordinary dock work or their jobs were taken over by 
less skilled labourers, often from other trades (Mol 1980).
In the late nineteenth century, both the shift to steam power, and the use of 
iron instead of wood to build vessels resulted in a greater carrying capacity and 
higher speeds. In this period, the job of stevedore was introduced to take care 
of the loading of the ships and to supervise the dockworkers. Most of the ste-
vedores were hired by shipping companies, who were glad to hand over the 
tasks of monitoring the loading and hiring workers. The growth of the volume 
handled in the ports created a need for more labour and better equipment, and 
the stevedore was indispensable in this process. The shipping companies 
pressed to achieve a rapid handling of their steamers, which had to be on their 
way again as soon as possible to recover the high expenses of steam shipping 
(De Goey 1993:4–25).
These technological innovations in shipping were not matched by similar 
improvements in cargo handling. Clearly, in view of the increase in cargo tran-
shipped through the ports, manpower was no longer sufficient. Although 
cranes and other mechanical devices were in use, technological progress was 
slow to catch on and the labour-intensive nature of dock work remained 
unchanged until the introduction of the container in the 1960s (De Goey 
1993:25; Green 2000:575–576). The pace of this mechanization process also 
depended on the type of cargo: grain was very suitable to mechanical loading, 
whereas other goods like tea or rubber still required to be handled manually. 
Even the bucket ladder used to move grain required a team of dockers and a 
division of tasks in weighing, bagging up, and carrying the grain.8
In the traditional harbour of Batavia, the loading and unloading of ships 
had been the task of the specialized crews of the proas. Working with lighters 
was a complicated task: the shipper had to align his proa alongside the ship in 
the roadstead so that the freight could be transferred between the two vessels. 
The consignment had to be stowed carefully, because a flat-bottomed, badly 
loaded tambangan was in ever-present danger of capsizing. The boat’s crew 
therefore had to be skilled and experienced, in both stowage and navigation, 
especially during the wet monsoon when they had to navigate the crashing 
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waves and the tricky breakers at the entrance of the harbour canal (Bruining 
1852:201).
The opening of the new harbour works at Tanjung Priok fundamentally 
changed the loading business. The major difference was that ocean-going ships 
could now load and unload directly at the wharves, and could fall back on the 
use of mechanical support. The skilled lightermen were therefore replaced by 
harbour workers, whose main asset had to be muscle power. This labour 
remained largely uncontrolled, as it was even in Australia where it was said ‘A 
man could buy himself a coil of rope and call himself a stevedore’ (Tull 2000). 
The heavy cargoes and the long working hours, not to mention the high acci-
dent rate, meant that men ran the risk of physical disability. In general, work-
ing on the docks was demanding, and dangerous.
 Dockworkers in Batavia
As is the case with many urban workers, information about the Priok dockers 
is very limited. One matter that is difficult to determine is the size of the labour 
population in Tanjung Priok. No official statistics pertaining to it were kept 
during the colonial era. The only figure available is from November 1948: a 
report by the Department of Social Affairs estimated the number of persons 
working in Tanjung Priok at 11,000 (Arbeidstoestanden 1949:3). In his article on 
the port strikes in the 1910s and 1920s, Ingleson mentions that Surabaya had a 
10,000-strong workforce (Ingleson 1983:457). As Tanjung Priok was a port com-
parable in size to Surabaya, it seems feasible to estimate that the number of 
workers in Tanjung Priok was also about 10,000, perhaps somewhat fewer dur-
ing the economic crisis of the 1930s.
Labour in the dock area was not restricted to the loading and unloading of 
the ships. Port operations involved an entire bureaucratic and technical appa-
ratus: the Havenbedrijf (Port Company) combining the work of both port 
authorities and port operations, the Dry Dock Company Tandjong Priok, the 
kpm workshop, customs and immigration, police, railways, the post office, and 
the vemen (storage companies). Most European personnel did not live in 
Tanjung Priok, but in the Batavian suburbs of Weltevreden and Meester 
Cornelis. They commuted daily on the special trains running to and from the 
harbour.9 Many of the Indonesians in the ‘steady’ workforce also lived in 




10 ‘Wij herinneren ons nog, hoe hij de kade van Priok met zijn rietje regeerde, en hoe hij uit het 
troepje koelies, destijds en zelfs nog langen tijd daarna, betiteld met de min fraaie naam van 
het “zeere beenen bataillon”, met groot gebaar haalde, wat eruit te halen viel’ (Rietdijk 
1921:59).
11 na, kpm (2.20.35) 201, Minutes Priok meeting 22-2-1912.
12 na, kpm (2.20.35) 201, Minutes Priok meeting 21-1-1913.
Batavia, although labourers working for the storage companies tended to live 
close to the docks.
The labourers on the wharves were better paid than those working on board, 
loading and unloading the ships. The latter were paid a daily wage and formed 
the floating workforce in the port. They were at the bottom of the social hierar-
chy. The stevedoring work was organized by smaller companies and 
individuals.
For a long time the labour organization in Tanjung Priok depended on the 
personal skills, authority, or tact of a few European labour brokers who medi-
ated between the shipping companies and the indigenous labourers (nishm 
1939:2). A few strong men reigned on the waterfront. An account of the labour 
situation in the early days of Priok referred to a certain Janus Hagenaar who 
enjoyed a ‘glorious career’ as recruiter and supervisor.
We still remember how he ruled the docks of Priok with his cane, and 
how he, gesticulating expressively, got the most out of the troop of coo-
lies, who at the time, and even long after, were given, the less pleasant 
name of the “sore legs battalion”.10
If mediators like Hagenaar were absent or made a mess of their work, shipping 
companies immediately suffered from a shortage of labourers.11
In contrast to most ports, where employers in the harbour could eas-
ily  choose from a surplus of workers, Tanjung Priok had to contend with 
an  acute shortage of labourers. In Tanjung Priok there was heavy competi-
tion  among the shipping companies for the available dockers. The need for 
labour was so pressing that any unexpected additional job would  have an 
impact on the available labour in the subsequent period. This could, for 
instance, happen when a crew of dockers had to do a night shift to handle a 
particular vessel and other ships suffered a standstill the next day because of a 
lack of labourers.12
Traditionally, dockworkers came from Banten (Bantam), a Residency at the 
west end of Java, or to a lesser extent from Tangerang, a district also west of 
Batavia. The Census of 1930 reports that it was ‘common knowledge that 
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13 The figures in the Census show that 12,424 people from Banten and 13,070 from Tangerang 
lived in the district of Batavia. A small group of harbour workers originated from 
Parungpanjang in the Bogor district. Unfortunately the Census does not specify numbers 
of the dock labourers (Volkstelling 1930 1933).
14 The migration routines of the Bantenese also caused problems at home. While the 
Bantenese had the reputation of hard workers outside their own region, in Banten they 
seemed ashamed to perform coolie labour. A colonial report depicted the Bantenese as 
abstemious, thrifty, and pious, but on their home ground they were said to be bone-lazy, 
fanatical, and rebellious. Verslag van de Commissie 1927:1–3; Arsip Nasional Republik 
Indonesia, Jakarta (anri), Memorie van Overgave Bantam 1931.
people from Banten and Tangerang worked in Priok’.13 They worked in the port 
for a few months only and then went back to their villages. At least 75 per cent 
of the workers left Tanjung Priok within one year (Rodenwaldt and Essed 1925). 
Circular migration was an established way of life in Banten. The majority of the 
young men travelled to Batavia or South Sumatra to work, but returned for the 
rice harvests or religious holidays, or when they had earned sufficient money 
to buy and cultivate their own piece of sawah land. These migration patterns 
assured an influx of money and goods into Banten.
The ‘work ethic’ of the Bantenese caused the port enterprises a headache, 
because do what they could, the port enterprises could not get a grip on the 
indigenous labourers.14 M.C. Koning, principal agent for the kpm in Batavia 
between 1911 and 1919, was looking back on his work twenty years later still full 
of incomprehension about the attitude of the dockers:
Those who were acquainted with the mentality of the native in those 
days also remember that little was needed to have him interrupt his work. 
The work was frequently halted for a celebration; the reasons for a sla-
matan were insignificant. When a coolie thought he had earned enough 
money for the time being to allow him to give free rein to his innate lazi-
ness, he left his job without a qualm and disappeared, only to turn up 
again when his purse was completely empty. Also, the moment the rice 
crop had to be harvested, the coolies left for their desa and remained 
there until the work in the sawah was done.
nishm 1939:8
The casual dockworkers were not employed directly by either the harbour 
management or the waterside companies, they were taken on indirectly 
through a mandur (foreman) who had been enlisted by a labour broker or 
sometimes a stevedore or shipping company. This system of indirect recruit-
ment was an established practice in many ports in the world, and was also 
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15 This was the case not only in Tanjung Priok, but also in Surabaya, where most dockers 
were Madurese, and in the harbour of Semarang, which attracted workers from Kudus, 
Demak, Juana, Kendal, and Jepara (Ingleson 1983:457).
16 na, kpm (2.20.35) 201, Minutes Priok meeting 22-2-1912.
commonplace in various industries in Java. The mandur was often village-born 
or had strong ties with the area from which his family originated. He used 
these networks to recruit labourers from his home village and region. This use 
of networks explains the concentrated origin of dockworkers from just a few 
areas.15 The advantage for the employers was that they did not have to deal 
with all the indigenous labourers, but could organize everything through a few 
foremen.
 Shortage of Labourers
Around 1905 shipping traffic had developed to such an extent that the small-
scale organization of labour was no longer satisfactory. The port of Batavia ran 
short of wharf and storage space and the limited number of dockworkers was 
an acute problem. The upshot was congestion and the shipping companies 
were driven into strong competition for port facilities and labour. In an attempt 
to overcome this problem, the main shipping lines in Priok – kpm, smn, rl, 
and Java-China-Japan Lijn ( jcjl) – combined to establish three cooperatives 
in 1911 and 1912: the Kolenmaatschap (Coal Partnership) for coal business, the 
Unieveer (Union Ferry) for lighter work and transport, and Stuwadoor 
Maatschap (Stevedore Partnership) for stevedoring (nishm 1939; à Campo 
1992). Although the integration of these port processes did indeed improve the 
handling of ships, it could not solve the shortage of labour. This arrangement 
was broken by jcjl when it decided to hire a Chinese broker, the firm of Wing, 
to bunker their ships. Wing attracted 200 Priok labourers by offering high 
wages. After that the three cooperatives had no other option than to raise their 
wages and the competition for labour only intensified.16
Another possible solution to the labour issue was to hire Chinese workers. 
The jcjl ships regularly brought coolies from China to work in the plantations 
of Deli (East Sumatra), and the company sometimes sought Chinese labourers 
for dock work in Tanjung Priok. Chinese labourers were also recruited from 
Singapore. The advantage of Chinese workers was that they, unlike the indige-
nous labourers, did not desert the dockside when work was at its height. 
Precisely in August and September, when shipping of cash crops was at its 
peak, there was always a massive exodus of the indigenous workers to Banten, 
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17 Confidential Letter kpm, Koning to Hummel, 7-2-1912, cited in à Campo (1992:419).
going home for the rice harvest. Lebaran (the end of the Islamic fasting) was 
another critical moment, because many Bantenese went back to their villages 
to celebrate.
Both these drawbacks to the employment of indigenous labourers did not 
apply to Chinese workers but, nevertheless, hiring them was not considered a 
permanent solution for the labour problem. The employers objected to the fact 
that the Chinese workers frequently went on strike and displayed strong group 
solidarity. Sometimes, the Chinese workers had already mutinied on the ships 
before they had arrived in Batavia (De Telegraaf 28-7-1910). Another perennial 
problem was that Chinese immigrants suffered from the change in environ-
ment, especially as the conditions in Priok were very harsh. Once in Batavia, 
the physical condition of the immigrants rapidly declined, and therefore, in 
the words of kpm agent Koning,
they performed even more badly than those skinny Chinese and natives 
who had been working in Priok and at least always carried on, despite 
being weak, exhausted, and miserable.17
In later years, the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese immigrants were often suspected of 
being communist revolutionaries, and port employers were no longer falling 
over themselves to hire new Chinese dockers (Politiek-politionele overzichten, 
1982, 1988:16).
The mechanization of dock labour was another alternative to solve the 
labour shortage. To choose this option would certainly make the port enter-
prises less vulnerable to fluctuations in labour supply and speed up the han-
dling of cargo. In Tanjung Priok some cranes were available, both on the 
wharves and on the barges. Large vessels were equipped with either their own 
cranes or winches with a lifting capacity of up to five tons each (à Campo 
1992:420). Despite these advantages, the options for mechanization were very 
limited, mostly because the cargo was still rarely standardized.
The possibilities of mechanization were promising in the case of coal. The 
handling of coal was a bottleneck in Tanjung Priok, as it was still done by man-
ual labour only. Long rows of workers carried coal onto the vessels along gang-
planks in baskets. The representatives of the shipping companies, meeting to 
discuss the matter, considered the various opportunities for mechanical coal 
loading. A technical committee visited several European ports to study the 
mechanical loading devices used there. In the end, the Rotterdam system was 
chosen as the most appropriate. In 1913, after protracted bickering between 
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18 Company brochure ‘nv Nederlandsch-Indische Steenkolen Handel-Maatschappij’, 
Amsterdam, no date. Unieveer and the Kolen Maatschap were incorporated into the 
nishm.
the various parties, two lighters, provided with steam cranes, were ordered, 
each with a capacity of 1,200 tons. Not long after, in early 1914, the Union com-
panies (kpm, smn, rl, and jcjl) established a new enterprise to run the coal 
trade in Tanjung Priok: the Nederlandsch Indische Steenkolen Handels-
Maatschappij (nishm, Netherlands Indies Coal Trading Company). The ambi-
tion was to compete with Singapore, where many Java-bound vessels used to 
take in coal (nishm 1939:10–11). The nishm had a 1,000 foot long wharf, 
equipped with four electrical coal transporters with grabs, each with a capacity 
of 100 tons per hour. The new loading facilities did indeed improve the han-
dling of the vessels, and the process required less labour. However, the unflag-
ging increase in shipping traffic still meant that a sizeable workforce had to be 
available, now made even more urgent as the nishm expanded its activities to 
tug boat and lighter services and stevedoring.18 In an attempt to rationalize 
one aspect of dock work, the Union companies had paradoxically produced a 
new competitor for labour on the waterfront.
 Living and Working in Priok
Most dockers lived in the old quarter of Batavia, and not in the quarters 
near the port. Every morning they had to walk an hour to the station, from 
where they travelled thirty minutes by train to the dockside. At the end of the 
day, they made the same trip in the opposite direction, giving a total travelling 
time of three hours per day. Every evening port employers posted the number 
of dockworkers needed for the next day, based on a calculation of the number 
of ships in the harbour and the expected arrivals. When a ship arrived unex-
pectedly, or when for some other reason more dockers were required, it was 
almost impossible to form a new gang and, considering the travelling time 
from Batavia, it would hardly be worth trying (Rietdijk 1921:60). It was in the 
best interests of the employers for the labourers to move to the waterfront as 
their immediate presence would increase the flexibility of cargo handling.
One of the main problems encountered in establishing a steady workforce 
in the docks was the poor living conditions in Tanjung Priok, or Batavia for that 
matter, and the appalling accommodation available to the labourers. In many 
cases, the foreman or the broker provided the migrant workers from Banten 
with a place to stay in one of the pondok (boarding-houses) in old Batavia. 
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19 ‘dat zijn slaapgelegenheden voor den Javaan van buiten. Droevige verblijfplaatsen waren 
het, plaatsen waar de menschen blootgesteld waren aan allerlei infecties, physieke en 
moreele! Prostitutie vierde er hoogtij, malaria, typhus, dysenterie enz. enz. vonden er gemak-
kelijk hun prooi’ (Tillema 1919:3).
20 “t Was een lugubere tocht. De meesten ter zake zeer deskundigen hadden vóór hun vertrek 
een paar kinine-tabletten ingenomen. Dit om van het bezoek geen malaria op te doen. […] De 
People lived cheek by jowl in these shabby lodging houses, which were built 
very close to each other. Fires could easily destroy a whole quarter (Abeyasekere 
1987:70–71). During the wet monsoon, heavy rains transformed the kampong 
area in central Batavia into a quagmire. When this happened, most of the 
workers did not show up at Tanjung Priok, after having spent all night in the 
wet and, if the bad weather persisted, many migrants returned to their home 
villages. In 1918 a severe flood forced many people to flee to Banten with as 
immediate consequence a lack of labourers, despite the offer of the harbour 
authorities to use godowns as temporary accommodation in Tanjung Priok. It 
took months before this situation had fully recovered (Rietdijk 1921:60).
Publicist and photographer H.F. Tillema described the city kampongs of 
Batavia as the ‘Augean stables’, afflicted by poverty and decay (Vanvugt 1993; 
Coté 2002). He was horrified by the sight of the pondok,
which form the sleeping accommodation of the Javanese from the coun-
try. Distressing dwellings they were, places where people were exposed to 
all sorts of infections, both physical and moral! Prostitution was rampant; 
malaria, typhoid, dysentery, etcetera, etcetera had no trouble finding easy 
victims.19
Sometimes workers just found a spot in the harbour to spend the night, saving 
a trip up and down to Batavia and keeping their train allowance. To observe 
them Tillema made a nocturnal trip to the harbour at the invitation of the 
director of the Department of Health. At midnight a small group, armed with a 
camera, left for Priok.
It was a lugubrious expedition. Most of the experts had taken quinine tab-
lets before departure. This to prevent [them] catching malaria on this excur-
sion. […]. The small heaps, which you will notice only after looking carefully, 
are sleeping persons, lying on the coal, exposed to the notorious mosquitoes 
of Tanjung Priok. “Sheer suicide”, said one companion. “Now one can see 
how much the authorities here lack any insight into hygiene”, remarked 
another. […] Deeply impressed by what we had seen, we returned home.20
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 hoopjes, die u na aandachtige beschouwing zult opmerken, zijn slapende menschen, liggend 
op de steenkool, blootgesteld aan de steken der beruchte muskieten van Tandjong Priok. “Je 
reinste zelfmoord,” merkte een der tochtgenooten op. “Nu kan men eens zien hoezeer het 
hygiënisch inzicht hier nog bij de autoriteiten ontbreekt,” merkte een ander op. […] Diep 
onder den indruk keerden wij terug’ (Tillema 1919:2).
21 na, kpm (2.20.35) 314.1, Minutes meeting Verenigde Nederlandse Scheepvaart-
maatschappijen 22-12-1921.
22 Private companies, such as the Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij (a construction works) 
and the Dordtsche Petroleum Maatschappij (an oil company), also rented areas for the 
accommodation of their labourers, who were permanent employees not directly involved 
in the actual dock work.
Tillema had the opportunity to discuss the situation with the kpm directors 
during a visit to the kpm headquarters as preparation for writing his critical 
pamphlet Kampongwee. Tillema and the kpm directors discussed the living 
conditions and studied photographs of the facilities in Priok. Thanks to the 
minutes of a board meeting of the shipping companies, it is still possible to 
discover what happened on this visit.21 It seemed Tillema and the kpm were on 
the same wavelength on this point.
Very scant accommodation of a more permanent nature was available in 
Tanjung Priok. Not much is known, unfortunately, about the housing situation 
in and around Tanjung Priok in its very early days. The port had been con-
structed in an isolated area, surrounded by swamps and mangroves. Only a 
small fishing settlement had been forced to make way for the construction 
works. Only after the turn of the century did the colonial port authorities begin 
to show an interest in the living situation of the Priok population. As a conse-
quence, one by one the existing kampongs were relocated to better, specially 
prepared terrains, such as Kampong Pedjongkoran and Kampong Kodja. The 
inhabitants were paid an allowance to move their dwellings, which they simply 
took apart and rebuilt at the new location. The port authorities constructed 
roads and pathways, installed the waterworks and an electricity grid, and built 
a central market.22
 Establishing the Uniekampong
Housing and hygiene had appeared on the agenda of the Priok meeting of the 
shipping companies several times, but initially to no purpose. In 1916 the kpm 
management in Batavia decided to take the labour issue into its own hands by 
setting up a koeliekampong (coolie kampong). The stevedoring companies had 
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23 na, kpm (2.20.35) 314.1: 623–632, Minutes April 1921.
24 na, kpm (2.20.35) 198, vb 86 Batavia 10-3-1917. A pikol is a unit of weight, roughly the equiv-
alent of 62.5 kg. This death rate of 25 per cent is hard to believe but if correct it is indicative 
of both the terrible living conditions and the dire economic need of the workers.
25 na, kpm (2.20.35) 198, vb 72 Batavia to Amsterdam 25-8-1916, vb 78 Batavia to Amsterdam 
4-11-1916; vb 110 Amsterdam to Batavia 2-11-1916, vb 113 Amsterdam to Batavia 28-12-1916; 
vb 152 Amsterdam to Batavia 28-1-1919.
not been able to supply dockworkers in sufficient numbers for all the shipping 
companies and, above all, the labourers were in such poor physical condition 
that they could barely undertake the arduous task of loading and unloading 
the ships. The director of a stevedoring company linked to the kpm had sug-
gested in a report that the workers be accommodated properly, in the vicinity 
of the dockside. The purpose of the Koeliekampong was to house the workers 
who lived downtown in the ‘most appalling conditions’, in a new kampong 
with better living conditions in order to bring down the death rate among 
them and improve their physical condition.23
What we wish to achieve with our coolie kampong is an end to the unfor-
tunate conditions prevalent in the slums in downtown [Batavia], where 
the Bantenese are living. Undernourished people live in insalubrious 
conditions and the result is, according to the harbour physician, a death 
rate of 25 per cent, while those who do not perish deliver an inferior 
working performance as a consequence of their poor physical shape. 
While a veem coolie shoulders a bag of copra on his own, we need four 
persons to do so, which is why handcarts are being used. When one con-
siders what is achieved in pikols in Makassar, the difference in speed of 
cargo handling is the first thing which strikes the eye.24
Initially the kpm wanted to co-operate with the other shipping companies, 
rl, smn and jcjl, to establish a common housing complex. This plan was 
stymied by the Priok agents of these other companies who were determined 
to establish their own kampong, but it turned out their plans were never 
executed.
In September 1918, the kpm opened the Koeliekampong. The local manage-
ment in Batavia envisaged accommodation for 700 labourers, but the kpm 
board of directors in Amsterdam restricted the experiment to 400 labourers. 
The directors in the Netherlands feared the kampong would not attract enough 
labourers to fill so many places.25 As will be discussed in detail in the next sec-
tion, the Koeliekampong was actually a success in many ways.
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26 Other partners were Java Pacific Lijn (through Scheepsagentuur), Java Bengalen Lijn and 
Java New York Lijn (only those ships ran by rl and smn). At the same time the partners 
established the nv Uniekampong, it was decided to dissolve the now redundant 
Stuwadoor Maatschappij. na, kpm (2.20,35) 197. It is remarkable that neither the colonial 
government nor the local authorities were involved in the project. Since the 
Decentralization Act of 1903, municipalities were responsible for a great variety of tasks, 
including sanitation works, public housing, and kampong improvement.
27 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197, nr 7a: Acte van Maatschap, July 1919.
Seeing the apparent success of the Koeliekampong, at least for the kpm as 
employer of the dockworkers, the other shipping companies quickly came 
round. In March 1919, it was decided to establish jointly a limited liability com-
pany, to run the kampong and labour pool, nv Uniekampong (Uniekampong 
Ltd). The Uniekampong would be the primary ‘supplier’ of dockworkers for the 
companies involved in the union. The main partners in the Uniekampong 
were the kpm, the Nederlandsch Indische Scheepvaart Etablissmenten (nise, 
the local representative of the rl), and Scheepsagentuur, the representative of 
the smn and jcjl in Batavia.26 According to the statutes (Acte van Maatschap), 
the stated goal of the nv Uniekampong was to guarantee the availability of 
workers for the loading and unloading, storing and transporting of cargo’s 
shipped in vessels operated by the Uniekampong members.27
In a radical break with the past, the Uniekampong was to house 4,000 dock-
workers, many more than they had ever hired before. Although the participa-
ting shipping companies were allowed to attract other labourers, this suggestion 
was strongly discouraged as such a practice would only drive up competition 
for labour. After registration at the Uniekampong the dockers received a spe-
cial pass and a European staff supervised the premises.
The relation between Uniekampong and the dockers can be characterized 
as semi-casual: fixed, but not permanent employment. The establishment of a 
labour pool was part of a general development of the gradual decasualization 
of dock work then occurring in various ports all over the world. The militant 
reputation of dockers was to a large extent based on the effects of casual labour. 
Port employers began to realize that steps had to be taken to alter the dockers’ 
casual way of life fundamentally (Weinhauer 2000:580–581).
Unquestionably, the Uniekampong served the economic interest of the four 
participating companies. With a 60 to 70 per cent share in the total shipping 
movements in Tanjung Priok, the four companies hoped to diminish the 
mutual competition on the labour market, and thereby control and bring 
down wages. A point of attention was to make sure all partners had their right-
ful share of the labourers. The nv employed an ‘administrator’ – in later years 
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28 As an extra warrant that no contracting party was slighted, a supervisory board, with three 
members from kpm, nise, and Scheepsagentuur, controlled the functioning of the 
Director and the Uniekampong. na, kpm (2.20.35) 197, nr 7a: Acte van Maatschap, July 1919.
29 aia was founded in 1916 by the Dutch architect Frans Ghijsels, who among other things 
had designed the kpm building (Scheepvaartgebouw) in downtown Batavia.
his title was upgraded to ‘director’– who looked after the fair distribution of 
workers over the various participant companies; he was also responsible for 
the staff and workers, and for costs and income.28
Nevertheless, the establishment of the Uniekampong was certainly inspired 
by ethical considerations too. The management of the Uniekampong demon-
strated its engagement with the dockworkers, although in a highly paternalis-
tic manner, aspiring to ‘educate’ the workers in matters of food, hygiene, and 
money. In an article in a nautical magazine, Rietdijk, first director of the 
Uniekampong, stressed that the ‘ethical approach’ converged with practical 
economic interests:
The brilliant improvement in the living conditions of the native workers 
is the ethical side, the benefit [we derive] from the improved perfor-
mance of the workers who are better looked after is the practical.
rietdijk 1921:61
Ethical or not, the Uniekampong was in no sense comparable to the European 
working-class housing projects which were built in the Netherlands Indies in 
the early twentieth century. The name ‘Uniekampong’ can be deceiving, as it 
was not really a kampong in the sense of a town quarter (Van Roosmalen 
2008:278–295). The housing complex displayed certain features of a tangsi (an 
army camp or barracks), as the labourers lived together in large communal 
buildings, although some did have private rooms.
 Life at the Koeliekampong
The first Koeliekampong, the precursor of the Uniekampong opened by the 
kpm in 1918, was located directly next to Pedjongkoran, one of the largest kam-
pongs in the Priok area. On its other side, the Koeliekampong bordered directly 
on Zandvoort Beach, a place where the colonial elite of Batavia used to come 
for some fresh air and relaxation. The complex was built under the supervision 
of the Algemeen Ingenieurs- en Architectenbureau (aia) and consisted of 
eight pondok for in total 500 to 600 workers and 48 mandur (foremen).29 It was 
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30 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197, nr 12.
31 na, kpm (2.20.35) 314.1: 623.2, Minutes Priok meeting 1-4-1919.
still a very modest affair as the pondok were constructed of wood and plaited 
bamboo. The construction of the Koeliekampong had cost the kpm around 
150,000 guilders in January 1919.30
The workers slept on baleh-baleh (wooden beds). According to the camp 
files, in 1919, one year after the opening, the number of beds in the eight pondok 
had already risen to 768. The workers could sit on long wooden benches or 
directly on the concrete floors. On the northern side, each building had an 
open gallery and a corridor. For every two pondok, there was a common kitchen, 
constructed of brick. Here the workers prepared rice, which was distributed by 
the management. The night watch had a bamboo shed from where he set off 
on his nightly rounds. Apart from the pondok, there were five separate houses 
where the chief mandur lived with their families. These houses had a private 
kitchen and steps made out of brick instead of wood.
Several hygienic measures were introduced. There were four buildings pro-
viding washing facilities, including tap water and water closets, in the kam-
pong. Water was drawn from an artesian aquifer and channelled to the drinking 
water taps. Waste water flowed through sewerage pipes into septic tanks. Ill or 
wounded workers were taken to a special shed, the ‘ziekenbarak’ (sick bay).
The European staff lived in two semi-detached houses, each with its 
own kitchen, washing place, and rooms for the servants. The director’s 
accommodation – with two doors onto the front porch – had a bathroom with 
a shower and a washing place. This house was connected to the kampong 
office, where the European staff worked. However, most of the European staff 
lived in Weltevreden in Batavia and came to work by bus, which made five 
return trips a day.31
The Koeliekampong had a central kitchen for daily meals, to supplement 
the portions of rice that were distributed to be cooked by the workers them-
selves. Workers had to buy their other daily necessities at the toko (small shops) 
in the complex or they could eat at one of the warung (food stalls). The toko 
and warung were all housed in two specially assigned buildings and the shop-
keepers rented the space from the kampong management. For recreation there 
was a cinema, complete with a projector, a screen, and wind fans on the roof 
used for cooling the spectators. The whole terrain had electric lighting. This 
was not ‘luxury’, but a necessity: good lighting was important for crews return-
ing from the docks at night. Moreover, a properly lighted complex was para-
mount to camp security. The Koeliekampong had its private security force, 
which strictly guarded law and order in the complex.
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As a whole, the first Koeliekampong can be considered ‘a society by itself ’. 
As said, the kpm began modestly with only 400 labourers, as there were doubts 
about whether the kampong would indeed attract enough labourers.32 During 
the first year, the kampong was a demonstrated success and had already 
accommodated 600 people. In fact, it attracted even more workers, up to a 
thousand. Despite the overcrowding, health conditions were much better than 
elsewhere in Batavia or Tanjung Priok. In the old dock quarters, several people 
died daily from diseases; in the kpm complex only eight people had fallen ill.
 From Koeliekampong to Uniekampong
The Uniekampong regulations stated that the ‘nv’ would provide housing, 
food, and medical care for indigenous men who were willing to work for the nv 
member companies. Workers living in separate accommodation were allowed 
to bring along their family, if the total number of people did not exceed the 
maximum set for that accommodation.33
The system in the Koeliekampong – which was borrowed from that used by 
the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij in North Sumatra (à Campo 1992: 
519) – was adopted by the partners in the Uniekampong, but the complex had 
to be expanded enormously to accommodate 4,000 workers in place of the 
original 400. Furthermore, the construction of the pondok was improved and 
more ‘durable’ materials were used: more brick and concrete, less wood and 
bamboo. In the period between 1919 and 1921, new pondok were built, as were 
new lavatory and washing buildings and six new kitchens. Again the aia was 
the main engineer and contractor.
Each pondok was designed to accommodate ninety persons. Some large 
pondok were specially assigned for use by families, the others were for single 
men. kpm had been pleasantly surprised that some workers brought their fam-
ilies along to the Koeliekampong. These workers formed a small, steady core of 
the inhabitants. In the Uniekampong workers with families were accommo-
dated in more private sections. However, the population of the Uniekampong 
consisted mainly of boedjong, young unmarried men, from Banten who worked 
on the waterfront for a limited period only.
32 na, kpm (2.20.35) 198, vb 72 Batavia to Amsterdam 25-8-1916, vb 78 Batavia to Amsterdam 
4-11-1916; vb 110 Amsterdam to Batavia 2-11-1916, vb 113 Amsterdam to Batavia 28-12-1916; 
vb 152 Amsterdam to Batavia 28-1-1919.
33 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197, 7b, 12-6-1919.
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According to the Uniekampong regulations the pondok were already ‘fully 
furnished’ for living,34 but this furnishing was very modest indeed, with baleh-
baleh for sleeping and long wooden benches. The mandur lived in separate 
rooms at each end of the building. Just as in the Koeliekampong, the chief 
mandur lived in private houses, close to the pondok. The separate houses and 
rooms were not furnished. Three new godowns for toko and warung were con-
structed, and a new office building was erected for the expanding European 
staff. A Decauville track was laid to make transport by train from the 
Uniekampong to the Tanjung Priok railway station possible, and the workers 
were transferred to and from the docks by ferry. A landing stage was con-
structed to this end and in 1921 a small harbour was dug at the cost of 30,000 
guilders.35 The expansion costs of the Uniekampong up to July 1920 were just 
over 365,000 guilders, although not all construction work had been finished by 
then.36
Food was supplied from a central kitchen but the menu was very basic: rice, 
fish, and eggs. The people were expected to prepare additional food in one of 
the smaller kitchens near their pondok. The Pasar Kodja containing many more 
toko and warung were also nearby to supplement the mostly Chinese-owned 
shops on the Uniekampong. The regulations stated that food had to be distri-
buted three times a day, in the morning, the afternoon, and the evening, at the 
same time every day. Under exceptional circumstances, breakfast could be dis-
tributed one hour earlier and dinner at night could be delayed two hours at the 
most. When workers were already or still working on the docks, the shipping 
company employing them was obliged to pick up the food at the Uniekampong 
kitchens and bring back the utensils afterwards. Medical check-ups were obli-
gatory for every worker. The Uniekampong had its own medical doctor, after 
1929 two. The workers were also strictly instructed to keep their accommoda-
tions clean.37
The Uniekampong also offered shared facilities. On their own initiative the 
dockers, of whom the majority were Muslim, had established a mosque in the 
Uniekampong. A vocational school educated the workers’ children to succeed 
them in the dock trade. For recreation, there was a football pitch and the cin-
ema, which both also attracted people from outside the kampong.
After a few years the press praised the Uniekampong as an example of how 
to cope with workers under modern conditions. The comments, for instance in 
34 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197, 7b, 12-6-1919.
35 Arsip Burgerlijke Openbare Werken, Citeureup (bow), H2/3/25 (1933), 6-10-1932.
36 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197, 16a.
37 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197, 7b, 12-6-1919.
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the Deli Courant, reflect the ‘ethical policy’ of the colonial government in the 
early 1920s. In the Netherlands, the daily newspaper De Telegraaf claimed that 
the success of the Uniekampong contrasted markedly with the bad employ-
ment records of the plantations.
Could it be that here [at Uniekampong] the psyche of the coolie was 
explored for the first time, that he was considered a human being and not 
merely a muscleman, who can be ordered around? Could it be that an 
attempt was made to fulfil his needs and desires and not ignore his inner 
self?38
The gradual modernization attracted new business as well. For instance, the 
establishment of a production plant of the American car company General 
Motors in the 1920s contributed to the transformation of the Priok area. And, 
as roads and railways were improved, this rather remote port area was drawn 
closer to the city of Batavia.
 The Inhabitants
The number of 4,000 dockers proved far too ambitious. It was hard to find so 
many workers, but the shipping companies had also come to realize that a 
work force of this size was excessive. In 1921 the kpm directors in The Hague 
complained that the Uniekampong had grown much larger than intended, and 
hence had become much more expensive.39
The Uniekampong was governed by a strict hierarchy, closely resembling 
the strata in the work force. The labourers were divided into the categories 
chief mandur, mandur, assistant-mandur, A-coolies (very experienced), 
B-coolies (experienced) and C-coolies (hardly or no experience).40 The ‘coo-
lies’, the actual dockers, worked six days a week, a maximum of twelve hours 
per day, starting at six in the morning and ending at six in the evening. This 
maximum did not include the travelling time to and from the docks. Overtime 
38 ‘Kan het niet zijn dat men hier eerst de psyche van den koelie heeft verkend, dat men hem als 
mensch heeft beschouwd en niet als domme kracht, wie men iets opdragen kan. Zou het niet 
zijn omdat men getracht heeft aan zijn behoeften, zijn verlangens te voldoen en omdat men 
niet buiten zijn innerlijk is blijven staan’ (De Telegraaf 20-11-1920).
39 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197. Minutes meeting in The Hague, 22-12-1921.




(hours worked before or after six) was paid out calculating it at 1.2 hours per 
hour. Wages were paid to the workers directly by the shipping companies.41 
This was a measure to eliminate the dominant position of the mandur, who 
had traditionally distributed the income to the whole gang.
Shipping companies had to ‘order’ dockers at least one day in advance. Even 
after the Uniekampong was up and running there was a never-ending debate 
about the distribution of the best workers. Shipping lines reverted to the prac-
tice of hiring skilled dockers of their own accord, bypassing the Uniekampong. 
smn and jcjl tried to establish their own stevedoring crew, which would be 
experienced in the stowage of their specific vessels. The upshot was that the 
best workers were attracted away from the Uniekampong, leaving the less 
experienced behind. On their part, the other companies accused the kpm of 
enjoying certain privileges in the Uniekampong. Eventually, it was agreed that 
each company would be allowed only a small group of fixed dockers, 50–100 
workers at the most.
One of the fears which beset the companies was that bringing the workers 
together might provide the ideal breeding-ground for labour organizations 
and communist aspirations leading to social unrest. One of the directors 
pointed out that in ‘Dutch ports similar [workers] concentrations had resulted 
in the organization of labourers which had harmed the employers signifi-
cantly’.42 In the other two major harbours of Java, Semarang and Surabaya, the 
1910s and 1920s were turbulent decades. Protracted strikes had ground both the 
other ports to a standstill in 1913, 1918, 1921, and 1925. Although the aspect of 
dockers’ resistance in Tanjung Priok still needs to be studied in more detail, 
it seems that strikes and disturbances did not occur as frequently and, when 
they did, it was on a smaller scale, than in Semarang or Surabaya. The 
Havenarbeidersbond (Harbour Workers’ Union), established in Semarang in 
1919, admitted that its section in Tanjung Priok was not particularly active. It 
could never attract any substantial support there, nor did its successor Sarekat 
Pegawai Pelabuhan dan Lautan (sppl, Union of Harbour Workers and Seamen) 
(Ingleson 1983:461, 464–465). The relative peace prevailing in the Uniekampong, 
and Tanjung Priok as a whole, is striking.
The fear that bringing workers together was asking for social unrest, was 
balanced by the expectation of the shipping companies owning the 
Uniekampong to have more control over the labourers when they lived in the 
Uniekampong. In contrast, the pondok communities downtown remained 
largely impenetrable for the companies. When unrest flared up among the 
41 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197, 7b, 12-6-1919.
42 na, kpm (2.20.35) 314.1:623–632, Minutes Priok meeting, 3-9-1919.
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workers’ population, the director of the Uniekampong had a signalling and 
mediating role. Director Zeeman was certainly very closely involved with the 
labourers’ daily concerns and actively promoted their interests in the board 
meetings.
The Uniekampong files do not contain any references to any serious upris-
ings or strikes before 1942. Even during the tense November of 1926, when com-
munist uprisings set North Banten, the home region of most dockers, alight, 
the Priok waterfront remained quiet, much to the surprise of the port employ-
ers. The limited degree of communist support among harbour workers might 
have been the reason the rebellion was geographically confined.
The absence of strikes did not automatically imply a lack of opposition, as 
workers resistance was often manifested in other, less confrontational forms, 
which were very effective indeed. The most common form of individual pro-
test was just to leave the Uniekampong, and find another employer in the 
docks. As most workers were closely tied to their mandur, just leaving was not 
always an option, and discontent was often voiced or even inspired by the fore-
men. The pressure the mandur could exert was very effective, and many times 
the employers had to accede to their demands. The Uniekampong is an exam-
ple of a working population, albeit perhaps through their foremen, which was 
conscious of its own power and the scope it had to negotiate with their employ-
ers. In these negotiations, the bargaining power of the dockers fluctuated 
together with the economic ups and downs of the harbour.
 Economic Ups and Downs
In the 1920s, the shipping companies flourished in the climate of rapid 
economic growth and expanding world trade, especially in colonial products 
like tea, coffee, rubber, or sugar. Conditions had a positive effect on the 
Uniekampong as well, as there was ample work for the dockers.43 As a conse-
quence, competition for hard-working and (more or less) skilled labourers was 
savage, and the workers could easily find jobs elsewhere in the docks or in the 
old harbour of Batavia. The Uniekampong had a rather high turnover of inhab-
itants. The better housing offered in the Uniekampong was not enough to over-
come the old practice of circular migration. In the harvest periods, many of 
the workers continued to return to their villages, just at the time that the load-
ing and unloading of ships reached a peak. Port employers sometimes had to 
43 A second Uniekampong complex, for 800 workers, was established in Belawan, the port of 
Medan in 1927. na, kpm (2.20.35) 19-12-1927.
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use ‘wage tactics’ to bind the workers, but the good living conditions in the 
Uniekampong definitely helped to some extent to build a stable labour force.
The Depression had an enormous impact on the Uniekampong. Dockworkers 
all over the world were a very vulnerable group, as world trade, and the whole 
shipping industry imploded. From the 1930s, the Uniekampong had to cope 
with serious budget cuts and the level of services diminished. Director Zeeman, 
who had held his position since the early 1920s, was trying to find all sorts of 
ways to lower the costs, from trying to convince the colonial government to 
reduce the charter charges for the ferry harbour to finding cheap alternatives 
for electricity. Pieces of land, which were rented from the Port Authorities for 
any future expansion, were handed back in 1934. One of the two medical doc-
tors had to leave again, also because there were on average only 25 patients per 
day.44 One year later, the cinema had to stop its shows as it had run out of silent 
films, the electricity net was changed from high to low voltage (a cut of 70 guil-
ders per year), and the water tariffs had dropped a bit. Some toko and almost all 
warung were left empty by their owners, as they could not afford the rents. 
There were simply too few customers left, as the working population had 
diminished drastically since the onset of the crisis.
The Depression completely reversed the balance of power between employ-
ers and workers in the harbour, and the strong bargaining power the workers 
had enjoyed in the 1920s disappeared. The shipping companies with a share in 
the nv Uniekampong were eager to cut their overheads, including the costs of 
the ‘expensive’ Uniekampong. The number of workers was reduced drastically 
to 1,550, and the shipping companies pushed the director to lower this number 
even more. However, Zeeman claimed that sending away workers would hardly 
yield a cutback, as the colonial government obliged employers to pay laid-off 
workers enough to live on. Instead Zeeman lowered the wages of the most 
skilled labourers like winch operators, who had been extremely hard to get just 
a few years before. He convinced the supervisory board not to lower the wages 
of the regular labourers by pointing out their long working hours. He also suc-
cessfully argued that it was unnecessary to save on the wages of the regular 
labourers because of the falling rice price, which already meant the daily cost 
of food for the Uniekampong had decreased.45
When the supervisory board repeated its pleas for lower wages in the follow-
ing years, Zeeman explained that the wages in the Uniekampong had already 
been relatively low, on average 37–38 cents per day, back in the 1920s. Since 
44 na, kpm (2.20.35) 197/221, Minutes Jaarvergadering Uniekampong Tandjong Priok, 
7-6-1934.
45 na, kpm (2.20.35), Minutes Jaarvergadering Uniekampong Tandjong Priok, 6/7-5-1931.
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1922 the wages had not been raised once, even though competing employers 
had raised the wages of their workers since 1925. Lowering the wages would 
mean the Uniekampong could no longer hire good labourers, and, worst of all, 
the mandur might desert the premises. One member of the supervisory board 
acknowledged the dilemma: ‘The Uniekampong has got some good mandur 
now. There is a possibility that the good coolies will go elsewhere if their wages 
are cut’.46
Unfortunately, the official sources, like the minutes of the Priok meetings, 
do not provide many details about how workers responded to the Depression. 
Some left the premises and tried their luck elsewhere or returned home. Many 
dockers preferred to stay – at least for a couple of months – in the relative secu-
rity of the Uniekampong.
The workers that stayed had to put up with deteriorating housing during the 
Depression. By the early 1930s, the pondok were ten to thirteen years old and 
badly in need of renovation; the kpm representative was shocked by the dilapi-
dated housing. However, maintenance and replacement investments were put 
on hold as a consequence of the economic crisis. In 1932, a new ‘model’ pondok 
was built, but financial constraints meant that the project was not pursued 
beyond this pilot. In 1935 renovation was again on the agenda of the board. The 
representative of the smn and member of the supervisory board, W.P.J. Koper, 
reported that he had seen with his own eyes that the accommodation had 
almost ‘run its course’ and would have to be replaced within five to ten years. 
Koper stated that the quality of the housing was ‘sub-standard’ and as an 
example he mentioned the small ‘rooms’ the workers had created in the pon-
dok, using paper and sasak (plaited bamboo), as the only divisions.47
 Thinking about Further Modernization
In 1937 the worst of the economic crisis was over and an ambitious moderniza-
tion plan was drawn up, not only to upgrade the Uniekampong, but the prem-
ises would be extended as well. This modernized kampong was designed for 
2,409 coolies, winch men and tractor drivers and their mandur. A new office 
building, a games hall, toko and warung, a new mosque, and a new hospital 
were all part of the plan. New housing for the European staff, namely for the 
doctor, the director and the supervisory staff, was also included. A completely 
new layout was drawn up for the actual Uniekampong, with 57 smaller pondok, 
46 na, kpm (2.20.35), Minutes Jaarvergadering Uniekampong Tandjong Priok, 27-5-1932.
47 na, kpm 314.1:623–632, Minutes Priok meeting, 24-7-1935.
238 Veering
<UN>
each for thirty men. Next to every three pondok (=90 men), a house for the 
mandur was planned. All buildings would be constructed of brick, in long rows 
of three. Total cost of the modernization plan: 781,000 guilders. The plan 
reflected a new optimism in the Uniekampong. At the time this plan was drawn 
up, 1937, the Uniekampong housed 900 workers, but with the worst of the crisis 
over, the shipping companies were counting on extra work for 600 labourers.
The building plans gave rise to a discussion between the administrators in 
Batavia and the Board of Directors in Amsterdam on the layout of the new site. 
The Board held the opinion that the space between the pondok was insuffi-
cient and formed a threat to health, safety and hygiene. Batavia replied that the 
existing Uniekampong was laid out ‘extremely spaciously’ (uitermate royaal) 
with a distance of at least 15 meters between the pondok. Although the inter-
space between the buildings in the proposed layout was only 11.5 to 12 meters, 
the plans were approved by the local medical staff of the kpm. A government 
official of the Department of Health also approved the layout, even though he 
made a critical remark on the building density. The kpm director in Batavia, E. 
Straatemeier, pointed out to the Board in Amsterdam that if a broader inter-
space were applied, the construction of 15 pondok would have to be cancelled. 
The consequence was that the total capacity of the new Uniekampong would 
be 2,000 instead of 2,400 workers.48 The Amsterdam Board persisted in its 
opinion. It had consulted its own expert and decided to set the interspace at 14 
meters at least. Moreover three open spaces, so-called ‘lungs’, should be left 
open. A lower capacity was no problem as the Uniekampong had some vacant 
land in reserve that could be built when necessary.49
The construction plan was never executed. The threat of war compelled the 
kpm-management in Batavia to take special measures. One of the seven mea-
sures taken was to cancel the construction of a new Uniekampong. The immi-
nent war had driven up the prices of building material to a level far higher than 
projected. The management deemed construction ‘not urgent’ and with some 
makeshift renovation work the Uniekampong could last for at least another 
five or six years. The full reconstruction could be postponed ‘until normal 
times would return’.50 The Amsterdam office consented: it pressed Batavia to 
48 na, kpm (2.20.35) 198, Letter from director kpm Batavia to Board of Directors in 
Amsterdam, Batavia, 22-8-1937.
49 na, kpm (2.20.35), Letter from Board of Directors Amsterdam to Directie kpm Batavia, 
Amsterdam 27-12-1937.
50 na, kpm (2.20.35), 1/11/1939 Confidential letter from Dir. Batavia to Amsterdam, 
6-12-1939.
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continue the improvement of the Uniekampong, but at a slower pace.51 The 
Japanese invasion would put the plans on ice indefinitely.
Although the plans were thus never executed, they are interesting, because 
they reveal something of the way Dutch entrepreneurs thought about accom-
modation of labourers. One point worth noting is the growing concern for 
social and hygienic aspects. Perhaps even more striking is the central, top-
down, and paternalistic approach. The letters of the Director explicitly point to 
the wish to ‘centralize’ matters in the kampong. The Batavia management was 
overruled by the Amsterdam head office – there is always a bigger boss – which 
gave precise building instructions.
 The Uniekampong During the Years of Turmoil
In April 1942, one month after it had overran the Dutch forces and occupied 
the Netherlands Indies, the Japanese army began to use the Uniekampong as a 
prisoner-of-war camp for British and Australian soldiers. The Dutch had dis-
mantled the port facilities just before they surrendered and now the British 
and Australian soldiers were used to do repair work in the harbour and at the 
airport. Six months later, the camp was expanded by adding the adjacent 
Kampong Kodja for Dutch prisoners. A total of 5,000 people lived in the bar-
racks in this period. In November 1943 the camp was abandoned, although 
forced labourers at the General Motors factory might have been housed in the 
Uniekampong in 1945. Very little is known about the Japanese period and it is 
unclear what happened with the Indonesian workers in the Uniekampong. 
The restored harbour facilities in Tanjung Priok served mainly military pur-
poses, and commercial shipping was at a minimum.
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Tanjung Priok came under 
direct control of the British military, before the newly proclaimed, indepen-
dent Republic of Indonesia could occupy the area. The harbour became the 
main landing stage for Dutch troops, which hoped to restore Dutch rule in the 
archipelago and squash the Indonesian Republic. Meanwhile European enter-
prises tried to re-establish their activities in the Indies, but the volume of trade 
was still very low. In March 1946 the British military authorities transferred the 
control of the Uniekampong back to the four shipping companies that had set 
up the compound.
The Uniekampong had been severely damaged during the Second World 
War. Most labourers had to sleep in the open air; the fresh water tank fell apart 
51 na, kpm (2.20.35), Confidential letters Amsterdam to Batavia 17-11-1939 and 22-12-1939.
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52 na, kpm (2.20.59), Annual report kpm Batavia 1945–1946.
53 na, kpm (2.20.35) 198, note 23-8-1948; na, kpm, 2.20.59, Annual report kpm Batavia 1947.
54 na, kpm (2.20.59), Annual report kpm Batavia 1945–1946.
55 na, kpm (2.20.59), Annual report kpm Batavia 1947.
56 na, kpm (2.20.59), Annual report kpm Batavia 1947.
through corrosion. In five months twelve pondok for 120 men each were 
repaired, as well as the housing for Dutch officials, and the central office. One 
of the former houses was used as a hospital with 40 beds. The sewerage system 
was renewed and a new water supply installed. In August 1946 a ceremonial 
meal (slametan) was held to re-inaugurate the Uniekampong. By the end of the 
year 1946, 2,200 labourers were living in Uniekampong again, together with a 
large number of women and children. New pondok were under construction.52 
The restoration works were completed in 1947.53
Perhaps even more important than the physical restoration, was the recon-
struction of the social network of dockers. The labourers were brought together 
by ten mandur that had already worked for the Uniekampong before the war; 
the three best men were appointed as head mandur. The workers were under-
nourished and in bad physical condition. They received a daily ration of 500–
600 grams of rice, with corned beef or dried fish. Midday food was distributed 
by the Uniekampong on the dockside.54 In May 1947 the nourishment was 
improved when the Uniekampong’s new kitchens were finished; according to 
the annual report better prepared meals resulted in a better physical condition 
of the workers and their families.55
The shipping companies pursued an ambivalent policy with respect to the 
labour relations. On the one hand, the employers tried to restore the colonial 
hierarchy in the Uniekampong and the system of ‘semi-casual’ labour of bind-
ing labourers via their foremen. On the other hand, the companies seized the 
opportunity to break the strong position of the mandur, for instance by paying 
wages directly to the workers (Arbeidstoestanden 1949). The Uniekampong 
was able to attract a flood of new workers, and by September 1947 their num-
ber had risen to 4,384 workers, women and children not counted. That year the 
Uniekampong hired its workers for 112.173 man-days per month, meaning that 
there was almost full employment.56
With such a massive influx of workers, it comes as no surprise that few of 
them had dock experience. The shipping companies complained about the 
skills of the workers. The kpm noted that mostly starved children and adult 
men were looking for a job on the docks, ‘in the hope to satisfy their hunger 
by stealing or robbing a bit’. It was with great relief that the Uniekampong 
management saw the return of many pre-war inhabitants in August 1947, 
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57 na, kpm (2.20.59), Annual report kpm Batavia 1947: 14, 130–132.
58 na, kpm (2.20.59), Annual report kpm Batavia 1949: 147.
following the ceasefire of the first Dutch offensive (politionele actie) against the 
Indonesian Republic.57 It seems that many workers had awaited the course of 
the violent clashes between the Dutch and Indonesian nationalists before 
returning to Tanjung Priok. Their return was hampered, though, by the fact 
that the ceasefire line ran between Tanjung Priok and Banten, the area where 
the majority of dockers originated from. Only after the second Dutch offensive 
of December 1948 and January 1949 were Tanjung Priok and Banten united in 
one hand, of the Dutch. Any mention of Republican influence on the work-
force is conspicuously absent in the records of the Uniekampong during the 
whole War of Independence.
As earlier remarks show, already in 1937 a complete overhaul of the 
Uniekampong was deemed necessary, but the plan was not executed. During 
the Second World War and the early years of the Revolution, the buildings had 
become totally worn out. In 1948 shipping companies decided to renovate the 
Uniekampong completely and this time the plan was executed. Considering 
the fact that more than 4,000 labourers and their families were living on the 
premises, the situation was very pressing, and already the same year the deci-
sion to renovate was taken, construction of new pondok and restoration of 
existing ones started. By the end of 1949 the Uniekampong renovations were 
completed, for the sum of 3,600.000 guilders.58
In the closing months of Dutch rule in the archipelago, the Uniekampong 
was perceived as the epitome of modernization, far removed from the appall-
ing living conditions of dockers of the beginning of the twentieth century. In 
1949, a survey conducted by the Department of Social Affairs spoke highly of 
the Uniekampong as a model for dock labour, to be followed by other ports of 
Indonesia. Especially the effort to break the power of the mandur, for instance 
by paying wages directly to the workers, was hailed as a tool of modern employ-
ment. The provision of food, drinking water and medical care were also exem-
plary. Almost 50 per cent of the total dockworker population in Tanjung Priok 
lived in the Uniekampong at the time, most of them with their families 
(Arbeidstoestanden 1949).
 The 1950s: Decolonization of the Uniekampong
After the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch to the Indonesians, in December 
1949, the effective decolonization of Indonesia had in many ways yet to begin 
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(Bogaerts and Raben 2007; Lindblad 2008). The inter-island shipping and the 
kpm, and indirectly the Uniekampong, formed a major bone of contention 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and the matter could not be solved at 
the Round Table Conference in 1949, which set the terms of the transfer of 
sovereignty. The kpm and the government of Indonesia opened negotiations 
in 1950, exploring the possibility of a joint Dutch-Indonesian venture for inter-
island shipping. The talks took place in an emotionally charged atmosphere, 
because the kpm had a strong symbolic meaning for both sides. The Dutch 
owners still had to come to terms with a bitter defeat and almost desperately 
tried to safeguard their economic interests; for them it was hard to hand over 
an emblematic company like the kpm. The Indonesians, for their part, realized 
the strategic importance of inter-island shipping, the main form of archipel-
ago-wide transport and communications, and an instrument of welding the 
archipelago into a nation. It was unacceptable this activity was monopolized 
by a foreign company, let alone a former colonial company (Dick 1987:14–15; 
Lindblad 2008:115–118). Already in 1950 the Board of the kpm acknowledged it 
did not have a future in Indonesia, put its investments in the former colony on 
hold, and shifted its attention to activities outside Indonesia.
The Indonesian authorities also tried to take control of the ports, because 
these were considered of strategic importance to the economy as well. On the 
whole, harbour facilities were in poor condition after years of political and 
military strife. The Indonesian government, lacking financial means, could 
hardly improve the situation. Newspapers in the early 1950s reported on an 
endless flow of complaints about the ‘congestion’ in the ports. For want of stor-
age space, goods waiting transportation inland were rotting on the quays.
The waiting time of ships in the ports was exacerbated by the workers’ 
unrest, not only in notoriously ‘red ports’ like Surabaya and Semarang, but also 
in smaller harbour towns. Tanjung Priok, that had been mostly unaffected by 
labour unrest in the past, also became the stage of strikes, sit-downs and other 
protests in the 1950s. For instance, a big strike paralysed Tanjung Priok in April 
1950. The mandur of the Uniekampong demanded several improvements from 
the director of Uniekampong, but the two sides did not reach an agreement. 
The combined union of sailors and dockers (Serikat Buruh Kapal dan 
Pelabuhan) supported the demands and not much later the Uniekampong 
workers went on strike. The action became all the more effective, because the 
workers of the second major labour pool on the docks, Trioveer, also went on 
strike, although for their own reasons. The combined strike became a direct 
threat to the distribution of food and commodities in the archipelago, and 
therefore the Ministry of Labour mediated between employers and workers. 
Only after a strike of nine days the employers gave in: they raised the wage of 
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the dockers and also agreed to hand out extra rice portions to the families of 
the labourers. On 13 April 9,000 dockers made a final protest march in Tanjung 
Priok, before resuming their work again.59
Tensions rose again over the handling of the cargo by Dutch stevedoring and 
transport companies. The government wished to ‘Indonesianize’ the economy 
and one of its measures was to transfer cargo activities to Indonesian owned 
enterprises. In 1954 the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet put a ruling – PP 61 – into 
effect that only Indonesian companies would get permission for stevedoring 
and cargo handling.
For the kpm and the three other participating shipping companies this rul-
ing was the signal to retract from the Uniekampong. If the shipping companies 
no longer held the handling of cargo in their own hands, it did not make sense 
to maintain a labour pool at the Uniekampong. Masjumi, an important Islamic 
political party, showed interest in buying the Uniekampong, but actually it was 
only interested in taking over the economic activities, and not the care for the 
labourers. It was not interested in the physical infrastructure and buildings at 
the Uniekampong either. The negotiations between the kpm and the Masjumi 
leadership, including Minister of Finance Wibisono, dragged along. The kpm 
directors had assessed the assets of the Uniekampong worth eighteen million 
rupiah, but had already accepted the idea they would not get more than four to 
five million rupiah. When the Masjumi leaders scented another buyer had 
unexpectedly entered the arena, they quickly reopened the negotiations with 
the shipping lines that owned the Uniekampong. The Minister of Finance ulti-
mately offered a price of eight million rupiah, but against a backdrop of mount-
ing political and economic tension between the two countries, the deal was 
eventually not struck. The kpm main office in Amsterdam had in vain put pres-
sure on the directors in Jakarta to round off the deal.60
In December 1957 Indonesian-Dutch relations reached a low over the status 
of West Papua. Indonesian labourers occupied the kpm office in Jakarta, the 
first seizure of Dutch companies with the open backing of the government 
(Lindblad 2008:180–182). Early 1958 it was clear that the shipping companies 
had to give up all involvement with the Uniekampong: the kpm had left 
Indonesia and the activities had been nationalized by the Indonesian state. nv 
Uniekampong was liquidated: the shipping companies paid compensation to 
the labourers and had to accept the total loss of the fixed property. The 
Uniekampong itself moved into Indonesian hands; for a long time to come it 
continued to be known as ‘Uka’.
59 Java Bode 4-4-1950; De Locomotief 14-4-1950.




The rapid technological and economic transformations in the late nineteenth 
century also set in motion the modernization of the labour organization. This 
process, which was going on both in the Western metropoles and in their colo-
nies, was clearly visible worldwide ‘on the docks’. The industrialization and 
rationalization of the economic system required a modernization of transport 
and infrastructure. These required new ways of managing shipping, loading, 
unloading, and of labour relations. Without a reorganization of the labour sys-
tem the investments in steam shipping, fixed shipping routes, connecting rail 
and road links could never pay off.
The major problem troubling dock labour was the use of casual labourers. 
As circumstances changed and the need for a more stable work force increased, 
port employers began to realize that, as Weinhauer has noted, the casual way 
of life of the dockworkers had to be altered fundamentally. This decasualiza-
tion included the registration of the dockworkers, the centralization of the 
labour market increasing the productivity of the workers, guaranteeing a 
weekly or monthly income, and improving the living conditions of the workers 
(Weinhauer 2000:580–581).
The Uniekampong can be seen as an attempt by the major shipping lines 
to create a labour pool, a stable and reliable workforce for the port of Tanjung 
Priok. The Uniekampong offered housing, food, medical care, and a certain 
level of guaranteed income to the dockers. Both ethical aspirations and eco-
nomic motives lay behind the idea of establishing a steady labour pool. 
Along with the changes in the organization of labour, modernization 
extended to the construction of the complex itself. Better housing, water sup-
plies and sewerage, electricity, paved roads, and a cinema all pulled the dock-
ers into modernity. In 1949 the Uniekampong was hailed a model of a modern 
complex.
From the perspective of the workers, the Uniekampong formed a break with 
existing patterns of cyclical migration and labour recruitment. Much to the 
dismay of the European employers, labourers were not overly enthusiastic 
about living in the Uniekampong, afraid as they were to sacrifice their relative 
independence. The contra-cyclical fluctuation in the size of the labour force is 
telling in this respect. During the boom years of the 1920s, the Uniekampong  con-
tinually struggled to attract sufficient numbers of labourers, whereas during 
the Depression of the 1930s more workers sought security in the Uniekampong, 
just when the shipping companies tried to reduce the labour force. After the 
Indonesian independence the shipping companies tried to restore their grip 
on the Uniekampong and even intensified their top-down attempts to control 
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dock labour. The rise in protests and mass strikes in the 1950s however marked 
a fundamental change in the workers attitude – obviously influenced by the 
new political reality in Indonesia. Instead of deserting the premises, labourers 
strived for better working and living conditions.
In sum, the modernization of shipping elicited a concomitant moderniza-
tion of labour in the ports. The Uniekampong was one of the strategies devised 
to achieve these goals, simultaneously changing both the physical structures in 
the docks and the social life. Many dockers did move to the Uniekampong and 
adjusted their lifestyle, but they were never fully controlled, and whenever it 
suited them best, just as easily left the Uniekampong again. After Independence 
the Dutch shipping companies were step by step forced to give up their top-
down attempts of modernizing the labour force.
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Moving at a Different Velocity
The Modernization of Transportation and Social Differentiation  
in Surabaya in the 1920s
Johny A. Khusyairi and Freek Colombijn
 Introduction
Driving through the bustling streets of Surabaya today, or walking along the 
pavement amid the noise of roaring motorcycles and cars, it is hard to imagine 
that once upon a time it was people on foot or in a horse-cart that set the pace. 
Faster forms of urban transportation, like horse trams, electric trams, cars, and 
bicycles, exerted multiple effects on the city. Roads had to be adjusted to 
accommodate the more rapid road transportation: a wider carriageway, a hard-
ened surface, and, where possible, curved bends instead of abrupt right angles. 
Sometimes trees were felled to make room for wider roads or parking bays. The 
improved means of transportation permitted the well-to-do to live in suburbs, 
leading to a profound change in urban space itself. Tram and railway lines 
imposed another transformation on urban space. In Surabaya crossings of 
road and railway on unequal levels were constructed.
People acquired new habits, as they grew accustomed to the new forms of 
transportation (Giddens 1990:102). New technologies of transportation (and 
communication) have overcome physical distance, the ‘time-space compres-
sion’ (Harvey 1989), and open up new opportunities of social interaction. Most 
conspicuously, the rapidity of movement increased and for many people not 
used to it, this speed was an exciting sensation (Porath 2002:788). The horse 
tram of Batavia barely affected the velocity of travel, but it did discipline peo-
ple into thinking in terms of clock time, regular departure schedules, and cor-
rect procedures for boarding and alighting (Proudfoot 2005:164). People’s 
radius of action increased, making it possible to venture beyond one’s own 
ward on a regular basis. People living in the suburbs with office jobs in the 
centre began to commute, albeit still within city boundaries (Van Roosmalen, 
this volume). The soundscape changed, as roaring motors pushed the old 
sound of azan and church bells into the background (Colombijn 2007). Traffic 
had to be better regulated to reduce the risk of new kinds of accidents, and 
new rules were drawn up to this end. Policemen were stationed to regulate the 
traffic at the busiest crossroads.
Fascinating footage from 1929 gives an image of the changes taking place in 
Surabaya. One shot shows a pedestrian with a pikulan (carrying-pole) trying to 
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cross a street, but not succeeding because of the constant flow of cars. 
Sometimes he ventures a few steps forward off the pavement, but then has to 
retreat to avoid a car which is hugging the kerb. After more than a minute, he 
takes a dash and safely reaches the other side of the street. Another shot shows 
a very busy crossing at Pasar Besar, the majority of the users are either cyclists 
or car-drivers, but there is still a scattering of horse-drawn carriages and bull-
ock carts. In the middle of the crossroads a policeman is standing on a slight 
elevation, endeavouring to keep some order. People (driving on the left) are 
supposed to keep the policemen on their right, but some try to take a short cut, 
see the policeman the last moment and suddenly swerve to the left so as to 
pass him on the correct side. The flow of traffic is severely hindered by the 
tram, which every now and then halts in the middle to allow passengers to get 
in or out. A third scene shows how joined in a coordinated effort up to four 
policemen try to direct the traffic (Soerabaia 1929). A photograph of thirty-one 
cars parked in Tunjungan, one of the main thoroughfares in the city, taken 
around the same year is an equally graphic record of the modernization of the 
street scene (Broeshart et al. 1994:36).
New forms of transportation were expensive and consequently people’s 
access to them was unequal. The passage of the pedestrian with a pikulan 
sketched above was hampered by car owners. Even the cost of a tram ticket 
could be prohibitive and reminded people of their relatively low economic 
standing (Proudfoot 2005). Trains, trams, and railway stations (including the 
distinction between the classes of carriage) were a place where it was possible 
to mark out class differences, or be forced to accept one’s inferior position.
Accepting the notion that people did not simply consume transportation, 
but that transportation also had a productive capacity, it is obvious that 
unequal access to transportation increased, or reinforced, social inequality. 
The better off people profited most from positive income effects of new forms 
of transportation. Again, pre-war (unpublished) footage from Surabaya allows 
a glimpse of this inequality. This shot shows traffic travelling at different 
speeds. At Tunjungan private cars dominate the scene almost completely and 
the speed of the traffic is high. In contrast, in a narrow street a cart with one 
axle and giant wooden wheels pulled by a zebu slows all the traffic down. 
A private car does not have the room to overtake the cart and has to adjust its 
speed to the pace of the zebu. Cyclists, pedestrians, and horse-drawn carriages 
give the traffic a chaotic appearance and no traffic rules are directly discernible 
in the images (Nederlands Indië voor 1942 (10) 1939; see also Broeshart et al. 
1994:89).
Traffic not only emphasized differences, it also had a democratizing and 
emancipatory effect. Rudolf Mrázek, who tellingly opens his Engineers of 
253The Modernization of Transportation in Surabaya
<UN>
1 Ethnicity remains important as an antecedent variable explaining unequal chances to appro-
priate a higher income.
happy land with a study of roads and traffic, evokes the images in which all 
passengers on the electric tram in Batavia, regardless of class, were subject to 
the same rhythm and the same shaking. A committee investigating the use of 
trains in Java in 1904 discovered to its surprise that the number of passengers 
in first and second class had risen by 4,000 and 33,000, respectively in the previ-
ous three years, but the number of third class passengers had jumped by no 
fewer than 550,000! The committee also reported its finding that the lower 
class indigenous people travelled by train more eagerly than the indigenous 
aristocrats and that they especially appreciated the 50 kg free baggage allow-
ance, allowing them to carry goats, hens, clothes and other goods. As Mrázek 
observes, the adoption of the train by lower class people contradicted the 
notion that modernity would trickle down from the European elite, to the 
masses via the indigenous aristocrats (Mrázek 2002:10–13).
This chapter analyses the degree to which modern transportation accentu-
ated social inequalities. At what rate were new forms of transportation intro-
duced and who profited from them? Who were included and excluded by 
‘modernization’? The new traffic, especially the growing differential velocity of 
movement, caused traffic accidents, and therefore an analysis of who were 
most often victim of these accidents is also called for. Finally, the new ways the 
state attempted to discipline the mass movement of modern transportation 
will be examined.
Throughout this chapter we wish to argue that class difference made more 
impact on the choice for particular forms of transportation than ethnicity. Our 
analysis goes against the current, hegemonic historiography that colonial soci-
ety was foremost, if not exclusively, dominated by ethnic differences, cast in a 
racial discourse. While, of course, ethnicity was very important and racial dis-
crimination visible in many places, we believe that in some aspects of colonial 
society, for example housing (Colombijn 2010), a focus on income rather than 
ethnicity gives more insight in the social dynamics.1 We believe this is also the 
case with traffic. Even the best scholars can too easily interpret social differ-
ences in ethnic terms, missing out on class. For instance, Howard Dick 
(2002:350) aptly points out one discriminatory side-effect of the cutting down 
of trees to widen roads: ‘[t]he shady, peaceful streets of the 1900s gave way to 
sun-filled streets of wall-to-wall bitumen, far less pleasant for those on foot’, 
and then continues with: ‘which is to say, the Indonesian population’. Why is 
going on foot one-to-one associated with Indonesians? Were there no 
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2 Age is another factor that influenced chances to use particular forms of traffic, but this point 
is perhaps so obvious it is unnecessary to be spelled out.
Europeans who could not afford a car and had to walk? Or took a stroll because 
they liked it? How about the Indonesians who passed through the ‘wall-to-wall 
bitumen’ roads in their own car? The contention of this chapter is that finan-
cial means rather than ‘racial’ categories were the deciding factor in people’s 
actual choice in their mode of transport.
Constraints imposed by space and available data means that one other 
social dimension, which was probably as important as income, has had to be 
skipped. The use of modern means of transportation was gendered. Men had 
more access to the new means of transportation than women and conse-
quently profited more from the modernization.2
Surabaya in the 1920s is an excellent case to study urban traffic. As the capi-
tal city of the province of East Java it was the second largest city of the 
Netherlands Indies at the time, and offered a great variety of forms of transpor-
tation. The city was also very well connected to destinations farther away by its 
port, railway, and airfield. The 1920s formed an optimistic decade between the 
economic disturbances of the First World War and the Depression.
 Private Means of Transportation
The first major road construction undertaken by the colonial state was the noto-
rious Grote Postweg (Great Post Road). By 1890 the intercity road network in Java 
already covered a fair area and after this period more investments were made in 
improving the surface (asphalting was introduced in the 1920s) rather than any 
in further extension of the network (Knaap 1989:26–27; Nas and Pratiwo 2002).
The roads in Java (at least between cities) were built by the indigenous peo-
ple, who were obliged by law to work a certain number of days per year on the 
roads. In 1914–1916 forced labour was abolished and replaced by a poll tax on 
the indigenous people (Knaap 1989:27). The forced labour was actually a form 
of double discrimination: the roads were built with the input of the indigenous 
people, while non-indigenous people, who enjoyed higher incomes on average, 
had more opportunity to buy the vehicles to travel on the roads. A motor vehi-
cle tax was only introduced in 1928 and later replaced by a heavy excise duty on 
petrol (Knaap 1989:27). Indigenous people who wanted to be exempted from 
forced labour on the roads could pay so-called rodigelden, at least in Padang 
(West Sumatra). By the early twentieth century the rodigelden had become a 
regular tax on the indigenous population, used for road construction, none of 
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3 Kosong, keretek and dokar were horse-drawn carts. Dokar were used for the transportation of 
persons and keretek perhaps too; a kosong, presumably was used for goods.
whom then still laboured on roads. The humiliating rodigelden were finally 
halved in 1937 when more progressive European members of the municipal 
council sided with their indigenous colleagues, but they were still not abol-
ished before the Second World War (Colombijn 1994:93–101).
The potential of roads was, of course, enormously expanded with the intro-
duction of cars and bicycles. The motorcar made its appearance in Java in 1894, 
two years earlier than in either Singapore or the Netherlands. It was a Benz, 
owned by Susuhunan Pakubuwana X. In 1900 there were fifteen motor vehicles 
(including motorcycles) in Java, ten years later the number of registered vehi-
cles had risen steeply to around 1,000. By then cars were mass-produced, but 
their precarious reliability combined with a lack of passable roads still con-
fined their use largely to cities. The number of motorized vehicles peaked at 
104,000 in 1929: 68,000 cars, 16,000 trucks, 15,000 motorcycles and 6,000 buses 
(Dick and Rimmer 2003:66; Knaap 1989:28, 85). Traffic counts in Buitenzorg 
(Bogor) in 1920–1921 and again in 1928 also show a spectacular increase in the 
share of cars in the traffic (Van Roosmalen 2008:139).
Howard Dick (2002:349) provides figures pertaining to the introduction of 
the car in Surabaya. The first automobile arrived in 1890. By 1911 about 500 cars 
had been registered, by 1920 this number had risen to 2,000 and in 1939 there 
were 6,657 cars, including 466 taxis. Another source records that there were 
over 3,400 registered cars in 1927 (sbs 1928). While registered car ownership for 
the whole of Java and of the Netherlands Indies peaked in 1929 and never fully 
recovered from the economic crisis (Knaap 1989:85), the Depression did not 
have a similarly lasting effect on car ownership in Surabaya. By the end of the 
1930s, the impact of the Depression on car ownership in Surabaya had totally 
vanished. Why this happened is not certain. East Java, the sugar industry in 
particular, certainly suffered in the economic malaise and intuitively, but 
apparently erroneously, we had expected that the car ownership in Surabaya 
would have reflected the downturn in the fortunes of the rural hinterland.
The numbers of bicycles in Surabaya also showed a rapid increase, doubling 
per decade: from 9,000 in 1917, to 18,000 in 1925, to 36,000 in 1937. In this case, it 
is easier to explain why the use of bicycles continued to increase during the 
Depression: cheap Japanese imports offset declining wages. Third-class pas-
sengers on the tram swapped the tram for a bicycle (Dick 2002:349). However, 
a report carefully compiled by the local Office of Statistics shows that bicycles 
were already by far the most popular means of transportation before the 
Depression (Table 10.1).3
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4 Howard Dick (2002: 349) writes ‘60 percent of private motor vehicles’, but from the context it 
can be gathered that he refers to cars only and not to motorcycles.
Ownership of the various means of transportation was unequally divided. Dick 
(2002:349) states that the bicycle was particularly important to indigenous 
people, who were finding some new employment at the urban fringes: in the 
port and at the naval base in the north and on the Ngagel industrial estate in 
the south. However, it can be assumed that the use of bicycles was also com-
mon among the Dutch, who were used to this vehicle in Europe.
More details are known about the relationship between ownership of cars 
and ethnicity. Of the registered vehicles in Java, 34 per cent were owned by 
Europeans, 28 per cent by indigenous people, 24 per cent by non-indigenous 
Asians (Vreemde Oosterlingen), and the remainder either by companies or the 
government (Knaap 1989:28, 85). This disproportionate share of the Europeans 
and non-indigenous Asians reflects their over-representation in the higher 
income groups. Compared to the whole of Java, car ownership in Surabaya was 
even more skewed, as Europeans owned 60 per of the private cars.4 Assuming 
an average family size of five, Howard Dick states that by 1939 on average there 
was almost one car for every European family, one for every five Chinese or 
Arab families, and one for every 30,000 indigenous families (Dick 2002:349). 
Dick’s calculations are a little hard to swallow. If one in every 30,000 indige-
nous families had a car, that would make one car per 150,000 Indonesians, or 
two or three cars for the entire indigenous population of Surabaya, which can-
not be correct. It is also unlikely that on average there was almost one car for 
Table 10.1 Number of registered vehicles in Surabaya in 1927
Kind of vehicle Number of vehicles Number of vehicles per 1,000 persons






Dokar & keretek 1,952 7.7
Pushcarts 610 2.4
Source: sbs (1928); population figures as of 1 January 1928 from the same report have 
been used for the calculation of the last column.
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5 Trusting that Dick did not make an error in his calculation and that his raw data compelled 
him to make his claims about unequal car ownership, some doubts can be raised about the 
reliability or validity of his original data.
every European family, as obviously many European families belonged to the 
lower income groups and could not afford a car. Should it therefore be assumed 
that quite a few other European families owned two cars or more?5
Although Dick’s estimate of the degree to which Europeans were over- 
represented as car owners can be questioned and by and large it can be 
assumed that ethnic status is too readily equated with a particular income 
group (Colombijn 2010:96–97), it is obvious that cars were still accessible to 
only a small proportion of the people. There were fewer than fourteen cars per 
1,000 residents in 1927 (Table 10.1). If it is assumed, rather arbitrarily, that in the 
course of the year each car was used by six different people, only one in twelve 
residents would have had a personal experience of sitting in a car (and far 
fewer would have enjoyed the experience of driving a car). Cars were within 
the reach of only a thin upper layer of the total population and the spread of 
motorized vehicles therefore increased the difference between people who 
had the financial means to consume new forms of modernity and those who 
did not. The most important modern means of private transport was still the 
bicycle, not the car.
 Public Transportation
When people did not have the means to purchase a vehicle themselves, they 
could still experience modern means of transportation by taking public trans-
port. The first railway from Surabaya went to Pasuruan and was opened in 1878, 
with a branch to Malang inaugurated the following year. More regional rail-
ways were opened later and, by 1894 or 1899 (sources disagree on the year), it 
became possible to travel by train from Surabaya to Jakarta (via Yogyakarta and 
Bandung). Two companies, the Staatsspoorwegen (State Railways) and 
Nederlands-Indische Spoorwegmaatschappij (nis, Netherlands Indies Railway 
Company), exploited the railways around Surabaya. They each ran different, 
mutually detached stations (Staatsspoorwegen the Gubeng and Kota stations, 
and nis Pasar Turi) and debates about connecting the lines at one new station 
proved fruitless. Taxis and horse-drawn carriages (dokar) profited from the fact 
that there were two main railway stations (Kota and Pasar Turi) and many pas-
sengers needed a vehicle to cross the one kilometre separating the stations to 
continue their journey by train. The companies engaged in fierce competition 
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6 Unfortunately, there seems to be a typo in the statistical report, which says that 52.237.33 
passengers took the steam tram; from the revenues (in guilders and cents) mentioned a line 
below in the report we can infer that the digits were wrongly placed; the figure of 5.2 million 
passengers agrees with the revenues of that year.
on the westbound lines, until they agreed on a division of freight and passen-
gers in 1926. Further cooperation was forced upon them when a regular air link 
was established between Batavia and Surabaya in 1929. In a successful attempt 
to meet the challenge of air transport, the railways managed to set up a jointly 
operated rail connection between Surabaya and the capital of the colony, 
which ran the 900 km in one day offering luxurious carriages (Broeshart et al. 
1994:27; Dick 2002:420–422; von Faber 1936:274; Knaap 1989:29).
In urban life, trams played a bigger role than interregional railways. Trams 
were introduced into Surabaya between 1889 and 1891 (the exact year differs 
from source to source). These trams were operated by the Oost-Java Stoomtram 
Maatschappij (ojs, East Java Steam Tramway Company). It is not certain 
whether these first trams in Surabaya were steam trams, or trams that loaded 
steam at fixed points. Between 1913 and 1916, a new steam tramline was built 
skirting the city centre along its west side. In 1923 and 1924, the ojs opened 
four new electric tramlines, running from Wonokromo in the south to the port 
of Tanjung Perak in the north. As this line was a double track, an enormous 
advantage over the steam tram, trams could always pass each other and could 
operate far more frequently, running at least one every ten minutes. An addi-
tional advantage of this high frequency was that the tram could be shorter 
(and yet serve the same total number of passengers) and caused less disrup-
tion to the other traffic (Von Faber 1936:276–280; Dick 2002:260, 348; Dick and 
Rimmer 2003:68; Knaap 1989:29). From maps from the late 1930s (Atlas 1938:23a; 
Van Diessen and Voskuil 1998:116–123) and common parlance (Von Faber 
1936:275), we can infer that by then at least, the nis trains were functioning as 
an urban steam tram system for the section within the city boundaries.
Both the steam and electric trams played an important role in transportation. 
In 1927, 11.4 million passengers used the electric tram (an average of 45 trips per 
urban resident in a year!) and 5.2 million passengers the steam tram (an average 
of 21 trips per person) (sbs 1928).6 Photographs testify to the fact that the tram 
had become a regular and important part of the street scene in Surabaya in the 
1920s (Broeshart et al. 1994). Dick and Rimmer (2003:68, 70) call attention to the 
fact that the electric tram seemed to be an enormous improvement compared 
to either its horse or steam counterpart: no more piles of horse manure or belch-
ing smoke. The overhead electricity cables were an eyesore to progressive urban 
planners (Karsten 1939), but perhaps not to the general public.
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Different kinds of passengers used the two types of trams. The steam tram 
connected the port area, to the rural hinterland of Surabaya, circumventing the 
city centre, running through the kampongs on the western side of the city and 
inner-city neighbourhoods around Pasar Turi station. In contrast, the main 
electric tram line, although also starting in the port area, cut straight through 
the city centre: passing in front of the governor’s office, and carrying on through 
the main business and shopping streets, Pasar Besar and Tunjungan. It subse-
quently took a route through the most chic streets of the city, Palmenlaan and 
Darmo Boulevard, to its terminus in the south of the city near the zoo. A shorter 
east–west line served new residential areas of the city, which were connected 
to the shopping area around Tunjungan (Atlas 1938:23a; Van Diessen and 
Voskuil 1998:116–123).
These routes suggest that probably the steam tram predominantly served 
the lower income groups of the population, whereas the electric trams tended 
to cater to middle and upper class people. Furthermore, six commuter trains 
carrying market traders also arrived at Pasar Turi every morning. Depending 
on their place of departure and the specific goods brought into Surabaya from 
those places, the trains were nicknamed ‘grass train’, ‘palm-wine train’, ‘chicken 
train’, and so on. Coolies working in the port area and the factories also helped 
to contribute to the daily bustle at Pasar Turi (Von Faber 1936:273). Although it 
is perhaps merely a historical conjuncture and not a causal relationship that 
the construction of new middle class suburbs coincided with the emergence of 
the electric tram, the fact remains that the more well-to-do-residents used the 
more modern form of public transport.
The association of the steam tram with lower income people and the elec-
tric tram with those with higher incomes was definitely not absolute. In 1925, 
overly conscious of their social standing, first class steam tram passengers 
complained there were not enough carriages and they had to stand in the first 
class carriages. From the point of view of comfort it was not ideal, the first class 
was positioned directly behind the locomotive, so they suffered from the 
smoke. The first class passengers asked for more carriages and demanded the 
third-class carriages be positioned directly behind the locomotive (Pewarta 
Soerabaia 8-1-1925).
The contention of this chapter is that financial means rather than ‘racial’ 
categories were the deciding factor in people’s actual choice in their mode of 
transport, but ethnic sensitivities definitely did play a role in the question of 
which means of transportation was deemed appropriate. Even though they 
might hold themselves aloof from interaction in the tramcar, the public was 
ethnically mixed, people sat side by side, on the same level, on the same 
benches. In 1870, discussing the possibility of starting a tram in Surabaya, the 
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editor of a Dutch newspaper commented that people should be aware of the 
unseemliness of a white lady sitting next to a coolie. It would also be galling if 
a coolie on a tram were to overtake a white man struggling by on foot (Proudfoot 
2005:138–152).
The competition between steam tram, electric tram, bus, and taxi was a 
common phenomenon throughout Southeast Asian cities (Dick and Rimmer 
2003:70), and Surabaya formed no exception. In 1924, the ojs also began to 
operate buses to those inner-city neighbourhoods where investment in the 
construction of tramlines was not warranted, but the service was not profit-
able and was discontinued the next year. In 1927 a new private company started 
a bus service running parallel to the steam tramway and in 1929 another com-
pany began to operate a bus line duplicating the route of the electric tramway. 
To counter this competition, the ojs felt compelled to operate buses on the 
same route, which competed not only with the other company, but also with 
its own electric trams. A price war was the result. In an attempt to economize, 
the maintenance of the buses was neglected. After one year the private bus 
company threw in the towel. In 1931 the council approved a bylaw, which gave 
the ojs the preferential right to exploit bus lines. The rationale of the bylaw 
was primarily to protect the profitability of the electric tram, which was con-
sidered to be in the public interest, but it was also to eliminate the existence of 
dangerously ill-maintained buses. The municipal bylaw gave the ojs a de facto 
monopoly on bus transportation. In 1931, the ojs operated regular buses to six 
destinations in the city (Von Faber 1936:283–286).
Taxis reveal a very similar story of stiff competition, cannibalistic economic 
behaviour, and municipal qualms about the quandary of allowing a liberal 
market and low prices versus regulating the market to ensure minimal safety 
standards. About 400 taxis were operating in Surabaya in 1925 and the number 
more than doubled to 843 registered taxis in 1929. Of these taxis 56 per cent 
were owned by Chinese, 22 per cent by indigenous people, 16 per cent by 
Europeans and 7 per cent by Arabs. An overwhelming majority (95 per cent) of 
the drivers was indigenous (sbs 1929; Soerabaiasch Handelsblad 4-3-1930).
It is tempting to interpret the over-representation of Chinese taxi owners as 
confirmation of their proverbial proclivity for business. Conversely, an equally 
plausible explanation of this over-representation lies in a miscalculation of the 
economic conjuncture by Chinese car owners. The taxi business in Surabaya 
was boosted by the economic slump directly following on the hausse after the 
First World War. The war had disrupted trade between Indonesia and conti-
nental Europe and suspended demand was rapidly fulfilled in the period 1919–
1921. When most needs had been satisfied, the mood changed again and both 
importers and exporters were stuck with unmarketable stock. Many people 
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7 Rudolf Mrázek (2002: 243) reports in a footnote that another taxi drivers’ union, B.A.T.O.J.A., 
was established in 1928, which united both indigenous and Chinese drivers. It is worth noting 
that a shared professional interest overcame ethnic differences.
who had optimistically purchased a car during the high conjuncture had to sell 
it and reverted to using taxis. Other car owners began to operate their private 
vehicle as a taxi to recover the costs (Von Faber 1936:281). It is possible that 
many of the Chinese taxi operators of the 1920s were traders who had incurred 
economic losses in 1922–1923.
In any case, the fierce competition resulted in diminishing profit margins. 
Taxi drivers had refused a municipal proposal to install taximeters in 1920, pre-
ferring to bargain for the fare (Pewarta Soerabaia 6-11-1920). This freedom to 
bargain backfired on the taxi operators when people who operated taxis as a 
part-time business especially accepted very low taxi fares in the customer mar-
ket. The professional taxi operators, organized in the Soerabaiaschen Bond van 
Autoverhuurders (Sobova, Surabaya Association of Car Rental Firms) asked 
the municipal administration to restrict competition in 1922 and again in 1924.7 
On both occasions, the council rejected this submission, giving priority to the 
interests of the customer (who included, of course, the councillors them-
selves). A first municipal bylaw on taxis in 1925 regulated the inspection of 
taxis and the fares they could charge and the testing of drivers, but only for 
registered taxi companies. This regulation actually disadvantaged regular com-
panies in their competition with wild taxi-drivers. In 1926, a revised bylaw was 
imposed on all taxis and to some degree at least controlled the rowdy driving 
styles and ill-maintained cars of many wild taxis. Municipal attempts to set 
fares continued to be ineffectual because both drivers and customers ignored 
the municipal decrees. During the Depression, the regular taxi firms again 
faced stiff competition from wild taxis, which undersold trips (Von Faber 
1936:281–282).
To complete this overview of public transportation, the least commonly 
accessible but yet the most modern form of transportation was flying. Surabaya 
was the scene of the first successful flight in Indonesia, in 1911. As already 
briefly hinted, in 1929 the Koninklijke Nederlandsch-Indische Luchtvaart 
Maatschappij (knilm, Royal Netherlands Indies Airlines) established a regu-
lar service between Surabaya, Batavia, Bandung and Semarang. The airfield 
was moved several times. Between 1938 and 1940, a modern airfield (with an air 
traffic control tower, arrival and departure lounges, and two runways at right 
angles to each other) was finally built at the north-western end of the city 
(Broeshart et al. 1994:27; Van Diessen & Voskuil 1998:116; Knaap 1989:31).
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 Traffic Accidents
The introduction of new mechanical forms of transport inevitably led to many 
accidents. From the vantage point of current knowledge about traffic safety, 
the greatest cause of traffic accidents was the variation in the speed of the dis-
parate vehicles. The different velocity is, as already mentioned, abundantly 
clear in the old films. The old footage we have studied already abound in cases 
of near accidents. Pedestrians crossing a street choked with cars were espec-
ially at risk. Often the person on foot ran across the street, only just managing 
to avoid a fast approaching car (Soerabaia 1929). Apparently, pedestrians still 
found it difficult to assess the speed of the approaching motorized vehicle 
properly.
The urban administration issued three-monthly reports about the number 
of traffic accidents, but unfortunately not all of them could be traced, but a 
summary report for 1927 has survived (Table 10.2). The incidence of reported 
accidents rose rapidly from 1,384 in 1927 to 2,048 the next year, and 2,349 in 
1929. The number declined again to 1,922 in 1930 (sbs 1931:5). The Municipal 
Statistical Office attributed the declining number of accidents to the installa-
tion of traffic lights and the setting up of driving schools (sbs 1931:3, 15), but it 
is also conceivable that the fall was positively influenced by the declining use 
of motorized vehicles in the Depression.
The number of people killed or injured correlated with the number of acci-
dents: from 316 in 1927, the figure rose to 536 in 1929, and dropped to 533 in 1930 
(Tables 10.2 and 10.3). It is intriguing that Europeans were over-represented in 
the number of victims and Chinese under-represented (Table 10.3). This differ-
ence is tricky to interpret. Perhaps Europeans made more use of modern 
means of transportation and consequently ran a higher risk of being involved 
Table 10.2 Damage from traffic accidents in Surabaya in 1927
Kind of damage Number of accidents
Lethal accident (met doodelijken afloop) 12
Seriously injured (zwaar lichamelijk letsel) 48
Slightly injured (licht lichamelijk letsel) 256
Material damage only (alleen materiële schade) 1,068
Total 1,384
Source: sbs (1928)
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in accidents? Perhaps on average, because of an unwarranted sense of superi-
ority, Europeans were more reckless drivers? It is also conceivable that 
European victims were more dutifully registered, whereas Chinese tried to 
avoid being included in any registration. The reason is a mystery.
The traffic accidents created a demand for ambulances. The appearance of 
this specialized vehicle was both a response to the modernization of the city 
and a sign of its modernity. When exactly the ambulance was introduced into 
Surabaya is not known, but the actual number must have been small, because 
when just one had to be repaired, its absence was immediately felt in the city. 
A local newspaper backed the call for more ambulances, printing the story of 
how an accident victim died in the street, because bystanders had waited three 
hours in vain for an ambulance (Pewarta Soerabaia 2-12-1920, 3-12-1920). It was 
not uncommon, however, for ordinary vehicles, including horse-carriages, to 
transport the injured victims of traffic accidents to hospital (Pewarta Soerabaia 
5-2-1925).
A comparison of the news reported in the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad and 
Pewarta Soerabaia shows how different layers of the population diverged in 
their thoughts about the modernization of the traffic. Given the fact that lit-
eracy was not yet general and that both newspapers served the middle class or 
elite, the Dutch language used in the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad restricted its 
readership to Dutch people and upper-layers of the non-Dutch middle class. 
Pewarta Soerabaia was Chinese-owned and the majority of its readers were 
probably found among this ethnic group and among lower middle class people 
of mixed background. Three monthly samples of both newspapers were taken 
from the years 1920, 1925 and 1930.
The Soerabaiasch Handelsblad protected the anonymity of the European 
citizens. Both the European responsible for an accident and the victims were 
Table 10.3 Number of victims of traffic accidents in Surabaya, 1928–1930
Indigenous Chinese Other Asians Europeans Total
1928 350 31 10 60 451
1929 432 36 8 60 536
1930 472 23 2 36 533
Ttotal 1928–1930 1,254 90 20 156 1,520
Share in accidents, 1928–1930 82.5 5.9 1.3 10.3 100
Share in population, 1930 79.4 11.4 1.6 7.6 100
Source: sbs (1930:15); sbs (1931:15); volkstelling 1930 (1936:2, 78–81).
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8 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad 7-2-1920, 1-3-1920, 2-3-1920, 13-2-1925, 18-2-1925, 12-3-1925, 5-3-1930, 
11-3-1930, 12-3-1930.
9 ‘dikandarkan oleh hadji Abdoelrachman’, ‘Wagimin, sopir mobil’, ‘seorang anak dari Mr. von 
Elgg’, ‘J.P. van der Wal berkendarahan speda’ (Pewarta Soerabaia 3-1-1925, 6-2-1925, 20-3-1925, 
10-2-1930).
designated Mr, Mrs or Miss (de heer, mevrouw, mejuffrouw) followed by their 
initials. Such a precaution was not deemed necessary if Chinese persons were 
involved; their full name was usually given, without the honorific Mr, Mrs, or 
Miss. The indigenous persons involved in accidents were faceless and described 
anonymously as ‘an indigenous woman’.8
Pewarta Soerabaia carried more frequent reports of traffic accidents, gave 
more details, and its discourse leaned more towards how problematic modern 
traffic could be for the ordinary citizen. Although it also used initials or such 
designations as bumiputera (indigenous), at least after 1925 it usually gave full 
names: ‘driven by Haji Abdoelrahman’, ‘Wagimin, a car-driver’, ‘a child of Mr 
Von Elgg’, ‘J.P. van der Wal on a bicycle’.9
Not surprisingly, most accidents were caused by driving errors (Table 10.4). 
According to the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad (2-3-1920), speeding was the most 
important cause of accidents. This conclusion was, however, as much a moral 
judgement as a factual conclusion. The head-on collision between two cars, 
the incident that led the newspaper to draw this conclusion, happened at 
5.30 a.m. and the dawning light might have interfered with the driver’s vision. 
What was worse, one of the cars was driving on the wrong side of the road.
The bulk of the vehicles involved in accidents were private cars and carts 
drawn by animals, either horse-drawn carriages or ox-carts. Pedestrians and 
cyclists, who made up a larger share of the traffic, were far less accident-prone 
Table 10.4 Causes of traffic accidents in Surabaya, 1928–1930
Cause 1928 1929 1930
Driving errors made by the driver of vehicle 1,832 2,109 1,619
Errors by pedestrian 73 97 89
Skids, technical defects of the vehicle, uncontrolled horses 73 79 75
Other and unknown causes 71 64 59
Total 2,049 2,349 1,842
Source: sbs (1930:17); sbs (1931:17).
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(Table  10.5). A contributory cause of the fact that cars and carriages were 
involved in accidents was the difference in their speeds. Many accidents 
described in the newspapers involved vehicles with a different velocity. For 
instance, a car approached a dokar from behind at such a speed that impact 
was inevitable. The dokar was flung aside by the impact and the female pas-
senger was wounded on her knee and in her mouth (Soerabaiasch Handelsblad 
19-3-1927). In another incident, a car driver, ‘who did not seem very skilled yet’ 
(jang rupanja belon begitoe pandei djalankan) collided with two horse-drawn 
carriages (a dokar and a kosong) in one crash (Pewarta Soerabaia 7-2-1920). In 
yet another accident, a Dutch driver hit a pushcart when he attempted to over-
take a pedestrian. He was driving too fast and failed to take into account the 
width of the cart and the narrowness of the road at that point (Pewarta 
Soerabaia 4-3-1930). The last example concerns a kosong making a turn. The 
driver made a warning indication with his whip before he began the manoeu-
vre. A car that was about to overtake him drove at such speed that impact 
seemed unavoidable. The driver still tried to control his horse, but in vain. The 
car crashed into the kosong, which was launched into the air by the impact 
(Pewarta Soerabaia 10-12-1920).
Although in all these examples the car-driver seemed to be largely to blame 
for the accident, the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad (2-3-1920) was of the opinion 
that driving a carriage is more difficult than driving a car. Cars were machines 
Table 10.5 Vehicles and pedestrians involved in accidents in Surabaya, 1928–1930
1928 1929 1930
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
Private cars 1,746 (43.9) 1,949 (42.7) 1,611 (43.2)
Animal drawn carts 856 (21.5) 891 (19.5) 639 (17.1)
Bicycles 622 (15.6) 753 (16.5) 627 (16.8)
Pedestrians 256 (6.4) 305 (6.7) 239 (6.4)
Trucks 125 (3.1) 170 (3.7) 206 (5.5)
Trams 186 (4.7) 182 (4.0) 126 (3.4)
Motorcycles 131 (3.3) 175 (3.8) 175 (4.7)
buses 54 (1.4) 135 (3.0) 108 (2.9)
The number of pedestrians includes people pushing a barrow and people disembarking a tram.
Source: sbs (1930:17); sbs (1931:17).
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10 ‘Tetapi diharep sadja soepaia besok atau loesa, orang-orang jang begitoe kedjem dan jang 
tiada mempoenjain perasa’an manoesia, bisa dapetken pembalesan jang lebih heibat, sebab 
orang-orang demikian itoe, tiada mempoenjain lain hoekoeman jang lebih berat daripada 
hoekoemannja Allah’ (Pewarta Soerabaia 8-1-1925).
and therefore easier to control. Horses, on the other hand, could become ner-
vous and difficult to control. Nevertheless, in reality uncontrollable horses did 
not pose a serious threat (Table 10.4).
The unwillingness to take responsibility for accidents complicated the disci-
plining of traffic users. A coachman, for instance, ran down a woman pedes-
trian with his carriage and fled. The woman died in the street, but the driver 
did not manage to escape, as a telegraph officer who witnessed the accident 
ran after him and caught him (Pewarta Soerabaia 8-1-1925). In the case of the 
car crashing into the kosong about to make a turn, the chauffeur began to stop 
his car to check on the victim. A white person sitting in the car, presumably the 
owner of the car, shouted at the chauffeur to drive on. Subsequently, the chauf-
feur left the kosong behind unattended. The newspaper concluded bitterly:
It is only to be hoped that tomorrow or the day after, people who are so 
cold-hearted and inconsiderate will meet an even crueller retribution, 
because for people like them no punishment is more severe than that 
meted out by God.10
 Regulating Modern Traffic
The accidents and the introduction of more up-to-date means of transporta-
tion demanded new regulations to govern the modern traffic. Traffic regula-
tions had existed in Surabaya since at least 1888. The Resident of Surabaya 
issued traffic rules to be used on main roads and for the use of vehicles or 
horses, their purpose being to keep the roads clean and the traffic running 
smoothly. Animals had to be well trained and drivers had to prevent the horse 
soiling on the street, keep an eye on their animal, and use their whip to give 
signs when they wanted to overtake another carriage or make a turn (Resident 
Soerabaia 1889). The rule that a driver keep an eye on his animal suggests that 
at the time such care could not yet be taken for granted and the driver could 
get around while dozing on the box.
Such carelessness was clearly no longer possible when motorcars appeared 
on the scene. The newspapers often attributed accidents to a lack of skill, and 
this dearth was attributed to the fact that many car-drivers did not 
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11 ‘[P]olitie toch tiada mengerti djalannja motor’.
have a driving licence. The need to issue driving licences as a means to ban 
incompetent drivers from the streets was debated in the newspapers. Should 
people driving buses and trucks be required to hold a separate licence? Should 
drivers not be subject to a psychological test as well – in itself a conspicuous 
sign of modernization! – as were the engine-drivers on French trains, in order 
to discover whether they showed an inclination to speed? Berlin was men-
tioned as an example of a city where drivers not only had to perform the basic 
functions required to drive the car at the test, but were also obliged to take a 
course of at least six lessons, in which they were taught the traffic regulations 
(Pewarta Soerabaia 2-3-1920, 10-2-1930; Soerabaiasch Handelsblad 2-3-1920, 
14-2-1930).
The newspapers, and perhaps the general public too, demanded that the 
state play its part in improving the driving skills of the chauffeurs. The state 
itself also gradually became convinced that it had to play a bigger role in regu-
lating the traffic. In other words, the new technology forced the state to mod-
ernize itself. The problem was that most contemporary policemen did not 
know how to drive a car themselves and therefore could neither give a driving 
test, nor issue a driving licence. As a reporter from Pewarta Soerabaia (15-12-
1920) remarked: ‘The police does not understand how a car is driven’11 and 
therefore he thought it was a change for the better that, as of December 1920, 
the responsibility for issuing licences was taken away from the police. 
Henceforward driving licences were issued by a commission led by two man-
agers of a taxi company, Cobbe and De Hoog. In contrast to the police, they 
were able to prove they were competent to drive a car. Perhaps this solution 
made sense, because Cobbe and De Hoog possessed the authority an ordinary 
policemen lacked. The solution was definitely not only in the interest of the 
road-users at large, it was of great assistance to the taxi company. The owners 
could earn extra income from issuing licences and they were handed the 
means to protect their business on a plate by helping their own drivers to get a 
licence, and perhaps to keep others out of the business.
In 1920 the city police department proposed that the municipal council 
install simple signs with ‘Stop’ and ‘Go’ (vrij) at every junction to lighten the 
work of the traffic police. The council accepted the idea, but policemen still 
had to be present to work the signs. The municipal council was also open to 
other ideas from the police department, namely a speed limit and a scheme to 
prevent the overcrowding of narrow streets (Pewarta Soerabaia 29-10-1920; Van 
Diessen 2004:134, 148). The editor of Pewarta Soerabaia was dissatisfied, as he 
thought the new measures did not go far enough. The newspaper launched a 
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debate about the trucks that obstructed the flow of traffic, especially when 
they were loading and unloading. The newspaper asked for a regulation ban-
ning trucks from narrow streets and regulating their loading and unloading 
(Pewarta Soerabaia 1-11-1920).
As stated, the different speed of motorized vehicles and horse-drawn car-
riages posed a risk, and the passage of the tram along public roads also created 
problems. In 1925 all vehicles were prohibited to stop on the tramlines (Pewarta 
Soerabaia 20-1-1925, 17-2-1925), but the editor of Pewarta Soerabaia remarked 
that this prohibition unjustly put the blame for the problems on other road 
users. ‘Sooner or later the tram will claim lives, because when it comes from 
Kepatian and crosses Tambakbajan Street it neither rings its bell nor reduces 
its speed’ (Pewarta Soerabaia 30-1-1925).12 The tramlines were also subjected to 
another regulation, not related to the traffic safety. This regulation prohibited 
horse-drawn carriages and taxis to wait for passengers in front of the railway 
station. Now that railway passengers had to walk longer distances to find a taxi 
or carriage, more often than not they preferred the tram that stopped in front 
of the station. Cogently, this regulation was issued at a time the tram company 
had lost its competition with the taxis (Pewarta Soerabaia 9-2-1925). The direc-
tion the modernization of traffic took was inextricably connected to particular 
interests.
 Conclusion
Modern transportation was the outcome of technology-driven modernization, 
but simultaneously stimulated the wider modernization of society. The spread 
of tramlines, motorcars and bicycles elicited the need for other inventions like 
traffic lights, ambulances, strict timetables, as well as the rationalization and 
standardization of traffic rules. Hence, the urban landscape was profoundly 
changed in various ways, not just restricted to the appearance of the cities but 
also inevitably affecting the behaviour of their inhabitants. In the words of 
Alexandre Freire (2009), the new means of transportation were ‘consumption 
icons of a social transformation’. These transformations occurred very rapidly 
in Surabaya in the 1920s and outmoded forms of transportation gradually 
became obsolete. By 1940 it was recognized that ox-carts slowed down the flow 
of traffic and therefore posed a dangerous threat. New traffic rules made 
12 ‘Ini tram besok atawa loesa aken mengambil korban djiwa manoesia, sebab apabila djalan 
di Kepatian liwatin straat Tambakbajan, tida maoe kasi bel atawa djoega tida maoe koe-
rangin djalannja’.
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participation of horse-carts in traffic impossible (Soerabaiasch-Handelsblad 
7-3-1940).
The benefits of new forms of transportation were not distributed evenly. 
The choice of public or private transportation and the form this public trans-
portation could take (steam tram, electric tram, taxi) or private transportation 
(car or bicycle) was to a considerable degree influenced by income. Conversely, 
the means of transportation determined the mobility of a person and a con-
comitant lifestyle and chances to appropriate a certain income. There was a 
strong association between income on the one hand and range and speed of 
movement on the other. In short, the mobilization of the transportation rein-
forced social inequality.
However, even though people from different social classes were obliged to 
move at different velocities, they definitely all seized the opportunities 
offered  by the new means of transportation. Lower-income people did not 
lag behind their well-to-do counterparts in this respect. It is therefore impor-
tant to bear in mind that the modernization of transportation also emanci-
pated lower-income people. They had fewer opportunities to use modern 
means of transportation than rich people, but this did not prevent them 
increasing their mobility and pace of life by recourse to the new means of 
transportation. Rich and poor moved at different velocities, but they all did 
this in the highest gear.
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The Two alun-alun of Malang (1930–1960)
Purnawan Basundoro
 Introduction
Arguably the most prominent characteristic of a typical town in Java is the 
presence of an alun-alun or town square. In general an alun-alun is a large 
open space; ordinary citizens often think of it as a field in the centre of the 
town. In some cities the alun-alun takes the form of a square studded with 
shady trees. An alun-alun is usually imagined as the core of the Javanese town, 
in part because it typically forms the ‘heart’ of a whole network of streets. But 
more significantly, the alun-alun carries symbolic significance because, tradi-
tionally, it was located directly in front of the palace (kraton), or regional kabu-
paten, the traditional seats of Javanese power. The traditional model on which 
all such alun-alun drew and in terms of which they were imagined was the 
Kraton of Yogyakarta. This was located on an imaginary line, which connected 
the Southern Ocean, the southern alun-alun, the palace itself, the northern 
alun-alun, and Mount Merapi on a north–south axis.
In the traditional configuration, on one side of an alun-alun would stand the 
royal audience hall (siti hinggil) or the residence of the Regent (kabupaten). If 
we were to compare the palace or the residence of the bupati to a private 
house, the alun-alun would be its front and sometimes also its back yard. The 
discussion of the role of the alun-alun in the development of Javanese cities is, 
therefore, very important, because it formed the centre from which the devel-
opment of a town was initiated.
People’s views of the alun-alun are many and various. Traditionally a banyan 
tree planted on the alun-alun was associated with mystical powers, as for 
instance the two banyan trees exactly in the centre of the alun-alun in 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta. When one of the banyan trees in the middle of the 
alun-alun of Yogyakarta collapsed in 1989, many people grew anxious and 
interpreted the falling of the tree as an ominous sign. Shortly afterwards the 
ruler of Yogyakarta, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, died and his death rein-
forced the belief of many people in the magical properties of the tree.
Among modern people, whose historical appreciation of the Javanese town 
may not be very strong, an alun-alun may simply be understood as a public 
space which can be used as a playground, as a place for dating, practising 
sports, selling things, even for herding cattle or as a place for conducting 
ceremonies on such special days, such as the celebration of Indonesian 
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Independence. For Muslim citizens, it can also be the large space needed to 
hold Eid prayers, such as those observed at the end of the Ramadan.
A glimpse back in history shows that the alun-alun is definitely not just an 
empty space, which can be used for various profane activities. At certain peri-
ods in the past, it has been a potent symbol pregnant with meaning. The most 
general and powerful significance associated with the alun-alun has been as a 
formal space closely related to official (royal) ceremonies, a function which it 
developed during the periods of traditional kingdoms. There is also evidence 
that the alun-alun has had spiritual meaning. This connection with royal spiri-
tual power is drawn from the physical proximity of the alun-alun to the resi-
dence of a ruler. Even in the Muslim state of Mataram – in contravention of the 
strict monotheism of Islam – the alun-alun was one of the elements used in 
the cult of the glorification of the king (Moertono 1985:84).
The alun-alun has also been a meeting ground for a ruler and his subjects. It 
is on the alun-alun that all the king’s guests had to wait before being admitted 
into his presence (seba). Therefore, the alun-alun is also called the paseban. 
The common people, who are the kawula or citizens of the kingdom, also think 
of the alun-alun as being the symbol of democracy because at this place they 
can stage a protest against the bureaucratic apparatus of the kingdom or even 
against the ruler himself. Such protests took the form of a pepe: that is, the 
practice of lying or sitting in the full sun until their ruler approached them.
Because it was a space imbued with special significance in terms of the con-
cept of Javanese power, alun-alun attracted the attention of the Dutch colonial 
government when it sought to establish its authority in Java. This newcomer 
also wanted to use the alun-alun as a representation of its recently won power 
in Javanese territory. It therefore signified its ascent to power by symbolically 
appropriating this public space and building the accommodation for the Dutch 
Resident or Assistent-Resident on the alun-alun opposite the palace or the 
Regent’s residence. The most obvious example of this is in Yogyakarta, where 
the house of the Dutch Resident (nowadays known as Loji Kebon) and the out-
ward and visible sign of the Dutch military presence, Fort Vredenburg (or Loji 
Besar), were built exactly opposite the palace. The erection of these colonial 
buildings on the alun-alun could be interpreted as a symbolic conquest of the 
alun-alun area (Surjomihardjo 2000:21). With the encroachment of these new 
symbols of power around the alun-alun, the power of Javanese traditional lead-
ers began to wane, or even in some instances to disappear completely.
During the colonial period, the weakening of the authority of traditional 
power-holders inevitably affected the people’s interpretation of the alun-alun. 
It was no longer regarded with respect as an official space belonging to the 
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government, but was transposed into a public space, which was accessible to 
anyone, high or low. Relegated to the secular sphere, the alun-alun also func-
tioned as an urban park whose subsequent development was inextricably 
linked to the growth of the town as a whole. In this process, the change in the 
meaning accorded to the alun-alun, from a place where official activities were 
held to a park or an open public space, transformed it into an urban concept, 
which has continued to develop in more pragmatic modern times.
One of the cities in Java where people’s interpretation of the alun-alun was 
affected by the changing balance of power is Malang. In Malang the changing 
meaning of the alun-alun under the impact of the rise and demise of the 
authorities did not end with the formation of Dutch colonial power, but con-
tinued into the Japanese period, the Indonesian Revolution and Independence. 
Malang occupies a special place in this respect, the more so because, as we 
shall see in detail shortly, it had two alun-alun.
The key question this chapter will now focus on is: What changes have 
occurred in Indonesia during 1930–1960 which have influenced the interpreta-
tion of the alun-alun of Malang by the inhabitants of the town and, conversely, 
to what extent has reference to the symbolic power of the alun-alun exerted an 
effect on the perceptions and interpretations of it by the townspeople of 
Malang? Specifically, it attempts to answer two subsidiary questions: How have 
the people of Malang interpreted the meaning of the alun-alun over time? 
And, on the basis of their perception and interpretation of the alun-alun, what 
(changing) activities have been performed on it?
 Malang: A City with Two alun-alun
The main alun-alun of this town, called Aloon-Aloon, was established in 1882 
(Kota Malang 1954:13). The shape of the Aloon-Aloon is unusual and diverges 
from those in traditional Javanese cities (Figure 11.1). At a first glance it does 
look as if it fulfils the typology of the typical Javanese alun-alun but a closer 
look at the location of its principal buildings reveals that it is an aberration and 
did not accord with the basic principles of the lay-out of a traditional town in 
Java, which always places the alun-alun in the ‘forecourt’ of the palace (kraton) 
or the house of the Regent.
The Aloon-Aloon was laid out under colonial rule and the way it was planned 
reflected the requirements of the Dutch government (Figure 11.2). The fact that 
it complied with Dutch priorities is betrayed by the buildings, which originally 
occupied the spaces around the Aloon-Aloon. The house of the Assistent-
Resident was located on the southern side, facing the Aloon-Aloon. The mosque is 
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to the west, as is the house of the caretaker of the mosque (kauman). On this 
same side stands the Protestant church. On the eastern side, there was a jail. At 
the north-west corner near the church stood the Sociëteit Concordia, the club 
which once formed the social centre of colonial society. The Regent’s resi-
dence was situated somewhat removed, to the east. Significantly, it was not 
oriented towards the Aloon-Aloon, but faced south towards the main street, 
Regent Straat (Kotapradja Malang 1964:12). The layout of the Aloon-Aloon, 
therefore, explicitly reveals that from its inception it was intended to be an 
official space, but more broadly, to be a means of imposing a colonial image 
on Malang. As the exemplary traditional centre of the town, the Aloon-Aloon 
was used as a primary venue to shape that image of colonial administrative 
authority.
The Dutch did not see exercising power as a goal in itself, and from their 
overriding economic point of view, the arrangement of the colonial town had 
to be focused on the economic requirements of the colonial government. The 
strong link between colonial political power and the control of crucial sectors 
of the economy was clearly signified in the establishment of the Javasche Bank 
and Escompto Bank in 1915. Both banks were built on the Aloon-Aloon, the centre 
of administrative control, on the northern side to be exact (Handinoto and 
Figure 11.1  Aloon-Aloon, Malang, 1900
Source: kitlv Collection 16,473. Courtesy of kitlv/Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden
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Figure 11.2  Aloon-Aloon in Malang during the Dutch period
Key to numbers, clockwise, starting in northwest corner: 12 Sociëteit 
Concordia; 14 Escompto Bank; 15 Javasche Bank; 16 jail?; 17 Regent’s office; 
1 Regent’s residence; 18 Bioscoop Grand; 21: Bioscoop Globe; 3 Resident’s 
office; 1 Resident’s residence; 6 Hotel Palace; 5 European girls’ school; 
4 mosque; 20 Protestant church.
Source: Officieele plattegrond der gemeente Malang 1936–1937 (pub-
lished by G. Kolff, Malang). Courtesy of Ms L.B.M. van Liempt
Soehargo 1996:52). Besides its function as a representation of the political and 
economic power of the colonial government, the alun-alun, finally, also 
became the centre of the town in another sense: it formed the nodal point in 
the network of urban streets. Thus, in the course of the nineteenth century, the 
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1 In the remainder of this chapter I refer to it as the Alun-Alun Bunder and not as JP Coen 
Plein, also for the colonial time, to emphasize that I treat the two places as belonging to one 
category of alun-alun.
alun-alun became the centre of what a number of writers have defined as the 
‘Indische’ town (Soekiman 1996; Nas 1986). As the centre of government, it 
assumed the role as symbolising the authority of the colonial government.
After 1900, in Malang as in other cities in Netherlands Indies, the migration 
of people from the Netherlands increased significantly and this new genera-
tion of Europeans wanted to give the town a more Western air. They wanted to 
move the town centre away from the alun-alun. This desire was reinforced after 
the town of Malang was granted municipality (gemeente) status in 1914. 
Eventually, in 1922, the Malang municipal council created a new square and 
moved its offices to this area. This square was named JP Coen Plein, after the 
founder of the voc Empire. Nowadays it is known as the Alun-Alun Bunder; 
the word ‘bunder’ (round) refers to the circular shape of the square.1 The relo-
cation of the municipal offices there signified that henceforward Malang pos-
sessed two alun-alun. Both alun-alun were then open spaces but a fountain 
erected in the middle of the Alun-Alun Bunder was intended to give the 
impression that this area now did duty as an urban park.
The plan to move the centre of government and urban life away from the old 
Aloon-Aloon reflected the desire to define a European-dominated centre as 
the sole locus of authority. The Dutch administration considered the Aloon-
Aloon unsuitable as the centre of a modern city since it was already occupied 
by the indigenous people from late afternoon to well into the night. Thomas 
Karsten, the prominent architect and town planner, was assigned this task. 
Planning for the design of a new alun-alun commenced in 1917, soon after 
Malang was granted municipal status (Handinoto and Soehardjo 1996:65).
The layout of the Alun-Alun Bunder was intended to encompass the beauti-
ful environs of the town. This beauty was derived from the mountainous scen-
ery with which Malang was surrounded, the main highlights being Mount 
Kawi to the west, Mount Semeru to the east, Mount Arjuna to the north, and 
the valley of the Brantas River, which flowed through the town. In the 1920s the 
beauty of this mountain scenery could no longer be appreciated from the 
Aloon-Aloon as many buildings blocked the vistas. Thomas Karsten envisaged 
a new angle of vision and the Alun-Alun Bunder was the result. The Alun-Alun 
Bunder helped to promote the reputation of Malang as a garden city (Hall 
1993:87–135).
When designing the Alun-Alun Bunder as the new municipal centre, 
Karsten took account of Javanese traditions. His design for the Alun-Alun 
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2 The town hall of Malang was designed by H.F. Horn (Pauline van Roosmalen personal 
communication).
Bunder, providing an open area in front of the government buildings, was 
based on the design principles of the Kraton of Yogyakarta or Surakarta. The 
design of the Alun-Alun Bunder complex was based on a similar north–south 
axis which linked the Southern Ocean, the town hall, the Alun-Alun Bunder 
itself with a water fountain in the centre, and Idenburg Straat, in an imaginary 
line straight to Mount Arjuna in the north. This layout of the Alun-Alun Bunder 
also paralleled the layout of municipal buildings in Semarang, which had also 
been inspired by the Kraton of Yogyakarta. Even the internal division of the 
town hall of Malang into rooms replicated the kraton.2 Where the kraton had 
its siti hinggil, the audience hall in which the ruler welcomed his high-ranking 
court servants, the town hall had a room in which the mayor (burgemeester) 
met the councillors. Just as the Sultan of Yogyakarta would be seated so that he 
looked north, in the direction of Mount Merapi, the position of the mayor was 
such that he looked north in the direction of Mount Arjuna when he met the 
council.
Although unquestionably based on traditional Javanese design and philoso-
phy, the Alun-Alun Bunder was in other respects a thoroughly European com-
plex. Named after the fourth Governor General of the voc, Jan-Pieterszoon 
Coen, it celebrated Dutch might. Unlike the Aloon-Aloon, local, indigenous 
people did not gather there. Unquestionably the reference to Jan-Pieterszoon 
Coen and the shape of the new square were significant, but the actual physical 
location of the Alun-Alun Bunder was also brimming with significance by 
repositioning Malang as a town within the conceptual design of the traditional 
Javanese town. The explanation for this apparent ‘traditional step’ can be 
found in the fact that the Alun-Alun Bunder was designed by Thomas Karsten, 
an architect with strong democratic-socialist tendencies. Karsten was opposed 
to the direction adopted by contemporary colonial policies and was interested 
in the potential and resources offered by the form of traditional Javanese build-
ing (Bogaers and de Ruijter 1986:71–88; Coté 2014; Van Roosmalen, this vol-
ume). Through the medium of a colonial town design, Karsten expressed his 
criticism of contemporary colonialism and whether or not his idea was wholly 
realized, the presence of the Alun-Alun Bunder and its municipal buildings 
was an endeavour to return to the original idea of the Javanese town which had 
been destroyed by nineteenth century colonial design.
As a result, the two alun-alun in Malang were both spaces imbued with 
strong symbolic meanings. So far, the analysis has been confined to the design 
of these spaces and the discussion of urban symbolism has so far 
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been somewhat one-sided, as only the symbolic meanings attributed by the 
powerful have featured. In what follows I attempt to redress this imbalance by 
discussing the way various groups in society have attributed meanings to the 
two alun-alun. When all is said and done, all urban residents have their own 
interpretation of the urban symbols. They can ascribe meanings quite different 
from that intended by the people who originally created these spaces. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to go a step beyond describing the alun-
alun as a consciously created symbol and examine how those symbols have 
been shaped, altered, and maintained and understood.
 The Struggle for the alun-alun of Malang in Dutch Times
Those who conceived the plan for the development of the Aloon-Aloon might 
never have thought that the alun-alun which they constructed as the symbol of 
colonial superiority would in the end be conquered so quickly by the people 
they colonized. The conquest is clearly represented in a black and white pho-
tograph of the Aloon-Aloon originally taken in the late nineteenth century 
(Figure 11.3). Vendors of food and drink (verkoopers van eet en drinkwaren) have 
invaded the area. They are sitting under the banyan trees, which were then 
between ten and twenty years old. The shade of the leafy trees planted in a row 
at the edge of the alun-alun pervades the square with a sense of coolness. It is 
in the shade of these banyan trees that the ‘conquest’ of the alun-alun by the 
vendors has been affected. Behind their angkringan (small cupboards situated 
on poles), they can be seen diligently serving their customers, who are seated 
in front of the angkringan on plaited mats. By comparison to these dozens of 
indigenous food and drink vendors and their customers, the colonial power 
seems very small. Even, the Assistent-Resident’s office seems to fade into the 
distance.
The presence of the indigenous people who gathered around the alun-alun 
every evening created a binary opposition to the situation outside the alun-
alun, which was still completely dominated by European colonial power. Every 
evening until deep in the night the fight against colonialism was staged on the 
alun-alun, even though it did not take the form of physical warfare. In the 
period of ‘rust en orde’ (law and order), more open armed resistance would 
have been futile because the state would have suppressed it by the force of its 
superior modern armaments.
As discussed above, the development of the original Aloon-Aloon was 
intended to present an image of colonial power by manipulating the symbolic 
meaning traditionally applied to this open space. The spatial arrangement of 
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the colonial town was consciously adapted to be the centre of the colonial 
administration as well as representing, at the local level, its unchallenged eco-
nomic power.
This may have been so in theory, but in the case of Malang the attempt to 
build colonial prestige on the vestiges of the original Javanese town by appro-
priating the alun-alun failed. Although in physical terms the Aloon-Aloon was 
reminiscent of the Javanese spatial arrangement, it failed to encapsulate the 
actual idea and significance of the Javanese concept of alun-alun. From the 
outset, by locating it to the west of the seat of traditional Javanese authority, 
(that is, in an inappropriate position), the Aloon-Aloon was perceived by indig-
enous residents to be the square of modern power. Colonial power in Malang 
was never perceived as being represented through the medium of the open 
space called the Aloon-Aloon. In fact, the reverse was true: the Aloon-Aloon 
became a representation of colonization and was transformed by the colo-
nized people into the vehicle of their opposition to colonialism.
The colonial image was expressed in the form of various buildings erected 
next to each other around the alun-alun (Figure  11.2). A variety of colonial 
Figure 11.3  Vendors on the Aloon-Aloon, Malang, 1895
Source: kitlv Collection 12,030. Courtesy of kitlv/Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden
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activities took place inside the rooms of these buildings but significantly, not 
on the alun-alun itself. With the exception of the Great Mosque on the western 
side of the alun-alun, all the edifices surrounding it were buildings, which 
served the needs of the colonial state. This colonial image was reinforced in 
1912 when a Protestant church was built on the western side of the alun-alun, 
on the Aloon-Aloon Koelon Straat, to the north of the mosque. The presence of 
this church exuded an impression redolent of Christian (Western) domination 
of the Muslim (indigenous) people whose Great Mosque of Malang had been 
built in 1875, several years before the alun-alun was developed. The tall church 
spire seemed – as was, no doubt, intended – to overwhelm the mosque to its 
south, which now appeared diminutive in comparison. The domination by 
construction continued in 1915 and 1916 when two Western edifices were 
erected almost simultaneously on the northern and southern sides of the alun-
alun. One, the Javasche Bank, was built in Aloon-Aloon Lor Straat, designed by 
Hulswit & Fermont and Ed. Cuypers and opened in December 1915. The other, 
the Palace Hotel, opened some months later in 1916 at the southwest corner. 
The ground plan of these two buildings revealed a strongly symmetrical pat-
tern that was immediately apparent in their appearance. The gate of the Palace 
Hotel consisted of a double tower, which strengthened the impression of the 
colonial desire to take charge of the centre of the alun-alun. In 1929, the 
Escompto Bank was established to the west of the Javasche Bank. The colonial 
image was reinforced even more strongly by the prominence of these two 
Western economic institutions.
Nevertheless, the colonial image, which these buildings exuded, paled in 
comparison to the even stronger image radiated by two other buildings on the 
alun-alun: the Sociëteit Concordia and the Bioscoop Rex. These two buildings, 
a social club and a cinema, were essential to the décor of a Western life-style. 
The many European social activities, which were held at the Sociëteit, includ-
ing dancing, pool games, playing cards, and many other pastimes, sharpened 
the awareness of the indigenous people of Malang that they were dominated 
by an alien group. The social distance was reinforced by the fact that they were 
warned not to enter the area. The Bioscoop Rex embodied this distance with 
its ‘living screen’, which was at that time the most modern form of entertain-
ment devised by Western technology. Those two entertainment venues were 
obviously far beyond the reach of indigenous people, especially those from 
lower social classes. For the poor it was impossible even to imagine being able 
to set foot in these places.
However, if the indigenous people could not take part in the colonial social 
activities inside the buildings surrounding the alun-alun, they could at least 
defy the Western life-style. They might be unable to enjoy the delicious food 
282 Basundoro
<UN>
served in the renowned Oen Restaurant opposite the Sociëteit Concordia, but 
food and drink vendors from their own ranks appeared like clockwork on the 
southern section of the alun-alun, selling their merchandise from dusk till late 
at night. While European people relaxed in the Sociëteit Concordia, the indige-
nous people could also enjoy themselves, not in the sociëteit, but in front of it 
on the alun-alun. They could drink coffee and eat peyek or gulai sold by people 
from Ponorogo. As European people enjoyed the art of dancing to the music of 
the waltz or were entertained by the comedies on the ‘living screen’, indige-
nous people could delight in the art of dance in a ludruk (Javanese folk the-
atre) performance presented at the north-eastern corner of the alun-alun 
behind gedek (panels of plaited bamboo).
Cultural resistance grew even stronger when religious ideology entered the 
arena. To those indigenous people of Malang who were obedient to Islamic 
teachings, such European areas as the sociëteit or bioscoop were prohibited ter-
ritory. In their eyes, the goings-on of the European people were sinful and the 
area was considered haram (forbidden), a place to be avoided. People in those 
areas were indulging in pleasures banned by Islamic doctrine, such as being 
drunk, gambling, dancing, and so on. So, it was on the alun-alun that the indig-
enous people could have fun and enjoy the entertainments permissible under 
the tenets of Islamic teachings.
As indigenous people encroached on and began to conquer the alun-alun, 
the government itself began to neglect and then intentionally undermine the 
meaning of the place as a symbol of colonial power it had originally ascribed. 
The authorities began to regard the square as simply a common open space 
devoid of any overly potent associations. This change in view was revealed to 
the full light of day when a tramline, which connected Malang to Dampit, was 
developed. From Blimbing Station the tramline ran via Lowokwaroe, Tjelaket, 
and Kajoetangan Straat, the main streets of European economic centre in 
Malang, towards the alun-alun. Approaching the alun-alun area, instead of 
being routed around it, the tramline continued straight through it, dividing 
it diagonally from the north-west to the south-east corner (Figure  11.2). 
Furthermore, a tram stop was constructed exactly in the middle of the alun-
alun under the banyan tree, to allow tram passengers to get on and off (Van 
Schaik 1996). The existence of a profane tram stop under the banyan tree even 
undercut the symbolic image of the alun-alun as an official space owned by the 
government. This spot was thronged with people every time a tram stopped 
with passengers wanting to get on or to alight. The banyan tree, which was 
once considered sacred in the context of Javanese culture, was deprived of its 
aura as the crowd of modern-day tram passengers used it casually as a tram 
shelter.
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Other evidence that the alun-alun no longer really held any significance for 
Europeans or for the municipal government in Malang was its exclusion from 
the Malang urban development plan. Following the decision to classify Malang 
as a municipality (gemeente and later stadsgemeente) in 1914, an urban devel-
opment plan (bouwplan) was drawn up. The plan, which divided Malang into 
various development zones, was implemented progressively in eight stages, 
from Bouwplan I to Bouwplan VIII. Not one of the eight development zones 
related to the Aloon-Aloon. Generally these section plans focused on the needs 
of the European people. For example, Bouwplan I, which was commenced in 
1917, provided a housing area for European people in the Oranjebuurt, the 
neighbourhood around Tjelaket. Bouwplan II, approved in 1920, concentrated 
on the area near the Alun-Alun Bunder, with the objective of developing it 
into the new centre of municipal government. This area was then generally 
known as the Gouverneur-Generaalbuurt (Governor General Neighbourhood), 
because all the streets in this area were named after Governors General of the 
Netherlands Indies. Bouwplan III pertained to the European cemetery. 
Bouwplan IV involved the construction of a housing complex for middle class 
people and was located west of Tjelaket and Lowokwaroe. The goals of 
Bouwplan V to Bouwplan VIII were similar and were overwhelmingly con-
centrated on providing housing for Europeans. The Aloon-Aloon, which had 
been effectively usurped by indigenous people, was not included in any of the 
bouwplannen (Jaarverslag 1940 1941).
After the construction of the Alun-Alun Bunder and the municipal build-
ings were completed, neither the colonial nor the municipal government 
planned any public festivals on the Aloon-Aloon. In the years 1937–1939, for 
example, the municipality organized several huge festivals to celebrate events 
related to the Dutch royal House of Orange: the marriage of Princess Juliana 
and Prince Bernhard, the birth of their first two children, and the fortieth anni-
versary of the reign of Queen Wilhelmina. The festivals centred on the Alun-
Alun Bunder, not on the Aloon-Aloon (Van Schaik 1996:42).
Nevertheless, the Aloon-Aloon was not totally ignored by Europeans. In 1938 
it was reported that people from the nearby Roman Catholic Church (located 
to the north of the Sociëteit in Kayoetangan Straat) had attempted to hold 
open-air church services there on Sunday evenings. One elderly resident 
recalled that the Roman Catholic priests would come and set up tables loaded 
with books and pamphlets and chairs under the banyan tree on the eastern 
side of the alun-alun (interview with Azis Salim). After everything was ready, a 
Catholic priest dressed in his white alb would begin to preach the ‘good news’ 
of Christ and read from the Bible. Initially his presence attracted an audience 
of local people to whom assistants distributed pamphlets expounding on 
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Christianity. Young children in particular were attracted by the arrival of the 
priests on the alun-alun. In their eyes, they must have appeared like sellers of 
medicinal herbs; but the sound of a loud voice in an open public place will 
always attract children’s attention. In any event, those children were probably 
more attracted by the pamphlets distributed by the preacher and his assis-
tants. In 1938 paper was still a great rarity for children in Malang. It was not 
long, however, before people realized the purpose of this activity was to con-
vert them and they stopped coming.
The activity of Roman Catholic priests was an attempt to re-empower the 
alun-alun. The priests expressly positioned themselves in the eastern part of 
alun-alun, opposite the Great Mosque, which was located on the western 
perimeter. Both the location and the mission of the Catholic priests was an 
attempt to create an opposition within the confines of the alun-alun. Muslims 
regard the mosque as a place to pray and it is central to the religion and the 
community of the local people. When war broke out, for instance, the mosque 
was used as a place to discuss the strategies with which to attack enemies. The 
priests who attempted to preach Christianity on the alun-alun were seen as 
infidels by the local Muslims. In fact, this attempt to propagate Christianity 
was soon halted because it attracted only young children. In any event, accord-
ing to Azis Salim, my main informant on the matter, evangelization vanished 
with the arrival of Japanese to Malang.
Even sporting activities, so much part of the European life-style and which 
required a large open space, were not held on the Aloon-Aloon. The Fifth 
Development Plan for Malang included a huge sports park consisting of a sta-
dium, a hockey field, two soccer fields, nine tennis courts, a clubhouse, and a 
swimming pool (Stadsgemeente Malang 1939). At the time it was constructed, 
the stadium was probably the best and biggest in Indonesia. This sports area 
was a propitious focal point as European people could enjoy the beautiful pan-
orama of Mount Kawi to the west as they participated in or watched the vari-
ous sporting activities. Mount Kawi was named ‘De Liggende Vrouw’ (The 
Sleeping Woman) in Dutch, because when it is viewed from far away, it resem-
bles a recumbent woman sleeping.
 The Arrival of the ‘Older Sibling’
On 8 March 1942, the Japanese Army entered Malang. The arrival of thousands 
of Japanese soldiers was received with mixed feelings by the citizens. The 
indigenous people had high expectations of them as ‘older siblings’ who would 
relieve them of the colonization by the Dutch. At the time, Indonesians were 
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3 ‘Koetika saja sampe di aloon-aloon, ternjata jang itu lapangan loewas penoeh sesak sama 
riboean orang, seperti jang belon perna saja liat. Pekarangan depan dari roemah Resident di 
tempatin oleh serdadoe-serdadoe Djepang jang itoe waktoe lagi repot boeat masing-masing 
sediaken barang boeat tangsel peroetnja. Ada jang masak boeboer, ada jang boeka bang-
kelannja oentoek keloearkan soempit serta mangkoknja. Pendek kata, marika itoe waktoe 
kasi pemandengan begitoe roepa seolah-olah Malang lagi ketamoean komedie-koeda jang 
besar dan jang personeelnja lagi beresin doeloe kaperloeannja sabelonnja marika moelai 
dengen tantjepken tiang-tiang dalem tanah boeat pasang tendanja. […] Ada jang boeka 
obsessed with Joyoboyo’s prophecy, which predicted that kate (tiny) people 
would come from the East to release them from the suffering caused by 
colonialism.
In contrast to the indigenous people, Chinese people, especially women, 
were terrified by the Japanese arrival. They had learnt that previously the 
Japanese had attacked their mother country, sought out attractive women to 
slake their lust, and were very cruel. By the time the Japanese soldiers arrived 
in Malang, many attractive Chinese women had exchanged their fine clothes 
for pating srediwil (ragged clothes), scratched or disfigured their faces with 
make-up, and tousled their hair in an attempt to camouflage their features. By 
taking these actions, they hoped to elude the attentions of Japanese soldiers 
and avoid being raped by them (Berdoeri 2004:185).
Remarkably, upon arrival in Malang, the Japanese soldiers first set down, 
not in the Alun-Alun Bunder, which was clearly the seat of the government and 
the mayor (burgemeester) but in the Aloon-Aloon. The situation there when 
the Japanese soldiers arrived was described expressively by Tjamboek Berdoeri 
in his book Indonesia dalem api dan bara.
When I arrived on the alun-alun [the Aloon-Aloon], the large field was 
thronged with more people than I had ever seen before. Japanese soldiers 
who were all busy preparing things to fill their stomach occupied the 
Resident’s front garden. Some were cooking porridge; others were open-
ing their backpacks to take out chopsticks and bowls. In short, the scene 
they presented was as if Malang was being visited again by a large hob-
byhorse troupe, whose members were first finishing off their own affairs 
before sticking poles into the ground to set up tents. […] Some Japanese 
were taking off their clothes and allowed their navels to peep from above 
the waistband of their trousers at the audience who had come in swarms 
to behold those new guests. Some were wearing dirty trousers, which 
plainly showed that they had been everywhere, pulling in the belts again 
and again to keep them from sliding down.3
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 badjoe dan biarin sadja poesernja maen-mata dari atas kepala-tjelananja sama publiek jang 
dateng bergroemoetan boeat liat itoe tetamoe-tetamoe baroe. Ada jang dengen tjelana jang 
mesoem kaliatannja djalan kian-kemari sembari saben-saben tarik saboeknja soepaia djangan 
terlalu mobrat-mobrot.’
This short description vividly sketches the scene on the Aloon-Aloon thronged 
with people who had come to witness the initial arrival of the Japanese. 
Normally, it would have only been crowded in the evenings, but now, during 
the day, it was suddenly occupied as if by an audience attracted by a group of 
hobbyhorse players who were just getting down off their vehicles. The 
Japanese decision to regroup on the Aloon-Aloon raises the question of why 
they did not go straight to the Alun-Alun Bunder where the town hall was situ-
ated. Its buildings would have been more comfortable as a place for the sol-
diers to rest after their battles and long journey. There were more rooms, 
including many bathrooms, and better furnishings than were available in the 
house of the Resident located there. They could also have gone to Rampal, an 
area in Malang occupied by the colonial army during the Dutch colonial 
period. But instead the Japanese soldiers chose the Aloon-Aloon as the first 
place to visit.
The Japanese commanders probably understood that the Aloon-Aloon 
belonged to the people; that the people of Malang had a stronger sense of 
belonging to this alun-alun than to the colonial Alun-Alun Bunder, which had 
been an elite place from which Malang urban life had been controlled in Dutch 
times. This psychological connection was manipulated by the Japanese, who 
desired to be regarded as the ‘older sibling’ and so decided that the ‘younger 
siblings’ should be visited first. From the Japanese point of view, the Alun-Alun 
Bunder and its environs needed first to be cleansed of the presence of the 
Dutch enemy who had been reigning over their younger sibling. This would be 
done after the younger sibling had been greeted.
Another interpretation of the Japanese decision to go to the Aloon-Aloon 
might be that the Japanese military wished to well and truly sever all links with 
the evidence of Western colonialism. Therefore all such Western symbols as 
the Alun-Alun Bunder were to be avoided. In general, the Japanese policy was 
to suppress evidence of Dutch colonialism by such measures as banning the 
use of the Dutch language as a spoken and written vehicle of communication 
throughout Indonesia. All schools that had previously used Dutch as the lan-
guage of instruction were required to switch to Indonesian.
The Japanese, then, also planned to make use of the symbolism attached 
to the alun-alun, in their case in an attempt to embrace Malang and make the 
idea of a Greater East Asia a reality. The next action the Japanese army took 
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was to replace the Dutch mayor of Malang, J.H. Boerstra, installing in his 
stead Raden A.A. Sam, previously the Regent of Malang. During the Japanese 
occupation he held three positions simultaneously: Regent, Resident, and 
mayor. This was a clever strategy on the part of the Japanese to empower the 
indigenous people, since it would have been quite possible for them to 
replace the Dutch mayor with a Japanese candidate, a choice which they 
eschewed.
In June 1942, a very symbolic event took place when an official ceremony 
was held to welcome the arrival of an important detachment of the Japanese 
Army to Malang. An official photograph of this occasion taken from the 
veranda of the home of the Resident shows a number of prominent Japanese 
soldiers, including the local commander Colonel Kato, either seated or stand-
ing around the Resident, Raden A.A. Sam. Other indigenous officials are seated 
slightly to the rear or to the side (Figure 11.4). Not visible in the photo but a fact 
known from reports of the occasion, were the thousands of Japanese soldiers 
lined up on the central part of the alun-alun in front of the high-ranking offi-
cials (Van Schaik 1996:52). The event was intended to demonstrate the warm 
relationship between the inhabitants of Malang and the Japanese army.
Figure 11.4  Resident Raden A.A. Sam and Japanese officials, 1942
Source: Van Schaik (1996:52; courtesy of Malang Studio, Malang)
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Initially, the Aloon-Aloon could be said to have been used to demonstrate the 
love affair between the indigenous residents and the Japanese soldiers. Later, 
this romance faded as the people of Malang began to suffer because the 
Japanese soldiers treated them even more brutally than the Dutch had done. 
One interviewee, mbok Satiah, a rice seller on the corner of Kayoetangan 
Street, remembered:
I was still about eight years old in the Japanese period. The Japanese sol-
diers were very brutal. Once, they arrested a man without any explicit 
reason. The man was beaten and dragged to the alun-alun. Some Japanese 
soldiers dug a hole a metre deep in the southwest corner. He was forced 
to get into it and was buried up to his neck. It was exactly the same as the 
stoning to death law in stories about the Prophet (Interview with mbok 
Satiah, 22 February 2005).
By what seems a strange twist of fate, during the Japanese occupation, the 
Aloon-Aloon was used as an arena in which the brutality perpetrated by 
Japanese soldiers against their younger sibling was publicly exposed, after hav-
ing first being used as a symbol to demonstrate common interests between 
older and younger siblings. This brutality was never exercised on the Alun-
Alun Bunder, so that it would seem that that public space was allowed to 
remain a centre of a sacred and untouched authority. It is not easy to compre-
hend the meaning of the brutality displayed by the Japanese soldiers in the 
example above, but unquestionably the Aloon-Aloon was transformed into an 
unruly space, akin to a deserted garden or wilderness in which the law of the 
jungle prevailed. During the Japanese period in Malang the Aloon-Aloon 
degenerated into a place robbed of its worth, degraded by the actions of 
Japanese soldiers but also in the perception of the people.
Mbok Satiah was keenly aware of this phenomenon. During the Japanese 
period, she also recalled, there was a well-known soto (soup) seller who tradi-
tionally hawked what people believed to be beef soto on the southern part of 
the alun-alun. One day, as he was busy serving many buyers, his son ran up to 
him and shouted: “Daddy, they are running away!” “What are running away?” 
his father asked. The boy’s answer shocked the customers and made them nau-
seous: “The cats which are going to be slaughtered for soto are escaping. The 
cage door was unlocked.” The soto seller was immediately reported and the 
Japanese soldiers came and dragged him away. His life ended then and there 
(Interview with mbok Satiah, 22 February 2005).
The alun-alun, therefore, became debased, a location where different 
groups exploited one another and where the exploiters were not always 
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necessarily foreigners. The acts of brutality showed no respect for religious 
feelings. When local people were forced to perform seikere on the alun-alun, 
the act of taking a bow towards the sunrise to honour ameterasu omikami, 
this constituted a brutal assault on their religious belief. Even though the 
alun-alun was surrounded by houses of worship, most prominently a mosque 
and a church, those religious symbols could not offer ‘succour’ to their mem-
bers who suffered at the hands of Japanese soldiers. One example was the 
experience, which befell a hajji on the southeast corner of the Aloon-Aloon. 
The incident took place soon after the arrival of the Japanese army in 
Malang. One day a man dressed as a hajji rode his bicycle from the north 
side of Jalan Aloon-aloon Wetan pedalling in a southerly direction. His bicy-
cle was decorated with two flags: the Japanese and the Indonesian. 
Coincidently, a Japanese soldier happened to be standing with a rifle on his 
shoulder on the corner of the alun-alun. Catching sight of a hajji riding the 
bike with the two flags, the soldier stopped him. Without uttering a word, 
the soldier pulled off and tore up the red and white (Indonesian) flag. The 
Japanese soldier, possibly ignorant about the Indonesian flag, saw only that 
it had the same colours as the Rising Sun, but its design was incorrect. The 
hajji, seeing that one of the flags had been torn to tatters by the soldier, 
thought that he was not supposed to decorate his bicycle with any flags so he 
also he pulled off the Japanese flag as he was in a hurry to save himself from 
a beating by the soldier. However, the Japanese soldier, now believing that 
his flag was being insulted by the hajji, hit him with the butt of his gun. 
Feeling proud of what he had done, the soldier walked away leaving the hajji 
rubbing his head to ponder his experience of true samurai blood (Berdoeri 
2004:195–6).
During this period, the alun-alun was also deemed a strategic place on 
which Japanese collaborators and ‘betrayers’ could express their thoughts. This 
became apparent during the latter part of the Japanese occupation when it 
clearly emerged who the traitors and those people who longed for the past 
were. Novelist Tjamboek Berdoeri describes one occasion when a man he con-
sidered to be a hankan (traitor to his country) or collaborator, delivered a 
speech on the alun-alun. It seemed that the man was a Eurasian even though 
he looked Indonesian. He loudly criticized everything, which could be linked 
to full-blood Dutch people who had suppressed Eurasian people and had 
refused to care for them. Consequently, he was grateful to the Japanese army, 
which had come to save them (Berdoeri 2004:226). This act of defiance was 
deliberately staged on the alun-alun because it was an open public space, com-





Independence ushered in a euphoric period for Indonesia. Independence was 
a magic word, which led people to believe they could do anything they wished: 
they were free. An indigenous person could feel free to break a Chinese shop 
window for instance. If he did so, the very frightened owner would hand over 
everything that was demanded in order to save his life. Independence also 
meant freely taking over anything colonial and destroying colonial symbols. 
Independence was freedom. In this period the Aloon-Aloon Malang and its 
environs was transmuted into an area where the euphoria of this freedom 
could be expressed.
In August 1945, shortly after the Proclamation of Independence, signs of this 
freedom of expression began to appear in Malang. Slogans were written on the 
walls of colonial buildings on the Aloon-Aloon. There was a big handwritten 
sign on the wall of the Nationale Handelsbank, next to the Palace Hotel, which 
read “Freedom is the Glory of any Nation”. There was even a bigger slogan 
below it saying “Indonesia for Indonesians!” (Kota Malang 1954:23).
A more formal attempt to take control of the alun-alun space was in the 
form of changing the names of the buildings in the area. The name of Palace 
Hotel was changed first to Hotel Merdeka (Freedom Hotel) and later to Hotel 
Pelangi (Rainbow Hotel). Bioscoop Rex was changed to Bioskop Ria (Cheerful 
Cinema). Sociëteit Concordia was changed into Gedoeng Rakjat (House of the 
People). These name changes were intended to show that, having gained inde-
pendence, all residents of Malang had in principle now the right to enjoy the 
entertainment offered by these facilities.
The ‘liberation’ of the Gedoeng Rakjat and its transformation into a public 
meeting place assumed even more symbolic significance when the newly 
established government of Indonesia in Jakarta chose the building as the 
venue in which to conduct the first meeting of the Komite Nasional Indonesia 
Poesat (knip, Central National Committee of Indonesia). The knip was 
founded as an organization to represent the Indonesian people, to fill the gap 
before a representative parliament could be directly elected. Between 
25 February and 5 March 1947, the Gedoeng Rakjat entered history as the first 
place in which the people’s representatives of the knip gathered. No fewer 
than 1500 people from throughout Indonesia visited the building to participate 
in, or just to witness first hand, the enactment of Independence.
The alun-alun and the surrounding buildings were not subjected to any 
physical changes. Nevertheless, the perspective of them among the Indonesian 
people and the way they treated these buildings had totally changed. Whereas 
previously in the colonial period the alun-alun and buildings had been 
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separated from one to another – the alun-alun for the common people, the 
buildings (except the mosque) for the colonial elite – with the coming of 
Independence, the alun-alun and the surrounding buildings were closely 
linked together. The opposition between the people’s space and the space of 
the colonial power had been obliterated. Nevertheless, it proved no easy mat-
ter to maintain this new spatial unity.
On 22 July 1947, as part of the large-scale First Dutch Offensive (Agresi 
Pertama, or Eerste Politionele Actie), Dutch soldiers launched an attack on 
Malang. The response of the inhabitants of Malang was to prevent the newly 
gained symbolic unity between square and buildings from falling apart in this 
very critical situation; their reply was to set fire to all the colonial buildings to 
prevent the Dutch from reoccupying them. The Great Mosque of Malang was 
the only building around the Aloon-Aloon spared from the Republican forces’ 
scorched-earth policy. According to a report by the contemporary local author-
ities, about a thousand buildings were burnt down (Kotapradja Malang 
1964:19). This number seems an exaggeration but certainly all the colonial 
buildings around both the alun-alun were razed and the report by the 
Kotapradja indicates that a large number of buildings throughout the town 
were also destroyed as a result of this policy.
The newly returned Dutch government struggled to regain control of the 
town in a military and administrative sense, and in its endeavours it again did 
not overlook the value of symbolism. Symbolic control included an attempt to 
reappropriate the Aloon Aloon. On 2 October 1947, only two months after the 
Dutch army had seized the town, Major-General M.R. de Bruyne officially dedi-
cated a monument to commemorate the deaths of marines and Koninklijk 
Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (knil, Royal Netherlands Indies Army) soldiers at 
the hands of Republican forces. The monument was in the form of a five-sided 
conical pillar on which were inscribed the names of the slain Dutch soldiers 
and a line from the Dutch national anthem (Van Schaik 1996:80). The monu-
ment was a symbol that the Aloon-Aloon was once again ruled by the Dutch. 
To emphasize this message, the monument was built exactly opposite of the 
mosque.
The arrogant action of erecting a monument in front of the mosque, the 
holiest place in the town as far as the Muslims in the Indonesian population 
were concerned, was interpreted as a huge insult. Angry as they were, the local 
people could do nothing about it, as they were faced by soldiers armed with 
guns. Understandably, when sovereignty was returned to the Indonesian 
Republic, one of the first actions taken by the municipal government was to 
demolish the monument. This event symbolized the return of the Aloon-Aloon 
to its authentic owners.
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 The Struggle for the Alun-Alun Bunder
In the meantime, how did the Alun-Alun Bunder fare through this tumultuous 
period? As described above, on its arrival the Japanese occupation force made 
its first appearance on the Aloon-Aloon, rather than on the Alun-Alun Bunder. 
Although intent on erasing all symbols linked to the Dutch colonial regime, no 
action was taken against the Alun-Alun Bunder by Japanese soldiers. It was 
only after Independence that attempts were made to ‘decolonize’ the Alun-
Alun Bunder and assert the Indonesian people’s full rights to all areas in 
Malang. As a sign of this right, a monument to liberty was erected in the mid-
dle of the Alun-Alun Bunder where previously the fountain had stood. This 
monument had a dual function. It served as a remembrance monument and as 
a tetenger (symbolic marker) from which central point the area described by 
the radius was officially ‘ours’. Unlike the Aloon-Aloon, the Alun-Alun Bunder 
had been dominated up to the very last seconds of Dutch colonialism in 
Malang, and a physical sign that the alun-alun was no longer under Dutch con-
trol was essential.
Malang lay within the region controlled by the Republic and to commemo-
rate the first year of Independence, a ceremony was conducted on 17 August 
1946, to lay the foundation stone of the Independence monument. A model of 
the monument was unveiled on the occasion (Figure 11.5) and the event was 
attended by Doel Arnowo, hero of the Battle of Surabaya (November 1945) and 
assistant to the governor of East Java at that time. Soenarko, Resident of 
Malang, also attended. The monument was almost completed by the time 
Dutch forces seized Malang in the First Dutch Offensive (Agresi Pertama), 
July 1947.
In the Dutch return to Malang there was more at stake than a simple mili-
tary campaign; they also found themselves embroiled in a fierce symbolic 
struggle to recapture the town. The Dutch were perceived as acting as the tiger 
in Javanese mythology, which makes an area previously staked out by the urine 
of the tiger’s enemy sangar (neutral). In the eyes of local people, Dutchmen 
actually resembled fearsome, rapacious tigers while they conceived of them-
selves as the wild bulls ready to combat the tiger by wielding their sharp horns 
effectively. In this metaphor, the potency of the enemy of the tiger was repre-
sented by its ability to demolish the monument, and this proved to be the only 
means the Dutch tiger had at its disposal to make the monument sangar. 
Before demolishing it, Dutch soldiers had already used a subtler way to domi-
nate the monument by swathing it in a huge Dutch red, white, and blue flag. 
The peak of the monument was topped by a European crown representing 
Queen Juliana, handily symbolizing the return of Dutch sovereignty without 
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4 For an image of it, see Van Schaik (1996:122).
having to construct a new monument.4 However, I believe this attempt to 
transform the existing monument and thereby create a new orientation in the 
town did not succeed, because the structure hidden under the Dutch flag and 
crown still belonged to the Indonesians.
It is easy to imagine that the erection of the Independence monument in 
the centre of the Alun-Alun Bunder fired the courageous imagination of the 
Malang youth with the belief that, as long as the monument remained stand-
ing, they would never be defeated even though the Dutch army was equipped 
with the most up-to-date guns. With such a firm belief entrenched, the only 
recourse available to Dutch forces to break the spirit of the Malang resistance 
was to demolish the monument, which they did on 23 December 1948. The 
Dutch destruction of the Indonesian monument was in a way their ‘revenge’ 
for the Indonesian burning of the town hall on the same alun-alun as part of 
the Republican scorched-earth strategy of July 1947. The destruction of the 
Figure 11.5 Laying of the foundation stone of the Independence monument in Malang, 17 August 
1946
Source: Van Schaik (1996:122; courtesy of Studio Malang, Malang)
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monument on the Alun-Alun Bunder marked the peak of the symbolic battle 
between the Dutch soldiers and the Indonesian inhabitants of Malang. For 
some years, the burning down of the municipal buildings and the destruction 
of the Independence monument left the Alun-Alun Bunder a no-man’s-land, a 
deserted area disfigured by ruined buildings.
The period after the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty emerged as the 
most crucial time in the history of Indonesia. Five years after the Proclamation 
of Independence, Indonesia faced tremendous difficulties in every aspect of 
life. The erection of the new monument was greeted warmly by the local com-
munity as it seemed to symbolize the reassertion of Indonesian rights, which 
had tended to fade. The Japanese occupation and the War of Independence 
had engendered many social, economic, political, and security problems. The 
long war had brought the people suffering and hardship, hitting housing and 
jobs particularly hard (Pewarta Soerabaia 24-3-1952). In Malang the depths to 
which the Aloon-Aloon had sunk was demonstrated by the presence of prosti-
tutes on the Aloon-Aloon. Under the banyan trees in the centre of the Aloon-
Aloon, a host of prostitutes would sell themselves at night (Pewarta Soerabaia 
24-3-1952). According to research undertaken later in 1968, these prostitutes 
were those who charged the lowest prices (between 50 and 100 Rupiah) (Survey 
sekitar 1970:29). Their clients risked contracting syphilis or gonorrhoea. The 
prostitutes’ trade also challenged the mosque located on the western edge of 
the alun-alun. Bambungan (squatters) who occupied the area or simply wan-
dered around there were another indication of how the Aloon-Aloon had 
fallen in people’s estimation.
Although the Aloon-Aloon was used as a ‘cattle market’, as people referred 
to the streetwalkers’ area at night, during the day it was used as an ordinary 
market. On the southern side, what remained of the burned out house of the 
former Assistent-Resident was occupied by many traders. The place was called 
Pasar Atoom (Atom Market) in imitation of the name of a big market in 
Surabaya. Perhaps the traders in Malang secretly hoped that one day their mar-
ket might be as big as that in Surabaya. Flower-sellers occupied the western 
part of the alun-alun, stretching from in front of the church to the mosque. In 
fact, until 1960s the alun-alun was the biggest outlet for flowers in Malang.
The presence of the traders on the alun-alun was a continuation of the old 
tradition of the popular rule over the alun-alun. In the colonial period, the 
ordinary people had had to fight against the colonial authority for control of 
the alun-alun. After Independence they still had to fight against the municipal 
government. In 1952, the traders in Pasar Atoom were expelled because the 
government decided to renovate the former Assistent-Resident’s house and 
turn it into offices. Eventually, this plan fell through (Pewarta Soerabaia 
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16-7-1952). In fact, in September 1952 an intercity bus stop was built on the area 
(Pewarta Soerabaia 1-9-1952). The bus stop only served to reinforce the impres-
sion that the Aloon-Aloon was no longer a sacred place.
 The Era of Politics
The euphoria of freedom was more than just a time to display slogans splashed 
on the walls of public buildings, stopping public transportation by force and 
getting in without paying a cent, or for yelling such heroic words as “Life or 
Death”. It was also the time to take action by joining organizations or political 
parties, something which would have seemed beyond people’s wildest dreams 
in the colonial period. Independence signalled the arrival of grassroots poli-
tics, which no authority could suppress. In this period, open spaces were essen-
tial because politics was public and without an open public space, politics 
could not have been public. Open spaces within the town essentially meant 
the alun-alun. Hence the alun-alun became a crucial element in the political 
euphoria in the 1950s and 1960s.
In Malang, the Aloon-Aloon was designated the chosen open space where 
competing ideologies could battle each other for dominance, as it was the 
place which belonged to the local people. It was only in the 1950s that an 
attempt was made to breathe new life into the area. On 1 May 1950, around the 
time of the anniversary of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (pki, Indonesian 
Communist Party), a group of party members erected a large, twice life-size 
statue on the plinth of the original monument, which had remained intact. 
Even though it was not a permanent statue it seems to have elicited a response 
from the authorities. A month later, on 9 June 1950, a Liberty Monument 
Committee was established to organize the erection of a permanent monu-
ment (Suwardono and Rosmiayah 1996:24). The committee worked hard for 
three years to raise the money to rebuild the damaged monument, a task that 
was finally completed in the middle of 1953 (Pewarta Soerabaia 16-5-1953). 
Local newspapers such as Pewarta Soerabaia reported the physical details of 
the monument in their headlines. The description in Pewarta Soerabaia on 16 
May 1953 indicates that it did not differ greatly from the original design of 1946. 
It featured six bamboo spears tied together in an unbreakable bond.
The Java Post, of 19 May 1953 published a poem by R. Dirman Sasmokoadi to 
celebrate the monument:
Malang Monument of Liberty






Standing tall in a peaceful field
In the round pool adorned with lotuses
Surrounded by beautiful buildings
Exactly in the centre of the city of HOPE
It is our monumental jewel
Celebrating Indonesia’s Independence
Freedom in its true meaning
Standing, prosperous to the end
r. dirman sasmokoadi
On 20 May 1953, a ceremony was held to mark the unveiling of the monument 
by President Sukarno. It was witnessed by thousands of people, but their pres-
ence was probably motivated more by the arrival of the president, than purely 
by any thoughts about the liberty monument. The person of Sukarno was more 
charismatic and more symbolic of Indonesia’s Independence than the monu-
ment. The Java Post of 21 May 1953 reported: “At 4:45 the president began to 
deliver his speech in front of the people. There were no posters by the people.” 
The lack of placards can be read as the absence of protesters. It was proof that 
this time the people in Malang were looking forward to greeting President 
Sukarno. Later, in the years in which the president was involved in conflicts 
with the military and various political parties, his arrival was often greeted by 
large demonstrations. This time, it seemed, the president had come to confirm 
the undisputed victory of the Indonesian people and the role of Malang in the 
struggle against the Dutch.
On the eve of the 1955 general election when parties were struggling for sup-
port, the political atmosphere intensified enormously. For example, on 
29 January 1955, a mass organization operating under the banner of the old 
Javanese doctrine Djawo Dwipo held a parade called ‘Ngruwat Pusoko Djowo’ 
(Purifying the Heirlooms of Java) (Java Post 28-1-1955, 29-1-1955). The parade 
commenced at Jodipan Wetan, proceeded via various streets through to the 
Aloon-Aloon and ended again at Jodipan. Actually, the main focal point of the 
parade was the Aloon-Aloon as the ritual of Djawo Dwipo was centred there. 
When the parade reached the Aloon-Aloon, people gathered in the centre of 
the square, where they sang a religious song dedicated to Djawo Dwipo and 
danced. The ritual was to declare ‘Penuntun Kawruh Kasempurnaning Gesang’ 
(Leaders towards Knowledge of the Perfection of Life). The organization later 
claimed that the event had been attended by almost a million people, 986,000 
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5 In fact, Islamic groups did attempt to use the Aloon-Aloon after the 1955 general election. On 
10 March 1957, thousands of Muslims gathered there to protest against Sukarno’s concept of 
a National Board (Pewarta Soerabaia 11-3-1957).
to be exact. In fact, only a few thousand out of the total of less than one million 
citizens of Malang bothered to turn up (Java Post 28-1-1955). Political rhetoric 
had conjured up a nonsensical reality. The Djawo Dwipo organization, which 
represented abangan (non-orthodox Muslim) power in Malang, wanted to re-
empower the alun-alun as a place for the people.
Another leader who attempted to use the alun-alun of Malang was Bung 
Tomo, who had led the Republican troops against the British in the Battle of 
Surabaya in November 1945. On 24 September 1955, he visited the Aloon-Aloon 
as the spokesperson for the campaign of the Indonesian Party. His exclaiming 
“Allahu Akbar” (God is great) and his highly emotive appeal might have galva-
nized Surabaya but did not win much support in Malang (Java Post 25-9-1955). 
His campaign attracted only a few people and he failed to gain significant 
numbers of votes in the general election. Amazingly, in 1955 there were no 
Islamic parties making use of the Aloon-Aloon to propagate their programmes 
and ideology.5 The outcome of the 1955 general election proved that Malang 
was dominated by abangan people; the Indonesian Communist Party emerged 
as the local victor. The liberty monument on the Alun-Alun Bunder became a 
dominant symbol of the town of Malang. For any charity event, small pins 
bearing a picture of the monument were often sold to raise money. In fact, on 
14 July 1970, it became the central element in the coat-of-arms of Malang, 
replacing the old symbol of an eagle.
 Conclusion
In the past hundred years, the two alun-alun of Malang have been the focus of 
processes of signification and spontaneous actions. History has revealed how 
the people in Malang have attempted to retain their control of these spaces. 
Each alun-alun exuded a different significance for the local people. The indig-
enous residents claimed their rights to the Aloon-Aloon by a silent invasion 
long before Indonesia gained its independence and Malang was freed from 
Dutch domination. This was different in the case of the Alun-Alun Bunder. 
Created as an elite area under Dutch colonialism, which revived briefly during 
the Dutch attempt to regain control after Independence was proclaimed, the 
Alun-Alun Bunder continued to be the focus of official symbolic representa-
tion of power. After the transfer of sovereignty, it became a symbol of the 
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power of a liberated nation and urban community. The control of the symbol-
ism of this public space was constantly contested and associated with repeated 
periods of struggle.
References
Berdoeri, Tjamboek (2004). Indonesia dalem api dan bara. Jakarta: Elkasa.
Bogaers, Erica and Peter de Ruijter (1986). ‘Ir. Thomas Karsten and Indonesian town 
planning, 1915–1940’, in: Peter J.M. Nas (ed.), The Indonesian city: Studies in urban 
development and planning, pp. 71–88. Dordrecht and Cinnaminson: Foris 
Publications. [Verhandelingen kitlv 117.]
Coté, Joost (2014). ‘Thomas Karsten’s Indonesia: Modernity and the end of Europe, 
1914–1945’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 170:66–98.
Hall, Peter (1993). Cities of tomorrow: An intellectual history of urban planning and 
design in the twentieth century. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Handinoto and Paulus H. Soehargo (1996). Perkembangan kota dan arsitektur kolonial 
Belanda di Malang. Yogyakarta: andi.
Jaarverslag 1940 (1941). Jaarverslag 1940 Stadsgemeente Malang. [Malang: 
Stadsgemeente.]
Kota Malang (1954). 40 Tahun kota Malang. Malang: Dewan Pemerintah Kota Malang.
Kotapradja Malang (1964). Kotapradja Malang 50 tahun. Malang: Kotapradja Malang.
Moertono, Soemarsaid (1985). Negara dan usaha bina-negara di Jawa masa lampau: 
Studi tentang masa Mataram II, abad XVI sampai XIX. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor 
Indonesia.
Nas, Peter J.M. (1986). ‘Introduction: A general view on the Indonesian town’, in: Peter 
J.M. Nas (ed.), The Indonesian city: Studies in urban development and planning, 
pp. 1–17. Dordrecht: Foris. [Verhandelingen kitlv 117.]
Schaik, A. van (1996). Malang: Beeld van een stad. Purmerend: Asia Maior.
Soekiman, Djoko (1996). Kebudayaan Indis dan gaya hidup masyarakat pendukungnya 
di Jawa (abad XVIII sampai medio abad XX). Yogyakarta: Yayasan Bentang Budaya, 
Yayasan Adikarya Ikapi and Ford Foundation.
Stadsgemeente Malang (1939). Stadsgemeente Malang 1914–1939. [Malang: 
Stadsgemeente.]
Surjomihardjo, Abdurrachman (2000). Kota Yogyakarta 1880–1930: Sejarah perkem-
bangan sosial. Yogyakarta: Yayasan Untuk Indonesia.
Survey sekitar (1970). ‘Survey sekitar beberapa motif dan efek serta pertimbangan-
pertimbangan pokok bagaimana cara menanggulangi tuna susila di masyarakat 
daerah Kotamadya Malang’. [Malang]: Djurusan Pendidikan Sosial ikip Malang. 
[Unpublished manuscript.]
299The Two alun-alun of Malang
<UN>
Suwardono and Supiyati Rosmiayah (1996). Monografi sejarah kota Malang. Malang: 
Sigma Media.
Wiryomartono, A. Bagus P. (1995). Seni bangunan dan seni binakota di Indonesia: Kajian 
mengenai konsep, struktur, dan elemen fisik kota sejak peradaban Hindu-Buddha, 
Islam hingga sekarang. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
<UN>
© ida liana tanjung, ���5 | doi �0.��63/9789004�807�4_0�3 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC 3.0) License.
The Indonesianization of the Symbols of Modernity 
in Plaju (Palembang), 1930s–1960s
Ida Liana Tanjung
 Introduction
The process of decolonization, the transfer of power in a political or economic 
sense, is almost invariably accompanied by a change of symbols. When there is 
a transfer of power, it stands to reason that there will be a change in meaning 
of the symbols, which express the identity of the new party in control. Such 
symbolic changes help to communicate the political and economic changes to 
the society. The decolonization of Indonesia was accompanied by symbolic 
actions such as the Proclamation of the Independence of Indonesia in 1945, 
the displaying of the Indonesian flag all over Indonesia, and somewhat earlier, 
the ban on Dutch symbols during the Japanese occupation. The replacement 
of the symbols of the old regime by the new regime goes beyond the political 
and also embraces cultural symbols (Wertheim 1999:121).
As centres of political, economic and social activity, colonial cities produced 
colonial symbols on a large scale in Indonesia. Most colonial symbols were 
‘decolonized’ following Independence in a process, which followed a similar 
pattern in almost all Indonesian cities. Most notable in this process was the 
destruction and replacement of the old colonial symbols, for example, statues 
commemorating a Dutch hero. These were typically destroyed and replaced by 
a monument commemorating heroes of the Independence struggle. This pro-
cess of eradication was by no means complete, however, and not all colonial 
symbols were wiped out by the new regime (Colombijn 2006; Basundoro, 
this volume). Sometimes the new regime did nothing but attach a new, 
Indonesianized meaning to the old form. A good example is when a building of 
the former colonial state was allocated a new function by the Indonesian 
Republic, or when a street or urban quarter was simply given a new name. 
Therefore, if we want to understand the decolonization of colonial symbols, it 
is not sufficient to look at the creation of new symbolic objects; it is just as 
important to interpret the mutation in the meaning of existing symbols.
This interpretive approach to urban symbols is rooted in accepted theories of 
symbolism and signification. The locus of the symbolic meaning of an object 
always lies outside the object and is never inherent in the object itself. People can 
give new meanings to a ‘symbol-carrier’ (also called ‘signifiant’), even when the 
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1 Some confusion exists about whether Plaju was in fact part of Palembang at the turn of the 
century (Nas 1995:137; McGee 1967:55; Taal 2003:66). In a sketch of Palembang in 1667, which 
was a major power at the time, Plaju was part of the city (Hanafiah 1998:77). A nineteenth-
century map of Palembang, however, places the urban boundary on the east bank of the 
River Musi at kampong 14 Ulu (De Clercq 1877:174), which excludes Plaju. Plaju was still not 
on the list of kampong names of the east bank (Seberang Ulu) of Palembang in 1934 (Hanafiah 
1998:363).
2 A strong local symbol at the time was the name Sriwijaya. Sriwijaya referred to a once power-
ful ancient state, which had its centre near Palembang. After considerable debate, and pres-
sure from President Sukarno, the local university and later a large fertilizer factory were 
named Sriwijaya (Vlekke 1959:27; Taal 2003:2; Fikiran Rakyat 3-6-1960, 13-6-1960, 20-8-1960).
symbol-carrier itself does not change (Nas 1993:14; Ahimsa Putra 2002:2; Dillistone 
2002:19; Nas, Jaffe and Samuels 2006:3, 7). In principle all objects can become a 
symbol. Social anthropologists have taught us that people’s behaviour and physi-
cal elements created by people have symbolic meanings, as long as they can be 
associated with life events. Symbolic meaning is also just not restricted to material 
objects, it can also be found in gestures and behaviour, texts, and, what is impor-
tant in this chapter, a certain area or neighbourhood. An area can become identi-
fied with a certain ethnic or social group. Often such particular visual elements of 
an area as architectural details or perhaps one particular building become a sym-
bol for the whole area and its people (Dillistone 2002:22; Taal 2003:26).
In this chapter I will analyse the changing symbolic meanings of one urban 
area, namely Plaju, an oil company town in South Sumatra. Plaju presents an 
interesting subject for research because it was an economic enclave, geograph-
ically proximate to but socially distant from the city of Palembang. Palembang 
stretches along both sides of the River Musi, but the main parts of town lie on 
the west bank (called the Hilir or Ilir side). Plaju is located on the east bank 
(called Hulu or Ulu), about ten kilometers and slightly downstream from the 
centre of Palembang, but still within easy reach by boat (Manurung et al., 
1956:256).1 It was only some time after Independence, in 1965, that a bridge 
connected both banks, thereby opening overland transport between the city 
centre and Plaju. This raises the question of whether political changes, which 
were clearly felt in Palembang, the capital of the province of South Sumatra, 
reverberated in the company town, lying in relative isolation across the river.2 
One particular question raised in this chapter is whether this company town 
lost some of its social exclusiveness as a result of decolonization.
Another interesting aspect of this question is that the decolonization of 
colonial symbols in Plaju was an unusually protracted process, as the Europeans 
who worked in the oil refinery continued to play a leading role after 
Independence. The Indonesianization of corporate enterprise (Lindblad 2008) 
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3 Djohan Hanafiah, Palembang; Ramli Sazili, Subdistrict head of Plaju; Syamsudin, Plaju Ulu 
groove; Husni Majeri, Hubmas Pertamina Plaju (Public Relations of Pertamina Plaju); 
Hasanuddin Saji, Bagus Kuning; Erwinsyah, Fasum Pertamina Plaju (Public Facilities of 
Pertamina Plaju); Makmum Murod, Kompleks Pertamina Plaju groove; M.Sihut, Ladang 
Plaju groove in 1970; Hasan, Kepala Bagian Hukum dan Pertanahan Pertamina Plaju (Head of 
Law and Land Affairs); Nawawi (retired of bpm), Plaju; Edy Thamrin, Plaju; Bawaihi (retired 
of bpm), Tangga Takat; Bakrie Syafar (retired of bpm), Plaju. The names at the interview list 
are only a part of 50 respondents who were interviewed in January and April 2005.
proceeded at a slower pace than did the decolonization of political symbols. 
This raises the question of how the slow pace of economic decolonization 
interfered with the symbolic decolonization in Indonesia. European managers 
of the oil refinery, the central Republican government, and the local govern-
ment of Palembang all had an interest in this oil company town. The upshot 
was that they were constantly in conflict with each other. They were in compe-
tition to take control of such urban symbols in Plaju as houses, buildings, and 
street names.
In short, Plaju is a special case, because it was relatively insulated from 
national, political changes in two ways: its geographical isolation from 
Palembang and the continued presence of Western managers. The company 
town was also special in a third way: it was not only, and perhaps not in the first 
place, a symbol of European might, but a symbol of modernity. Its attraction 
for Indonesians may have relied less on the wish to uproot the Dutch from 
Indonesian soil, than the desire to acquire its modernity.
The theme of this chapter is a discussion of the decolonization of colonial 
symbols in Plaju, where this process apparently ran a different course than in 
other cities in Indonesia. The work is based on a survey of literature and news-
papers about Palembang and Plaju, and interviews which took place during a 
two-month period with retired refinery staff in Plaju and Palembang.3 Before 
moving on to understanding the symbolic changes, it is essential to sketch the 
simultaneous social changes that took place at the time.
 Origin and Development of the Oil Company Town Plaju until the 
Second World War
In 1897 Jan Willem IJzerman, head of the Muara Enim Petroleum Maatschappij, 
planned to establish an oil refinery in Plaju. At the time Plaju was nothing 
more than a small kampong. The Musi Ilir Petroleum Maatschappij also built a 
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smaller refinery in Bagus Kuning, a village near Plaju. Both these refineries, 
which covered an area of about 100 and 21 hectares respectively, became prop-
erty of the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. They were operated by the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (bpm, 
Batavian Oil Company), a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell (Bartlett et al., 
1986:46; De Bruyn Kops 1919:124; Lindblad 2002:105). To improve production, 
bpm closed the Bagus Kuning refinery in 1909 and focused on oil refining in 
Plaju. The Plaju refinery had the advantage of producing marketable second-
ary products and its location near a good river infrastructure ensured refined 
products could be efficiently transported to Java and Singapore by big ships 
(Pertamina 1995:3; Purwanto 1997:90). In 1912, Standard Oil (later Standard 
Vacuum or Stanvac) started a refinery at Sungai Gerong, directly downstream 
from Plaju.
When it established the Plaju refinery, bpm also built houses for its labour-
ers. These were located near the refinery but separated from the indigenous 
kampong Plaju, from which the refinery had derived its name. These houses 
would form the beginning of the company town Plaju. At first the houses were 
built in Malay style on piles, not markedly different from the kampong houses. 
A house on piles (kolong house) was ideal in the local environment, because 
the river at Plaju was still tidal. Moreover, during the rainy season, the River 
Musi used to flood the lower areas, which temporarily would transform the 
area into a swamp (lebak) (Peeters 1997:37; Stibbe 1919:332). The existence of 
swamps and wetlands meant that houses could not be built directly on the 
land. The draining of swamps would have been an expensive undertaking, as 
soil and pebbles had to be imported from outside Palembang. It was only after 
the oil industry in South Sumatra made spectacular progress in the second 
decade of the twentieth century and Plaju grew into the biggest refinery in 
Sumatra (Zed 2003:71) that bpm started to build on the ground in Plaju and 
abandoned the method of construction on piles. The new Plaju complex was 
equipped with various convenient facilities, including a water supply, a tennis 
court, swimming pool, club, hospital, and shopping mall (Nas 1995:140).
Colonial cities were home to a diversity of people of different ethnic, social, 
cultural, and religious backgrounds (Yeoh 1996:1). Typically social stratification 
was based on the tripartite ‘racial’ categorization of the Netherlands Indies in 
which Europeans were the upper class, Chinese the middle class, and the 
indigenous people the lower class. Plaju also formed a multi-ethnic society, but 
one in which the composition was somewhat unusual. The oil industry, which 
was supported by large capital investments and advanced technology from for-
eign oil companies in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, attracted many Westerners to this small place. Expert staff was recruited 
304 Tanjung
<UN>
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had 350 students (Rivai 2001: 70). The Dutch destroyed it together with the refinery during the 
Second World War; later the location was used as a tennis court according to a map of the 
Plaju complex in 1956.
from the Netherlands, Britain, the United States, Canada, Russia, Rumania, 
Japan, Germany, Poland, and other European countries (Purwanto 1997:92). 
These Europeans, Americans, and Japanese were all classified as ‘European’ in 
the colonial legal tripartite division. Compared to companies in Palembang, 
the refinery of Plaju stood out because of the number of European technicians 
it employed. In 1926 208 European employees worked there and in 1929 this 
number had increased to 475 (Zed 2003:79).
While Europeans worked as experts, Indonesian and Chinese labourers, 
generally referred to as Asian Labour, did the rough work. However, there was 
no recruitment of contract labourers in Java and China as had been done ear-
lier for the plantation in East Sumatra, and the tin mines of Bangka, and 
Belitung. Some of the Asian Labour came from South Sumatra; the rest came 
from outside South Sumatra. These people had actively looked for a job in the 
oil companies and after they had been taken on were categorized on the basis 
of their qualification, as skilled manpower or semi-skilled manpower. Between 
1924 and 1926, 80 per cent of the workers in the oil industry came from South 
Sumatra, and 20 per cent from outside, primarily from Java and China (Zed 
2003:77–79). Unlike the indigenous population in Java and perhaps Palembang, 
which was vertically divided into status groups (Wertheim 1959:138–141), the 
Indonesians in Plaju were not further subdivided.
This socio-ethnic categorization of the oil company was reflected in the spa-
tial layout of Plaju. The European settlement was deliberately located at quite 
some distance from the refinery so that its inhabitants would not be disturbed 
by industrial noise and pollution. The Indonesian settlement was located in 
the vicinity of the refinery. It is not entirely unclear where the Chinese settle-
ment would have been. However, according to retired staff members of the 
refinery, there was a Chinese school in front of the Plaju hospital, on the main 
street and I presume that the Chinese settlement was not far from that school.4
The type of housing in Plaju revealed the cultural origin of the inhabitants. 
Most of the European houses were of what can be described as Indies architec-
ture, which was a hybrid style of modern architecture from the Netherlands 
adapted to the tropical climate in Indonesia (Handinoto 1996:163; Figure 12.1). 
The houses were neat and had a spacious yard embellished with flowers and 
green lawns; the bpm employed gardeners to maintain the greenery. One con-
temporary observer, Broersma (1921:35–37), admired this ‘petroleumstad’  
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(oil town). According to him, Plaju was really different from Palembang, which, 
in contrast, he deemed dirty and disorderly.5
However Broersma’s favourable opinion could not count for the whole of 
Plaju as the condition of the Indonesian settlements was less salubrious. 
Indonesian labourers lived in barracks that were equipped with a common 
kitchen and bathroom. Each barrack block was inhabited by more than one 
family and was colloquially named by their residents after a tree or bird in the 
area, such as Tangsi Burung (Bird Barrack) and Tangsi Duren (Durian Barrack). 
The reason the residents used the name Tangsi Burung was, allegedly, because 
the building looked like a birdcage and the name Tangsi Duren was used 
because of the many durian trees around the house.
Besides housing, bpm also provided various facilities in Plaju for the refin-
ery staff, but again, differences existed between the various categories of 
employees. A club (sociëteit), swimming pool and tennis court were facilities 
Figure 12.1  The house of European staff of the bpm Plaju in 1930
Source: kitlv Collection 158486. Courtesy of kitlv/Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden
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that conveyed an image of modernity, but these facilities were located in the 
European area. The function of these facilities and their location emphasized 
colonial social distinctions between indigenous and European people. The 
company also built shops to fulfil the basic requirements of the refinery 
employees, but the European shop was quite different from the Asian shops, as 
the Europeans required different goods. The European shop was known as 
Civo Laut (Sea Civo), because of its location at the Musi River and because 
most goods – like alcoholic drinks, clothes, and canned food – had come from 
overseas. Asian employees did not dream of shopping at Civo Laut and bpm 
had provided them with a shop of their own which was called Civo Darat (Land 
Civo). Here one could buy various Asian necessities like rice and clothes. 
Vegetables and fish were commonly bought from merchants from outside 
Plaju who were generally passing through by boat.6
 Early Indonesianization of Plaju’s Modernity, 1930s
In the 1930s, the oil industry was growing rapidly in South Sumatra; there were 
about 35 oil-mining concessions in the area. The oil industry activity was not 
just restricted to the actual oil fields. Huge pipes hundreds of kilometres in 
length, connecting hundreds of drill towers, oil pumps, and storage tanks, cov-
ered the area before finally reaching the refinery in Plaju (Zed 2003:79–80). The 
company did not want to only rely on water transportation between the refin-
ery and the oil fields, and this concern led bpm to build a road network in 
South Sumatra as well. The development of the oil industry had thus an enor-
mous influence on the whole region. Local communities could use the roads 
and attend schools that were also established by bpm. bpm established 42 
schools throughout South Sumatra before the war (Rivai 2001:70).
Therefore, from the people’s point of view, the oil industry in Plaju was a 
symbol of modernity and prosperity. Working at one of the oil companies 
around Palembang became a dream for many educated youth in the 1930s, 
although they had to compete with people coming from outside South Sumatra 
(Zed 2003:80). The increased participation of educated Indonesians in the oil 
industry in the 1930s caused a shift within the Indonesian labour force, as now 
also indigenous people became part of the staff of bpm, as supervisors, techni-
cians or administrators (Purwanto 1997:92). Previously these positions had 
only been occupied by European staff.
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The Indonesianization of the staff of the refinery had, as corollary, the early 
decolonization of colonial symbols in Plaju, long before political indepen-
dence was achieved. For example, before the 1930s the sociëteit (club) was a 
colonial symbol of European modernity and a space that could only be used by 
European staff (Figure 12.2). After the entry of Indonesians in the higher ech-
elons of the refinery, another club was opened for the Indonesian staff, Sociëteit 
Kranie. For the Indonesian staff, the sociëteit was not only a social club, but 
also formed a way of becoming acculturated to the new culture and it was a 
symbol of their newly won status. The Indonesian staff at the refinery con-
veyed their status and new identity in their behaviour, as they started playing 
table tennis, dancing, and gambling.7 Because of the dancing, both the 
European sociëteit and the Indonesian sociëteit were better known as kamar 
bola (ball room).
In their desire to take part in modern life, the Indonesian staff also tended 
to use Dutch, although typically mixed with Indonesian. A local newspaper 
reported the following: ‘When they spoke, Malay was mixed with some Dutch, 
Figure 12.2  The sociëteit of bpm/Shell at Plaju, on the River Musi in 1955
Source: kitlv Collection 52668. Courtesy of kitlv/Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden
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8 ‘Marika kalau ngomong-ngomong sedikit-sedikit hindia dicampoeri dengan bahasa Belanda 
meskipoen kakoe, sebab memang tidak pandai bahasa asing itoe’ (Pertja Selatan 23-1-1930).
although clumsily, because they had not really mastered that foreign 
language’.8
In religious matters, however, Indonesians of course chose their own path 
and did not follow the European attendance of Christian services. A mosque 
was erected in the Indonesian part of Plaju, funded by the profits of the night 
market (Han Po 11-6-1931). A church, incidentally, was not erected in the 
European area of Plaju until the 1950s. For years, religious services were held in 
a school and eventually in the photo and film club Het Brandpunt (Dunia 
Minyak December 1956).
Remarkably, not only did Indonesians adopt Western manners, the 
European staff also copied elements of Indonesian behaviour. In the 1930s, 
bpm implemented a policy of conscious hybridization. It recommended that 
traditional clothes (sarong and kebaya) and the Malay language should be 
used by Europeans in the household in order to become more aware of the 
Indonesian culture in their daily lives (Pattynama 2004). Plaju was a special 
case in this respect. In 1930 the bpm announced to its European staff that they 
should learn Indonesian as fast as possible in order to become more connected 
to their Indonesian co-workers. The bpm would raise the salary of everybody 
that could speak the language (Pertja Selatan 23-1-1930).
The blending of lifestyles in Plaju also became apparent in housing. The 
bpm had built brick barracks for their labourers using a vernacular style of roof 
while Indonesian staff occupied houses not far from those barracks (Figure 
12.3). Meanwhile, bpm used local architectural elements (again a peculiar, ver-
nacular shape of the roof) for houses that were intended for the European staff 
creating houses that looked quite similar to those built by the N.V. 
Volkshuisvesting in Kali Salak, Surabaya, in 1927 intended for middle class 
Indonesian households (Handinoto 1996:115).
Even Indonesians who were not employed by the bpm took part in the 
modernity of the refinery, although this gave rise to some misgivings on the 
part of the European management. Not all Indonesian labourers could be 
housed inside the complex and they were forced to look for accommodation 
outside, for example in the nearby Kampong Bali and Kampong Plaju. As a 
consequence, the increased interaction between the refinery labourers and 
the kampong residents made the company town more accessible to the kam-
pong people. Concerned that this might affect the safety of the refinery, bpm 
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9 ‘Segala penggawe-penggawe baik dari koeli maoepoen krani-krani, pendeknya seantero dari 
aziatisch personeel masing-masing mereka oleh BPM diberikan tanda penning dan tidak itoe 
sadja, tapi masing-masing mereka djoega diportret, maka djoega dikeraskan peratoeran’ 
(Pewarta Palembang 3-11-1934).
management decided to establish a front gate and a guard post in 1934. 
Henceforth, Indonesians had to have a token from bpm as a kind of identity 
card to enter the refinery compound. This was reported by Pewarta Palembang 
as follows: ‘All workers, both coolies and clerks, in short all Asian personnel, 
were given a token by bpm; and not just that, they were also photographed; 
hence the regulations were tightened’.9
Although the bpm kept the kampong inhabitants out of the refinery, it could 
not prevent them from benefiting from the modern goods available in its 
stores. Refinery workers received an allotment from the bpm in the form of 
clothes, rice and kerosene. Typically, some of these goods were sold to kam-
pong residents with the result that their appearance became increasingly simi-
lar to that of a refinery worker. Nevertheless, some differences remained. A son 
of a refinery worker remembered that when he went to school, he wore shoes 
Figure 12.3  Barracks with vernacular-style roof for bpm labourers, 1930
Source: kitlv Collection 16746. Courtesy of kitlv/Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden
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11 ‘Di bpm (Plaju) tidak pernah ada penyakit cholera, typus dan influenza, karena boeat djaga 
kesehatan pendoedoek telah dikabarkan/disediakan tempat oentoek keperloean’ (Pertja 
Selatan 1-11-1930).
12 Nationaal Archief, The Hague (na), Memorie van Overgave W. Steinbuch, Resident 
Palembang 1933–1936:286.
and his kampong friends did not, because their fathers were not refinery 
workers.10
The modernity of the oil company town of Plaju was not only apparent in 
terms of its outward appearance, but also evidenced by awareness of its inhab-
itants of how to live hygienic, healthy, and neat lives. So, when the local news-
paper reported that Plaju had been infected by cholera and typhoid (Pertja 
Selatan October 1930), the bpm was not amused, since that news damaged the 
modern image of Plaju. bpm complained to Pertja Selatan that because both 
cholera and typhoid were associated with slum areas, these diseases could not 
possibly have infected Plaju. In the next issue Pertja Selatan amended – or 
rather self-censored – its previous chapter, reporting instead: ‘In bpm (Plaju) 
there has never been outbreaks of cholera, typhoid or influenza, because of the 
surveillance of public health, which is provided for its inhabitants’.11
Various efforts were undertaken by the bpm to maintain this clean and 
healthy image of Plaju. For instance, the bpm also established a big hospital on 
the compound, the first hospital in Seberang Ulu, the south side of the River 
Musi.12 Refinery workers who had intentionally scribbled on a public bathroom 
wall were sacked (Pertja Selatan 13-3-1930). From the point of view of the direc-
tors, the graffiti defiled the clean image of the company. From the perspective 
of the labourers, however, their deed can be seen as an act of resistance: a way 
of appropriating public space. It was a symbol of the Indonesianization of 
Plaju, albeit a symbol of the weak, who had no other outlet to express them-
selves and who were denied access to the consumption of modernity.
 Plaju During the Japanese Occupation and the Struggle for 
Independence
In the Second World War Palembang was the main Indonesian target of Japan, 
because half of the oil production in the Netherlands Indies flowed through 
that city. On 14 February 1942, 600 paratroopers landed at one of the airfields of 
Palembang and around the two refinery complexes at Plaju in a surprise attack. 
The Dutch authorities had planned to damage the refineries to put them out of 
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European settlement), and the airport to the north of the city.
commission for six months, in the expectation that by then the Japanese would 
have retreated. In effect they miscalculated, not only about the time the 
Japanese would stay, but also the speed of the Japanese advance on Plaju. In 
the chaos of their retreat, the refineries of bpm and Standard Oil were only 
slightly damaged. The Japanese soon restored the oil installation, which was in 
full swing within half a year (De Jong 2002:35–36).
After their conquest, the Japanese quickly suppressed all symbols of Dutch 
rule such as the flag, portraits of Queen Wilhelmina and other members of the 
Royal Family, images with the words ‘Nederland zal herrijzen’ (the Netherlands 
will rise again), V-badges and buttons with a W on them worn by officials. 
Furthermore the use of Dutch or English language in public was prohibited 
and Japanese or Indonesian had to be used instead (De Jong 2002:69). bpm was 
renamed Dai Ici Seiyuzo (Alumni Pendidikan Tehnik Minyak Plaju 1999:6) and 
the names of buildings and streets in Plaju were replaced by Indonesian ones. 
Naturally, the Japanese did not destroy the colonial buildings, housing and 
facilities, but reused them for military purposes. As the oil refineries at Plaju 
and Sungai Gerong were a strategic place, they became two of the four head-
quarters of Japan in Palembang (Taal 2003:71) (Table 12.1).13
The only legacy of this Japanese period that has remained in Plaju until 
today is the oil engineering school, a symbol of Japan’s lack of expertise needed 
to run an oil industry at that time. When Japan took over the oil refinery they 
were short of competent experts. Most of the staff, who worked for the Japanese 
Table 12.1 Number of students at the oil engineering school in Plaju, 1942–1945
Year Level Number of students
1942–1943 Minaraiko 100
Sekiyu Ko Yoseijo 200
1943–1944 Minaraiko 100
Sekiyu Kogiyo Gakko 400
1944–1945 Sekiyu Kogiyo Gakko 400
Source: Alumni Pendidikan Tehnik Minyak Plaju (1999:15)
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in the oil projects in Indonesia had been taken directly from school and lacked 
practical experience. Therefore the Japanese recalled staff who had formerly 
been employed at the oil installations, in order to get them back in operation 
as quickly as possible. In April 1942 the Japanese brought about 300 oil workers 
from Java to Palembang to work at the refineries (De Jong 2002:50). However, 
most of the staff that worked for the Japanese had only been ordinary labour-
ers during the Dutch era, and as a result Japan later decided to establish an 
engineering school in Plaju to upgrade the skills of these labourers, as well as 
to train all young people from the Palembang region who had previously 
attended a Hollandsch Inlandsche School (his, Dutch Language Elementary 
School) or Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (mulo, Advanced Elementary 
Education). Many of them came from the environs of Palembang (Bartlett et 
al., 1986:56; Alumni Pendidikan Tehnik Minyak Plaju 1999:15). In total, almost 
1,200 people followed the oil engineering education during the Japanese years. 
Although the quality of the lessons was not as hoped for, the oil engineering 
school was the first attempt to train Indonesian people in the oil industry 
(Bartlett et al. 1986:57).
After the Japanese surrender and the proclamation of the Indonesian 
Republic, Plaju was taken over by the young Republic. The management was 
transferred to one department of the Palembang Residency, the Mine and Oil 
Division, headed by Dr M. Isa. Isa was the former chairman of Partai Indonesia 
Raya and the founder of the militant oil labour organization Persatoean 
Pegawai Minyak (ppm, Union of Oil Workers) that sided with the Republic and 
which, after Isa became head of the Mine and Oil Division, was headed by 
Salam Faiman. To celebrate the transfer to the Republic the oil labourers of the 
Plaju refinery organized a big party in restaurant ‘Asia’ (Zed 2003:338–339).
The new Republican leaders were initially euphoric about controlling the 
biggest refinery in Palembang but they soon had to face the return of the bpm, 
coming on the heels of the Allied forces that sought to regain control of the oil 
industry. Consequently the Plaju refinery became a contested area. On the one 
side there was the government of the Indonesian Republic in Palembang and 
the oil workers association ppm, and on the other side, the bpm (Shell) that 
was the owner of the refinery before the Second World War (Basundoro 2004:7). 
The conflict was solved by the so-called ‘olie diplomasi’ (oil diplomacy). The 
district head of Palembang, Dr Ak Gani, proposed a division of tasks to the 
allied forces, which resulted in an agreement about oil production quota. On 
behalf of the Republic, ppm would hold the concession, while bpm (Shell) 
became the actual operator of the refinery (Zed 2003:359–360). This successful 
diplomatic effort by Ak Gani in fact represented the first step towards the 
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nationalization of the most important economic resource of South Sumatra. 
However, because of financial constraints, complete nationalization could not 
be carried out entirely at that moment. The Republic needed the foreign com-
pany as investors. During the first year of the Revolution, the installations at 
Plaju were guarded by a Japanese battalion, Asano Butai. In August 1946 the 
Japanese finally transferred the guarding of Plaju to the Allied forces 
(Mangkualam 1986:72; Zed 2003:360). In the next month, on 23 September 
1946, the management of the Plaju refinery was transferred back to its initial 
owner, namely the bpm (Manurung et al., 1956:126).
After the transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic by the Dutch 
in 1949, the bpm lost something of its political protection and the company 
had to become more responsive to public demands. This became clear, for 
example, in a land dispute in 1956. In 1956, a plot of land located in Kampong 
Ladang Plaju, but owned by the bpm, was sized by the government and given 
to the kampong residents.14 On other occasions kampong residents took the 
initiative to request the government to take over bpm assets, and those 
requests were not limited to land. In one case the local government was 
urged by residents to take over the wall that surrounded the bpm complex, 
because according to the residents, this wall was very disturbing to the peo-
ple living next to it (presumably because their free passage was blocked). 
Consequently, the municipal council ordered bpm to demolish its wall and to 
give the debris to the kampong residents so that they could pave a path. 
Although this time the local administration did not back the kampong resi-
dents, and the request was refused by the bpm, the request was unmistakably 
an effort of the local population to break into the exclusiveness of the Plaju 
complex.
 The Entry of the Army in Plaju
One unforeseen consequence of the struggle for independence was a struggle 
for housing and land between the state, corporate enterprise, and the various 
groups of armed forces. The bpm and Stanvac oil companies each gave up 
between 50 and 60 houses to the Dutch army during the Revolution to protect 
Palembang against Republican forces (Colombijn 2010:259–260, 341–343). 
The main object of the army was to take possession of the so-called ‘Rumah 
Pintu Besi’ (Iron Door Houses), whose doors were made of iron (Figure 12.4). 
The Iron Door Houses were located at 60th, 61th, 63th, 64th, and 65th Street, 
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and Dutch forces in Palembang from November until December 1946. The violence 
reached its climax in what Palembang residents call Pertempuran Lima Hari Lima Malam 
(the Battle of Five Days and Five Nights), taking place around 1 January 1947 (Mangkualam 
1986:111–166; Zed 2003:415).
16 Interview April, 2005.
just outside the refinery, but were still considered part of the oil complex. 
They were among the first houses that were built by the bpm for European 
employees, especially house number 1 to 7.
The transfer process of the Iron Door Houses to the military began when 
Plaju came under control of the Allied Forces in late 1945. The Allied Forces 
initially claimed some of the houses of bpm that were strategically located 
in front of the Plaju complex. After the Allied Forces left Palembang on 
9 November 1946 (Zed 2003:413), the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger 
(knil, Royal Netherlands Indies Army) took over the Iron Door Houses.15 
Later, the Indonesian army took over the European houses that were occupied 
by the Dutch Army, including the Iron Door Houses, but not other houses in 
Plaju. The other European-style houses in Plaju continued to be occupied by 
European and Indonesian employees who held the higher functions in the 
refinery’s administration and operation.16 In other words, the European style 
Figure 12.4  An Iron Door House in Plaju 
Photograph: Ida Liana Tanjung
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17 Archive of hkp up III Pertamina, Plaju (hkp), Recht van Eigendom of the Nomura land 
No. 108/p, 8-12-1951.
18 hkp, letter No. 5270, 22-9-1952.
19 hkp, letter Commander T.T II/Sriwijaya to Deputy of Sumatera bpm. No. K 84/SN/T.T.II, 
3-2-1953.
20 hkp, letter General Manager Sumatera bpm, C. Hull, 14-12-1959.
houses in Plaju expressed both change and continuity in the political domain 
(Evers 1993:83). The transfer of the Iron Door Houses to indigenous occupants 
symbolized the liberation of Indonesia and the Indonesianization of urban 
space. On the other hand, the return of Europeans to Plaju in 1945 and contin-
ued occupancy of houses by oil company staff reflected a continuation of the 
image of Plaju as an exclusive settlement, which continued to exist at least 
until 1965.
The significance of the presence of the army also became increasingly 
apparent. In a land dispute case in 1952 W.G.J. Vesseur, representative of the 
bpm in Sumatra, lodged a complaint to D.I Pandjaitan, Commander of 
the Territory II/Sriwijaya South Sumatra Division. The complaint concerned 
the army’s use of land of the former NV Nomura Oost. This former plantation 
belonged to the Japanese rubber export firm Nomura Shokusan Company, 
which was taken over by Lee Rubber, the biggest rubber export company in 
Palembang, which had its main office in Singapore (Zed 2003:387). The bpm had 
purchased the land belonging to NV Nomura, which was located next to the 
Bagus Kuning complex, in 1951.17 Its is probable that the bpm controlled only a 
part of this land, the other part of the Nomura land being in the hands of the 
Indonesian Army. The Army had built a barrack, which crossed the boundary 
with the Bagus Kuning complex. Vasseur proposed to the Army either of two 
options: either to pay rent for the use of the land and buildings, or to demolish 
the barrack, so that bpm could erect a border wall.18 The commander of the 
Sriwijaya Division rejected both options and suggested instead that if bpm 
wished to build a wall around its compound, it should be built at at least five 
metres distance from the barrack.19 The land dispute continued for years, until 
the nationalization of bpm in 1958–1959, when the bpm was finally forced to 
transfer a large part of its assets, including the land of NV Nomura, to the Army.20
 Changing Names of Streets and Buildings in Plaju
The gradual Indonesianization of the higher echelons of the staff of the 
refinery, which started in the 1930s and continued at a faster pace in the 
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Independence. A street in Plaju was named after him and a statue dedicated to him and 
his soldiers was unveiled in the 1970s (Mangkualam 1986).
1950s, was reflected in the changing symbolic landscape in Plaju. Names of 
streets and places have significant symbolic meanings, which provide infor-
mation about the ideas and interests of the names they record (Yeoh 
1996:221). When New Guinea was excluded from the territory of the 
Indonesian Republic in 1949, many Indonesians felt very disappointed, and 
as a result the dislike of the Dutch reached a point that all associations with 
the Dutch colonial past had to be wiped out. One form of this process of eras-
ing the remnants of Dutch colonialism was the changing of street names and 
names of buildings. This, as Sandra Taal (2003:154) has argued, was of par-
ticular significance because unlike for instance statues, streets are found 
everywhere.
According to Peter Nas (1993:30) street names can convey so-called collec-
tive, historical and projective memories. Projective memory applies particu-
larly to streets laid out as a grid, in which streets are merely numbered and do 
not get a more individual name. In Plaju, street naming was based on such a 
system, which was appropriate for a new town, enabling it to be expanded sys-
tematically in the future. In colonial times, the bpm had named all streets in 
Plaju Weg (Road) followed by a number (Weg 1 until Weg 71).
After Independence, the municipal governments changed most Dutch 
names in their respective cities. Many local administrations chose to name the 
main streets after national heroes from the Revolution or earlier times and as a 
result almost every Indonesian city has a uniform pattern of names that 
emphasize national identity (Taal 2003:155). However, this was not the case in 
Plaju, because the company town was out of reach of the nationalist municipal 
government of Palembang. As the names in Plaju were changed by the com-
pany and not by the government, there were no streets with names of heroes.21 
All that the company did was change the Dutch ‘Weg’ into the English word 
‘Road’, in order to adapt to the current political situation after Independence 
that tended to be hostile towards Dutch companies and to reflect the compa-
ny’s part-English ownership (Table 12.2).
In contrast to the projective system, Asians tend to name streets and places 
after the peculiar characteristics of their kampong and landmarks related to daily 
life experiences. For example, in Singapore the Armenian Street (as it was called 
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Table 12.2 The change of street names in the bpm Plaju complex
Before 1949 1949–1959 1959–1965 After 1965
Weg 23 Melati Road 23 Djl. Melati (Djl. 23) Jl. Melati
Weg 23 a Kamboja Road 23 a Djl. Kamboja (Djl. 23a) Jl. Kamboja
Weg 24 Tjempaka Road 24 Djl. Tjempaka (Djl. 24) Jl. Cempaka
Weg 24 a Kemang Road 24 a Djl. Kemang (Djl. 24 a) Jl. Kemang
Weg 25 Mawar Road 25 Djl. Mawar (Djl. 25) Jl. Mawar
Weg 26 Teratai Road 26 Djl Teratai (Djl. 26) Jl. Teratai
Weg 27 Terusan Road 27 Djl. Terusan (Djl. 27) Jl. Teratai
Weg 30 Beringin Road 30 Djl, Beringin (Djl. 30) Jl. Beringin
Weg 31 Antara Road 31 Djl. Antara (Djl. 31) Jl. Antara
Weg 32 Bakaran Road 32 Djl. Bakaran (Djl. 32) Jl. Bakaran
Weg 33 Utama Road 33 Djl. Utama (Djl. 33) Jl. Utama
Weg 34 Rengas Road 34 Djl. Rengas (Djl. 34) Jl. Rengas
Weg 35 Upaya Road 35 Djl. Upaya (Djl, 35) Jl. Upaya
Weg 37 Durian Road 37 Djl. Durian (Djl. 37) Jl. Durian
Weg 39 Kelapa Sawit Road 39 Djl. Kelapa Sawit (Djl. 39) Jl. Kelapa Sawit
Weg 40 Pengantingan Road 40 Djl. Pengantingan (Djl. 40) Jl. Pengantingan
Weg 41 Permai Road 41 Djl. Permai (Djl. 41) Jl. Permai
Weg 43 Petanang Road 43 Djl. Petanang (Djl. 43) Jl. Petanang
Weg 46 Kenari Road 46 Djl. Kenari (Djl. 46) Jl. Kenari
Weg 47 Tembesu Road 47 Djl. Tembesu (Djl. 47) Jl. Tembesu
Weg 48 Djati Road 48 Djl. Djati (Djl. 48) Jl. Jati
Weg 49 Tjemara Road 49 Djl. Tjemara (Djl. 49) Jl. Cemara
Weg 49 Lamtaro Road 49 Djl. Lamtaro (Djl. 49) Jl. Lamtaro
Weg 50 Lontar Road 50 Djl. Lontar (Djl. 50) Jl. Lontar
Weg 51 Waru Road 51 Djl. Waru (Djl. 51) Jl. Waru
Weg 51 Bluntas Road 51 Djl. Bluntas (Djl. 51) Jl. Bluntas
Weg 53 Ketapang Road 53 Djl. Ketapang (Djl. 53) Jl. Ketapang
Weg 54 Telaga Road 54 Djl. Telaga (Djl. 54) Jl. Telaga
Weg 55 Kenanga Road 55 Djl. Kenanga (Djl. 55) Jl. Kenanga
Weg 56 Kebon Djahe Road 56 Djl. Kebon Djahe (Djl, 56) Jl. Kebon Jahe
Weg 57 Anggrek Road 57 Djl. Anggrek (Djl. 57) Jl. Anggrek
Weg 70 Rampai Road 70 Djl. Rampai (Djl, 70) Jl. Rampai
Weg 71 Bakung Road 71 Djl. Bakung (Djl, 71) Jl. Bakung
Source: Arsip up III Pertamina Plaju, maps of Plaju from 1949, 1956 and 1959
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by the British overlord) was called Seng Po Toa Chu Au (Behind the big house 
Seng Po) by the Chinese inhabitants (Yeoh 1996:229–231). In the same vein, after 
1949 ‘Asian’ names were added to the road numbers in Plaju. For instance, Road 
31 became Antara Road 31, because it ran ‘between’ (antara in Indonesian) the 
refinery and the housing complex. Road 30 was renamed Beringin Road 30, 
because a banyan tree (waringin or beringin) stood there. This Asian way of 
nomenclature introduced after Independence confirms the impression that the 
public symbols of Plaju were gradually Indonesianized. The Indonesianization of 
Plaju was different from other places, however, because no names of heroes were 
imposed by the state; the place making was bottom-up based on local character-
istics of the landscape.
Mounting tension over New Guinea resulted in the nationalization of Dutch 
companies in Indonesia in 1957–1958 (Mackie 2002:405). Because of its part-
British status, the bpm escaped nationalization, but the massive departure of 
Dutch staff caused instability in the company. Within six months the company 
replaced almost all its Dutch managers and staff with English and American 
personnel or promoted Indonesian workers to more responsible positions 
(Bartlett et al., 1986:116). In short, bpm wanted to rid the enterprise of its Dutch 
image and promote instead both an international and local image. Around 
1955, the company’s name bpm became Shell Petroleum. Other oil companies 
in Indonesia followed this example; the Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum 
Maatschappij (a subsidiary of Standard Oil) and Nederlandsche Pacific 
Petroleum Maatschappij changed their names into Stanvac and Caltex Pacific 
(Basundoro 2004:15).
The naming policies of the foreign oil companies could eventually not stop 
the progressive nationalization, which was given juridical footing by the imple-
mentation of Law 44/1960 (Bartlett et al., 1986:173). Shell and other foreign oil 
companies were forced to accept a gradual take-over by the Indonesian state. 
This transfer would take almost five years (1960–1965). During that period, 
names of streets and places in Plaju were further Indonesianized. All English 
names carrying the word ‘Road’ were replaced by the Indonesian word ‘Djalan’ 
and after 1965 the projective system of giving names was abandoned com-
pletely. In this way names of streets inside the complex were soon no different 
from street names in the kampongs outside the complex.
At the same time as the street names in Plaju were changed, names of build-
ings were replaced following a similar pattern. Dutch names of important 
buildings were changed into English and later into Indonesian names 
(Table 12.3).
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 Conclusion
Plaju was a symbol of modernity in the early and mid-twentieth century, both 
because of the capital-intensive industry and the modern facilities offered to the 
labourers and white-collar staff. At first, the symbols of modernity were very much 
also symbols of Dutch colonialism: the modern villas, club, tennis court, etcetera 
were exclusively used by Europeans. The Indonesianization of the oil refinery started 
in the 1930s, long before political independence was achieved, when Indonesians 
gradually entered the middle echelons of the refinery. They did not only get better-
paid jobs, but also appropriated various symbols of modernity. For instance, they 
established a social club of their own, where they experimented with a modern life-
style (such as ballroom dancing) and spoke a hybrid language containing Dutch 
words. At the same time, also the European staff became Indonesianized, when they 
were stimulated to learn Indonesian and wear Indonesian dress (sarong and kabaya).
After Independence, the Indonesianization of the refinery progressed: more 
Indonesians were promoted to top ranks and British and Americans also replaced 
Dutch personnel. The Indonesianization of Plaju also took other forms, as when the 
Indonesian army occupied a considerable number of houses. The Indonesianization 
of Plaju took also a symbolic form, because names of streets and important buildings 
were changed into Indonesian. In the case of Plaju, it is significant that the process of 
name change occurred more slowly than in most other places, and more impor-
tantly, that names were first changed from Dutch to English and only in a second 
phase from English to Indonesian. For company directors, it was more important to 
avoid a Dutch image than to adopt an Indonesian appearance. For the same reason, 
new Indonesian street names refer only to local situations and not to national heroes.
Table 12.3 Names of important buildings in Plaju
before 1949 1949–1959 after 1959
Societeit Unitas Club Unitas Arena Ria
Societeit Kranie Club House Balai Ria
Bioscoop Cinema Aneka Ria
Hollandsch-Inlandsche 
School
Indonesian Elementary School Sekolah Dasar Bakaran
Source: Archive of up III Pertamina Plaju, maps of Plaju from 1949, 1956, 1959
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In short, the Indonesianization of the oil refinery in Plaju was exceptional 
compared to major cities in Indonesia, firstly, because it started relatively early 
before 1945, and secondly, because it progressed relatively slowly after 1945. The 
explanation for this slow process was probably the relative isolation of Plaju. 
The political storms in Palembang were only a breeze by the time they reached 
the refinery. The company, throughout its own name changes, remained in con-
trol of the refinery until the mid-1960s. The municipal government of Palembang 
tried to include Plaju in its jurisdiction and even built an office for the kampong 
head in front of the gate of the Plaju housing complex (Manurung et al., 1956:190). 
The establishment of this office as a symbol of the Palembang municipality, and 
by extension the national state, did not affect the exclusiveness of Plaju.
According to Wolfram-Seifert (cited by Taal 2003), the exclusiveness of the 
Plaju refinery came to an end when the Ampera Bridge was built in 1965. Even 
then, however, Plaju was not totally integrated into the city of Palembang. The 
refinery came under the direct control of the central government in Jakarta 
and as a result the newly created symbols had a more national rather than 
regional character. For example, the name of the refinery changed from pt 
Shell Indonesia into pn Permina and after the fusion in 1965 with Pertamin it 
was eventually renamed Pertamina (Taal 2003:79). Furthermore, most of the 
refinery workers were recruited from outside Palembang with the result that 
people from Palembang did not regard the area as a part of Palembang. The 
Indonesianization of the symbols of modernity of Plaju did not entail a further 
integration of the refinery into Palembang.
References
Ahimsa Putra, Heddy Shri (2002). ‘Tanda, simbol, budaya dan ilmu budaya’, paper pre-
sented at the ‘Cultural Seminar’, Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Gadjah Mada 
University, Yogyakarta, 13 June.
Alumni Pendidikan Tehnik Minyak Plaju (1999). Sejarah tehnik minyak Plaju 1942–1945: 
Kepeloporan semangat juang 1945. Palembang: Penerbit Unsri.
Bartlett, Anderson G. et al. (1986). Pertamina: Perusahaan minyak nasional. Jakarta: Inti 
Idayu Press.
Basundoro, Purnawan (2004). ‘Nasionalisasi dengan jalan damai: Indonesianisasi 
usaha pertambangan minyak di Indonesia’, paper presented at the workshop ‘The 
economic side of decolonization’, Yogyakarta, 16–19 August.
Broersma, R. (1921). Palembangsche verkenningen. [S.l.: s.n.; offprint from the 
Locomotief.]
321The Indonesianization of the Symbols of Modernity in Plaju
<UN>
Bruyn Kops, G.F. de (1919). Overzicht van Zuid-Sumatra. Amsterdam: Zuid-Sumatra 
Instituut.
Clercq, F.S.A. de (1877). ‘De hoofdplaats Palembang’, Tijdschrift van het Aardrijkskundig 
Genootschap 2:174–175.
Colombijn, Freek (2006). ‘Sign of the times: Symbolic change around Indonesian inde-
pendence’, in: Peter J.M. Nas and Annemarie Samuels (eds), Hypercity: The symbolic 
side of urbanism, pp. 113–144. London, Bahrain and New York: Kegan Paul.
Colombijn, Freek (with the assistance of Martine Barwegen) (2010). Under construc-
tion: The politics of urban space and housing during the decolonization of Indonesia, 
1930–1960. Leiden: kitlv Press.[Verhandelingen kitlv 246.]
Dillistone, F.W. (2002). The power of symbols. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.
Evers, Hans-Dieter (1993). ‘Simbolisme perkotaan di Indonesia: Kasus Padang “Kota 
Tercinta”’, Prisma 22(4):81–91.
Fasum Pertamina Plaju (n.y.). Denah perumahan Plaju dan Bagus Kuning tahun 
1905–1957.
Hanafiah, Djohan (ed.) (1998). Sejarah perkembangan pemerintah kotamadya Daerah 
Tingkat II Palembang. Palembang: Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II 
Palembang.
Handinoto (1996). Perkembangan kota dan arsitektur kolonial Belanda di Surabaya 
1870–1940. Surabaya: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat, 
Universitas Kristen Petra and Yogyakarta: Andi.
Jong, L. de (2002). The collapse of a colonial society: The Dutch in Indonesia during the 
Second World War. Leiden: kitlv Press. [Verhandelingen kitlv 206.]
Kerchman, J.M.W. (ed.) (1930). 25 Jaren decentralisatie in Nederlandsch-Indië: 1905–1930. 
Semarang: Vereeniging voor Locale Belangen.
Lindblad, J. Thomas (2002). ‘The late colonial state and economic expansion, 1900–
1930s’, in: Howard Dick et al., The emergence of a national economy: An economic 
history of Indonesia, 1800–2000, pp. 111–152. St Leonards: Allen and Unwin and 
Leiden: kitlv Press.
Lindblad, J. Thomas (2008). Bridges to new business: The economic decolonization of 
Indonesia. Leiden: kitlv Press. [Verhandelingen kitlv 245.]
Mackie, J.A.C. (2002). ‘Periode 1941–1965 sebagai selingan dalam pembentukan eko-
nomi nasional: Bagaimana sebaiknya kita menafsirkan’, in: J.Th. Lindblad (ed.), 
Fondasi historis ekonomi Indonesia, pp. 394–415. Yogyakarta: Pusat Studi Sosial Asia 
Tenggara, Universitas Gadjah Mada.
Manurung, P.K. et al. (1956). Sumatera Selatan. Palembang: Djawatan Penerangan 
Propinsi Sumatra Selatan.




McGee, T.G. (1967). The Southeast Asian city: A social geography of the primate cities of 
Southeast Asia. London: Bell.
Nas, Peter J.M. (1993). ‘Jakarta, city full of symbols: An essay in symbolic ecology’, in: 
Peter J.M. Nas (ed.), Urban symbolism, pp. 13–37. Leiden: Brill.
Nas, Peter J.M. (1995). ‘Palembang: Venice of the East’, in: Peter J.M. Nas (ed.), Issues in 
urban development: Case studies from Indonesia, pp. 132–142. Leiden: Research 
School cnws. [cnws Publications 33.]
Nas, Peter J.M., Rivke Jaffe and Annermarie Samuels (2006). ‘Urban symbolical ecology 
and the hypercity: State of the art and challenges for the future’, in: Peter J.M. Nas 
and Annemarie Samuels (eds), Hypercity: The symbolic side of urbanism, pp. 1–19. 
London, Bahrain and New York: Kegan Paul.
Pattynama, Pamela (2004). ‘Keluarga Indis: Kehidupan sehari-hari pada masa sebelum 
perang di Batavia’, in: Joost Coté and Loes Westerbeek (eds), Recalling the Indies: 
Kebudayaan kolonial dan identitas poskolonial, pp. 29–57. Yogyakarta: Syarikat 
Indonesia.
Peeters, Jeroen (1997). Kaum tuo, kaum mudo: Perubahan religius di Palembang 1821–
1942. Jakarta: inis.
Pertamina (1995). Perkembangan kilang Plaju/Sungai Gerong (Kilang Musi) kurun 
waktu 1895–1995. Jakarta: Perpustakaan Pusat Pertamina.
Purwanto, Bambang (1997). ‘Minyak dan ekonomi di karesidenan Jambi dan Palembang 
pada akhir masa kolonial’, Lembaran Sejarah 1(1):81–102.
Rivai, Liza (2001). Sejarah pendidikan di kota Palembang. Yogyakarta: Philosophy Press.
Stibbe, D.G. (ed.) (1919). Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië vol. 3. ’s Gravenhage: 
Nijhoff and Leiden: E.J. Brill. [second edition.]
Taal, Sandra (2003). Between ideal and reality: Images of Palembang. [PhD thesis, Leiden 
University.]
Vlekke, Bernard H.M. (1959). Nusantara: A history of Indonesia. The Hague: Van Hoeve. 
[Originally published by Harvard University Press, 1943.]
Wertheim, W.F. (1959). Indonesian society in transition: A study of social change. The 
Hague and Bandoeng: Van Hoeve. [2nd revised edition.]
Wertheim, W.F. (1999). Masyarakat Indonesia dalam transisi: Studi perubahan sosial. 
Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana Yogya.
Yeoh, Brenda S.A. (1996). Contesting space: Power relations and the urban built environ-
ment in colonial Singapore. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Zed, Mestika (2003). Kepialangan politik dan revolusi Palembang 1900–1950. Jakarta: 
LP3ES.
<UN>
© sarkawi b. husain, ���5 | doi �0.��63/9789004�807�4_0�4 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC 3.0) License.
1 According to the statistics of February 1959, the population of Surabaya consisted of: 1,003,312 
Indonesians; 125,747 Chinese; 12,268 Europeans; 8,703 Arabs; 2,191 Indian/Pakistanis; and 117 
Stateless persons (Surabaja Post 25-3-1959).
Chinese Cemeteries as a Symbol of Sacred Space
Control, Conflict, and Negotiation in Surabaya, Indonesia
Sarkawi B. Husain
 Introduction
‘Hidup hanya menunda kekalahan’ (Life simply means postponing defeat), said 
Chairil Anwar in his poem Derai-derai cemara. Everybody will die one day. Yet, 
is that the end of everything? It is for the individual who is dead, but not to his 
or her remaining family and relatives. Death can sometimes stir up a hornet’s 
nest of problems. Funerals might be obstructed, graves might be robbed, tomb-
stones might be destroyed, and cemeteries may be relocated, having to yield to 
city development. These problems represent the fate that has befallen Chinese 
cemeteries in Indonesia. In Yogyakarta, for instance, a Chinese cemetery abut-
ting the housing complex of the Gadjah Mada University (ugm) had to be relo-
cated because the land was needed for a campus mosque. In Makassar, a Chinese 
cemetery had to make way for an office for the governor of South Sulawesi.
As Surabaya developed in the 1950s, Chinese cemeteries also had to be closed. 
The urban population grew rapidly after independence. Squatters were looking 
for land on which to build a dwelling, and both the municipality and real-estate 
developers needed land for housing estates. The threat posed to tombs in the 
middle of housing areas was especially high on two counts. Firstly, on the prac-
tical level, they were considered excellent building land for housing.
Secondly, the graveyards conflicted with the desire of the urban government 
to give the city a modern appearance, one which befitted the newly won inde-
pendent status of the country. The scattered graveyards violated the aesthetics 
of order and regularity, which also in colonial times were in the eyes of plan-
ners a sign of modernization (Van Roosmalen, this volume). The cemeteries 
thus ran counter to the desired modern image of Surabaya. Chinese cemeteries 
in particular were deemed inappropriately located in the centre, because in a 
sense they encapsulated the problematic relationship between the politically 
dominant, indigenous majority and the economically powerful, but politically 
weak, Chinese minority.1 Two excerpts of the reasons given by the Surabaya 
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2 ‘Mengingat akan perkembangan-perkembangan pada dewasa ini, sangatlah tidak pada tem-
patnja adanja makam ditengah kota, seperti jang terletak di Djl. Tambaksari, Embong Malang, 
Djl. Pandegiling dsb […]. Demikian djuga untuk memelihara akan keindahan kota, maka perlu 
sekali sekarang dimulainja penutupan makam-makam tersebut’. Arsip Kota Surabaya (aks), 
box 118, no. 1824.
3 ‘[…] karena sudah tidak sesuai lagi dengan keadaan kota, maka makam-makam didalam kota 
itu harus ditutup. Ini untuk keperluan perluasan kota […] Diatas tanah yang kosong itu lalu 
diberdirikan rumah-rumah jang baik dan jang sesuai dengan keindahan kota’. (Surabaja Post 
25-3-1958).
municipal government for its decision to close cemeteries in 1958 refer to the 
aesthetics (keindahan kota) and the fact that the cemeteries are no longer up-
to-date with a modern city.
In view of the latest developments, it is inappropriate to have cemeteries 
such as those on Jl. Tambaksari Street, Embong Malang, Pandegiling, etc. 
in the middle of the city. […] Moreover, if the aesthetic quality of the city 
is to be maintained, it is essential to close down the cemeteries.2
[…] Because they are no longer consonant with current conditions in 
the city, the cemeteries in the city should be closed. This is in order to 
enlarge the city […] On that particular vacant land, decent houses, which 
would enhance the aesthetics of the city will be built3
For its part, in view of the significance of graveyards in their culture, the 
Chinese community was extremely upset by the closure of its cemeteries by 
the municipality. The reasons for closing the cemeteries and using the land for 
housing complexes reflect the insensitivity of the local government to the exis-
tence of a cemetery, which was more than just a resting place for the deceased; 
it was a potent symbol of respect for the ancestors (Figure 13.1). In the eyes of 
Chinese people, a cemetery is redolent with a sacrosanct significance and 
function. Any negligence in caring for the ancestors’ tombs could have fatal 
consequences for their children and grandchildren. Quite apart from any 
sacred significance, a tomb is also a cogent reminder of people’s social- 
economic status; the reason rich people are willing to buy a large piece of land 
in which to bury their parents.
In Chinese culture, a tomb has enormous importance as it is believed that 
the soul of the deceased remains in contact with surviving family members. 
In order to show proper respect to the ancestors, it was necessary to con-
struct a tomb as soundly as possible. In Chinese culture, respect for parents is 
called Hao and this is shown to living parents every day, but respect for the 
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dead is paid differently. Confucianism teaches a tradition of strong kinship ties 
in which the family forms the basis for preserving customs and culture, and 
enormous respect is paid not only to the living parents but, by extension, also 
to the ancestors (Herlianto 2001:5; Moerman 1929:128–136).
Therefore, having a child, particularly a son, is of enormous importance to 
a Chinese family. A son is needed to continue the patrilineal lineage and to 
bring blessing (hokky), and also eventually he will replace his father in his 
role as guardian of the ancestors’ ashes. Given this situation, a parent’s tomb 
is thought of as the focal point of kinship ties among family members and 
relatives. Therefore, there is an annual celebration in the cemetery on 
Cengbeng Day, when relatives gather, pray, and make offerings at the ances-
tors’ tomb.
The preparations for a Chinese funeral can be complicated because it is 
essential that a tomb have good feng shui, that is: it should be located on a hill 
in the vicinity of flowing water (Figure  13.2). Bearing this in mind, many 
Chinese opt for cremation and preserve the ashes in an ash house in order to 
avoid tombs with bad feng shui and, of course, excessive expenses. Moreover, 
special account has to be taken of the orientation of the tomb, the tombstone, 
Figure 13.1 Funeral procession of a Chinese person in Surabaya, around 1900
Source: kitlv Collection 9853. Courtesy of kitlv/Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden
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and the date of the funeral. The Chinese believe that whether the feng shui is 
good or bad will become evident in a year’s time revealed in potential tangible 
influences on the son. At all costs, the Chinese usually strive to avoid changing 
the location of a cemetery considered good or, at least, not bad. However, if 
there are indications manifested through bad effects, a feng shui expert will 
immediately be summoned to examine the tomb to establish the reasons for 
the pernicious influences, and if possible, see if it can be upgraded to eliminate 
the atmosphere of calamity.
The measures taken by the city government in closing several Chinese cem-
eteries in Surabaya in the 1950s severely disturbed the sacredness of the tombs 
and eroded respect for ancestors. Instead of being a sacred symbol of the rela-
tionship with the ancestors, these cemeteries were unceremoniously trans-
formed into building land, contested between parties with disparate interests. 
The relocation of cemeteries for city development and dwellings, office build-
ings, mosques, and other purposes sent palpable signals, which could not be 
ignored, that a cemetery as a sacred symbol had to bow to economic and politi-
cal symbols (Nas 1993). This chapter examines the ways in which Chinese cem-
eteries in Surabaya were disturbed and the Chinese using them felt threatened 
as the city was modernized, and how their role in Chinese society was super-
seded by other symbols.
Figure 13.2  Chinese graves at Embong Malang, Surabaya, 1880
Source: kitlv Collection 36D356. Courtesy of kitlv/Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden
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4 aks, box  1827, no. 45.887, Bijvoegsel van het Provinciaal Blad van Oost-Java Serie B, no. 4, 
1-4-1940. There were separate regulations for other ethnic or religious groups.
 Chinese Cemeteries during the Colonial Era and the Japanese 
Occupation
In the face of rapid population growth, the position of a cemetery as a last rest-
ing place became crucial. In the colonial era, cemeteries were located in the 
residential areas of each community group in Surabaya. The European ceme-
tery was close to the Krembangan church, in the vicinity of the European area 
around Jembatan Merah. The Arab cemetery was located in the Arab quarter, 
Ampel. The principal Chinese cemetery was in the Chinese quarter, located 
between Handelstraat (now Jalan Kembang Jepun) and Chinesche Voorstraat 
(now Jalan Karet) (von Faber 1931:314–319), but Chinese graves were found in at 
least ten different locations in Surabaya.
In the last days of the colonial era, matters relating to the Chinese cemetery were 
regulated in the Verordening op de Algemeene Begraafplaatsen voor Chineezen 
in de Stadsgemeente Soerabaja. This regulation was issued on 7 Feb ruary 1940 
and ratified two months later.4 The decree set out the conditions pertaining to 
such matters as the burial permit, the digging of the grave, transportation of 
the corpse, tombstone, as well as the maintenance costs of the cemetery.
In contrast to the period after independence, the Chinese cemeteries raised 
very few problems during the colonial era and the subsequent Japanese occu-
pation. There are several possible explanations for this relative lack of prob-
lems relating to cemeteries. One possible reason might have been the discipline 
exercised by the determination of the Dutch and Japanese colonial govern-
ments to protect public places. Another possible reason is that the Chinese 
population had more political clout before 1942; for instance, they were enti-
tled to reserved seats on the municipal council. Arguably most importantly, 
there was less population pressure and more other available land.
During their occupation, the Japanese did interfere with the Muslim ceme-
teries, which lay scattered throughout the town. On 1 August 1942, the Japanese 
government announced the closing of some Islamic cemeteries, including 
those at Simolawang Gang II, Oendaan Wetan, Kalisari Gang I, Kambojastraat, 
Ketabangkali, Djagalan Gang IV, Djagalan Gang V, Kawatan Gang 12, and 
Plemahan Gang V (Penoetoepan 2602 [1942]). The following year, on 30 June 
1943, the municipality decided that as of 1 July 1943 cemeteries in certain neigh-
bourhoods (kampongs) would be out of bounds. The cemeteries closed at that 
juncture were Soerabajan, Kedoengklinter Gang VII, Wonoredjo Gang III, 
Kedondong Lor, Pandegiling Gang I, Koepang Pandjaan, Kedoenganjar Gang 
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5 aks, box 231, no. 4185, letter Surabaya Shityo, no. 1076/B, 30-6-2603 [1943].
6 aks, box 127, no. 1934; box 133, no. 1975.
Kuburan, Petemon Gang Kuburan, Garoeda Gang 2, and Dinojo Aloen-Aloen 
Gang IV.5 No explanation was given for closing the cemeteries, but it might 
even then have been related to the need of space to pursue measures to 
improve the already obvious dearth of housing.
Insofar as the Japanese were concerned about Chinese deaths, it was not 
about the cemeteries, but their custom of keeping the dead body above the 
ground for some days. Although the Japanese Government still allowed 
Chinese people to keep deceased relatives at home for several days, this was on 
the condition that the corpse was in a closed coffin and that they complied 
with orders issued by the Eisibutyo (Head of City Health Office).6
 The Chinese Cemetery during the Early Days of the Republic
After independence, Chinese cemeteries became increasingly vulnerable. 
Conflicts, once latent, between the Chinese and the local community began to 
emerge. These contentions were essentially about space and land as homeless 
people used the cemetery land to build houses on; they turned the cemeteries 
into kampongs. This practice already occurred in colonial times (Figure 13.3), 
but now became more common. The sorts of incidents which vented the latent 
tension could assume many forms and included burglaries, the obstruction of 
the Chinese funerals, and various swindles, to mention just a few. On 27 January 
1958, for example, three pieces of limestone worth 600 rupiahs each were sto-
len from Kembang Kuning Chinese cemetery (Surabaja Post 28-1-1959). Chinese 
associations regularly submitted complaints to the municipal government 
when such problems arose. Importantly, these associations offered families a 
formal vehicle in which they could organize themselves and draw strength 
from unity; taking care of the elaborate, expensive burials was just one of the 
tasks assumed by these associations. In this section, I shall indicate a number 
of cemetery-related disturbances with which the Chinese had to deal in the 
early years of the independent Republic of Indonesia.
On 28 March 1951, the Giok Yong Kong Hwee association sent a letter to the 
Surabaya municipal government enumerating the disturbances experienced 
by its members. These incidents had taken place on 24 and 25 March 1951. On 
24 March, Tan Ing Tjiauw, who had just buried his child in Banju Urip, was 
forced to sign a letter by a group of people before they would let him go home. 
On 26 March, some of these people came to Tan Ing Tjiauw’s house and again 
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asked him for money. What exactly happened remains unclear, but it would 
seem that Tan Ing Tjiauw was intimidated and felt compelled to pay in order to 
be left in peace. Another disturbance in the cemetery in Banju Urip occurred 
on 25 March when people from the local community prevented Njoo Hian 
Liong from burying the body of his daughter. Njoo Hian Liong then requested 
the Hok Kian Kong Tik Soe association to allow his daughter to be buried in the 
Kupang Gunung cemetery.7
The municipal government promptly responded to the letter from the Hok 
Kian Kong Tik Soe association and issued an official announcement, dated 
12 April 1951, stating that the land in Banju Urip was a cemetery: as this status 
had now been confirmed, no building permits for this land were to be issued by 
the municipal administration. Thus, on 2 May 1951, the Dewan Pemerintah 
Daerah (dpd, Executive Board of the Local [Municipal] Administration) of 
Surabaya sent a letter to the Kepala Kepolisian Urusan Dalam Kota Surabaya 
(Chief of the Surabaya Police) with the request that the requisite measures be 
taken to prevent disturbances at Chinese funerals and to prosecute offenders 
properly according to the letter of the law. In the opinion of the dpd the 
offences against the Chinese should be regarded as criminal acts as stipulated 
in the Criminal Code, which stated:




8 ‘Barang siapa, jang dengan sengadja mengganggu orang bepergian jang diperbolehkan 
masuk dalam suatu pemakam atau mengganggu/menghalangi pengangkutan djinazah 
kesuatu pemakam, dihukum pendjara selama-lamanja satu bulan dua minggu atau 
hu kuman denda sebanjak-banjaknya seratus duapuluh rupiah’. aks, box 1496, no. 32.896, 
Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, Article 178.
9 aks, box 1496, no. 32.896, letter Dinas Perkembangan Kota, 25-7-1951.
10 Surabaja Post 17-4-1956, 7-5-1956, 8-5-1956, 9-5-1956, 14-5-1956, 15-5-1956, 16-5-1956, 
23-5-1956.
Any individual who deliberately disturbs people who enter a cemetery 
for legitimate purposes or who obstructs a funeral will be sentenced to a 
maximum of one month and two weeks’ imprisonment or a fine of a 
maximum of 120 rupiahs.8
The police responded to the request from the dpd, by interrogating the per-
sons involved in the particular incidents and these people promised hencefor-
ward to refrain from any further actions. The Dinas Perkembangan Kota (Urban 
Development Office) cleared the burial ground of the huts, which had recently 
obstructed people who were holding a funeral.9 These examples of cases would 
seem to warrant the conclusion that the municipal administration upheld the 
historical rights of the Chinese cemeteries against the invasion of land-hungry 
squatters.
 Ongoing Conflicts: The Closure of Chinese Cemeteries in the Late 
1950s
In the course of the 1950s, the matter of squatting became an issue of steadily 
growing proportions in Surabaya (Purnawan 2005; Colombijn 2010). The prob-
lem of demolishing illegal dwellings was a serious matter, as the Pakis incident 
of April 1956 shows. The attempted demolition of illegal houses in Kampong 
Pakis resulted in four deaths and two people injured. Furthermore, as a direct 
response to this demolition, thousands of people went on strike in May 1956 
and a number of communal and political organizations called for an end to the 
demolitions, demanding the prosecution of the state apparatus (military). The 
upshot of this event was a prohibition on demonstrations in the area of 
Surabaya City proper. This prohibition was issued and then officially pro-
claimed by the commander-in-chief of the army.10
Against the confused background of the spread of squatting, the mounting 
population pressure and the hints of a deterioration in Chinese-indigenous 
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Peralihan, 7-2-1958; Surabaja Post 14-3-1958.
13 Regulation of Central Military Sovereign dated 4 December 1957 No. Pert/P.M./014/1957.
relationships, the municipality of Surabaya somewhat cut back of its previous 
efforts to defend the cemeteries against squatters. In 1958, the Dinas Pekerdjaan 
Umum (pu, Public Works Office) proposed the closure of several Chinese cem-
eteries in different areas of the town. The Public Works Office argued that 
these closures were essential because cemeteries should not be located in the 
middle of the city. Such a location was deemed inappropriate and was thought 
to affect the appearance of the city adversely. The proposal was sent to the 
Dewan Pemerintah Daerah Peralihan (dpdp, Interim Executive Council of the 
Local Administration) of Surabaya, which discussed the matter with a spe-
cially instituted commission, Panitia Penyelesaian Tanah Makam Tionghoa 
(Commission for the Settlement of [the Disputes about] Chinese Burial 
Grounds), which included representatives from the Chinese community in 
Surabaya. After reaching an agreement with the Panitia Penyelesaian Tanah 
Makam Tionghoa, on 11 March 1958 the dpdp of Surabaya publicly announced 
the planned closure of seven Chinese cemeteries.11 People were given a period 
of up to six months after this proclamation was issued to submit a written 
request to hold a funeral in one of the cemeteries or lodge an objection to this 
plan.12 The dpdp also designated three cemeteries which were to remain open 
and where burials could continue to take place. The three cemeteries threat-
ened  with closure were those to the south of Jalan Banju Urip, to the west 
of Jalan Kembang Kuning, and the cemetery in Banju Urip, Kupang Gunung, 
and Kembang Kuning.
Closing seven cemeteries to burials dealt with just one aspect of the prob-
lem; the urban administration also tried to solve the problem, which formed 
the other side of the coin: squatting in cemeteries. Therefore, as well as the 
announcement of the closure of the cemeteries, the dpdp declared that hence-
forward it was prohibited to erect dwellings within the confines of a cemetery. 
Furthermore, to ensure that the announcement was put into effect, the dpdp 
added another rule, stating that any individual in breach of the prohibition on 
the construction or use of buildings in one of the ten Chinese cemeteries 
(seven closed, three still open), would be liable to punishment under a regula-
tion of the Central Military Sovereign dated 4 December 1957.13 This ordinance 
covered the prohibition on the use of land without the possession of a legal 
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permit from the landowner or the authorities.14 Naturally enough, the prohibi-
tion on squatting in cemeteries did not end the practice; the municipality now 
faced the task of finding land to accommodate the people who had built illegal 
dwellings in the cemeteries and were now evicted (Surabaja Post 14-3-1958).
Despite, or perhaps because of, the measures taken by the local administra-
tion, on 16 March 1958 another conflict erupted between the local community 
and Chinese people who had gathered to bury a relative. This case is interest-
ing for two reasons. First, the intervention of security officers who were guard-
ing the funeral prevented the local people from making trouble, however it 
simultaneously stirred up anger and subsequent reprisals against the city gov-
ernment. Second, the conflict occurred on day five after the announcement on 
the closure of seven Chinese cemeteries. The announcement might well have 
triggered the conflict.
The conflict began as Liem Kie Seng prepared to bury his female relative, 
Liem Kiem Nio, in the cemetery belonging to the Hwa Kiauw Bian Hap Hwee 
association, south of Jalan Banju Urip.15 The reason the local community 
halted the funeral was its objection that the tomb was located very near one of 
its houses. The people asked Liem Kie Seng to move the location of the tomb 
away to a distance of 100 metres from the house. This request was rejected by 
the children of the deceased, Liem Kiem Nio, on the grounds of Municipal 
Ordinance No. 770200/8, dated 13 March 1958, which permitted the funeral. 
Furthermore, it was impossible to postpone the funeral any longer. To avoid 
further incidents, the State Police Sector I joined members of the Military 
Police Unit 55 to provide an escort for the funeral procession.16
In the next phase of the incident, the local people, represented by the heads 
of the neighbourhood associations and the Panitia Penutupan Penguburan 
Jenazah Bangsa Tionghoa (Committee of Chinese Cemetery Closure, a com-
mittee formed by the people of Banju Urip) took the matter to the provincial 
government. They sent a letter to dpdp of East Java, dated 1 April 1958, in which 
the residents complained about the unjust and discriminatory decision of the 
Surabaya Municipality dpdp in the case of the funeral of Liem Kiem Nio. Her 
tomb was located on the border of Kampong Banju Urip Kidul and very close 
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to people’s dwellings: only 25 metres from houses and wells for drinking water. 
The local people had not been able to do anything to prevent the burial because 
the police had protected the funeral party.
In its letter to the dpdp of East Java, the local community argued that the 
incident was an unequivocal indication that the decision of the dpdp of 
Surabaya had been unfair. Whereas the interests of Liem Kie Seng had been 
thoroughly taken care of by the granting of permission to hold the burial, the 
interests of the Banju Urip people had been completely ignored. The unfortu-
nate incident had stirred up feelings of deep resentment in the community of 
Banju Urip, for two reasons. Their first grudge was that the funeral of a Chinese 
person (Liem Kiem Nio), who was of no significance to the state or the people, 
had been protected by state institutions, and this was not one of its official 
tasks. The letter is not fully clear on this point, but people felt that perhaps the 
police had protected the funeral above and beyond the call of duty and had 
actually been privately hired by the relatives of Liem Kie Seng. Whatever the 
truth of the matter, the people believed that the police and military had other, 
more urgent tasks to perform than escorting a funeral. The second cause of 
resentment was that the incident supported the popular feeling that democ-
racy was consciously being violated by a small group of people to sustain their 
own vested interests, at the cost of public interests.17 The letter of the neigh-
bourhood people did not make explicit which minority group allegedly violat-
ing democracy they had in mind, but almost certainly from the context they 
were referring to the Chinese.
The frequent reference to the word ‘democracy’, and the ‘destruction of 
democracy’, is significant in the socio-political period of 1957–1965, when 
Indonesia was ruled by what was known as Guided Democracy. This was a 
politically shaky period. In 1958, the perceptibly growing centralizing power of 
the Government was seriously contested in the prri/Permesta Rebellion 
(Ricklefs 1991:396; Surabaja Post 22-2-1958; 3-3-1959). At the local level, in 1957 
and 1958 local municipal politics livened up, because, in contrast to the 
Parliament, municipal councils were elected bodies and, secure in the knowl-
edge they had been chosen by the voters, dared to speak out. As a partial 
consequence of the national elections of 1955 and municipal elections later, 
the Indonesian Communist Party, plus other political parties and labour 
unions, emerged as champions of the squatters. People no longer just 




18 aks, box 1852, no. 46.935.
19 aks, box 118, no. 1824.
In reaction to the letter sent by the neighbourhood leaders of Banju Urip, 
the dpdp of East Java sent a letter, dated 9 June 1958, asking the dpdp of 
Surabaya to submit a report setting out details of the situation. In a letter, dated 
31 July 1958, the mayor of Surabaya informed the dpdp of East Java that the 
problem was solved after the local community had been provided with the 
necessary explanation.18 Whether tension on the ground had really been dis-
sipated by this exchange of letters remains an open question. The real answer 
is perhaps not, as another major conflict broke out within months.
The next major conflict, again involving the police, erupted on 14 July 1958, 
when two members of the Chinese burial association, Hwa Kiauw Bian Hap 
Hwee, were digging a grave. When the local community noticed the work in 
progress, its members obstructed it, with the result that the relatives of the 
deceased had to go to the Public Works Office of the Surabaya municipality to 
try to repair the situation. The family received a letter of notification from the 
head of the Bagian Makam (Cemetery Division) of the Public Works Office, 
M. Kasno, stating that the cemetery was not one of the seven cemeteries, which 
had been closed, so the burial could proceed.
Because the community did not comply with the letter of notification from 
the municipal government and continued to hinder the funeral, the Chinese 
family sought help from the police. Anticipating possible riots, the police made 
sure that it had backup from the Military Police. Despite the forces arrayed 
against it, the community was determined to obstruct the funeral. They pre-
sented a common resolution stating their arguments for doing this. This reso-
lution confused both the police and the military police, who consequently 
offered the Chinese family insufficient help to ensure the safe procedure of the 
funeral. In view of the situation and as it was growing dark, the board of the 
Hwa Kiauw Bian Hap Hwee burial association hurriedly offered another burial 
place, which was accepted by the relatives, although the deceased could no 
longer be buried alongside his wife’s tomb as requested in his will.19
The board of the Hwa Kiauw Bian Hap Hwee association claimed that this 
incident had contravened the state regulations and had violated the moral 
right of the family to hold a funeral in accordance with its own traditions. 
Therefore, the committee urged the government to take the measures neces-
sary to ensure against any recurrence of the unfortunate affair. It argued that 
steps to prevent any future disruptions should include ensuring that the local 
community was provided with detailed information via the heads of the urban 
kampongs (kepala Rukun Kampung, or RK). This would ensure three matters: 
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funerals taking place in legitimate cemeteries would no longer be obstructed; 
funerals would no longer have to be escorted by the police as this caused 
resentment in the community against the security forces; and there would be 
a stop to the illegal use of burial land and illegal buildings in the cemeteries.20
The municipal government responded positively to this request by the 
burial association, to the effect it sent a letter to the kampong heads. The letter, 
dated 2 September 1958, stated three points. The first of these was that those 
Chinese cemeteries not listed for closure in the decree of 11 March 1958 were 
legally designated cemeteries in which funerals could be held. The second 
made clear that the obstruction of the funeral of two Chinese people on 14 July 
1958 in the legally designated Chinese cemetery in Kupang Gunung had bro-
ken the law and was irresponsible. Finally, to avoid similar incidents in future, 
all heads of the kampong associations were requested to inform their commu-
nities about the legal position of Chinese cemeteries.21
Still unsettled by the ongoing disturbances at the Chinese cemeteries, the 
Panitia Perhimpunan Makam dan Tanah Makam Tionghoa (Committee for the 
Protection of Chinese Cemeteries and Burial Land), a Chinese lobby group, 
sent a letter to the Surabaya municipal government dated 9 September 1959. 
The letter enumerated five points. First, the situation in the cemeteries had not 
improved despite the announcement by the dpdp that seven Chinese ceme-
teries had been designated for closure and the subsequent prohibition on 
erecting buildings on designated cemetery land without a permit in the before-
mentioned 1957 regulation of the Central Military Sovereign.22 Second, the dis-
mantling and moving of illegal houses in Chinese cemeteries had not yet been 
completed, as the heads of the kampongs (kepala RK) were aware. Third, ille-
gal buildings in the cemeteries, some of them even built of brick, were mush-
rooming. Fourth, the community was still denying the legitimate use of the still 
open cemeteries by the Chinese. Fifth, it was impossible to hold a funeral in 
the proper Chinese manner as people were forced to separate spouses in death. 
Referring to the latest incident, the letter mentioned that one funeral had had 
to be moved to another cemetery in order to prevent an escalation in the con-
flict between the police and the local community.23
The Surabaya dpdp forwarded this letter to the Chief Inspector of the 
Surabaya City Police with the request that any further destruction of the 
Chinese cemeteries be prevented in accordance with the agreement made in 
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the previous month between three parties: Komando Militer Kota Besar 
(kmkb, Military Command of a Municipality), the police, and the dpdp of 
Surabaya.24
Despite the best efforts undertaken by the Surabaya municipal government 
to deal with the disturbances at Chinese cemeteries, none of its actions was 
very successful; the destruction inexorably continued. On 15 July 1961, Tan 
Hong Lian (a government medical doctor) sent a letter to the mayor of Surabaya 
in which he complained about the destruction of his family’s tomb in Banju 
Urip. The extent of the destruction was so serious it had lead to the exposure of 
a coffin. Responding to the complaint, the mayor forwarded the letter to the 
Chief of the Surabaya Police Sector I so that the necessary measures could be 
taken.25 The latter’s reaction is unknown.
 Negotiating a Solution
As a response to the plan to close seven Chinese cemeteries and to the oppor-
tunity offered by the dpdp to object, various Chinese people submitted a spe-
cial consideration to the municipal government. On 28 March 1958, for 
instance, the Lam Yang Tjo Soe association, chaired by Han Twan Hwie, wrote 
a letter to the dpdp requesting permission to use two graves it had bought on 
Jalan Mendut.26 On 12 May 1958, the association sent another letter informing 
the authorities that there were thirty-two tombs still unused. In this letter, Han 
Twah Hwie requested that funerals on this land should be permitted to go 
ahead without any unnecessary obstacles.27
On 3 September 1958, Tjoa Ping Khie sent a letter requesting that he and his 
wife be given permission to use the Chinese cemetery in Banju Urip for their 
future funeral. Tjoa Ping Khie had bought the grave space for himself and his 
wife five years prior to the announcement that this cemetery would be closed. 
The municipal government consented to the latter’s request.28
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As said, in the municipal proclamation of 11 March 1958, Chinese people 
were given a six-month period in which to submit a request for dispensation 
for those among them who wanted to bury relatives in one of the seven ceme-
teries. This provision was a prudent decision as many Chinese had already 
bought land for their tombs long before the Government issued the announce-
ment. Nevertheless, the granting of dispensation became a source of conflict 
between the local community and the Chinese who wanted to hold funerals. In 
the opinion of the people living around the cemeteries, commencing with the 
proclamation on 11 March 1958, the Chinese funerals could no longer be held in 
the designated graveyards.
Tjoa Ping Khie, who had successfully obtained permission to be buried with 
his wife in the future, had to bear the brunt of this when he applied for dispen-
sation to use the Chinese cemetery in Banju Urip. The community rejected the 
dispensation granted by the municipal government for the following reasons: 
Banju Urip was transformed into an orderly residential area, although the most 
of the houses situated there did not have a formal permit from the Surabaya 
municipal government and consequently the land use for funerals was illegal. 
Second, a recent confrontation with a person from Malang who was renovat-
ing his parents’ tomb had caused an unexpected incident. In the opinion of the 
local community, to avoid further incidents, the municipal government should 
take three steps, namely: the Banju Urip cemetery should remain closed (no 
more dispensations should be granted); the designation of Banju Urip as a 
cemetery had to be withdrawn; and the dispensation granted to Tjoa Ping Khie 
should be nullified.29
The government repudiated the objections made by the community and 
permits or dispensations continued to be issued to Chinese families, for 
instance that given to Han Tjing Tjwan on 12 September 1961 to bury a relative, 
Mrs Han Tjong Khing, in Tambaksari.30
Eager to find a solution, the dpdp invited the Panitia Penyelesaian Tanah 
Makam Tionghoa (Committee for the Resolution of the Chinese Cemeteries) 
to a meeting on 21 January 1959. This same committee had been consulted 
prior to the seminal proclamation of 11 March 1958, stipulating that seven cem-
eteries had to be closed and squatting had to end. In this meeting of 21 January 
1959, Amiruddin (member of the dpdp Surabaya), and Soedarmadji (member 
of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Peralihan, Interim Municipal Council) 
represented the administration. The eight-person strong delegation from the 
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Committee for the Resolution of the Chinese Cemeteries was led by Ong 
Ing Sien.
The goal of the meeting was to find a solution for the community, which was 
using Chinese cemeteries as a dwelling place. The meeting also revealed that a 
few indigenous people were knowingly making a profit by buying and selling 
cemetery land. In the meeting, Ong Ing Sien pointed out that the problem with 
Chinese cemeteries did not stop with the illegal acquisition of land; it also 
extended to the obstruction of Chinese funerals by the local community. 
Therefore, he called on the local government to end the problem once and for 
all by requesting the military to take resolute measures.31
According to Oon Tjhing Tiauw (secretary of the Committee for the 
Resolution of the Chinese Cemeteries), one of the most difficult matters expe-
rienced by Chinese people was the illegal use of the empty spare tombs; tombs 
prepared for future burials were now occupied by local people. To retrieve the 
tombs, the Chinese people had to pay compensation. Therefore, he hoped that, 
anticipating Cengbeng Day on 5 April 1958, the local government would imme-
diately remove all illegal dwellings from the cemeteries. Tho Boon Hwan, 
another member of the committee, proposed that the local government should 
relocate the tombs to a public cemetery, or the government should provide 
housing for the community.32
Three conclusions emerged from the meeting between the municipal 
administration and the Committee for the Resolution of the Chinese 
Cemeteries. First, while a solution was sought, the building of illegal dwellings 
would be halted. With the support of the authorities, the committee would set 
up border demarcation signs or build fences around the cemeteries. 
Furthermore, the committee was required to locate the troublemakers. Second, 
the local government would discuss the provisions concerning the cemeteries 
with the police. Third, the local government would discuss the security of the 
cemeteries on Cengbeng Day with the police.33
 Conclusion
For many people who have special traditions linked to the burial of a relative, 
the cemetery is a ‘sacred space’ and a site of great importance. Cemeteries are 
particularly important to Chinese people, as the cemetery is more than the last 
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resting place of their deceased relatives; its significance is far greater: it sym-
bolizes respect for ancestors and underlines social status. The problem is that 
cemeteries require a large area of land, which often leads to conflicts about 
urban space. In colonial times, conflicts about Chinese burials were still largely 
contained by the state.
The frequency and intensity of conflicts increased in the course of the 1950s, 
for several reasons. The major reason was that many economic migrants had 
poured into Surabaya and empty urban space was in extremely short supply; 
these migrants invaded the Chinese cemeteries, occupied tombs, and built 
houses in the burial grounds. The municipal administration had less authority 
than its Dutch and Japanese predecessors had had and therefore less power to 
stop the squatters. The squatters, in contrast, had gained strength since colo-
nial times, because they enjoyed the backing of grassroots movements, includ-
ing political parties. Being the authorized owners of the cemetery, the Chinese 
community could not tolerate the squatters, let alone the constant distur-
bances, which disrupted funerals, but the Chinese had less political clout than 
they had had in Dutch times.
The response of the local administration to mounting tensions was to 
begin by closing seven Chinese cemeteries, but at the same time to give better 
protection from squatters to the three remaining Chinese cemeteries. In other 
words, slowly but surely the Chinese cemeteries were removed from the cen-
tre of the city. The untidy appearance of a Chinese cemetery was not suitable 
in a modern town. The idea that a cemetery, full of significance for the next of 
kin, was something valuable became increasingly obsolete in the moderniz-
ing city.
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